Article 54 of the Common Program
Text
Article 54 of the Common Program
The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.

Timeline concerning Korean War


1949


January Li Lisan, Zhou Baozhong, Choi Yong-kon
& SU advisors meet in Harbin on Korean troops
7-3-1949 Stalin meets Kim
9-3-1949 Kim leaves SU
28-4-1949 Kim IL visits China
18-5-1949 Talks between Mao and Kim Il about
military aid to Korea
August 4th Army’s 164th and 166th divisions,
consisting of Korean soldiers are transferred to North Korea
3-9-1949 Kim requests Stalin permission to
attack the South
24-9-1949 Politburo CPSU against Korean attack
26-10-1949 Stalin sends Mao a telegram on Korea.
Korea is not ready
29-12-1949 Lin Biao asks instructions on Korean
soldiers
1950
7-1-1950 Sino-Korean sign an agreement to establish
additional telegraph and telephone lines.
11-1-1950 CMC sends instructions on Korean soldiers
19-1-1950 Kim asks PRC to send Korean-nationality
soldiers back together with their equipment.
22-1-1950 CC acepts proposals of Nie Rongzhen to send
Korean soldiers back
30-1-1950 Stalin formally approves Kim’s unification
project
30-3-1950 Kim and his delegation secretly arrive
in the SU.
8-4-1950 Kim visits Stalin
10-4-1950 Mao agrees to meet Kim
25-4-1950 Stalin finally endorses Kim’s plan
Kim leaves Moscow
13-5-1950 Kim secretly visits Beijing after
visiting Stalin
14-5-1950 Stalin sends telegrams on the Korean
situation. North Korea will start war
14-5-1950 Mao returns 2 Korean divisions to Kim
16-5-1950 End of visit Kim
25-6-1950 Outbreak of the Korean War
27-6-1950 Resolution of the Security Council of
UN on Korea. Zhou reacts. SU withdrawls from Security Council
29-6-1950 GB authorises Royal Navy support for South Korea.
29-6-1950 The North Korean army seizes Seoul the
capital of the South
30-6-1950 PLAN postpones preparations for the Taiwan
campaign and orders military observers to N Korea
5-7-1950 Stalin approves sending Chinese Volunteers
to the Korean border
7-7-1950 CMC announces decision to establish the North
Eastern Border Defence Forces
8-7-1950 Korea complains about chinese representative
10-7-1950 Zhou chairs conference of CMC on Korea
11-7-1950 "Chinese People's Committee of the Movement
to Fight against U.S. Invasion of Taiwan & Korea" is formed
13-7-1950 CMC decision on organizing the Northeast Frontier Force
13-7-1950 Telegram on SU air protection for Chinese troops
17-7-1950 'National Campaign Week against U.S. Aggression
in Taiwan and Korea'
19-7-1950 Taiwan offers to send three of his best divisions
to help South Korea
22-7-1950 PRC publication of "A Public Notice to Taiwan
Comrades"
22-7-1950 Mao sends Stalin telegram on accepting air protection
and training of pilots
22-7-1950 Zhou reports to Mao on Korean situation
24-7-1950 End of special week
25-7-1950 SU agrees to train Chinese pilots
27-7-1950 PLA 40th Army arrives at Andong, a border city
on the Yalu River
1-8-1950 Mao and SU foreign minister Molotov discuss
the Korean War
4-8-1950 PB meeting to discuss Korean situation
5-8-1950 CMC orders Gao Gang to complete combat preparations
by the middle of August.
6-8-1950 CMC meeting on reorganisation of the PLA
13-8-1950 Chinese ambassador Ni Zhiliang, arrives in Korea
17-8-1950 US ambassador for het UN says US wants a free
unified and independent Korea
18-8-1950 Mao sends telegram to Gao Gang
20-8-1950 Zhou sends telegram to the Sec.Gen. of UN supporting
the SU motion of arbitrating the Korean issue
26-8-1950 CMC enlarged meeting decides to speed up the
construction of special troops.
27-8-1950 Several incidents during august, September with
US airplanes at the Sino-Korean border
27-8-1950 Stalin sends telegram on SU advisors to Zhou
27-8-1950 Stalin sends telegram on Korea and UN to Gottwald
31-8-1950 Zhou chairs meeting of CMC on Korea
31-8-1950 The Korean People's Army launches the Pusan Campaign
1-9-1950 Peng Dehuai establishes his CVA headquarters in Andong
6-9-1950 CMC orders the 50th Corps to move from Hubei to join
the Northeast Frontier Defence Army.
8-9-1950 Mao comments on army deployment
10-9-1950 Peng Dehuai speeds up his preparation for Korean
intervention
15-9-1950 US army and allied forces land at Inchon
17-9-1950 Zhou sends a five men team to Korea to investigate
the situation
24-9-1950 Zhou protests to the UN against alleged U.S. air
bombardment of Andong
25-9-1950 Nie Ronzhen, tells the Indian Ambassador that China
will intervene in Korea
26-9-1950 UN forces retake Seoul
27-9-1950 US acknowledged, planes may have mistakenly bombed
a North Chinese town.
27-9-1950 “a ‘top secret’ directive” authorizes MacArthur to
move beyond the 38th Parallel
27-9-1950 Zhou announces "China will send troops across the frontier
to participate in defence of North Korea."
30-9-1950 CPPCC meeting. Zhou issues a warning: PRC will not sit
idle if the US forces cross the 38th Parallel
1-10-1950 Zhou delivers a speech at the National Day "Fight for
crushing the war of aggression"
1-10-1950 Telegram from Zhou to Kim Il Sung
1-10-1950 South Korean troops cross the 38th parallel into North Korea.
2-10-1950 PB meeting on Korea after telegram from Stalin
3-10-1950 Zhou meets Indian ambassador
3-10-1950 Enlarged meeting Secretariat on Korea
4-10-1950 PB meeting on Korea
5-10-1950 Russian experts are to leave Korea
6-10-1950 Enlarged meeting CMC
6-10-1950 Roshchin visits Mao
7-10-1950 American patrols cross the 38th parallel in Korea
7-10-1950 The Problem of the Independence of Korea. General
Assembly Resolution Approved
8-10-1950 Special enlarged Politburo meeting Mao decides to
enter the Korean war
8-10-1950 Zhou talks with Indian ambassador
8-10-1950 Zhou and Lin fly to the Black Sea villa of Stalin.
8-10-1950 Peng flies to Shenyang to take the command of the CVA
9-10-1950 Formal meeting of cadres assigned to the CVA is
convened in Shenyang by Gao Gang
11-10-1950 Stalin meets Zhou and Lin
11-10-1950 PB meeting no SU aircover
12-10-1950 Mao orders Peng Dehuai to postpone the intervention.
Peng flies to Beijing
13-10-1950 PB meeting Mao affirms his decision to enter the war
14-10-1950 Mao meets Roshchin and talks about North Korea
14-10-1950 Peng sends the first train load of Chinese soldiers
across the Yalu river
14-10-1950 Letter from Zhou to Stalin
16-10-1950 a regiment of the 42nd Army enters Korea in the night
Mao orders attack
18-10-1950 Zhou back In Beijing
18-10-1950 PB meeting
19-10-1950 the first units of CVA troops cross the Yalu River into
North Korea
19-10-1950 Mao tells party officials to maintain a news blackout
on the fighting in Korea
21-10-1950 Kim meets Peng Dehuai
24-10-1950 Zhou "Resisting US Aggression,…" during a meeting of
the CPPCC
25-10-1950 Start of 1st campaign CVA in Korea. US warcrimes according
to PLA
26-10-1950 CC Instructions concerning Conducting Propaganda on
Current Affairs nationwide
27-10-1950 CVA ends the US/UN advance PRC officially enters
the Korean war. Mao asks Stalin for help
28-10-1950 FLAC calls upon writers and artists to support the Korean War
31-10-1950 Air defence meeting
1-11-1950 260 agricultural scientists sign a petition of protest
against American aggression
1-11-1950 First Chinese Mig fighters(flown by SU pilots) are seen in
action in air battles over the Yalu River.
2-11-1950 CVA and US troops clash in Korea for the first time
2-11-1950 Kim asks Stalin to train the Korean reserves of the PLA
4-11-1950 CCP and other parties publicize the joint "Anti-American
and Pro-Korean" declaration
5-11-1950 End of the 1st campaign in Korea
6-11-1950 The railway force of the Chinese army enters Korea
6-11-1950 CVA offensive is halted at Chongchon River, North Korea
7-11-1950 The 9th army enters Korea. Mao requests for military
equipment from the SU
7-11-1950 Chinese delegation arrived in Lake Success to present
China’s position to the UN
7-11-1950 Patrotic pact by the merchants and trade unions of Beijing
11-11-1950 PRC demands combined talks on Korea and Taiwan in
Security Council
14-11-1950 ACYF announces its "Proclamation of 'Anti-USA and
Aid Korea' and Defending China",
15-11-1950 Mao asks Stalin for air force aid
16-11-1950 Zhou asks for SU aid
17-11-1950 Mao orders east coastal regions to make
preparations to fight against invasion
18-11-1950 Mao instructs Peng Dehuai. The command will be
in Chinese hands
23-11-1950 Mao remarks at the banquet for the north Korean
government delegation
25-11-1950 launch of the 2nd campaign, pushing the enemy to the
south of the 38th Parallel.
25-11-1950 Mao's son is killed in Korea
26-11-1950 Chinese people's committee against American aggression
and aid for Korea is founded
1-12-1950 Representatives of CCP and Korean Communist party talk
about joint military operations
2-12-1950 Mao "Telegram to Participants of Demonstration
in Tianjin "
3-12-1950 Mao and Kim meet and form Joint Command of the CVA
and KPA
4-12-1950 Mao approves PLAAF plan for air support to CVA forces
in Korea
5-12-1950 ACFSS holds meeting to "Resist US aggression and to
aid Korea"
6-12-1950 CVA recover Pyongyang
7-12-1950 China’s conditions of withdrawal presented to India,
England, the US, the UN and Sweden.
8-12-1950 CVA-KPA combined command is established. Peng
is Cmdr. and p.c.
8-12-1950 End of 2nd campaign in Korea
9-12-1950 General Douglas MacArthur "requests commander's
discretion to use atomic weapons."
10-12-1950 End of CCP & Korean talks
12-12-1950 Mao and Peng meet. Zhou reports on situation in Korea
13-12-1950 Mao orders CVA to cross the 38th Parallel. Despite
Peng's plea not to cross
21-12-1950 Mao orders Peng to cross the 38th parallel
22-12-1950 PRC rejects the offer of a ceasefire in Korea
24-12-1950 General Douglas MacArthur sends a list of targets
to the Pentagon
28-12-1950 CVA cross the 38th Parallel into South Korea
29-12-1950 Chen Yi on a fact-finding mission in Korea
30-12-1950 Launch of the 3rd campaign
1951
4-1-1951 Seoul falls again to CVA and North Korean troops
8-1-1951 3rd campaign CVA successfully ends
13-1-1951 Mao warns Fujian for an large scale invasion
of GMD troops
14-1-1951 Mao backs Peng
14-1-1951 Mao asks Stalin on military credits
16-1-1951 Peng Dehuai meets Kim
16-1-1951 Mao cables Stalin on message from Kim
17-1-1951 PRC refuses a cease-fire in Korea.
19-1-1951 Mao's directive to the Chinese People’s Volunteers CVA
21-1-1951 The Air Force joins the Korean War and launches
the first aerial duel.
25-1-1951 Launch of the 1st phase of the 4th campaign
27-1-1951 Peng Dehuai proposes temporarily retreat
28-1-1951 Mao refuses Peng's proposal
30-1-1951 Army representatives return home to report on
their military actions in Korea
1-2-1951 The United Nations condemns PRC as an aggressor in Korea
2-2-1951 Zhou issues a statement denouncing the UN condemnation
2-2-1951 CC Instructions on Promoting the Movement to Resist
America & Assist Korea among All Walks in the Country.’’
10-2-1951 Enlarged PB meeting ?
11-2-1951 The CVA make a counterattack in Hoengseong
13-2-1951 the Battle of Chipyong-ni
15-2-1951 19th army enters Korea. CVA are defeated at Chipyong-ni.
18-2-1951 End of enlarged PB meeting
21-2-1951 Peng meets Mao on the "grave difficulties" of the CVA
26-2-1951 Peng meets Mao
28-2-1951 Peng meets Mao
1-3-1951 Mao sends telegram to Stalin on air support
3-3-1951 PLA meeting to discuss the logistic work in Korea of
the air force, artillery and armoured forces
5-3-1951 PRC makes formal charges against USA of using chemical
warfare in Korea
8-3-1951 End of 1 st phase of 4th campaign
13-3-1951 CVA are edged back and UN forces slowly move north
14-3-1951 RMRB editorial on Korean war
15-3-1951 The southern capital, Seoul, is retaken by the UN
15-3-1951 CVA’s air force head headquarters is formally
established in Andong. Stalin answers Mao
24-3-1951 US threatens the PRC with an extension of the war
if the proposed truce is not accepted.
28-3-1951 Peng Dehuai again requests SU air support for Chinese
ground troops. SU still refuse
29-3-1951 The Chinese rejects MacArthur's offer for a truce in Korea
31-3-1951 The armoured battalion command post CVA is formed
31-3-1951 2nd phase of the 4th campaign
6-4-1951 The Party Committee of the CVA enlarged meeting
11-4-1951 47th army enters Korea
11-4-1951 Douglas MacArthur is removed and replaced by
Matthew Ridgway
13-4-1951 30 US jetfighters above Fujian
21-4-1951 The CVA wins the 4th Campaign in Korea
22-4-1951 Launch of the 5th campaign of CVA
30-4-1951 PRC claims the US are using the CVA in Korea as guinea
pigs for their chemical weapons
1-5-1951 CVA and North Koreans again advance near to Seoul
1-5-1951 229,990,000 demonstrate in China in support of the
movement to resist America and aid Korea
6-5-1951 Liu meets Roshchin
14-5-1951 UN takes additional measures agaisnt PRC
15-5-1951 CVA and North Korean troops are driven out of Seoul
20-5-1951 End of 5th campaign
22-5-1951 Stalin sends new MIG's to PRC
26-5-1951 Mao makes the "small range surround, small range blot"
strategy in fighting in Korea
27-5-1951 Mao instructs Peng Dehuai
31-5-1951 Mao sends update on situation in Korea to Stalin
1-6-1951 "June first" campaign call for patriotism, arms donations,
and relief aid
3-6-1951 Kim meets secretly Mao & Zhou after the failure of the
5th campaign
4-6-1951 Xu Xiangqian delegation arrives in Moscow asking for aid
5-6-1951 Stalin orders to Mao that he should not make haste on
negotiations with US on Korea. Gao Gang
9-6-1951 Kim and Gao Gang visit Stalin to convince him to agree
to the necessity of an Armistice
13-6-1951 Mao and Stalin communicate on Peace Talk
14-6-1951 Mao and Stalin communicate on Peace Talk
19-6-1951 20th army enters the Korean war
20-6-1951 End of visit Gao Gang to Stalin
22-6-1951 CVA launches attack on Seoul
23-6-1951 SU Ambassador to the U.N., Yakov Malik, calls for
negotiations
24-6-1951 Stalin to Mao on Malik
26-6-1951 Stalin sends telegram to Mao on MIG's
29-6-1951 UN proposal for peace negotiations
30-6-1951 Intensive communication between Mao and Stalin about
peace negotiations
1-7-1951 Armistice negotiations begin in Korea
2-7-1951 CMC meeting on Korea
5-7-1951 Mao to Stalin on peace talks
10-7-1951 Korean Armistice negotiations start in Kaesong
15-7-1951 Mao tells Stalin, China will not concede on the issue of POWs
20-7-1951 Mao writes Stalin on foreign troops withdrawal
25-7-1951 Northern Korea and PRC agree an agenda for the ceasefire
negotiations with the UN
10-8-1951 CMC meeting
13-8-1951 Mao sends Mao telegram on armistice
18-8-1951 US launches the Summer Offensive
18-8-1951 CMC meeting
22-8-1951 American aircraft bombs the residence of Chinese negotiation
representatives
28-8-1951 CC decides to make October 25 the anniversary of the war to
resist US aggression.
28-8-1951 Stalin Mao should not hastily conclude the agreement
1-9-1951 6th Campaign, which was to commence in September
is cancelled.
3-9-1951 CPGC Zhou speaks about ceasefire Korea
8-9-1951 Mao asks Stalin for more SU advisors in Korea
15-9-1951 Mao orders PLAAF units to participate more fully in the war
18-9-1951 Peng Dehuai asks Kim for permission to “raise funds”
for Korean food,
21-9-1951 Liu Zhen talks with Peng about forward basing Chinese MiGs
and resulting risks.
29-9-1951 US launches the Autumn Offensive
4-10-1951 Mao to Stalin on militairy aid
18-10-1951 Mao on the Peace talks
24-10-1951 The truce talks resume in Panmunjom
November Logistical conference in Shenyang
5-11-1951 PRC starts Islands Campaign in Korea
14-11-1951 Mao to Stalin on peace talk
18-11-1951 Stalin again sends message that Mao should not accelerate
the peace talk.
26-11-1951 peace proposals are rejected
1952
25-1-1952 Mao makes San Fan target for CVA
31-1-1952 Mao to Stalin on the Korean negotiations
4-2-1952 Mao, Stalin and Peng Dehuai send telegrams to each other
on Korean War
17-2-1952 Mao calls for the San Fan campaign in the frontline to
cease completely
18-2-1952 Nie Rongzhen reports to Zhou and Mao on biological warfare
21-2-1952 Mao to Stalin About the use by the Americans of
bacteriological weapons in north Korea
22-2-1952 the head office of the CPARUANK releases the
statistics of weapon donations
24-2-1952 Zhou protest at the UN against USA for using
smallpox virus while retreating
24-2-1952 CMC meeting on Korea
March Nationwide campaigns against American imperialism
8-3-1952 Zhou makes a statement protesting the US use of
bacteriological weapons
29-3-1952 Guo Moro reports to world peace council on US germ warfare
30-3-1952 Zhou issues statement on truce talks
7-4-1952 Chinese investigating commission on biological
warfare in Korea reports
10-4-1952 truce talk agreement on the exchange of the ill
and injured POWS
19-4-1952 UN report to North Korea & PRC 62,000 POW wish to
remain in the South 70,000 want to return
22-4-1952 Mao to Stalin on military aid
26-4-1952 truce talks from both sides resume their meeting
and negotiations
30-4-1952 CVA decides to launch the Summer Counterattack
2-5-1952 PRC and North Korea refuse to accept partial repatriation
7-5-1952 Strong protests against US slaughtering war prisoners
captured in the Korean war
13-5-1952 1st and 2nd battle of the Summer Counterattack Campaign.
8-6-1952 The truce talks reach the agreement on the settlement of POWs
23-6-1952 American bombers strike dams and power generators along
the Yalu River
13-7-1952 3rd battle in the summer campaign.
(The Golden City Campaign)
17-7-1952 Mao, Stalin and Kim have contact on armistice
22-7-1952 100 US planes fly “just outside” PRC's territorial waters
31-7-1952 The DPRK awards Peng Dehuai the title of hero of the DPRK
20-8-1952 Zhou and Stalin talk about Korea
4-9-1952 Stalin, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai meet
16-9-1952 Zhou gives messages from Mao to Stalin on POW
18-9-1952 CVA stage an autumn tactical counteroffensive operation
19-9-1952 Zhou and Stalin talk about Korea
7-10-1952 CVA begins an offensive in Korea
16-10-1952 Kim officially puts an end to the talks
2-11-1952 SU Politburo again emphasized that it is necessary
to continue the struggle in Korea
15-12-1952 PRC rejects an Indian idea for cease fire in Korea
17-12-1952 conference of the CVA leaders
20-12-1952 CC issues instructions on Korea
21-12-1952 End of CVA conference
27-12-1952 Stalin to Mao on Korea
1953
22-2-1953 UN general Clarke writes Kim & Peng, asking to
exchange POWs who are ill or injured
19-3-1953 SU writes draft letters to Mao, Kim and UN
delegation on Korea
21-3-1953 Zhou meets the whole Soviet leadership and
talks about ending the Korean war
30-3-1953 Zhou Statement concerning the problem of Korean
armistice negotiations. POW
7-4-1953 F86 shot down. The pilot is POW untill 1955
10-4-1953 Truce talk agreement on the exchange of the ill
and injured POWS
20-4-1953 The prisoner exchange begins at Panmujom
23-4-1953 UN accepts resolution to investigate accusations
about bacteriological warfare
26-4-1953 Peace talks resume
30-4-1953 CVA decides to launch the Summer Counterattack Campaign.
11-5-1953 Mao talks with Kuznetsov and Likhachev
13-5-1953 US planes bombs irrigation dams in N Korea and ten of
thousands of civilians drown
5-6-1953 Foreign Affairs conference Zhou on Korea
8-6-1953 The truce talks reach the agreement on the settlement of POWs
9-6-1953 CVA repels the advance of South Koreas forces at Kumsong
15-6-1953 CVA launches an offensive against the U.S. lst Corps
22-6-1953 CVA launches an offensive against Seoul
24-6-1953 CVA forces launch a major offensive aimed at the
S Korean troops.
3-7-1953 Peng Dehuai on armistice negotiations
13-7-1953 CVA launches the Kinjo Campaign
27-7-1953 Armistice is signed in Korea
31-7-1953 Peng Dehuai receives the National Flag order of
merit 1st class from Kim in Pyongyang
5-8-1953 "Operation Big Switch" begins at Panmunjom, Korea
11-8-1953 Peng Dehuai is welcomed back from Korean Wa
r in Beijing
12-11-1953 Delegation led by Kim arrives in Beijing
16-11-1953 Zhou and Kim sign secret technological
cooperation pact
19-11-1953 North Korea signed 10-year aid pact with Beijing
23-11-1953 Sino-North Korean Economic and Cultu
ral Cooperation Agreement
25-11-1953 Korean delegations leaves
1954
23-1-1954 UN Command in Korea releases those POWs
who refuse repatriation PRC or N Korea
26-4-1954 Geneva Conference on Korea opens
27-4-1954 2nd plenary session on Korea
28-4-1954 Zhou adresses the Geneva conference at 3rd plenary session
29-4-1954 4th plenary session
30-4-1954 5th plenary session
3-5-1954 Zhou adresses the Geneva conference at 6th plenary session
4-5-1954 7th plenary session
7-5-1954 8th plenary session
11-5-1954 9th plenary session
13-5-1954 10th plenary session
20-5-1954 Sino-North Korean Agreement on the Rate of
Exchange between the National Currencies
22-5-1954 11th plenary session. Statements by Zhou
28-5-1954 12th plenary session
3-6-1954 Direct passengers rail service between Beijing
and Pyongyang
5-6-1954 13th plenary session Statement by Zhou
11-6-1954 14th plenary session Statement by Zhou
15-6-1954 Geneva Conference on Korea ends. Statement by Zhou
4-9-1954 Sino-North Korean Protocol for the Excha
nge of Goods in 1954
5-9-1954 Peng Dehuai of the CVA resigns and
Deng Hua
Deng Hua (1910-1980) as a CVA deputy commander and deputy political commissar

