Article 54 of the Common Program

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As seen in Article 11 of the Common Program, the struggle against imperialism is one of the main objects of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. For that reason, the government decides to overtly or/and secretly support the independence struggle against France, UK, the Netherlands, and US in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. At the meeting between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong on February 3, 1949, Mikoyan proposed to establish an Asiatic bureau to coordinate the actions of several communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong had the opinion that this was still too early. “One may return to this question when our forces take the south of the country and our position strengthens.” In July 1949 when Liu Shaoqi was in Moscow. Stalin reraised the Asiatic affair and proposed a division of tasks in the struggle against imperialism. China will have the leading role in the East. This division was practical, not ideological, in 1949 the SU had not the military power to support revolution in Asia. It also lacked financial funds and Stalin still had to stabilize the Russian influence in East Europe. In his own country, he had to reconstruct the economic sector after the destruction during the Second World War. In September 1949, Zhou Enlai in his speech at the installation of the new foreign affairs department argued that national interests is in the center of the daily routine of the foreign affairs policy “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.” April 1950 Zhou Enlai told officials of the party intelligence service that the PRC recognizes the significance of supporting revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia and is committed to the broader goal of global liberation. Moving forward, we must assist oppressed nations and allies in the East, including Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam, in their struggles for independence. Our priorities include consolidating world peace, preventing the rearmament of Japan and Germany, and focusing on liberating Taiwan, decisively defeating Jiang Jieshi, and aiding the revolutionary efforts of weaker nations in Southeast Asia.

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In 1952, an important change occured in the Chinese foreign policy. In his speech to Chinese diplomats, Zhou Enlai told them China will focus less on freedom fighters, but more on "…the relations between states.” and besides the concentration on the brotherly states (East Europe), the policy will focus on in the immediate vicinity of China. In the relationship with neighboring countries, the emphasis lies on friendship rather than on ideological similarity. In September 1952, Zhou Enlai discussed this new foreign policy with Stalin "...relations with Southeast Asian countries they are maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means."
Priority of this new policy was to make a ‘security block’. One of the main reasons for this change was the failure of communist revolutions in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines. The ‘freedom fighters’ were minimalized to small guerrilla groups fighting in the jungle. The role of the US in Southeast Asia became more active and adopted the role of the old European colonizers. This policy resulted in military treaties between the US and Thailand (October 17, 1950) and the Philippines (August 30, 1950). China was afraid to become encircled by enemies. This fear was increased after military treaties between the US and South Korea (October 1, 1953) and with Japan (March 8, 1954). The anxiety heightened after the signing of the SEATO pact of September 8, 1954. Even prior to Stalin's demise, China aspired to attain parity with the Soviet Union. As a constituent of the socialist bloc, the PRC's ambition to reclaim its perceived "rightful" status on the global stage overshadowed Sino-Soviet relations and the cohesion of the socialist coalition. For Mao, reinstating China's predominant role in postwar global politics hinged on asserting authority and influence within bloc affairs. The new policy was shaped by a number of initiatives. The first one was the organization of a peace conference of countries in the Asiatic and Pacific Region in Beijing.(See Article 11) Between October 2 till 12 October 1952, 37 countries were represented. Remarkable was the invitation of the leaders of the Trotskyist Party of Ceylon, almost the only Trotskyist party that had managed to gain some mass following. (Trotskyism was in the eyes of Stalin more dangerous than any bourgeois or fascist influence) The Congress condemned the US actions in Korea and demanded the return of POWs and presented a call to India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problems in a peaceful way. In contrast to the trade union congress of November 1949 (see below), this meeting emphasized less revolution and struggle and more cultural exchange and peace making.
A second initiative was the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries on May 3, 1954. This organization invited and escorted foreign delegations. It was engaged in people-to-people diplomacy. A third activity was the backing of a SU proposal of September 23, 1953. In this scheme, both countries called for a 5 country meeting with the US, UK, and France to reduce the international tension. This conference was held in Berlin from January 25 till February 17, 1954, but without the participation of the People's Republic of China. These four countries decided to hold a peace conference in Geneva on Korea and Indochina with all involved parties.(People's Republic of China included) The fourth initiative was of fundamental nature. The formation of a new foreign policy based on 5 principles (和平共处五项原则) non-aggression; no interference in national affairs; mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These principles were an elaboration of a provision in the treaty that China and Tibet conclude on May 23, 1951. Article 14 of this agreement reads: “The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.” Zhou Enlai stated on June 5, 1953: “Today internationally, the main contradiction is the question of peace and war. We advocate resolution of all international conflicts through peaceful consultation. They [the U.S. imperialists] just advocate resolution by war Imperialism is afraid of peace, and also of war. We are not afraid, of peace." During the preparations for the Geneva conference, this new foreign policy gets even more stature. See for details on Geneva conference Article 11. On March 2, 1954, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the CCP, Zhou Enlai defends his policy. “At the(Geneva) conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favourable to relaxing the tense international situation. …”
The Five Principles served as the cornerstone of treaties, such as those with India, replacing the authoritarian norm of proletarian internationalism within the socialist bloc. On a global scale, peaceful coexistence emerged as Beijing's strategy for forging a unified front in its confrontation with the United States. On July 7, 1954, Mao Zedong spoke out as a supporter of this policy. “Right now, it has been impossible [for us] to shut the door tight; instead, the situation is very advantageous and we need to walk out the door… To relax international tension, countries of different systems can peacefully co-exist. This slogan originated by the Soviet Union, and it is our slogan as well. Now it becomes the catch word in [Anthony] Eden’s mouth, in Nehru’s, too. They want to relax international tension as well” He even wanted to negotiate with the US on the issue of expatriates. Merely two weeks later, Mao renounced this declaration, emphasizing that the principle of 'peaceful coexistence' should not be extended to Beijing’s dealings with Washington but rather should be leveraged to isolate the US imperialists. Concurrently, Beijing vehemently opposed Moscow’s endeavor to employ the Five Principles in its interactions with Washington. Mao Zedong started an international crisis at the end of July. A propaganda campaign ‘to liberate Taiwan’ started and military operations in the coastal area of Zhejiang province took place. Finally, in January 1955, resulting in the takeover of the island Yijiangshan.

