Article 54 of the Common Program

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As seen in Article 11 of the Common Program, the struggle against imperialism is one of the main objects of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. For that reason, the government decides to overtly or/and secretly support the independence struggle against France, UK, the Netherlands, and US in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. At the meeting between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong on February 3, 1949, Mikoyan proposed to establish an Asiatic bureau to coordinate the actions of several communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong has the opinion that this is still too early. “One may return to this question when our forces take the south of the country and our position strengthens.” In July 1949 when Liu Shaoqi is in Moscow. Stalin reraises the Asiatic affair and proposes a division of tasks in the struggle against imperialism. China will have the leading role in the East. This division is practical, not ideological, in 1949 the SU has not the military power to support revolution in Asia. It also lacks financial funds and Stalin still has to stabilize the Russian influence in East Europe. In his own country, he has to reconstruct the economic sector after the destruction during the Second World War. In September 1949, Zhou Enlai in his speech at the installation of the new foreign affairs department puts the national interests in the center of the daily routine of the foreign affairs policy “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.” April 1950 Zhou Enlai told officials of the party intelligence service about "... the importance of assisting revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. Urging his listeners not to be content with the victory that China had achieved, he declared: “We should be prepared to shoulder the burden of helping to liberate the entire world . . . From now on, we should help the oppressed nations and brothers in the East such as Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam to liberate themselves. If all these nations have risen up and won liberation, would it not be true that the power of the people all over the world will be greater and that imperialism will be more vulnerable to collapse?..."our tasks include consolidating of world peace and preventing the rearming of Japan and Germany and that our current focus is to liberate Taiwan, completely defeat Chiang Kai-shek, and assist the revolutionary movements of weak nations in Southeast Asia."⁹

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In 1952, an important change occured in the Chinese foreign policy. In his speech to Chinese diplomats, Zhou Enlai tells them China will focus less on freedom fighters, but more on "…the relations between states.” and besides the concentration on the brotherly states (East Europe), the policy will focus on in the immediate vicinity of China. In the relationship with neighboring countries, the emphasis is on friendship rather than on ideological similarity. In September 1952, Zhou Enlai discussed this new foreign policy with Stalin "...relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means."
Priority of this new policy is to make a ‘security block’. One of the main reasons for this change is the failure of communist revolutions in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines. The ‘freedom fighters’ are minimalized to small guerrilla groups fighting in the jungle. The role of the US in Southeast Asia becomes more active and adopts the role of the old European colonizers. This policy results in military treaties between the US and Thailand (October 17, 1950) and the Philippines (August 30, 1950). China is afraid to become encircled by enemies. This fear increases after military treaties between the US and South Korea (October 1, 1953) and with Japan (March 8, 1954). The anxiety heightens after the signing of the SEATO pact of September 8, 1954. Even prior to Stalin's demise, China aspired to attain parity with the Soviet Union. As a constituent of the socialist bloc, the PRC's ambition to reclaim its perceived "rightful" status on the global stage overshadowed Sino-Soviet relations and the cohesion of the socialist coalition. For Mao, reinstating China's predominant role in postwar global politics hinged on asserting authority and influence within bloc affairs. The new policy is shaped by a number of initiatives. The first one is the organization of a peace conference of countries in the Asiatic and Pacific Region in Beijing.(See Article 11) Between October 2 till 12 October 1952, 37 countries are represented. Remarkable is the invitation of the leaders of the Trotskyist Party of Ceylon, almost the only Trotskyist party that has managed to gain some mass following. (Trotskyism is in the eyes of Stalin more dangerous than any bourgeois or fascist influence) The Congress condemns the US actions in Korea and demands the return of POWs and presents a call to India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problems in a peaceful way. In contrast to the trade union congress of November 1949 (see below), this meeting emphasizes less revolution and struggle and more cultural exchange and peace making.
A second initiative is the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries on May 3, 1954. This organization invites and escorts foreign delegations. It is engaged in people-to-people diplomacy. A third activity is the backing of a SU proposal of September 23, 1953. In this scheme, both countries call for a 5 country meeting with the US, UK, and France to reduce the international tension. This conference is held in Berlin from January 25 till February 17, 1954, but without the participation of the People's Republic of China. These four countries decide to hold a peace conference in Genève on Korea and Indochina with all involved parties. (People's Republic of China is included) The fourth initiative is of fundamental nature. The formation of a new foreign policy based on 5 principles (和平共处五项原则) non-aggression; no interference in national affairs; mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These principles are an elaboration of a provision in the treaty that China and Tibet conclude on May 23, 1951. Article 14 of this agreement reads: “The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.” Zhou Enlai states on June 5, 1953: “Today internationally, the main contradiction is the question of peace and war. We advocate resolution of all international conflicts through peaceful consultation. They [the U.S. imperialists] just advocate resolution by war Imperialism is afraid of peace, and also of war. We are not afraid, of peace." During the preparations for the Geneva conference, this new foreign policy gets even more stature. See for details on Geneva conference Article 11. On March 2, 1954, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the CCP, Zhou Enlai defends his policy. “At the(Geneva) conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favourable to relaxing the tense international situation. …”
The Five Principles serve as the cornerstone of treaties, such as those with India, replacing the authoritarian norm of proletarian internationalism within the socialist bloc. On a global scale, peaceful coexistence emerged as Beijing's strategy for forging a unified front in its confrontation with the United States. On July 7, 1954, Mao Zedong spoke out as a supporter of this policy. “Right now, it has been impossible [for us] to shut the door tight; instead, the situation is very advantageous and we need to walk out the door… To relax international tension, countries of different systems can peacefully co-exist. This slogan originated by the Soviet Union, and it is our slogan as well. Now it becomes the catch word in [Anthony] Eden’s mouth, in Nehru’s, too. They want to relax international tension as well” He even wants to negotiate with the US on the issue of expatriates. Merely two weeks later, Mao renounces this declaration, emphasizing that the principle of 'peaceful coexistence' should not be extended to Beijing’s dealings with Washington but rather should be leveraged to isolate the US imperialists. Concurrently, Beijing vehemently opposes Moscow’s endeavor to employ the Five Principles in its interactions with Washington. Mao Zedong starts an international crisis at the end of July. A propaganda campaign ‘to liberate Taiwan’ starts and military operations in the coastal area of Zhejiang province take place. Finally, in January 1955, resulting in the takeover of the island Yijiangshan.