becomes commander-in-chief.
1-10-1954 Kim Il Sung on visit in Beijing
3-10-1954 CVA returns partly from Korea
22-11-1954 13 Americans captured by PRC during the Korean
War are sentenced to prison
10-12-1954 UN resolution accused PRC of "detention and
imprisonment of UN military personnel…"
17-12-1954 Zhou sends telegrams to UN Secretary-General
Hammarskjold
30-12-1954 Dag Hammarskjöld's goes to Beiijng in order to
get 15 detained American pilots released
31-12-1954 Protocol on Communist PRC's Aid to Korea in 1955

As seen in Article 11 of the Common Program the struggle against imperialism is one of the main objects of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. For that reason the government decides to overtly or/and secretly support the independence struggle against France, UK, the Netherlands and US in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
At the meeting between
Mikoyan
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
and Mao Zedong on February 3, 1949 Mikoyan proposes to establish an Asiatic bureau to coordinate the actions of the several communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong has the opinion that this is still too early. “One may return to this question when our forces take the south of the country and our position strengthens.”
Document: 03-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
In July 1949 when Liu Shaoqi is in Moscow. Stalin re-raises the Asiatic affair and proposes a division of tasks in the struggle against imperialism. China will have the leading role in the East.
Document: 02-07-1949 Stalin's Conversation with the Liu Shaoqi Delegation on the Importance of the Chinese Revolution and Creating a Union of Asian Communist Parties
This division is practical, not ideological, in 1949 the SU has not the military power to support revolutions in Asia. It also lacks financial funds and Stalin still has to stabilize the Russian influence in East Europe. In his own country he has to reconstruct the economic sector after the destructions during the Second World War.
In September 1949 Zhou Enlai in his speech at the installation of the new foreign affairs department puts the national interests in the centre of the daily routine of the foreign affairs policy “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.”
Cited in Yan Xue-tong (2002). Analysis of China’s national interests. Tianjin People Press Page 8

New foreign policy....