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The developments in Indochina (nowadays Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) and Korea are a good showcase of the foreign policy of China. The focus of this article lies on Vietnam. After the capitulation of Japan in 1945, Ho Chih Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam. On March 6, 1946, after negotiations with France, a division along the 16th parallel became a fact. At the end of 1946, skirmishes occured and the conflict between the French Republic and the Vietnamese People's Republic escalated. For years, Ho Chih Minh sought support from the SU and later also from the People's Republic of China. On January 19, 1950 China recognized Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). and both parties signed an agreement to supply weapons to Vietnam. On January 30, 1950, Ho Chih Minh and the political leaders Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi had a secret meeting in Beijing. A few days later Ho Chih Minh travelled to Moscow. He joined Mao Zedong in a visit to Stalin. Stalin offered to provide aid and said “Towards Vietnam we feel equal concern as we do for China’ and: “From now on, you [Ho] can count on our assistance, especially now after the war of resistance, our surplus materials are plenty, and we will ship them to you through China. But because of limits of natural conditions, it will be mainly China that helps you. What China lacks, we will provide.” Mao Zedong adds “Whatever China has and Vietnam needs we will provide.” With this position, China was in danger of losing or postponing diplomatic recognition by France.
The Chinese regime had several motives to back Ho Chih Minh. One is the international solidarity of all communist parties in Asia. Mao Zedong declared in 1947, anti-imperialist forces in the East must unite to oppose both imperialist oppression and domestic reactionaries, striving to liberate over a billion oppressed people. Through collective effort and collaboration with global democratic forces, it is possible to defeat imperialist agendas, prevent a third world war, overthrow reactionary regimes, and achieve lasting peace. However, the path ahead will be challenging, requiring readiness to confront significant resistance from enemies both domestic and foreign. The division made in July 1949 (during the visit of Liu Shaoqi, see above) in a West bloc and an East block made PRC responsible for actions in Asia. A success in Vietnam would show the world that the Chinese revolution could be used as a model for all underdeveloped countries. There is no evidence that the SU directly supported Vietnam before 1955.
The second reason was of national interest. An escalation of the conflict between France and DRV could provide trouble at the frontier. In Yunnan, at the border with the DRV, there were still GMD troops. Moreover, the fear of US intervention reinforced the will to support Ho Chih Minh. Beijing decided to send a delegation to improve the contacts between China and the DRV. In the first instance, the delegation led by Luo Guibo was thought to stay for 3 months, but in April 1950 the Vietnamese Communist Party asked for military support, which was given for more than 8 years. Another reason for support, several Vietnamese and Chinese leaders knew each other from their stay in Paris, Moscow, or Nanjing. General Cheng Geng and General Wei Guoqing coordinated from Beijing the Chinese Military Advice Group (CMAG). The CMAG started to train DRV troops. Chen Geng provided partly the military strategy. He consulted frequently Mao Zedong. This strategy was “Concentrating our forces and destroying the enemy troops by separating them” In September 1950, almost 20.000 soldiers are trained and they form the elite corps. Besides military training, the Chinese advisors help with the construction and improvement of roads near the border. The road workers are often GMD prisoners. Chinese advisors provide assistance in land reform in the North. "In 1951, China built a rail line from China into Vietnam to carry war supplies and other goods to Ho. In addition,..By 1953, Chinese heavy weapons arrived. By 1954, China had reportedly trained and supplied 40,000 Vietminh soldiers.⁵ Meanwhile, China’s shipments of supplies to the Vietminh had increased from 10 to 20 tons monthly in 1951 to 400 to 600 tons in 1953. Then it jumped to 4,000 tons a month. ⁶"