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The developments in Indochina (nowadays Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) and Korea are a good showcase of the foreign policy of China. The focus of this article lies on Vietnam. After the capitulation of Japan in 1945, Ho Chih Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam. On March 6, 1946, after negotiations with France, a division along the 16th parallel becomes a fact. At the end of 1946, skirmishes occur and the conflict between the French Republic and the Vietnamese People's Republic escalates. For years, Ho Chih Minh sought support from the SU and later also from the People's Republic of China. On January 19, 1950 China recognizes Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). and both parties sign an agreement to supply weapons to Vietnam. On January 30, 1950, Ho Chih Minh and the political leaders Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi had a secret meeting in Beijing. A few days later Ho Chih Minh travels to Moscow. He joins Mao Zedong in a visit to Stalin. Stalin offers to provide aid and says “Towards Vietnam we feel equal concern as we do for China’ and: “From now on, you [Ho] can count on our assistance, especially now after the war of resistance, our surplus materials are plenty, and we will ship them to you through China. But because of limits of natural conditions, it will be mainly China that helps you. What China lacks, we will provide.” Mao Zedong adds “Whatever China has and Vietnam needs we will provide.” With this position, China is in danger of losing or postponing diplomatic recognition by France.
The Chinese regime has several motives to back Ho Chih Minh. One is the international solidarity of all communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong declared in 1947: “All the anti-imperialist forces in the countries of the East, too, should unite together, oppose oppression by imperialism and by their domestic reactionaries and make the goal of their struggle the emancipation of the more than 1,000 million oppressed people of the East…If everyone makes strenuous efforts, we, together with all the democratic forces of the world, can surely defeat the imperialist plan of enslavement, prevent the outbreak of a third world war, overthrow all reactionary regimes and win lasting peace for mankind. We are soberly aware that on our way forward there will still be all kinds of obstacles and difficulties and that we should be prepared to deal with the maximum resistance and desperate struggle by all our enemies, domestic and foreign…" The division made in July 1949 (during the visit of Liu Shaoqi, see above) in a West bloc and an East block makes People's Republic of China responsible for actions in Asia. A success in Vietnam would show the world that the Chinese revolution could be used as a model for all underdeveloped countries. There is no evidence that the SU directly supported Vietnam before 1955. The second reason is of national interest. An escalation of the conflict between France and DRV can provide trouble at the frontier. In Yunnan, at the border with the DRV, there are still GMD troops. Moreover, the fear of US intervention reinforces the will to support Ho Chih Minh. Beijing decides to send a delegation to improve the contacts between China and the DRV. In the first instance, the delegation led by Luo Guibo is thought to stay for 3 months, but in April 1950 the Vietnamese Communist Party asks for military support, which is given for more than 8 years. Another reason for support, several Vietnamese and Chinese leaders know each other from their stay in Paris, Moscow, or Nanjing. General Cheng Geng and General Wei Guoqing coordinate from Beijing the Chinese Military Advice Group (CMAG) The CMAG starts to train DRV troops. Chen Geng provides partly the military strategy. He consults frequently Mao Zedong. This strategy is “Concentrating our forces and destroying the enemy troops by separating them” In September 1950, almost 20.000 soldiers are trained and they form the elite corps. Besides military training, the Chinese advisors help with the construction and improvement of roads near the border. The road workers are often GMD prisoners. Chinese advisors provide assistance in land reform in the North. "In 1951, China built a rail line from China into Vietnam to carry war supplies and other goods to Ho. In addition,..By 1953, Chinese heavy weapons arrived. By 1954, China had reportedly trained and supplied 40,000 Vietminh soldiers.⁵ Meanwhile, China’s shipments of supplies to the Vietminh had increased from 10 to 20 tons monthly in 1951 to 400 to 600 tons in 1953. Then it jumped to 4,000 tons a month. ⁶"