In 1952 an important change takes place in the Chinese foreign policy. In his speech to Chinese diplomats Zhou Enlai tells them China will focus less on freedom fighters, but more on "…the relations between states.”
30-04-1952 Zhou Enlai "Our foreign policies and our tasks"
Zhou Enlai "Adhering to internationalism and opposing narrow nationalism. Everyone knows in theory that this is the correct attitude, but in their practical work people sometimes manifest a nationalism and chauvinism that stem from their pride in the victory of New China. 0f course, we should have national self-confidence, but it is wrong to behave, even unwittingly, in a conceited and arrogant way; that is narrow nationalism." He continues: "Our patriotism is socialist and people 's democratic patriotism, not bourgeois chauvinism. ...Socialist patriotism is not narrow nationalism; rather, it is patriotism that inspires national confidence but is enlightened by internationalism."
and besides the concentration on the brotherly states (East Europe), the policy will focus on in the immediate vicinity of China.
In the relationship with neighboring countries the emphasis is on friendship rather than on ideological similarity. In September 1952 Zhou Enlai discusses this new foreign policy with Stalin "...relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means."
Document: 03-09-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai

Priority of this new policy is to make a ‘security block’. One of the main reasons for this change is the failure of communist revolutions in Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines. The ‘freedom fighters’ are minimalised to small guerrilla groups fighting in the jungle. The role of the US in Southeast Asia becomes more active and adopts the role of the old European colonizers. This policy results in military treaties between the US and Thailand (October 17, 1950) and the Philippines (August 30, 1950). China is afraid to become encircled by enemies. This fear increases after military treaties between the US and South Korea (October 1, 1953) and with Japan (March 8, 1954). The anxiety heightens after the SEATO pact of September 8, 1954.
Even before the dead of Stalin, China seeks to become on an equal footing with the SU. “As a member of the socialist camp, the PRC's desire to recover its "rightful" place in the world took ultimate precedence over Sino-Soviet relations and the unity of the socialist camp. For Mao, restoring China's preeminent position in postwar global politics could be achieved by exerting authority and influence in bloc affairs.”
Kuo Mercy A. (1999). Contending with contradictions: PRC policy towards Soviet eastern Europe with special reference to Poland, 1953-1960. PhD., Oxford. Page 65
The new policy is shaped by a number of initiatives. The first one is the organisation of a peace conference of countries in the Asiatic and Pacific region in Beijing. Between October 2 till 12 October 1952, 37 countries are represented. Remarkable is the invitation of the leaders of the Trotskyist Party of Ceylon, almost the only Trotskyist party that has managed to gain some mass following. (Trotskyism is in the eyes of Stalin more dangerous than any bourgeois or fascist influence) The congress condemns the US actions in Korea and demands the return of POWs and present a call to India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problems in a peaceful way. In contrast to the trade union congress of November 1949 (see below) this meeting emphasises less revolution and struggle and more cultural exchange and peace making.
A second initiative is the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries on May 3, 1954. This organisation invites and escorts foreign delegations. It is engaged in people-to-people diplomacy.
A third activity is the backing of a SU proposal of September 23, 1953. In this scheme both countries call for a 5 country meeting with the US, UK and France to reduce the international tension. This conference is held in Berlin from January 25 till February 17, 1954, but without the participation of the People's Republic of China. These four countries decide to hold a peace conference in Genève on Korea and Indochina with all involved parties. (People's Republic of China is included)
18-02-1954 Agreement Berlin Conference
The fourth initiative is of fundamental nature. The formation of a new foreign policy based on 5 principles (和平共处五项原则) non-aggression; no interference in national affairs; mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These principles are an elaboration of a provision in the treaty that China and Tibet conclude on May 23, 1951. Article 14 of this agreement reads: “The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.”
Document:05-10-1951 Mao Zedong asks Stalin for more military aid
Zhou Enlai states on June 5, 1953: “Today internationally, the main contradiction is the question of peace and war. We advocate resolution of all international conflicts through peaceful consultation. They [the U.S. imperialists] just advocate resolution by war Imperialism is afraid of peace, and also of war. We are not afraid, of peace."
Cited in Mark Chi-kwan (1996). America's response to the Chinese communist peaceful coexistence initiative, 1954-1957. PhD these. University of Hong Kong. Page 28
During the preparations for the Geneva conference this new foreign policy gets even more stature.See for details on Geneva conference Article 11. On March 2, 1954 at a meeting of the Secretariat of the CCP Zhou Enlai defends his policy.
“At the(Geneva) conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favourable to relaxing the tense international situation. …”
Document: 02-03-1954 'Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,' Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) [Excerpt]
At November 23, 1953 Mao Zedong asks Ho Chi Minh to resolve the Vietnam issue in a peaceful way “It is necessary and timely for the Government of Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express willingness to use peaceful negotiation to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so, can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and the peace-loving people all over the world, to bankrupt the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame of the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of, and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans.” See Sheng Michael M. (2008). “Mao and China’s Relations With the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split.” Modern China.Page 482
The 5 principles are the foundation of the treaties for example with India.
Document:29-04-1954 Agreement between the republic of india and the people’s republic of China on Trade and intercourse between Tibet region of China and India
In statements of political leaders from Cambodia, Indonesia and Afghanistan is often referred to this 5 principles when talking about negotiations with PRC.
“…to make the Five Principles replace the more authoritarian norm of proletarian internationalism within the socialist bloc. In the world at large, peaceful coexistence became Peking's weapon for forming a united front in its struggle with the United States.”
Hsiung James Chieh (1972). Law and policy in China's foreign relations: A study of attitudes and practice. New York. Page 35
On July 7, 1954 Mao Zedong is also a big supporter of this new policy. “Right now, it has been impossible [for us] to shut the door tight; instead, the situation is very advantageous and we need to walk out the door… To relax international tension, countries of different systems can peacefully co-exist. This slogan originated by the Soviet Union, and it is our slogan as well. Now it becomes the catch word in [Anthony] Eden’s mouth, in Nehru’s, too. They want to relax international tension as well”
Cited in Sheng Michael M. (2008). “Mao and China’s Relations With the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split.” Modern China. Page 482
He even wants to negotiate with the US on the issue of expatriates. Only two weeks later he abandons this statement “Mao made it clear that the ‘peaceful coexistence' principle should not be applied to Beijing’s relations with Washington, but, rather, should be used to isolate the US. imperialists.13 In the meantime, Beijing strongly opposed Moscow’s attempt to use the Five Principles in dealing with Washington.”
McMahon Robert J. (2013) The Cold War in the Third World. OUP USA. Page 90
Mao Zedong starts an international crises at the end of July.
27-07-1954 Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle against the United States and Jiang Jieshi after the Geneva Conference
A propaganda campaign ‘to liberate Taiwan’ starts and military operation in the coastal area of Zhejiang province take place. Finally in January 1955 resulting in the takeover of the island Yijiangshan.

Indochina....


The developments in Indochina (nowadays Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and Korea are a good showcase of the foreign policy of China. The focus lies on Vietnam. After the capitulation of Japanin 1945
Ho Chih Minh
Ho Chih Minh (1890-1969) Chairman and First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Vietnam. Prime Minister (1945–1955)
proclaims the independence of Vietnam. On March 6, 1946 after negotiations with France a division along the 16th parallel becomes a fact. At the end of 1946 skirmishes take place and the conflict between the French Republic and the Vietnamese People's Republic escalates. For years Ho Chih Minh seeks support from the SU and later also from the People's Republic of China. At January 19, 1950 China recognizes Democratic Republic Vietnam (DRV).
Document: 01-02-1950 Telegram, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi
April 28, 1951 a Vietnamese diplomat comes to Beijing. A Vietnamese embassy in Moscow is opened March 1952. Untill that time all contacts go through China. A Chinese embassy opens in September 1954. The CCP decides to send their Vietnamese members back to promote the revolution in their own country.
and both parties sign an agreement to supply weapons to Vietnam.
At January 30, 1950 a secret meeting takes place in Beijing between Ho Chih Minh and the political leaders Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi. A few days later Ho Chih Minh travels to Moscow. He joins Mao Zedong in a visit to Stalin. Stalin offers to provide aid and says “Towards Vietnam we feel equal concern as we do for China’ and: “From now on, you [Ho] can count on our assistance, especially now after the war of resistance, our surplus materials are plenty, and we will ship them to you through China. But because of limits of natural conditions, it will be mainly China that helps you. What China lacks, we will provide.” Mao Zedong adds “Whatever China has and Vietnam needs we will provide.”
Cited in Pham Hong Tung(2012). “The cold war and Vietnam 1945-1954: how did a nationalist struggle turn into a class struggle?” in Albert Lau (Ed.), “South East Asia and the cold war” Routledge. Page 165
With this position, China is in danger of losing or postponing diplomatic recognition by France.
The Chinese regime has several motives to back Ho Chih Minh. One is the international solidarity of all communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong declares in 1947: “All the anti-imperialist forces in the countries of the East, too, should unite together, oppose oppression by imperialism and by their domestic reactionaries and make the goal of their struggle the emancipation of the more than 1,000 million oppressed people of the East…If everyone makes strenuous efforts, we, together with all the democratic forces of the world, can surely defeat the imperialist plan of enslavement, prevent the outbreak of a third world war, overthrow all reactionary regimes and win lasting peace for mankind. We are soberly aware that on our way forward there will still be all kinds of obstacles and difficulties and that we should be prepared to deal with the maximum resistance and desperate struggle by all our enemies, domestic and foreign…"
Document:25-12-1947 Mao Zedong "The present situation and our tasks"
The division made in July 1949 (during the visit of Liu Shaoqi, see above) in a West bloc and an East block makes People's Republic of China responsible for actions in Asia. There is no evidence the SU directly supported Vietnam before 1955.
The second reason is of national interest. An escalation of the conflict between France and DRV can provide troubles at the frontier. In Yunnan at the border with the DRV there are still GMD troops. Also the fear of US intervention reinforces the will to support Ho Chih Minh. Beijing decides to send a delegation in order to improve the contacts between China and the DRV. In the first instance the delegation led by
Luo Guibo
Luo Guibo (1907-1995)
is thought to stay for 3 months but in April 1950 the Vietnamese Communist Party asks for military support, which is given for more than 8 years.
April 1950 China establishes in Yunnan a Vietnamese military academy. The costs are entirely borne by China. See Kraus Charles (2012) “A border region ‘exuded with militant friendship’: Provincial narratives of China's participation in the First Indochina War, 1949–1954.” Cold War History, 12, 3. Page 505
An other reason for support several Vietnamese and Chinese leaders know each other from their stay in Paris, Moscow or Nanjing.
Zhai Qiang (1993).“Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950- 1954” The Journal of Military History, 57,4. Page 695. "Early in the 1920s, Ho Chi Minh, who could speak fluent Chinese and often visited ChinaIn the late 1930s and early 1940s,... Ho, while conducting revolutionary activities in China, became a member of the ccp-led Eighth Route Army and stayed in the ccp’s Red capital Yan’an for several weeks. 4" Chen Jian (2001). Mao’s China and the cold war. Page 118. When GMD troops in South China moved against PLA troops, the PLA soldiers fled to a Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP) base area just inside Vietnam, where they were provided with food, medicine, supplies,and with sanctuary.
General
Chen Geng
Chen Geng (1903-1961) (3rd from the left) with Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh(2nd from the left) in July 1950.
and General
Wei Guoqing
Wei Guoqing (1913-1989) Luo Guibo (1907-1995)
coordinate from Beijing the Chinese Military Advice Group (CMAG) The CMAG starts to train DRV troops.
On April 17, 1950 the PLA HQ decides to form the CMAG. The CMAG counts 281 military advisors. Mao Zedong and other political leaders warn the CMAG “…the importance of unity and cordial relations between the two parties. They asked the Chinese advisers to avoid the mentality of big-state chauvinism and not to display contempt for the Vietnamese. In a telegram to Luo Guibo in August (1950), Liu instructed Luo not to impose his views on the Vietnamese and not to take offense if they refused to adopt his suggestions. Zhai Qiang (2000). “China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975” University of North Carolina Press. Page 25. Mao Zedong's involvement is clear from the telegrams to Chen Geng on July 23, 26, and 28, August 24 and October 6 and 10, 1950. See Yang Kuisong (2002). Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949-1973. Washington, D.C. Pag 5
Chen Geng provides partly the military strategy. He consults frequently Mao Zedong. This strategy is “Concentrating our forces and destroying the enemy troops by separating them”
Cited in Chen Jian (1993) “China and the First Indo-China war, 1950-1954. CQ 133. Page 92
In September 1950 almost 20.000 soldiers are trained and they form the elite corps. Besides military training, the Chinese advisors help with the construction and improvement of roads near the border. The road workers are often GMD prisoners. Chinese advisors provide assistance in land reform in the North.