Chinese supply routes

October 13, 1950, the Vietnamese troops with the assistance of the Chinese advisors gained the first victory at the border area. The French troops retaliated and Ho Chih Minh and the CMAG asked for more military support. “On 22 July, the CCP Central Committee replied that the PRC would not send troops directly into fights in Vietnam, because this had long been an established principle. Chinese troops, however, could be deployed along the Chinese-Vietnamese border,..”

The situation changed slightly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong warned Deng Zihui "our troops should not go across the Sino-Vietnamese border by any means or on any occasions; it would be better to keep a distance from the border even in pursuit of KMT remnants." Mao, in particular, wanted Deng to see to it that his order "be strictly observed [because] otherwise we would be in big trouble.⁸⁹"
China and SU were convinced the situation in Indochina had to be resolved at the negotiating table. On November 23, 1953, Mao Zedong sent a message to Ho Chi Minh, emphasizing the importance of the DRV formally expressing its willingness to pursue peaceful negotiations to end the Vietnam War. Mao argued that this approach would allow Vietnam to claim the mantle of peace, support the struggles of the French people and peace advocates worldwide, and expose the false narrative of French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for rejecting peace—a tactic to shift responsibility for the war onto Vietnam. Additionally, this strategy would exploit and deepen the divisions between the French and the Americans. The Soviet leaders asked China to put pressure on Ho Chih Minh to come to the Geneva conference. To extend the pressure on Ho Chih Minh, the decision was made to stop training Vietnamese soldiers on Chinese territory.

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See for details on the Geneva Conference on Indochina Article 11. On May 7, 1954, one day before the opening of the peace talks in Geneva, the Vietnamese conquered the strategic important city of Dien Bien Phu. After more than 2 months of talks, all parties agreed on a compromise. Vietnam will be divided in 2 parts with the 17th latitude as the border, and a plebiscite in July 1956 will define the future of Vietnam. (This public consultation was never held). With this result, the Chinese delegation hoped to avoid any American intervention in Indochina. The following year, Beijing endeavors to persuade Hanoi to acknowledge this division to prevent any external interference. Beijing began to withdraw its advisers in 1955. North Vietnam was viewed as a buffer zone. With mutual hostility and suspicion regarding each other’s motives in Vietnam, China and the United States backed divergent administrations in Vietnam, finding partition more expedient than any alternative compromise. Ultimately, the domestic factor outweighted communist solidarity. The decision lied between accepting a divided Vietnam, with the North communist and the South pro-western, or continuing the war with the Americans, who might replace the French. Zhou Enlai's advocacy for the former option vividly illustrates China's prioritization of immediate national security and economic development needs over the long-term vision of a broader regional "area of peace."

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In 1950, the PRC decided to support the North Korea government in his strive for conquering the whole territory of the Korean peninsula. In the 1930’s, the Japanese army invaded Korea. During this occupation, North Korean and Chinese communists fought in the Northeast of China against this enemy. After the capitulation of Japan in August 1945, Kim Il sung (the leader of the Korean Communist party) asked the SU troops in Korea to hand over the captured Japanese weaponry. A part of this military hardware found its way to the Chinese communists in Northeast China. Korea served as a vital supply route for weaponry, particularly for the PLA in South Manchuria. North Korea, though often overlooked, played a crucial role as a rear base, providing significant support to the PLA. Between the latter half of 1947 and early 1948, over 520,000 tons of goods for the CCP were transported or exchanged through North Korea. Additionally, more than 20,000 CCP members and supporters traversed the region during this period.
During the Moscow conference of December 1945, the delegates of the SU, US, and UK decided to select the 38th parallel as the dividing line to disarm the Japanese troops. The SU disarmed and administered the northern part, the US the southern part. In 1948, two separate countries emerged; The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRK) and the Republic of Korea (RoK). The SU and US troops left the peninsula, only ‘advisors’ remained. Both Korean governments saw themselves as a representant of the whole nation and were in pursuit of reunification.