Chinese supply routes

October 13, 1950, the Vietnamese troops with the assistance of the Chinese advisors gain the first victory at the border area. The French troops retaliate and Ho Chih Minh and the CMAG ask for more military support. “On 22 July, the CCP Central Committee replied that the PRC would not send troops directly into fights in Vietnam, because this had long been an established principle. Chinese troops, however, could be deployed along the Chinese-Vietnamese border,..”

The situation changed slightly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong warned Deng Zihui "our troops should not go across the Sino-Vietnamese border by any means or on any occasions; it would be better to keep a distance from the border even in pursuit of KMT remnants." Mao, in particular, wanted Deng to see to it that his order "be strictly observed [because] otherwise we would be in big trouble.⁸⁹" China and SU are convinced the situation in Indochina has to be resolved at the negotiating table. Mao Zedong cables Ho Chih Minh "It is necessary and timely for the Government of Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express willingness to use peaceful negotiation to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so, can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and the peace-loving people all over the world, to bankrupt the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame of the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of, and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans." The Soviet leaders asked China to put pressure on Ho Chih Minh to come to the Geneva conference. To extend the pressure on Ho Chih Minh, the decision is made to stop training Vietnamese soldiers on Chinese territory.

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See for details on the Geneva Conference on Indochina Article 11. On May 7, 1954, one day before the opening of the peace talks in Geneva, the Vietnamese conquered the strategic important city of Dien Bien Phu. After more than 2 months of talks, all parties agree on a compromise. Vietnam will be divided in 2 parts with the 17th latitude as the border, and a plebiscite in July 1956 will define the future of Vietnam. (This public consultation was never held). With this result, the Chinese delegation hopes to avoid any American intervention in Indochina. The following year, Beijing endeavors to persuade Hanoi to acknowledge this division to prevent any external interference. North Vietnam is viewed as a buffer zone. With mutual hostility and suspicion regarding each other’s motives in Vietnam, China and the United States back divergent administrations in Vietnam, finding partition more expedient than any alternative compromise. Ultimately, the domestic factor outweighs communist solidarity. The decision lies between accepting a divided Vietnam, with the North communist and the South pro-western, or continuing the war with the Americans, who might replace the French. Zhou Enlai's advocacy for the former option vividly illustrates China's prioritization of immediate national security and economic development needs over the long-term vision of a broader regional "area of peace."