Chinese supply routes

October 13, 1950 the Vietnamese troops with assistance of the Chinese advisors gain the first victory at the border area. The French troops retaliate and Ho Chih Minh and the CMAG ask for more military support.
“In an urgent telegram to the CCP Central Committee, the CMAG reported on May 15, 1951, that “troops are starving, even though we had transferred three regiments to the central areas and reduced office and logistics personnel daily grain [rations] down to 700 grams.” It asked the Chinese government to send between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of rice to Vietnam before the end of June” “To supply the Vietnamese, the PLA General Logistics Department set up an office at Nanning to handle military aid, economic assistance, and supply transportation.” Li Xiaobing (2007). A history of the modern Chinese army. University Press of Kentucky. Page 213
“On 22 July, the CCP Central Committee replied that the PRC would not send troops directly into fights in Vietnam, because this had long been an established principle. Chinese troops, however, could be deployed along the Chinese-Vietnamese border,..”
Cited in Chen Jian (1993) First Indo-China war. Page 97
CMAG–Viet Minh Campaigns of 1950–1952.
Source: Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietname Wars, 1950–1975, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2000), p. 27.
China and SU are convinced the situation in Indochina has to be resolved at the negotiating table. Mao Zedong cables Ho Chih Minh "It is necessary and timely for the Government of Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express willingness to use peaceful negotiation to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so, can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and the peace-loving people all over the world, to bankrupt the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame of the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of, and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans."
Cited in Sheng Michael M. (2008). Mao and China’s Relations. Page 481
The Soviet leaders ask China to put pressure on Ho Chih Minh to come to the Geneva conference.
Document: 26-04-1954 Cable from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, via Comrade Yudin
To extend the pressure on Ho Chih Minh the decision is made to stop training Vietnamese soldiers on Chinese territory.

Peace Talks about Indochina....

See for details on the Geneva Conference on Indochina Article 11.
On May 7, 1954, one day before the opening of the peace talks in Geneva, the Vietnamese conquer the strategic important city of Dien Bien Phu. After more than 2 months of talks all parties agree on a compromise. Vietnam will be divided in 2 parts with the 17th latitude as border and a plebiscite in July 1956 will define the future of Vietnam. (This public consultation was never held). With this result the Chinese delegation hopes to avoid any American intervention in Indochina. The next years Beijing is trying to convince Hanoi to accept this split to avoid any interference. North Vietnam is seen as a buffer. “Being hostile and suspicious about each other’s intentions in Vietnam, China and the United States supported different governments in Vietnam, and found partition more convenient than any other kind of compromise”
Nguyen Thach Hong (2000). Vietnam between China & the United States 1950-1995. PhD., University of New South Wales. Page 51
Ultimately, the domestic factor is more important than the communist solidarity. “the choice of either a divided Vietnam in which the North would be communist and the South pro-western or a prolongation of the war with the Americans who would probably replace the French. The fact that he (Zhou Enlai) promoted the former is a clear demonstration of the prior claims of China's immediate needs for national security and economic development over the longer term aspirations for a larger regional "area of peace. "
Shao Kuo-kang (1986). Zhou Enlai's diplomacy and the neutralization of Indo-China, 1954-55, The China Quarterly, 107. Page 488
Zhou Enlai states in 1949: “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.” Cited in Yan Xue-tong (2002). Analysis of China’s national interests. Page 8

Korea....

In 1950 the People’s Republic of China decides to support the North Korea government in his strive for conquering the whole territory of the Korean peninsula. In the 1930’s the Japanese army invaded Korea. During this occupation North Korean and Chinese communists fight in the Northeast of China against this enemy.
“…during the Chinese Civil War, 34,855 ethnic Koreans from the five counties of Yanbian, Jilin, fought for the CCP, and over 100 thousand ethnic Koreans joined local communist-led military organizations ,such as the public security troops and militias.” Shen Zhihua (2008) “Alliance of “Tooth and Lips” or Marriage of Convenience? The Origins and Development of the Sino‐North Korean Alliance, 1946-1958”. Page 5 In 1949 Mao Zedong mentions one of the motives to support DRK “In view of the long association of North Korean Communists with the CCP when they had their headquarters in Yenan and because of the military assistance given the Chinese communists by Korean volunteers in fighting the Nationalists in Manchuria the CCP owed a debt of gratitude to the Korean Communists which they could not ignore” Zhai Qiang (1994). The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chines-British-American relations, 1949-1958” Kent State University Press, 1994. Page 71
After the capitulation of Japan in august 1945 Kim Il sung (the leader of the Korean communist party) asks the SU troops in Korea to hand over the captured Japanese weapons.
A part of this weapons finds its way to the Chinese communists in Northeast China. Korea is an important supply line for weaponry. “….especially for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in South Manchuria. North Korea was the obscure, but critical rear that offered tremendous support to the PLA… From the second half of 1947 to early 1948, more than 520 thousand tons of goods belonging to the CCP were transhipped or exchanged via North Korea. At the same time, over 20 thousand CCP members and supporters crossed Korea.”
Shen Zhihua (2008) “Alliance of “Tooth and Lips” or Marriage of Convenience? The Origins and Development of the Sino‐North Korean Alliance, 1946-1958”. Page 5
During the Moscow conference of December 1945 the delegates of the SU, US and UK decide to select the 38th parallel as the dividing line to disarm the Japanese troops.
Document:27-12-1945 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers
The SU disarms and administers the northern part, the southern part the US. In 1948 two separate countries emerge; The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRK) and the Republic of Korea (RoK) The SU and US troops leave the peninsula, only ‘advisors’ remain. Both Korean governments see themselves as a representant of the whole nation and are in pursuit of reunification.

Leading up to the war....

On March 7, 1949 Kim Il sung demands from Stalin an explicit authorization for an attack on South Korea. Stalin refuses: “…, raising three problems: (1) the North Korea army did not have an overwhelming superiority over the troops of the South; (2) in the South, there were still American troops, which would interfere in case of hostilities; (3) the agreement for the 38th parallel was in effect between the USSR and the United States. The agreement would not be broken by our side, Stalin said. He asked Kim Il sung if he could have a good opportunity to launch a counter attack in response to the Southern attack.”
Hwang Byong Moo (2010).The Role and Responsibilities of China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War Korea National Defense University International Journal of Korean Studies. XIV, 2. Page 103
Both Stalin and Mao Zedong have doubts about Kim’s plans. In May 1949 Mao Zedong agrees to hand over Korean divisions of the PLA, as soon as Kim needs them.
Document:18-05-1949 Telegram from the leader of the group of Soviet specialists in Northeast China to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers about the results of the Chinese-Korean talks on military cooperation
Document:1949 Report on the 164th and the 166th division
On September 24, 1949 the Politburo of the CPSU again denies to authorize an attack, because the situation is not ripe for an attack.
Document:03-09-1949 Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky
“From the political side, a military attack on the south by you is also not prepared for,…”
Document:24-09-1949 Politburo Decision to Confirm the Following Directive to the Soviet Ambassador in Korea
This answer is in accordance with the previous encounter between Stalin and Kim Il sung on March 5, 1949
05-03-1949 Meeting between Stalin and Kim Il Sung
Stalin also informs Mao Zedong about his refusal.
Document: 26-10-1949 Draft Reply from Stalin to a Telegram from Mao Zedong on the Issue of Korea
When Mao Zedong is visiting the SU, Kim Il sung secretly visits Stalin on February 9, 1950.
Document:30-01-1950 Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov conversations Stalin with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong
Document:21-03-1950 Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinski regarding meeting with Kim Il Sung
The Russian leader is prepared to deliver military support in weaponry and credits. In a following secret visit to Stalin from April 8 till 25 1950 Kim Il sung receives permission to attack the South on the explicit condition that Mao Zedong also agrees.
Document:25-04-1950 conversations Stalin with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong conversations Stalin with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong
Stalin states “…the present situation has changed from the situation in the past and, that North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed with China and personally with comrade Mao Tse-tung…”
Document:13-05-1950 Cable from Roshchin to Stalin, Relaying Mao's Request for Clarification on North Korea Taking Action Against South Korea
From May 13 till 16 Kim Il sung visits Mao Zedong in the Chinese capital, the Korean leader overtakes him with the consent of Stalin. Mao Zedong does not trust Kim Il sung and seeks conformation from Stalin
Document:14-05-1950 Cable from Vyshinsky to Mao Zedong, Relaying Stalin's Stance on Permission for North Korea to attack South Korea. Kim (2018) remarks "...Kim Il-sung continued to pressure Mao Zedong to agree to his attack plan and emphasized that ‘the American imperialist will not be able to intervene. Stalin also told us that the imperialist will not intervene.’ To this, Mao replied: ‘How the imperialist behaves is beyond my control. We don’t know what’s inside the imperialist’s mind.’ Mao still opposed to Kim Il-sung’s attack plan. 27" Kim Donggil (2016). New insights into Mao’s initial strategic consideration towards the Korean War intervention. Page 6
Stalin has manoeuvred Mao Zedong in an awkward position. When he agrees, all credits go to Stalin and China has to pay. When he disagrees he will be accused not to be solidary in the struggle against imperialism and he runs the chance of getting no support for his invasion plans for Taiwan.
"At Stalin's suggestion, Kim did not inform Mao of the specific schedule of Pyongyang's military campaign. Thus after Kim's departure on May 15, Beijing continued, or more accurately, accelerated, its preparation for the Taiwan campaign. By mid-May, with the completion of the military campaign in Hainan Island, Mao's next target was Taiwan." Qing Simei (2007). From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960. Harvard University Press. Page 152. See also Christensen Thomas J. (2011) Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton University Press. Page 87. See for more details chapter 3 Alliance problems, signalling and escalation of Asian conflict.
To put it in a positive way Stalin offers Mao Zedong the right to veto the attack.
“Although Stalin did not consult Mao before he gave Kim Il-sung the go-ahead to launch a war of reunification in March 1950, he did tell Kim that his blessing was conditional on Mao’s consent. Stalin would not commit Soviet military forces to assist if Kim’s plan failed and the United States came into the conflict. Kim could only count on Mao’s support to save him under such circumstances. Thus, Stalin granted Mao veto power.” Sheng Michael M. (2014). Mao’s role in the Korean conflict: a revision. Twentieth-Century China, 39. (3). Page 274
It is not clear why Stalin thinks the situation has changed, perhaps he refers to the final victory of the PLA in China, perhaps to the successful test of the Russian atomic bomb in August 1949 or the foundation of the NATO in April 1949. Stalin sees this as a real threat in West Europe and the decreasing willingness of the US to intervene in Asia.
Bajanov Evgueni (1996). Assessing the politics of the Korean war, 1949-51. CWIHP bulletin 6-7. Page 87
See also Matray James I. (2002). Dean Acheson's press club speech reexamined. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 22 (1).
On December 30, 1949 the US announces that the present US troops in Asia will only protect Japan and the Philippines and Korea and Taiwan are no part of their military operation field.
Document:30-12-1949 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the National Security Council
The recently concluded friendship treaty between the People's Republic of China and SU stipulates that the SU loses eventually major ports (for example Harbin and Lüshun)in the East. “The Korean peninsula suddenly loomed attractive, as it could provide the Soviet Union with access to a Pacific warm-water port. If North Korea occupied South Korea, the Soviet Union could control the whole of the Korean peninsula, and the ports of Inchon and Pusan would replace Lushun.”
Shen Zhihua (2000). Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East. Journal of Cold War Studies, 2, (2). Page 60
In April and May 1950 Mao Zedong fulfils his appointment with Kim Il sung and sends 50000 Korean soldiers of the PLA back to Korea.
Document:11-01-1950 The Military Commission Agrees to Allow the 4th Field Army's Ethnic Korean Officers and Soldiers Repatriate to Korea
Document:22-01-1950 Telegram from Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong
These troops are meant to reinforce the defense of North Korea, not to invade South Korea. This is also part of the demobilisation of the PLA which starts on May 16, 1950
Besides soldiers, Korean workers, medical and other personnel are pushed to go to North Korea.
Document:18-07-1950 Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to Gao Gang
Two days after Kim Il sung has left Beijing Zhou Enlai promises Stalin China will send ‘volunteers’ to the DRK. Stalin answers: “We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel.”
Document:05-07-1950 Ciphered telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai via Roshchin. China effectively claimed that people were going to war on a voluntary and individual basis rather than on the orders of the state, and they also claimed that the CPV was not a state army during the debate about withdrawing foreign militaries that was repeatedly brought up during the negotiations about ending the Korean War. If the UN forces withdrew, the Chinese said, they would do their best to persuade the CPV to go home, too.