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On March 7, 1949, Kim Il sung demanded from Stalin an explicit authorization for an attack on South Korea. Stalin declined, citing three key concerns: (1) the North Korean army lacked overwhelming superiority over the South's forces; (2) American troops were still stationed in the South and would likely intervene if hostilities broke out; and (3) the agreement on the 38th parallel between the Soviet Union and the United States remained in effect and would not be violated by the Soviet side. Stalin asked Kim Il Sung if a favorable opportunity could arise to launch a counterattack in response to an attack from the South. Both Stalin and Mao Zedong had doubts about Kim’s plans. In May 1949, Mao Zedong agreed to hand over Korean divisions of the PLA, as soon as Kim needs them. In the spring of 1949, Mao explicitly opposed any military action by North Korea against South Korea, asserting that such a possibility should only be entertained following the conclusion of the Chinese civil war and after consultations with the Soviet Union. On September 24, 1949, the Politburo of the CPSU again denied to authorize an attack, because the situation was not ripe for an attack. “From the political side, a military attack on the south by you is also not prepared for,…” This answer was in accordance with the previous encounter between Stalin and Kim Il sung on March 7, 1949 Stalin also informed Mao Zedong about his refusal.
When Mao Zedong was visiting the SU, Kim Il sung secretly visited Stalin on February 9, 1950. The Russian leader was prepared to deliver military support in weaponry and credit. In a following secret visit to Stalin from April 8 till 25 1950, Kim Il sung received permission to attack the South on the explicit condition that Mao Zedong also agreed. Stalin stated “…the present situation has changed from the situation in the past and, that North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed with China and personally with comrade Mao Tse-tung…” From May 13 till 16, Kim Il sung visited Mao Zedong in the Chinese capital, the Korean leader overtook him with the consent of Stalin. Mao Zedong did not trust Kim Il sung and sought conformation from Stalin Stalin had maneuvered Mao Zedong in an awkward position. When he agreed, all credits go to Stalin and China had to pay. When he disagreed, he would be accused not to be solidary in the struggle against imperialism, and he runs the chance of getting no support for his invasion plans for Taiwan. To put it in a positive way, Stalin offered Mao Zedong the right to veto the attack. It is not clear why Stalin thinks the situation has changed, perhaps he refers to the final victory of the PLA in China, perhaps to the successful test of the Russian atomic bomb in August 1949 or the foundation of the NATO in April 1949. Stalin sees this as a real threat in West Europe and the decreasing willingness of the US to intervene in Asia. A credible rationale is that the war resolved all of Stalin’s security and diplomatic predicaments: the military conflict between the US and China constrained US influence in Asia, afforded the Soviet Union the opportunity to strengthen European socialism, and bolstered Soviet authority over China.
On December 30, 1949, the US announced that the present US troops in Asia would only protect Japan and the Philippines. Korea and Taiwan are not part of their military operation field. The recently concluded friendship treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union stipulated that the Soviet Union would eventually relinquish key ports in the East, such as Harbin and Lüshun. This made the Korean Peninsula increasingly appealing, as it could offer the Soviet Union access to a warm-water port on the Pacific. If North Korea were to occupy South Korea, the Soviet Union could gain control over the entire peninsula, with ports like Inchon and Pusan serving as replacements for Lüshun.
In April and May 1950, Mao Zedong fulfilled his appointment with Kim Il sung and 50000 Korean soldiers of the PLA are sent back to Korea. Besides, soldiers, Korean workers, medical, and other personnel were pushed to go to North Korea. Two days after Kim Il sung had left Beijing, Zhou Enlai promised Stalin China will send ‘volunteers’ to the DRK. Stalin answered: “We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel.”