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In 1950, the People’s Republic of China decided to support the North Korea government in his strive for conquering the whole territory of the Korean peninsula. In the 1930’s, the Japanese army invaded Korea. During this occupation, North Korean and Chinese communists fought in the Northeast of China against this enemy. After the capitulation of Japan in August 1945, Kim Il sung (the leader of the Korean Communist party) asked the SU troops in Korea to hand over the captured Japanese weaponry. A part of this military hardware finds its way to the Chinese communists in Northeast China. Korea is an important supply line for weaponry. “….especially for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in South Manchuria. North Korea was the obscure, but critical rear that offered tremendous support to the PLA… From the second half of 1947 to early 1948, more than 520 thousand tons of goods belonging to the CCP were transshipped or exchanged via North Korea. At the same time, over 20 thousand CCP members and supporters crossed Korea.”
During the Moscow conference of December 1945, the delegates of the SU, US, and UK decided to select the 38th parallel as the dividing line to disarm the Japanese troops. The SU disarms and administers the northern part, the US the southern part. In 1948, two separate countries emerge; The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRK) and the Republic of Korea (RoK). The SU and US troops leave the peninsula, only ‘advisors’ remain. Both Korean governments see themselves as a representant of the whole nation and are in pursuit of reunification.

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On March 7, 1949, Kim Il sung demands from Stalin an explicit authorization for an attack on South Korea. Stalin refuses: “…, raising three problems: (1) the North Korea army did not have an overwhelming superiority over the troops of the South; (2) in the South, there were still American troops, which would interfere in case of hostilities; (3) the agreement for the 38th parallel was in effect between the USSR and the United States. The agreement would not be broken by our side, Stalin said. He asked Kim Il sung if he could have a good opportunity to launch a counter attack in response to the Southern attack.” Both Stalin and Mao Zedong have doubts about Kim’s plans. In May 1949, Mao Zedong agrees to hand over Korean divisions of the PLA, as soon as Kim needs them. In the spring of 1949, Mao explicitly opposed any military action by North Korea against South Korea, asserting that such a possibility should only be entertained following the conclusion of the Chinese civil war and after consultations with the Soviet Union. On September 24, 1949, the Politburo of the CPSU again denies to authorize an attack, because the situation is not ripe for an attack. “From the political side, a military attack on the south by you is also not prepared for,…” This answer is in accordance with the previous encounter between Stalin and Kim Il sung on March 5, 1949 Stalin also informed Mao Zedong about his refusal.
When Mao Zedong is visiting the SU, Kim Il sung secretly visited Stalin on February 9, 1950. The Russian leader is prepared to deliver military support in weaponry and credit. In a following secret visit to Stalin from April 8 till 25 1950, Kim Il sung receives permission to attack the South on the explicit condition that Mao Zedong also agrees. Stalin states “…the present situation has changed from the situation in the past and, that North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed with China and personally with comrade Mao Tse-tung…” From May 13 till 16, Kim Il sung visits Mao Zedong in the Chinese capital, the Korean leader overtakes him with the consent of Stalin. Mao Zedong does not trust Kim Il sung and seeks conformation from Stalin Stalin has maneuvered Mao Zedong in an awkward position. When he agrees, all credits go to Stalin and China has to pay. When he disagrees, he will be accused not to be solidary in the struggle against imperialism, and he runs the chance of getting no support for his invasion plans for Taiwan. To put it in a positive way, Stalin offers Mao Zedong the right to veto the attack. It is not clear why Stalin thinks the situation has changed, perhaps he refers to the final victory of the PLA in China, perhaps to the successful test of the Russian atomic bomb in August 1949 or the foundation of the NATO in April 1949. Stalin sees this as a real threat in West Europe and the decreasing willingness of the US to intervene in Asia. A credible rationale is that the war resolved all of Stalin’s security and diplomatic predicaments: the military conflict between the U.S. and China constrained U.S. influence in Asia, afforded the Soviet Union the opportunity to strengthen European socialism, and bolstered Soviet authority over China.
On December 30, 1949, the US announces that the present US troops in Asia will only protect Japan and the Philippines and Korea and Taiwan are not part of their military operation field. The recently concluded friendship treaty between the People's Republic of China and SU stipulates that the SU loses eventually major ports (for example, Harbin and Lüshun)in the East. “The Korean peninsula suddenly loomed attractive, as it could provide the Soviet Union with access to a Pacific warm-water port. If North Korea occupied South Korea, the Soviet Union could control the whole of the Korean peninsula, and the ports of Inchon and Pusan would replace Lushun.”
In April and May 1950, Mao Zedong fulfils his appointment with Kim Il sung and sends 50000 Korean soldiers of the PLA back to Korea. Besides, soldiers, Korean workers, medical, and other personnel are pushed to go to North Korea. Two days after Kim Il sung has left Beijing, Zhou Enlai promises Stalin China will send ‘volunteers’ to the DRK. Stalin answers: “We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel.”