Korean War....

Kim Il sung overtakes Mao Zedong for a second time when on June 25, 1950 he (without a warning to Mao Zedong) opens the offensive on South Korea.
Document:25-06-1950 Resolution of 25 June 1950
"June 30, 1950, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communisc Party (CCP) relayed its new policy to the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA): "China's attitude is to denounce the American invasion of Taiwan and intervention in China's internal afiairs. Our plan is to continue to demobilize the army, strengthen the construction of the navy, and delay the liberation of Taiwan."
Ross Robert S. & Jiang Changbin (2001). Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973. Harvard University Asia Center. Page 144
About a month earlier on June 23, 1950 Mao Zedong reassures the delegates of the 2nd plenum of the CPPCC the period of war is over and the focus lies on land reform. The land reform act will promulgated on June 30. Besides on May 16, 1950 the military leaders have decided to start a large-scale demobilization. See Article 25
Just two days after the invasion on June 27 the UN condemns the attack and on July 7 the UN calls its members “…(to) furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”
Document:07-07-1950 Resolution of 7 July 1950
Meanwhile the SU and the People's Republic of China are in constant contact how to assist the DRK.
Document: 05-07-1950 Ciphered telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai via Roshchin
The Chinese government is deeply concerned about the lack of Russian air support and a possible US intervention.
Document:13-07-1950 Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)
The SU is only prepared to train Chinese pilots. In July the PLA starts preparations for a future assistance of the DRK. The Northeast Border Defense Army is formed. To prepare the nation for a future intervention the regime starts on July 17 a propaganda week against the US aggression in Taiwan and Korea. The recruitment of volunteers starts, each village would be given a quota, and this quota would usually be filled without much persuasion. During the Korean war many ex-GMD soldiers are sent to the front.
Brown argues that in places like “rugged Guizhou” (107) the Chinese Civil War had not yet ended when the Korean War began, and, in fact, continued through 1950 and 1951. However, the new regime implemented harsh measures in which former PLA resisters in Guizhou “were allowed to repent and then fight against the world’s most powerful army in Korea” (108). In other words, at least in this case and in this area, the new regime decided to consolidate rule through leaving a “legacy of terror and war” (129). Brown Jeremy(2007). From Resisting Communists to Resisting America: Civil War and Korean War in Southwest China, 1950–51. Page 107
See Article 20 .
Mao Zedong attempts to persuade Stalin to make sure that Kim Il Sung knows that he must agree to conduct negotiations to cease hostilities but his attempts are in vain.
Document:30-06-1950 Ciphered Telegram, from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]
At the politbureau meeting of August 4 Mao Zedong tells the Chinese army and party top an intervention is inevitable. “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this.”
Cited in Chen Jian (1992). The Sino-Soviet alliance and China’s entry into the Korean war. (CWIHP Working Paper, 1.) Washington. Page 26 "...the preparation work for entering the Korean War was "too onerous and urgent to be completed in August." Viewing this difficulty, Mao issued another instruction to the NEDBA on 18 August, ordering them to "step up and make sure to fulfill every preparatory work by 30 September." Page 27
After initial successes of the North Korean forces, the South Koreans with the aid of UN troops counterattack and when the American troops land in Inchon the situation for the North Koreans deteriorates significantly. Kim Il sung is desperate and sends a telegram to Stalin for immediate relief. “…at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union. If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people's democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.”
Document: 29-09-1950 Ciphered Telegram from DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist Leader Pak Heon-yeong to Stalin (via Shtykov)
The deterioration of the situation is serious and the Russians are taken their precautions: “We agree with your proposal that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, be evacuated to the territory of the USSR and China”
October 1 RoK troops cross the 38th latitude and Stalin appeals to Mao Zedong for help. “… possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course. I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it.”
Document: 01-10-1950 Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (via Roshchin)

Decision to intervene....

In the following days there are many consultations within the Chinese politburo and between Moscow and Beijing. October 2 Mao Zedong cables Stalin the intervention troops are not yet ready and “In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war,(article 1 of the friendship treaty of February 14, 1950) … Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here”
Document:03-10-1950 Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov (Stalin) See for a detailed account of the decision making: Tkacik John J., Jr (2006). How the PLA sees North Korea. In Scobell Andrew Wortzel Larry M. Shaping China’s security environment: the role of the people’s liberation army. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Pages 139-144
It is only on October 8, 1950 Stalin informs Kim Il sung about China's hesitation.
Document:08-10-1950 Letter from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtytkov
Zhou Enlai and
Lin Biao
Lin Biao (1907-1971) Fourth Field Army
go to the Black Sea villa of Stalin. On October 11, they have a meeting with Stalin to ask for more information on SU support, particularly on Russian air support. That same day Stalin and Zhou Enlai inform Mao Zedong they have come to the conclusion that China on this moment is not capable of intervening in Korea.
Document: 11-10-1950 Stalin and Zhou Enlai cable Mao Zedong
Mao Zedong agrees but two days later he revises his decision. Mao Zedong informs Zhou Enlai on October 13 "As the result of an emergency agreement of all the various members of the Politburo, we have reached the unanimous opinion that it is advantageous for us to send troops to Korea. In the initial period, they will attack the ROK forces. In this regard, we have considerable confidence."
Kim Young Sik (No date) Eyewitness: A North Korean Remembers http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war10_YoungSKim.htm
Document: 08-10-1950 Directive Creating the Chinese People's Volunteers. Scobell (1999) describes in his article Soldiers, statesmen, strategic culture and China's 1950 intervention in Korea", the position of several Politburo members regarding the war. See pages 486-493
On October 15 Stalin and Zhou Enlai meet again and Stalin reiterates his refusal to supply air support.
On October 29, Stalin ordered the Soviet air force to move into position on the Chinese-Korean border; on November 1, the Soviet air force started to operate in North Korea, contrary to what Stalin had told Zhou in mid-October.” Sheng (2014) Mao’s role in the korean conflict. Page 284. On November 15. 1950 Mao Zedong cables Stalin "I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes." See also the article of Shen Zhihua (2010). China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese–Soviet–Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 33,2, 211-230.
“… the inherent inexperience of the North Koreans and Chinese in air war also resulted in Communist airpower being always seen as a bonus, never a significant component of any major offensive. Deployment of ground forces would continue to dominate Communist strategic thought.”
Ho Shu Huang, “What mattered more in the Korean War- airpower or seapower?” NUS History Society E-Journal. Page 10
On October 18 under heavy pressure from Mao Zedong the politburo decides to send Chinese People's Army (CVA) into Korea.

Motivation....

There are several reasons for this decision. First of all “…a historical fact that the peninsula has served as a major springboard for the conquest of continental Asia, particularly by Japan. Any major disturbance to the peninsula's delicate stability will therefore lead to serious concern, regardless of the nature of China's domestic political system.”
Kim Youngho (1998). International dimensions of the Korean war. Korea Journal 38 (4) 6. Page 138
It is not that Beijing is afraid of a Japanese invasion but they fear an invasion of the Taiwan regime. In that case there will be an anti-communist state at the border.
In case of an armed conflict with the US, China prefers to fight this clash outside the mainland. There are 3 potential areas from where the regime fears an attack, Korea, Indochina and Taiwan. From a tactical viewpoint Korea is preferred, it is a mountainous region and there is a direct supply line from the SU.
On February 17, 1958 Zhou Enlai expresses in his speech at CVA cadre's gathering "The confrontation between U.S. imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was the choice of location. This was not a decision for the imperialists to make only; we had our say, too. The American imperialists decided [to have this showdown] in the Korean battlefield, this was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans [by our own choice]. Looking back, it is understood that everything considered it would have been much more difficult for us if [we had chosen] Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands [in the Taiwan Strait]" Cited in Sheng Michael M.(2002). The Psychology of the Korean War: The Role of Ideology and Perception in China's Entry into the War” Journal of Conflict Studies, 22, 1. Page 58
The treaty of February 14, 1950 with the SU, obliges the latter to help the People's Republic of China. Beijing wants neither American soldiers nor Russian troops on its territory. They fear to lose the important industrial area of the Northeast “The secret protocol stipulated that the citizens of third countries, such as those of the U.S. and Britain, were not allowed to settle or carry out any industrial, financial, trade, or other related activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang, and the Soviet Union would impose comparable restrictions on the Soviet Far East and the Central Asian republics. The agreement freed Manchuria of any outside interference. Stalin’s attempt to consolidate the strategic complex before the Korean War demonstrates his careful attention to creating an advantageous strategic environment.”
Yu Bin (2001). China's conflict behavior in Korea revisited. Implications for East Asian security. International Journal of Korean Studies, 5, (1), Page 84
Mao Zedong may have had the feeling "Having just concluded an alliance with the Soviet Union that was essential for the PRC’s economic development and national security, Mao was not in a position to refuse to grant the assistance that Stalin counted on him to provide."
Weathersby Kathryn (2002). Should we fear this? Stalin and the danger of war with America. (CWIHP Working paper 39). Page 13
Mao Zedong also knows he cannot occupy Taiwan without the aid of the SU.
Document:11-01-1950 Liu Shaoqi reported to Mao
"Preventing a wave of refugees from crossing into the northeast was a significant part of Beijing’s internal rationale for action in Korea. The alternative was to accept the quasi-permanent status of North Korean consulates and enclaves up and down the border from Dandong to Ji’an/Tonghua and on to Yanbian in the north."
Cathcart Adam & Kraus Charles (2011) The Bonds of Brotherhood: New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950–1954. Journal of cold war studies, 13 (3). Page 34." "The Chinese government, aided by the North Korean embassy in Beijing, estimated that the number of refugees in China in late 1950 had already surpassed 10,000 people." Page 37 "On 4 October 1950, Stalin had suggested that Kim Il-Sung retreat into Manchuria with a government-in-exile. Although the Chinese were opposed to the idea—their invasion of Korea could be seen as an action undertaken to prevent such a scenario..." Page 39
Also a domestic factor in the decision-making plays a role. "According to party sources, the American intervention in Korea and especially the Inchon landing were signals of hope for China's counterrevolutionaries. Active resistance groups, now joined by landlords, secret societies, and unemployed soldiers, thought that better times were just ahead and intensified their resistance. They carried out widely scattered acts of violence extending into the Northeast, the logistical base for Chinese forces in Korea, and stirred up rumors, while intimidating local party cadres. "You're like a frog in a well with no idea of the big picture and still in a mess. The third world war is coming and the Nationalist army will be right back."
Hunt Michael H.(1992). Beijing and the Korean crisis, June 1950-June 1951. Political Science Quarterly, 107, (3). Page 471. Kim (2016). "The US actions created uncertainty in China’s domestic economy and ideological confusion as well. For example, on 28 June, in large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, cash withdrawals from banks rapidly increased, and stock markets collapsed. Commodity prices also soared, as people rushed to purchase large quantities of daily necessities. At the same time, rumours began to appear that the Korean War was the ‘prelude to the Third World War’ and that ‘China should give up on Taiwan to avoid a conflict with the US’" Kim (2016). New insights Page 8. Kim also remarks; "From January to october in 1950, 816 armed revolts occurred to overthrow the China’s communist government and the number of people who got arrested for being a spy totaled up to 25,041 by august, and the Chinese government executed 639 of them:" Page 10 note 31