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Kim Il sung overtakes Mao Zedong for a second time when on June 25, 1950 he (without warning to Mao Zedong) opens the offensive on South Korea. On June 30, 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP communicated its updated policy to the PLA, emphasizing China's condemnation of the American incursion into Taiwan and interference in China's internal matters. The strategy entails persisting with the demobilization of the army, enhancing naval development, and postponing the liberation of Taiwan. A week earlier, on June 23, 1950, Mao Zedong reassures the delegates of the 2nd plenum of the CPPCC, the period of war is over, and the focus lies on Land reform. The land reform act will promulgated on June 30.
Just two days after the invasion on June 27 the UN condemns the attack and on July 7 the UN calls its members “…(to) furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” Meanwhile, the SU and the PRC are in constant contact how to assist the DRK. The Chinese government is deeply concerned about the lack of Russian air support and a possible US intervention. The SU is only prepared to train Chinese pilots. In July, the PLA starts preparations for a future assistance of the DRK. The Northeast Border Defense Army is formed. To prepare the nation for a future intervention, the regime starts on July 17, a propaganda week against the US aggression in Taiwan and Korea. The recruitment of volunteers starts, each village would be given a quota, and this quota would usually be filled without much persuasion. During the Korean War, many ex-GMD soldiers are sent to the front. See Article 20 .
Mao Zedong attempts to persuade Stalin to make sure that Kim Il Sung knows that he must agree to conduct negotiations to cease hostilities but his attempts are in vain. At the politburo meeting of August 4, Mao Zedong tells the Chinese army, and the top of the CCP intervention is inevitable. “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this.”
After initial successes of the North Korean forces, the South Koreans with the aid of UN troops counterattack, and when the American troops land in Inchon, the situation for the North Koreans deteriorates significantly. Kim Il sung is desperate and sends a telegram to Stalin for immediate relief. “…at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union. If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people's democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.” October 1 RoK troops cross the 38th latitude and Stalin appeals to Mao Zedong for help. “… possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course. I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it.”

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In the subsequent days, numerous discussions take place within the Chinese Politburo and between Moscow and Beijing. On October 2, Mao Zedong sends a cable to Stalin, indicating that the intervention troops are still not prepared, and “In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war,(article 1 of the friendship treaty of February 14, 1950) … Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here” It is only on October 8, 1950, Stalin informs Kim Il sung about China's hesitation. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to the Black Sea villa of Stalin. On October 11, they have a meeting with Stalin to ask for more information on SU support, particularly on Russian air support. The same day, Stalin and Zhou Enlai inform Mao Zedong, they have come to the conclusion that China at this moment is not capable of intervening in Korea. Mao Zedong agrees, but two days later he revises his decision. Mao Zedong informs Zhou Enlai on October 13 "As the result of an emergency agreement of all the various members of the Politburo, we have reached the unanimous opinion that it is advantageous for us to send troops to Korea. In the initial period, they will attack the ROK forces. In this regard, we have considerable confidence." On October 15, Stalin and Zhou Enlai meet again and Stalin reiterates his refusal to supply air support. The lack of experience of North Koreans and Chinese in aerial warfare meant that Communist airpower was consistently viewed as an additional asset, rather than a substantial element of any significant offensive. Consequently, the focus in Communist strategic planning remained on the deployment of ground forces. On October 18, under heavy pressure from Mao Zedong, the politburo decided to send Chinese People's Army (CVA) into Korea.

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Primarily, it is a historical reality that the peninsula has been a significant launching point for the conquest of continental Asia, notably by Japan. Consequently, any significant disruption to the delicate stability of the peninsula will evoke serious concern, irrespective of China's domestic political system. It is not that Beijing is afraid of a Japanese invasion, but they fear an invasion of the Taiwan regime. In that case, there will be an anti-communist state at the border. In case of an armed conflict with the US, China prefers to fight this clash outside the mainland. There are 3 potential areas from where the regime fears an attack, Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. From a tactical viewpoint, Korea is preferred, it is a mountainous Region, and there is a direct supply line from the SU.On February 17, 1958 Zhou Enlai expresses in his speech at CVA cadre's gathering "The confrontation between U.S. imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was the choice of location. This was not a decision for the imperialists to make only; we had our say, too. The American imperialists decided [to have this showdown] in the Korean battlefield, this was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans [by our own choice]. Looking back, it is understood that everything considered it would have been much more difficult for us if [we had chosen] Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands [in the Taiwan Strait]"
The treaty of February 14, 1950, with the SU, obliges the latter to help the People's Republic of China. Beijing wants neither American soldiers nor Russian troops on its territory. They are concerned about the potential loss of the significant industrial region in the Northeast. According to the secret protocol, citizens from third countries, such as the U.S. and Britain, were prohibited from settling or engaging in any industrial, financial, trade, or related activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Similarly, the Soviet Union would enforce similar restrictions in the Soviet Far East and the Central Asian republics. This agreement aimed to shield Manchuria from external interference. Stalin's effort to solidify the strategic complex before the Korean War underscores his meticulous attention to establishing a favorable strategic environment. Mao Zedong might have felt compelled to comply, having recently forged an alliance with the Soviet Union crucial for the PRC's economic advancement and national security. Mao understood the importance of providing the assistance Stalin expected, as a triumph over the US army would ensure Stalin's fulfillment of the newly ratified treaty, albeit reluctantly, with Mao. Additionally, Mao was aware that he couldn't successfully occupy Taiwan without Soviet assistance. "Preventing a wave of refugees from crossing into the northeast was a significant part of Beijing’s internal rationale for action in Korea. The alternative was to accept the quasi-permanent status of North Korean consulates and enclaves up and down the border from Dandong to Ji’an/Tonghua and on to Yanbian in the north."
Domestic factors also played a significant role in the decision-making process. According to party sources, the American intervention in Korea, particularly the Inchon landing, provided hope for China's counterrevolutionary factions. Various resistance groups, now bolstered by landlords, secret societies, and unemployed soldiers, perceived better prospects on the horizon and intensified their opposition. Their actions included widespread acts of violence that extended into the Northeast, the logistical hub for Chinese forces in Korea. They also spread rumors and intimidated local party officials. A common sentiment expressed was: "You're like a frog in a well, unaware of the broader situation and still in chaos. The third world war is imminent, and the Nationalist army will soon return." On October 10, 1950, the CC announced the instructions to suppress the contra revolutionaries. See Article 7 . The national campaign against US aggression is also a part to counteract internal problems. See Article 49. In its editorial of December 25, 1952, the Renmin Ribao remarks: "…as the facts of the past two years have proved, the struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea is still a great driving force for the construction work of our country in all aspects. …, the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea not only did not cause the interruption of our country's economic recovery and reconstruction work, on the contrary, it further promoted the successful completion of this work." A sixth reason to support the Koreans can also be traced to a historical factor; the aforementioned assistance of Korean soldiers to the PLA. Throughout the Chinese Civil War, there had been ongoing political, military, economic, and cultural interactions along the Sino-Korean border. Notably, the northern provinces of North Korea served as a crucial refuge for PLA soldiers and supplies during critical phases of the civil war in the northeast. This sanctuary spared numerous lives and valuable resources from destruction by the GMD forces. Zhou Enlai expresses the band as follows: “China and Korea are neighbouring countries as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth are exposed to the cold. If the DPRK is subjugated by US imperialism, there will be no security for northeast China.” A reason which also should be mentioned is the prestige China and Mao Zedong will gain in Asia from resisting the US. “…the perceived American disdain for China as a weak country and the Chinese as an inferior people made them angry…how to face the ‘US imperialists’ was to the CCP a problem concerning values and beliefs, which was related to their feelings as Chinese”
Article 11 of the Common Program shows that anti imperialism is an important factor in foreign affairs of the PCR. Mao considered the Korean War within the broader framework of the ongoing Asian revolution, where Communist China held significant sway. He saw it as the "proletariat internationalist duty" of the Chinese to counter American aggression in Korea and aimed to catalyze a wave of revolution in the East, following China's example. Mao believed that Communist China's security could only be ensured through revolutions spreading across Asia, or even globally. This dedicated commitment to revolution clarifies Mao's readiness to engage in the conflict prior to the Inchon landing and China's assertive objectives during the war.
Naturally, there are downsides to consider. The nation has been embroiled in conflict for over 15 years. Critics highlighted several obstacles: firstly, the country had yet to recover from prolonged warfare; secondly, land reform remained unfinished; thirdly, the 'liberation' of Taiwan and Tibet still loomed, alongside the need to eradicate bandits and remnants of the GMD on the mainland; fourthly, the Chinese military was inadequately equipped and trained; fifthly, a segment of the population and the army harbored anti-war sentiments. Consequently, they argued that unless absolutely necessary, it would be preferable to avoid war altogether, or alternatively, China should wait for three to five years until it was adequately prepared to intervene. In 1951, about 60 percent of China's tax revenue goes to the defense budget, most of which is spent on purchasing Russian weapons.