On October 10, 1950 the CC announces the instructions to suppress the contra revolutionaries. See Article 7 The National campaign against US aggression is also a part to counteract internal problems. See Article 49
In its editorial of December 25, 1952 the Renmin Ribao remarks: “…stated that the experience of the previous two years had proved that the struggle in resisting America and aiding Korea had been “a great dynamic power which drove forward national construction programs in all aspects,..."
Cited in Walker Richard Louis (1955). China under communism. The first five years. New Haven. Page 237
A sixth reason to support the Koreans, can also be traced to a historical factor; the aforementioned assistance of Korean soldiers to the PLA “Political, military, economic, and cultural exchange had been taking place along the Sino-Korean frontier throughout the Chinese Civil War.Most significantly, North Korea’s northern provinces had served as a strategic sanctuary for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and supplies during pivotal stages of the civil war in the northeast, sparing many lives and countless goods from Kuomintang destruction.”
Cathcart Adam & Kraus Charles (2011) The Bonds of Brotherhood: New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950–1954. Journal of cold war studies, 13 (3). Page 29 "...the Northeast Bureau of the CCP...were invited to Pyongyang to open the CCP’s Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea (..) late in the summer of 1946.31" Kraus Charles (2014). Bridging East Asia’s Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950 The Journal of Northeast Asian History 11, (2). Page 50. In the 1930’s Kim Il sung fought with a Chinese – Korean army unit against the Japanese troops. Chinese communists nearly executed him on suspicion of being a member of a pro-Japanese Korean group. See also Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng (2018). A Misunderstood Friendship. Mao Zedong, Kim Il- Sung, and Sino-North Korean relations 1949-1976. Columbia University Press Pages 19-20
Zhou Enlai expresses the band as follows: “China and Korea are neighbouring countries as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth are exposed to the cold. If the DPRK is subjugated by US imperialism, there will be no security for northeast China.”
Document:24-10-1950 Zhou Enlai “Resisting US Aggression, Aiding Korea and Defending Peace”. Gomàà notices "Since 1949 both China and North Korea have accepted the course of the Yalu (in Korean, Amrok) and Tumen (in Korean, Tuman) Rivers as the border. This has helped lessen the frontier dispute but the lack of a precise delimitation for certain islands has marred relations between the two communist regimes. Gomàà Daniel (2006). The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier. Page 873"
A reason which also should be mentioned is the prestige China and Mao Zedong will gain in Asia, from resisting the US. Chen (1994) remarks “…the perceived American disdain for China as a weak country and the Chinese as an inferior people made them angry…how to face the ‘US imperialists’ was to the CCP a problem concerning values and beliefs, which was related to their feelings as Chinese”
Chen Jian (1994). China's road to the Korean war: The making of the Sino-American confrontation. New York. Pages 23-25
Of course there are negative aspects. The country has been in a state of war for more than 15 years. The opponents “... pointed to the following obstacles: first, the country had not recovered from many years of warfare; second, the land reform had not been completed; third, Taiwan and Tibet remained to be liberated, and bandits and KMT remnant troops on the mainland needed to be cleared out; fourth, the Chinese army was insufficiently equipped and trained; fifth, among some portion of the population and the army, there was a sentiment against war. Therefore, they believed that, unless absolutely necessary, it would be better to avoid war, or China should at least wait for three to five years until it was well prepared to intervene.”
Zhai Qiang (1994). The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chines-British-American relations, 1949-1958. Kent State University Press. Page 69
In 1951, about 60 percent of China's tax revenue goes to the defense budget, most of which is spent on purchasing Russian weapons.
Document: 16-01-1950 Ciphered telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

Intervention...

On October 25, 1950 the CVA crosses the border. Mao Zedong order to form an invasion defends the intervention: “In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory”
Document:08-10-1950 Directive Creating the Chinese People's Volunteers
The next day the CC informs the public: “… not only is it imperative to enter the war, we are definitely capable of winning against US imperialism, because the US is a paper tiger. Although the US is economically superior and is better equipped, its global aggression is opposed by the people of the entire world, and it is isolated. It has military weaknesses: its front is too long, its rear is too distant, its troop strength is inadequate and its morale is low. Its allies such as Britain and France are no longer powerful while Japan and West Germany have not yet rearmed. The US is no longer the only nation with atomic weapons, and, in any event, these do not make the difference between victory and defeat. Final victory belongs to the Chinese and Korean people.”
Cited in McLeod Paul (2000). The Korean war 1950-53: A 50 year retrospective the Korean war through Chinese eyes. in Dennis Peter & Grey Jeffrey (Eds.), The Korean war 1950-53: A fifty year retrospective: the chief of army's military history conference. Army History Unit, Australia. Pages 11-12

Mao Zedong is responsible for the overall strategy. Zhou Enlai has the general command. He receives the most important information and he displays the most essential information to Mao Zedong. Peng Dehuai has the command in Korea in cooperation with the Korean army. "The CVA-KPA combined command had authority for unity of command over all the regular and irregular units of CVA and KPA in Korea, but also controlled military administration related to logistics, railroads, ports, and airfields.38 The Beijing leadership, in consultation with Moscow, allowed North Korea to move its army divisions to Manchuria for restructure and training purposes. By October 30 and early November, nine divisions crossed the border and deployed in the Northeastern and Yangtse River areas, where a pilot school was planned to open for 2,600 pilots.39 During the Korean War, China’s Northeast was a very crucial rear area for the CVA as well as for the KPA."
Hwang Byong Moo (2010). The Role and Responsibilities. Page 112 "When General Peng arrived at the old imperial Zhongnanhai compound (October 4, 1950) abutting central Beijing’s Forbidden City, he was completely unaware that he would be asked to command China’s secret invasion of Korea set to commence in less than 2 weeks." See Tkacik John J., Jr (2006). How the PLA sees North Korea. Page 140
Document:17-11-1950 Telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai
Document:08-12-1950 Draft Agreement by the Party Central Committee on Establishing a Sino-North Korea Joint Headquarters. The relationship between North Korean and Chinese officials is strained. In 1951 Peng Dehuai vetoed North Korean proposals to continue offensive operations against US and South Korean troops in 1951. He also vetoed the use of railways for anything other than military operations, including reconstruction after battle lines stabilized. Shen (2018) describes the difficulties to establish a joint command. Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng (2018). A Misunderstood Friendship. Mao Zedong, Kim Il- Sung, and Sino-North Korean relations 1949-1976. Columbia University Press. Pages 45-51

On November 2 the first skirmishes between American and Chinese troops take place. That same month on the 25th, Mao Zedong’s son Mao Anying is killed during an American bombardment.
Zhou Enlai attendit plus d’un mois pour en informer Mao Zedong et la tragédie demeura secrète – l’épouse même de Mao Anying ne fut informée qu’en 1953 417 ! Pour le sommet du Parti, ce fut un choc, tant Mao Anying faisait figure de prince héritier. Mao, sa cour, ses complots. Domenach Jean-Luc (2012). Mao, sa cour et ses complots. Derrière les Murs rouges. Fayard Page 128
The CVA campaign is very successful and on December 28, the 38th latitude is crossed and shortly hereafter the South Korean capital Seoel is captured.
Document:08-01-1951 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak Il-u to Kim Il Sung
In November 1950 China reacts positive to an attempt of the UN to solve the Korean affair.
Document:13-12-1950 Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua
The attempt to achieve a truce, comes to nothing. Two months later the UN attempts a new effort to come to a truce.
Mao Zedong has the opinion the US has two options: “1.Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. …2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.”
Document:16-01-1951 Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, transmitting 14 January 1951 Message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with Message from Kim Il Sung
Document:29-01-1951 Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin, conveying 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai
Therefore Mao Zedong is not interested in a diplomatic solution. Chen (2018) mentions an other motive "a new high tide of patriotism rose among the Chinese people. The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea quickly went beyond the “defending home and safeguarding the motherland” propaganda to enter a new phase placing emphasis upon building a powerful and respected New China under the CCP’s leadership. Mao clearly realized that the Chinese “volunteers’ ” continuous victory in Korea would serve as a powerful source in this respect. On February 2, the CCP leadership issued an instruction, calling upon the whole Party and whole country to echo the Chinese victory in Korea by bringing the patriotic movement of resisting America and assisting Korea to deeper levels, so as to “heightening our nation’s self-confidence and self-respect."
Chen Jian (2018). Far Short of a “Glorious Victory”. Page 16
On February 1, 1951 the UN condemns the People's Republic of China as aggressor in the Korean conflict.
Document:01-02-1951 Resolution of the General Assembly on the Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea

Start peace negotiations in 1951....

January 1951 the front is turning and the UN troops start to march to the North, the Chinese and North Korean troops are cornered April 22, 1951 the CVA undertake a desperate attempt to turn the tide, this 5th campaign is a disaster. There are over 200 000 casualties. On the battlefield, the situation has turned into a stalemate around the old demarcation line. The People's Republic of China is also losing on the diplomatic terrain, the UN accepts a resolution for an economic boycott of China.
Document: 18-05-1951 Additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea. Roe notices "(The) troops from Manchuria were accustomed to cold weather. General Song Shilun's troops, employed in northeast Korea, were mainly from eastern China and not used to the cold. It is one of the ironies of the Chinese plan that those troops were employed around the Chosin Reservoir, where the temperatures were extremely cold, while the Manchurian troops were employed in western Korea, where the temperatures were somewhat milder. The losses from cold were devastating. It was an unfortunate error brought on by the hasty and extemporized nature of the Chinese intervention." Roe Patrick C. (2000). The Dragon Strikes:China and the Korean War, June-December 1950. Page 416
This reversal compels the Chinese leadership to extensively discuss the situation in Korea with Stalin and Kim Il sung. On June 3, 1951 Kim Il sung arrives in Beijing to talk about an armistice. Mao Zedong convinces the Korean leader to accept the old border and to prepare himself for a protracted war.
Zhang Shu Guang (1992). Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 Cornell University Press. Page 128
Stalin wants to continue the war.
Document: 05-06-1951 Telegram from (Stalin) to Mao Zedong, via Krasovsky. Su Yu ( Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff) repeats this argument on March 11, 1952 "One should examine the impact of the armistice of the Korean War from two aspects: a quick armistice is good for [domestic] construction, while a delayed one is good for the exercise (of the army)." cited in Chen Li (2015). From Civil War Victor to Cold War Guard: Positional Warfare in Korea and the Transformation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1951–1953. Page 183. Chen also observes "During the period of positional warfare in Korea, China’s military leadership understood the value of learning the lessons of modern combat and took measures to promote them both on the frontline and at home, for instance, rotating combat units to Korea to gain frontline experience and updating the training programme for units deployed in China." Page 208
In June 1951 Gao Gang, Kim Il sung and Stalin negotiate about the conditions to talk about an armistice
Document:13-06-1951 Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meeting in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung
June 23 The Russian ambassador to the UN asks for the possibilities to come to negotiations. Mao Zedong supports this request because it gives them the upper hand and he hopes “If negotiations begin, it is extremely necessary that you (Stalin) personally lead them, so that we do not find ourselves in a disadvantageous position.”
Document: 30-06-1954 Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
Stalin does not want to be manoeuvred in this position and puts the responsibility totally in the hand of the Chinese. “In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him]”
Document:30-06-1951 Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
July 10, 1951 the negotiations start in Kaesong (North Korea). There are several obstacles to overcome.
Document:11-07-1951 Cable, Mao Zedong to Joseph Stalin. It takes 575 meetings before the war is ended.
The most important is the distrust of both parties. Zhou Enlai puts it as follows: “They (USA) attempt to delay the negotiations by displaying their strength, creating tension and pressuring us in order to reach a cease- fire on favourable terms. “But he adds: “We are willing to settle the Korean, Far East and world problems peacefully, but we must not fear righteous, anti-aggressor wars for that is the only possibility of obtaining a lasting peace.”
Document:03-09-1951 Zhou Enlai’s Speech to the Central People’s Government Council, 'The Korean Ceasefire Negotiations and Making Peace with Japan'
The position of the demarcation line is also a big obstacle. On October 25, 1951 the discussion resumes. This time in Panmunjon village in the Demilitarized Zone. Stalin warns Mao Zedong to slacken the talks. “We consider it correct that the Chinese/ Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations”.
Document:19-11-1951 VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
Stanley Elizabeth A. (2009). Ending the Korean war. The role of domestic coalition shifts in overcoming obstacles to peace. International Security, 34 (1). She enumerates some reasons why the SU wants to prolong the war “First, it tied down U.S. forces, which hindered U.S. efforts to engage militarily in Europe, drained U.S. economic resources, and caused domestic political problems for President Harry Truman. Second, it created a rift between the United States and its allies over tactics in the Korean War. Third, it provided the Soviets with an excellent opportunity to gather intelligence on U.S. technology and military organization. Not only could it field-test its new equipment against American technology, but it could gain information from U.S. POWs. Finally, it created hostility between China and the United States and tied China more firmly to Moscow through dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance.” Page 64. There are also disadvantages in this stategy “For example, the war also galvanized the United States into approving National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), dramatically increasing military spending, strengthening NATO, and starting to rearm Germany—all of which arguably imposed costs on the Soviet Union in terms of the wider bipolar superpower conflict.”
Mao Zedong is also convinced that these delay techniques are profitable for China. In this way he gets the newest SU weaponry and learns modern fighting techniques.
See 20-08-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai and see Mao Zedong “Did we then have any experience in fighting the U.S. aggressors? No, we did not. Did we then know much about the U.S. troops? No, we did not. Now, all this has changed.” 12-09-1953 Mao Zedong “Our great victory in the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea and our future tasks” SWM, Vol. V.
Stalin is irritated about these arms shipments: “He rebuked the Chinese for trying to get all the weapons during one year, explaining that it was “physically impossible and totally unthinkable”
Bajanov (1996) Assessing. Page 90. In 1952 Stalin argues “The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953,..” 27-12-1952 Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong
The Chinese negotiators mistrust the US based on the peace negotiations between the GMD and the CCP during the civil war. "By reviewing this history of cease-fire negotiations in Chinese civil war, …, the CCP leadership had a deep distrust and suspicion of American mediation and involvement in the Chinese civil war. They refuted in the end the impartiality of Marshall’s mission (1945-1947). In their opinion, the cease-fires mediated by Marshall were plots to allow Nationalist troops to regroup for further attacks, although they also adopted such realist attitude toward cease-fires."
Zhong Wenrui (2013). Military-diplomatic adventurism: communist China’s foreign policy in the early stage of the Korean war (1950-1951) MA thesis, University of north Texas. Page 27
On November 27, 1951 both parties reach an agreement on the position of the demarcation line. A big issue during the negotiations are the prisoners of war. The Chinese demand that each POW shall return to his fatherland, the other party that each POW can decide for himself were to go. Many Chinese POW want to go Taiwan which is unacceptable for Beijing.
"Many of the Chinese soldiers in the CPV had originally been in the Nationalist Chinese army, and some of these were likely to prefer to go to Taiwan rather than being forced to return to Communist China.” Boose Donald W. Jr. (2000). The Korean war truce talks: A study in conflict termination. Parameters, 30 (1 ). Page 108. The choice is often determined by: “...choice of prison compound leaders, for reasons of conviction, interest calculation, coercion, and threat of retribution from leaders” Chang David Cheng (2011) To Return Home or “Return to Taiwan: Conflicts and Survival in the “Voluntary Repatriation” of Chinese POWs in the Korean War” University of California, San Diego. Page 16. 21 American POW don't wish to return to the US.
The talks bog down on this topic. On a small scale the fighting resume. In August and September Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il sung have talks with Stalin. The latter is convinced the POW have to return to their fatherland.
Document:19-09-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai
On March 30, 1953, after the death of Stalin, Zhou Enlai announces China agrees on the repatriation of wounded and in the free choice of each POW in his destination. A clear victory for the UN.