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On October 25, 1950, the CVA crosses the border. Mao Zedong order to form an invasion defends the intervention: “In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory” The next day the CC informs the public. Entering the war is not only a necessity but also a feasible endeavor, as we can certainly prevail against US imperialism, which is essentially a paper tiger. Despite the economic superiority and better-equipped status of their army of the US, its global aggression faces widespread opposition from people worldwide, leading to its isolation. The US exhibits military vulnerabilities, with an overly extended front, a distant rear, insufficient troop strength, and low morale. Former powerful allies like Britain and France are no longer as influential, and Japan and West Germany are yet to be fully armed. The US no longer holds a monopoly on atomic weapons, and, in any case, these do not determine the outcome of victory or defeat. The ultimate triumph belongs to the Chinese and Korean people.

Mao Zedong is responsible for the overall strategy. Zhou Enlai has the general command. He receives the most important information and he displays the most essential information to Mao Zedong. Peng Dehuai has the command in Korea in cooperation with the Korean army. The combined command of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CVA) and the Korean People's Army (KPA) held authority over all regular and irregular units of both forces in Korea. Additionally, it managed military administration concerning logistics, railways, ports, and airfields. Upon consultation with Moscow, the leadership in Beijing permitted North Korea to transfer its army divisions to Manchuria for restructuring and training. By late October and early November, nine divisions had crossed the border and were deployed in the Northeastern and Yangtse River regions, with plans to open a pilot school for 2,600 pilots. During the Korean War, China's Northeast played a crucial role as a rear area for both the CVA and the KPA. On July 31, 1953, Peng Dehuai received North Korea's highest award. During the ceremony, Peng expressed reluctance in accepting the award, suggesting that it should have been given to "old pockmarked Gao Gang" for his leadership in the home front and logistics efforts during the war. The "Resist America Aid Korea" movement, which was a nationwide campaign, had a significant impact across all provinces and regions of China. However, Manchuria and the Northeast Government played a leading role in the campaign, serving once again as a testing ground for China's first modern conflict involving extensive logistics networks, air support, and considerable mechanization. To address the challenges posed by the war, the Northeast Government and Gao Gang were granted extraordinary powers by the central government. Gao played a crucial role in coordinating efforts between the CVA in Korea, Soviet military assistance, North Korean allies, and the CC in Beijing, which implemented a nationwide mobilization campaign. Gao Gang travelled twice to North Korea (08-11-1950 and 25-01-1951 - 30-01-1951) and once to SU (09-06-1951 - 20-06-1951) to coordinate war planning, a highly unusual step for a Regional leader.

On November 2, Chinese and American troops had the first skirmishes. That same month on the 25th, Mao Zedong’s son Mao Anying is killed during an American bombardment. The CVA campaign is very successful and on December 28, the 38th latitude is crossed and shortly hereafter the South Korean capital Seoul is captured. See Map, Map, and Map. In November 1950 , China reacts positive to an attempt of the UN to solve the Korean affair. The attempt to achieve a truce comes to nothing. Two months later, the UN attempts a new effort to come to a truce. Mao Zedong has the opinion that the US has two options: “1.Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. …2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.” Therefore Mao Zedong is not interested in a diplomatic solution. On February 1, 1951, the UN condemns the People's Republic of China as aggressor in the Korean conflict.

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January 1951, the front is turning and the UN troops start to march to the North, the Chinese and North Korean troops are cornered. April 22, 1951, the CVA undertake a desperate attempt to turn the tide, this 5th campaign is a disaster. There are over 200 000 casualties. On the battlefield, the situation has turned into a stalemate around the old demarcation line. The People's Republic of China is also losing on the diplomatic terrain, the UN accepts a resolution for an economic boycott of China. This reversal compels the Chinese leadership to extensively discuss the situation in Korea with Stalin and Kim Il sung. On June 3, 1951, Kim Il sung arrived in Beijing to talk about an armistice. Mao Zedong convinces the Korean leader to accept the old border and to prepare himself for a protracted war. Stalin wants to continue the war. In June 1951, Gao Gang, Kim Il sung and Stalin negotiated about the conditions to talk about an armistice June 23, The Russian ambassador to the UN, asked for the possibilities to come to negotiations. Mao Zedong supports this request because it gives them the upper hand and he hopes “If negotiations begin, it is extremely necessary that you (Stalin) personally lead them, so that we do not find ourselves in a disadvantageous position.” Stalin does not want to be maneuvered in this position and puts the responsibility totally in the hand of the Chinese. “In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him]” July 10, 1951, the negotiations start in Kaesong (North Korea). There are several obstacles to overcome. The most important is the distrust of both parties. Zhou Enlai puts it as follows: “They (USA) attempt to delay the negotiations by displaying their strength, creating tension and pressuring us in order to reach a cease- fire on favourable terms. “But he adds: “We are willing to settle the Korean, Far East and world problems peacefully, but we must not fear righteous, anti-aggressor wars for that is the only possibility of obtaining a lasting peace.” The position of the demarcation line is also a big obstacle. On October 25, 1951, the discussion resumes. This time in Panmunjon village in the Demilitarized Zone. Stalin warns Mao Zedong to slacken the talks. “We consider it correct that the Chinese/ Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations”. Mao Zedong is also convinced that these delay techniques are profitable for China. In this way he gets the newest SU weaponry and learns modern fighting techniques. Stalin expressed irritation regarding these arms shipments. He chastised the Chinese for attempting to acquire all the weapons within one year, stating that it was "physically impossible and entirely unthinkable." The Chinese negotiators mistrust the US based on the peace negotiations between the GMD and the CCP during the civil war. After examining the history of cease-fire negotiations during the Chinese civil war, the CCP leadership harbored profound distrust and suspicion of American mediation and involvement. They ultimately rejected the impartiality of Marshall's mission (1945-1947), believing that the cease-fires mediated by Marshall were schemes to enable Nationalist troops to regroup for subsequent attacks. However, they also maintained a pragmatic stance toward cease-fires. On November 27, 1951, both parties reached an agreement on the position of the demarcation line. A big issue during the negotiations are the prisoners of war. The Chinese demand that each POW shall return to his fatherland, the other party that each POW can decide for himself where to go. Many Chinese POWs want to go Taiwan, which is unacceptable for Beijing. The talks bog down on this topic. On a small scale the fighting resumes. In August and September 1952 Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Kim Il sung had talks with Stalin. The latter is convinced the POWs have to return to their fatherland. On March 30, 1953, after the death of Stalin, Zhou Enlai announces China agrees on the repatriation of the wounded and to the free choice of each POW in his destination. A clear victory for the UN.

“Some 50,000 Chinese and North Korean POWs refused repatriation, but any assessment of the value of this moral and propaganda victory must be tempered by the knowledge that the additional 15 months of fighting cost more than 125,000 UNC and some 250,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties” On April 26, 1953, the negotiations started again, but also the preparation for a new military campaign.

Even on July 13, the CVA started a new campaign which lasted until July 27, the day the truce was signed by both parties. The SU are too busy with national problems (who will be the successor of Stalin) and political unrest in East Europe to interfere.The economic embargo on strategic goods is not withdrawn.

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The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteer Army, victorious forever!

A Korean delegation led by Kim Il sung visited the People's Republic of China from November 12 till November 25, 1953. The visit results in a ten-year economic and cultural treaty. In 1955, the CVA started its withdrawal. At the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il sung in November 1957, they decided to have a complete withdrawal of the CVA from Korea. On October 26, 1958, the last Chinese soldiers left Korea. See Poster 1959

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Chapter 7 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents
• Contact