“Some 50,000 Chinese and North Korean POWs refused repatriation, but any assessment of the value of this moral and propaganda victory must be tempered by the knowledge that the additional 15 months of fighting cost more than 125,000 UNC and some 250,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties”
See Boose, “The Korean war truce talks” Page 111. “Between Aug. 5, 1953 and Dec. 23, 1953, Operation Big Switch took effect repatriating an even larger number than before of POWs captured during the war. The total returned by the United Nations Command under this operation was 75 ,823, consisting of 70,183 Koreans and 5,640 Chinese. The total returned by North Korea and China was 12,773, consisting of 7,862 Korean, 3,597 Americans, and 946 British troops.” Kemp Butler Amy (2010). Commentary: Operations little and big switch. Hilltop Times.
"...only one third of the approximately 21,000 Chinese prisoners of war were repatriated to Communist China; the remaining two thirds, or more than 14,300 prisoners, went to Nationalist Taiwan in a propaganda coup."Chang David Cheng (2011). To return home or return to Taiwan: Conflicts and survival in the voluntary repatriation of Chinese POWs in the Korean war. Ph.D thesis, University of California, San Diego. Page XV Zhu (2015) states "By October 1953, it appeared that close to onethird of the CPV’s POWs, totaling 7,110 soldiers, had agreed to be repatriated to Communist China.2 When they returned, they faced a disheartening situation. Forced confession, persecution, punishment, and humiliation turned the former “war heroes” into enemies of the state." Zhu Pingchao (2015). “Disgraced Soldiers”: The Ordeal of the Repatriated POWs of the Chinese Volunteer Army from the Korean War. Journal of Chinese Military History, 4. Page 163
On April 26, 1953 the negotiations start again but also the preparation for a new military campaign.
North Korea after armistice

Even on July 13 the CVA starts a new campaign which lasts until July 27, the day the truce is signed by both parties. The SU are too busy with national problems (who will be the successor of Stalin) and political unrest in East Europe to interfere.
The USSR Council of Ministers decides after the death of Stalin: “…in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peace loving peoples.” 19-03-1954 Resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations In East Europe an uprising starts on June 4, 1953 in East Germany. Unrest has increased in Czechoslovakia and Rumenia.

Chinese troops withdrawal from Korea....

The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteer Army, victorious forever!

A Korean delegation led by Kim Il sung visits the People's Republic of China from November 12 till November 25, 1953. The visit results in a ten-year economic and cultural treaty.
Document: 23-11-1953 Mao Zedong’s Remarks at the Banquet for the North Korean Government Delegation
See also
Document:23-11-1953 Agreement on Korean Technical Personnel Receiving Training in China and Chinese Technical Personnel Working in Korea Made by the Governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
. In 1955 the CVA starts its withdrawal. At the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il sung in November 1957, they decide to a complete withdrawal of the CVA from Korea. On October 26, 1958 the last Chinese soldiers leave Korea. See Poster 1959

Literature Notes Documents...

3. Cited in Yan Xue-tong (2002). Analysis of China’s national interests. Tianjin People Press Page 8 Back
5.Zhou Enlai "Adhering to internationalism and opposing narrow nationalism. Everyone knows in theory that this is the correct attitude, but in their practical work people sometimes manifest a nationalism and chauvinism that stem from their pride in the victory of New China. 0f course, we should have national self-confidence, but it is wrong to behave, even unwittingly, in a conceited and arrogant way; that is narrow nationalism." He continues: "Our patriotism is socialist and people 's democratic patriotism, not bourgeois chauvinism. ...Socialist patriotism is not narrow nationalism; rather, it is patriotism that inspires national confidence but is enlightened by internationalism." Back
7. Kuo Mercy A. (1999). Contending with contradictions: PRC policy towards Soviet eastern Europe with special reference to Poland, 1953-1960. PhD., Oxford. Page 65 Back
10. Cited in Mark Chi-kwan (1996). America's response to the Chinese communist peaceful coexistence initiative, 1954-1957. PhD these. University of Hong Kong. Page 28 Back
12. At November 23, 1953 Mao Zedong asks Ho Chi Minh to resolve the Vietnam issue in a peaceful way “It is necessary and timely for the Government of Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express willingness to use peaceful negotiation to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so, can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and the peace-loving people all over the world, to bankrupt the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame of the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of, and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans.” See Sheng Michael M. (2008). “Mao and China’s Relations With the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split.” Modern China. Page 482 Back
14. In statements of political leaders from Cambodia, Indonesia and Afghanistan is often referred to this 5 principles when talking about negotiations with PRC. Back
15. Hsiung James Chieh (1972). Law and policy in China's foreign relations: A study of attitudes and practice. New York. Page 35 Back
16. Cited in Sheng Michael M. (2008). “Mao and China’s Relations With the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split.” Modern China. Page 482 Back
17. McMahon Robert J. (2013) The Cold War in the Third World. OUP USA. Page 90 Back
20. April 28, 1951 a Vietnamese diplomat comes to Beijing. A Vietnamese embassy in Moscow is opened March 1952. Untill that time all contacts go through China. A Chinese embassy opens in September 1954. The CCP decides to send their Vietnamese members back to promote the revolution in their own country. Back
21. Cited in Pham Hong Tung(2012). “The cold war and Vietnam 1945-1954: how did a nationalist struggle turn into a class struggle?” in Albert Lau (Ed.), “South East Asia and the cold war” Routledge. Page 165 Back
23. April 1950 China establishes in Yunnan a Vietnamese military academy. The costs are entirely borne by China. See Kraus Charles (2012) “A border region ‘exuded with militant friendship’: Provincial narratives of China's participation in the First Indochina War, 1949–1954.” Cold War History, 12, 3. Page 505 Back
24.Zhai Qiang (1993).“Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950- 1954” The Journal of Military History, 57,4. Page 695. "Early in the 1920s, Ho Chi Minh, who could speak fluent Chinese and often visited ChinaIn the late 1930s and early 1940s,... Ho, while conducting revolutionary activities in China, became a member of the ccp-led Eighth Route Army and stayed in the ccp’s Red capital Yan’an for several weeks. 4" Chen Jian (2001). Mao’s China and the cold war. Page 118. When GMD troops in South China moved against PLA troops, the PLA soldiers fled to a Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP) base area just inside Vietnam, where they were provided with food, medicine, supplies,and with sanctuary. Back
25. On April 17, 1950 the PLA HQ decides to form the CMAG. The CMAG counts 281 military advisors. Mao Zedong and other political leaders warn the CMAG “…the importance of unity and cordial relations between the two parties. They asked the Chinese advisers to avoid the mentality of big-state chauvinism and not to display contempt for the Vietnamese. In a telegram to Luo Guibo in August (1950), Liu instructed Luo not to impose his views on the Vietnamese and not to take offense if they refused to adopt his suggestions. Zhai Qiang (2000). “China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975” University of North Carolina Press. Page 25. Mao Zedong's involvement is clear from the telegrams to Chen Geng on July 23, 26, and 28, August 24 and October 6 and 10, 1950. See Yang Kuisong (2002). Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949-1973. Washington, D.C. Pag 5 Back
26. Cited in Chen Jian (1993) “China and the First Indo-China war, 1950-1954. CQ 133. Page 92 Back
27. “In an urgent telegram to the CCP Central Committee, the CMAG reported on May 15, 1951, that “troops are starving, even though we had transferred three regiments to the central areas and reduced office and logistics personnel daily grain [rations] down to 700 grams.” It asked the Chinese government to send between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of rice to Vietnam before the end of June” “To supply the Vietnamese, the PLA General Logistics Department set up an office at Nanning to handle military aid, economic assistance, and supply transportation.” Li Xiaobing (2007). A history of the modern Chinese army. University Press of Kentucky. Page 213 Back
28. Cited in Chen Jian (1993) First Indo-China war. Page 97 Back
29. Cited in Sheng Michael M. (2008). Mao and China’s Relations. Page 481 Back
31. Nguyen Thach Hong (2000). Vietnam between China & the United States 1950-1995. PhD., University of New South Wales. Page 51 Back
32. Shao Kuo-kang (1986). Zhou Enlai's diplomacy and the neutralization of Indo-China, 1954-55, The China Quarterly, 107. Page 488 Back
33. Zhou Enlai states in 1949: “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.” Cited in Yan Xue-tong (2002). Analysis of China’s national interests. Page 8 Back
34. “…during the Chinese Civil War, 34,855 ethnic Koreans from the five counties of Yanbian, Jilin, fought for the CCP, and over 100 thousand ethnic Koreans joined local communist-led military organizations ,such as the public security troops and militias.” Shen Zhihua (2008) “Alliance of “Tooth and Lips” or Marriage of Convenience? The Origins and Development of the Sino‐North Korean Alliance, 1946-1958”. Page 5 In 1949 Mao Zedong mentions one of the motives to support DRK “In view of the long association of North Korean Communists with the CCP when they had their headquarters in Yenan and because of the military assistance given the Chinese communists by Korean volunteers in fighting the Nationalists in Manchuria the CCP owed a debt of gratitude to the Korean Communists which they could not ignore” Zhai Qiang (1994). The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chines-British-American relations, 1949-1958” Kent State University Press, 1994. Page 71 Back
35. Shen Zhihua (2008) “Alliance of “Tooth and Lips” or Marriage of Convenience? The Origins and Development of the Sino‐North Korean Alliance, 1946-1958”. Page 5 Back
37. Hwang Byong Moo (2010).The Role and Responsibilities of China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War Korea National Defense University International Journal of Korean Studies. XIV, 2. Page 103 Back
49. "At Stalin's suggestion, Kim did not inform Mao of the specific schedule of Pyongyang's military campaign. Thus after Kim's departure on May 15, Beijing continued, or more accurately, accelerated, its preparation for the Taiwan campaign. By mid-May, with the completion of the military campaign in Hainan Island, Mao's next target was Taiwan." Qing Simei (2007). From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960. Harvard University Press. Page 152. See also Christensen Thomas J. (2011) Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton University Press. Page 87. See for more details chapter 3 Alliance problems, signalling and escalation of Asian conflict. Back
50. “Although Stalin did not consult Mao before he gave Kim Il-sung the go-ahead to launch a war of reunification in March 1950, he did tell Kim that his blessing was conditional on Mao’s consent. Stalin would not commit Soviet military forces to assist if Kim’s plan failed and the United States came into the conflict. Kim could only count on Mao’s support to save him under such circumstances. Thus, Stalin granted Mao veto power.” Sheng Michael M. (2014). Mao’s role in the Korean conflict: a revision. Twentieth-Century China, 39. (3). Page 274 Back
51.Bajanov Evgueni (1996). Assessing the politics of the Korean war, 1949-51. CWIHP bulletin 6-7. Page 87 Back
52. See also Matray James I. (2002). Dean Acheson's press club speech reexamined. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 22 (1). Back
54. Shen Zhihua (2000). Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East. Journal of Cold War Studies, 2, (2). Page 60 Back
57.These troops are meant to reinforce the defense of North Korea, not to invade South Korea. This is also part of the demobilisation of the PLA which starts on May 16, 1950 Back
61. Ross Robert S. & Jiang Changbin (2001). Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973. Harvard University Asia Center. Page 144 Back
65. Brown argues that in places like “rugged Guizhou” (107) the Chinese Civil War had not yet ended when the Korean War began, and, in fact, continued through 1950 and 1951. However, the new regime implemented harsh measures in which former PLA resisters in Guizhou “were allowed to repent and then fight against the world’s most powerful army in Korea” (108). In other words, at least in this case and in this area, the new regime decided to consolidate rule through leaving a “legacy of terror and war” (129). Brown Jeremy(2007). From Resisting Communists to Resisting America: Civil War and Korean War in Southwest China, 1950–51. Page 107 Back
67. Cited in Chen Jian (1992). The Sino-Soviet alliance and China’s entry into the Korean war. (CWIHP Working Paper, 1.) Washington. Page 26 "...the preparation work for entering the Korean War was "too onerous and urgent to be completed in August." Viewing this difficulty, Mao issued another instruction to the NEDBA on 18 August, ordering them to "step up and make sure to fulfill every preparatory work by 30 September." Page 27 Back
69.The deterioration of the situation is serious and the Russians are taken their precautions: “We agree with your proposal that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, be evacuated to the territory of the USSR and China” Document: 05-10-1950 Telegram from Gromyko to Shtykov, approved by CC Politburo Back
74. Kim Young Sik (No date) Eyewitness: A North Korean Remembers http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war10_YoungSKim.htm Back
76. On October 29, Stalin ordered the Soviet air force to move into position on the Chinese-Korean border; on November 1, the Soviet air force started to operate in North Korea, contrary to what Stalin had told Zhou in mid-October.” Sheng (2014) Mao’s role in the korean conflict. Page 284. On November 15. 1950 Mao Zedong cables Stalin "I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes." See also the article of Shen Zhihua (2010). China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese–Soviet–Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the Korean War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 33,2, 211-230. 15-11-1950 Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov Back
77. Ho Shu Huang, “What mattered more in the Korean War- airpower or seapower?” NUS History Society E-Journal. Page 10 Back
78. Kim Youngho (1998). International dimensions of the Korean war. Korea Journal 38 (4) 6. Page 138 Back
79. On February 17, 1958 Zhou Enlai expresses in his speech at CVA cadre's gathering "The confrontation between U.S. imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was the choice of location. This was not a decision for the imperialists to make only; we had our say, too. The American imperialists decided [to have this showdown] in the Korean battlefield, this was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans [by our own choice]. Looking back, it is understood that everything considered it would have been much more difficult for us if [we had chosen] Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands [in the Taiwan Strait]" Cited in Sheng Michael M.(2002). The Psychology of the Korean War: The Role of Ideology and Perception in China's Entry into the War” Journal of Conflict Studies, 22, 1. Page 58 Back
80. Yu Bin (2001). China's conflict behavior in Korea revisited. Implications for East Asian security. International Journal of Korean Studies, 5, (1), Page 84 Back
81. Weathersby Kathryn (2002). Should we fear this? Stalin and the danger of war with America. (CWIHP Working paper 39). Page 13 Back
83. Cathcart Adam & Kraus Charles (2011) The Bonds of Brotherhood: New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950–1954. Journal of cold war studies, 13 (3). Page 34." "The Chinese government, aided by the North Korean embassy in Beijing, estimated that the number of refugees in China in late 1950 had already surpassed 10,000 people." Page 37 "On 4 October 1950, Stalin had suggested that Kim Il-Sung retreat into Manchuria with a government-in-exile. Although the Chinese were opposed to the idea—their invasion of Korea could be seen as an action undertaken to prevent such a scenario..." Page 39 Back
84. Hunt Michael H.(1992). Beijing and the Korean crisis, June 1950-June 1951. Page 471. Kim (2016)."The US actions created uncertainty in China’s domestic economy and ideological confusion as well. For example, on 28 June, in large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, cash withdrawals from banks rapidly increased, and stock markets collapsed. Commodity prices also soared, as people rushed to purchase large quantities of daily necessities. At the same time, rumours began to appear that the Korean War was the ‘prelude to the Third World War’ and that ‘China should give up on Taiwan to avoid a conflict with the US’" Kim (2016). New insights. Page 8. Kim also remarks; "From January to october in 1950, 816 armed revolts occurred to overthrow the China’s communist government and the number of people who got arrested for being a spy totaled up to 25,041 by august, and the Chinese government executed 639 of them:" Page 10 note 31 Back
85. Cited in Walker Richard Louis (1955). China under communism. The first five years. New Haven. Page 237 Back
86. Cathcart Adam & Kraus Charles (2011) The Bonds of Brotherhood: New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950–1954. Journal of cold war studies, 13 (3). Page 29 "...the Northeast Bureau of the CCP...were invited to Pyongyang to open the CCP’s Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea (..) late in the summer of 1946.31" Kraus Charles (2014). Bridging East Asia’s Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950 The Journal of Northeast Asian History 11, (2). Page 50. In the 1930’s Kim Il sung fought with a Chinese – Korean army unit against the Japanese troops. Chinese communists nearly executed him on suspicion of being a member of a pro-Japanese Korean group. See also Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng (2018). A Misunderstood Friendship. Mao Zedong, Kim Il- Sung, and Sino-North Korean relations 1949-1976. Columbia University Press Pages 19-20 Back
88. Chen Jian (1994). China's road to the Korean war: The making of the Sino-American confrontation. New York. Pages 23-25 Back
89. Zhai Qiang (1994). The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chines-British-American relations, 1949-1958. Kent State University Press. Page 69 Back
92. Cited in McLeod Paul (2000). The Korean war 1950-53: A 50 year retrospective the Korean war through Chinese eyes. in Dennis Peter & Grey Jeffrey (Eds.), The Korean war 1950-53: A fifty year retrospective: the chief of army's military history conference. Army History Unit, Australia. Pages 11-12 Back
93. Hwang Byong Moo (2010). The Role and Responsibilities. Page 112. "When General Peng arrived at the old imperial Zhongnanhai compound (October 4, 1950) abutting central Beijing’s Forbidden City, he was completely unaware that he would be asked to command China’s secret invasion of Korea set to commence in less than 2 weeks." See Tkacik John J., Jr (2006). How the PLA sees North Korea. Page 140 Back
96.Zhou Enlai attendit plus d’un mois pour en informer Mao Zedong et la tragédie demeura secrète – l’épouse même de Mao Anying ne fut informée qu’en 1953 417 ! Pour le sommet du Parti, ce fut un choc, tant Mao Anying faisait figure de prince héritier. Translation: Zhou Enlai waited more than a month to inform Mao Zedong and the tragedy remained secret - Mao Anying's own wife was only informed about 1953 417! For the Party top, it was a shock, as Mao Anying was seen as a kind of Crown Prince. Domenach Jean-Luc (2012). Mao, sa cour et ses complots. Derrière les Murs rouges. Fayard Page 128 Back
101. Chen Jian (2018). Far Short of a “Glorious Victory”. Page 16 Back
104. Zhang Shu Guang (1992). Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 Cornell University Press. Page 128 Back
112. Stanley Elizabeth A. (2009). Ending the Korean war. The role of domestic coalition shifts in overcoming obstacles to peace. International Security, 34 (1). She enumerates some reasons why the SU wants to prolong the war “First, it tied down U.S. forces, which hindered U.S. efforts to engage militarily in Europe, drained U.S. economic resources, and caused domestic political problems for President Harry Truman. Second, it created a rift between the United States and its allies over tactics in the Korean War. Third, it provided the Soviets with an excellent opportunity to gather intelligence on U.S. technology and military organization. Not only could it field-test its new equipment against American technology, but it could gain information from U.S. POWs. Finally, it created hostility between China and the United States and tied China more firmly to Moscow through dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance.” Page 64. There are also disadvantages in this stategy “For example, the war also galvanized the United States into approving National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), dramatically increasing military spending, strengthening NATO, and starting to rearm Germany—all of which arguably imposed costs on the Soviet Union in terms of the wider bipolar superpower conflict.” Back
113. See 20-08-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai and see Mao Zedong “Did we then have any experience in fighting the U.S. aggressors? No, we did not. Did we then know much about the U.S. troops? No, we did not. Now, all this has changed.” 12-09-1953 Mao Zedong “Our great victory in the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea and our future tasks” SWM, Vol. V. Back
114. Bajanov (1996) Assessing. Page 90. In 1952 Stalin argues “The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953,..” 27-12-1952 Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong Back
115. Zhong Wenrui (2013). Military-diplomatic adventurism: communist China’s foreign policy in the early stage of the Korean war (1950-1951) MA thesis, University of north Texas. Page 27 Back
116. "Many of the Chinese soldiers in the CPV had originally been in the Nationalist Chinese army, and some of these were likely to prefer to go to Taiwan rather than being forced to return to Communist China.” Boose Donald W. Jr. (2000). The Korean war truce talks: A study in conflict termination. Parameters, 30 (1 ). Page 108. The choice is often determined by: “...choice of prison compound leaders, for reasons of conviction, interest calculation, coercion, and threat of retribution from leaders” Chang David Cheng (2011) To Return Home or “Return to Taiwan: Conflicts and Survival in the “Voluntary Repatriation” of Chinese POWs in the Korean War” University of California, San Diego. Page 16. 21 American POW don't wish to return to the US. Back
118. See Boose, “The Korean war truce talks” Page 111. “Between Aug. 5, 1953 and Dec. 23, 1953, Operation Big Switch took effect repatriating an even larger number than before of POWs captured during the war. The total returned by the United Nations Command under this operation was 75 ,823, consisting of 70,183 Koreans and 5,640 Chinese. The total returned by North Korea and China was 12,773, consisting of 7,862 Korean, 3,597 Americans, and 946 British troops.” Kemp Butler Amy (2010). Commentary: Operations little and big switch. Hilltop Times.
"...only one third of the approximately 21,000 Chinese prisoners of war were repatriated to Communist China; the remaining two thirds, or more than 14,300 prisoners, went to Nationalist Taiwan in a propaganda coup."Chang David Cheng (2011). To return home or return to Taiwan: Conflicts and survival in the voluntary repatriation of Chinese POWs in the Korean war. Ph.D thesis, University of California, San Diego. Page XV. Zhu (2015) states "By October 1953, it appeared that close to onethird of the CPV’s POWs, totaling 7,110 soldiers, had agreed to be repatriated to Communist China.2 When they returned, they faced a disheartening situation. Forced confession, persecution, punishment, and humiliation turned the former “war heroes” into enemies of the state." Zhu Pingchao (2015). “Disgraced Soldiers”: The Ordeal of the Repatriated POWs of the Chinese Volunteer Army from the Korean War. Journal of Chinese Military History, 4. Page 163 Back
119. The USSR Council of Ministers decides after the death of Stalin: “…in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peace loving peoples.” 19-03-1954 Resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations In East Europe an uprising starts on June 4, 1953 in East Germany. Unrest has increased in Czechoslovakia and Rumenia. Back


Meetings....

  • 14-06-1950 – 23-06-1950: 2nd Session of the 1st CPPCC National Committee
  • 07-07-1950 and 10-07-1950: CMC 1st meeting on national defense
  • 04-08-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
  • 02-10-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
  • 03-10-1950: Enlarged Secretariat meeting
  • 06-10-1950: Enlarged CMC meeting on Korea
  • 13-10-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
  • 18-10-1950: Politburo meeting on Korea
  • 02-10-1952 – 12-10-1952: Asia and Pacific Rim Peace Conference
  • Continue to Article 55