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Kim Il sung overtook Mao Zedong for a second time when on June 25, 1950 he (without warning to Mao Zedong) opened the offensive on South Korea. On June 30, 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP communicated its updated policy to the PLA, emphasizing China's condemnation of the American incursion into Taiwan and interference in China's internal matters. The strategy entailed persisting with the demobilization of the army, enhancing naval development, and postponing the liberation of Taiwan. A week earlier, on June 23, 1950, Mao Zedong reassured the delegates of the 2nd plenum of the CPPCC, the period of war is over, and the focus lies on Land reform. The land reform act will promulgated on June 30.
Just two days after the invasion on June 27 the UN condemned the attack and on July 7 the UN called its members “…(to) furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” Meanwhile, the SU and the PRC were in constant contact how to assist the DRK. The Chinese government was deeply concerned about the lack of Russian air support and a possible US intervention. The SU was only prepared to train Chinese pilots. In July, the PLA started preparations for a future assistance of the DRK. The Northeast Border Defense Army was formed. To prepare the nation for a future intervention, the regime started on July 17, a propaganda week against the US aggression in Taiwan and Korea. The recruitment of volunteers started, each village would be given a quota, and this quota would usually be filled without much persuasion. During the Korean War, many ex-GMD soldiers were sent to the front. See Article 20 .
Mao Zedong attempted to persuade Stalin to make sure that Kim Il Sung knew that he must agree to conduct negotiations to cease hostilities but his attempts were in vain. At the politburo meeting of August 4, Mao Zedong told the Chinese army, and the top of the CCP intervention was inevitable. “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this.”
After initial successes of the North Korean forces, the South Koreans with the aid of UN troops counterattacked, and when the American troops landed in Inchon, the situation for the North Koreans deteriorated significantly. Kim Il sung was desperate and asked Stalin for immediate relief. “…at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union. If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people's democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.” October 1 RoK troops crossed the 38th latitude and Stalin reached out to Mao Zedong, requesting assistance by deploying troops to support the Koreans. He urged Mao to move at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel immediately, providing cover for North Korean forces to organize combat reserves in the area. Stalin suggested the Chinese divisions be presented as volunteers, led by Chinese commanders. He noted that he had not informed, nor planned to inform, the North Korean leadership of this proposal but was confident they would welcome the move once they became aware of it.

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In the subsequent days, numerous discussions took place within the Chinese Politburo and between Moscow and Beijing. On October 2, Mao Zedong sent a cable to Stalin, stating that the intervention forces were still unprepared. He also expressed concern that such an action would likely provoke open conflict between the United States and China, potentially drawing the Soviet Union into the war under Article 1 of the Friendship Treaty signed on February 14, 1950. Mao noted that many CCP comrades believed it was necessary to approach the situation with caution. It was only on October 8, 1950, Stalin informed Kim Il sung about China's hesitation. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to the Black Sea villa of Stalin. On October 11, they had a meeting with Stalin to ask for more information on SU support, particularly on Russian air support. The same day, Stalin and Zhou Enlai informed Mao Zedong, they had come to the conclusion that China at this moment was not capable of intervening in Korea. Mao Zedong agreed, but two days later he revised his decision. Mao Zedong informed Zhou Enlai on October 13 "As the result of an emergency agreement of all the various members of the Politburo, we have reached the unanimous opinion that it is advantageous for us to send troops to Korea. In the initial period, they will attack the ROK forces. In this regard, we have considerable confidence." On October 15, Stalin and Zhou Enlai met again and Stalin reiterated his refusal to supply air support. The lack of experience of North Koreans and Chinese in aerial warfare meant that Communist airpower was consistently viewed as an additional asset, rather than a substantial element of any significant offensive. Consequently, the focus in Communist strategic planning remained on the deployment of ground forces. On October 18, under heavy pressure from Mao Zedong, the politburo decided to send Chinese People's Army (CVA) into Korea.

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Primarily, it was a historical reality that the peninsula had been a significant launching point for the conquest of continental Asia, notably by Japan. Consequently, any significant disruption to the delicate stability of the peninsula would evoke serious concern, irrespective of China's domestic political system. It was not that Beijing was afraid of a Japanese invasion, but they feared an invasion of the Taiwan regime. In that case, there would be an anti-communist state at the border. In case of an armed conflict with the US, China prefered to fight this clash outside the mainland. There were 3 potential areas from where the regime feared an attack, Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. From a tactical viewpoint, Korea was preferred, it is a mountainous Region, and there is a direct supply line from the SU. On February 17, 1958 Zhou Enlai expressed in his speech at CVA cadre's gathering that a confrontation between the US imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was merely where it would occur. This decision was not solely in the hands of the imperialists—we had a say as well. The American imperialists chose the Korean battlefield for this showdown, which worked to our advantage. We deliberately decided to confront the Americans and support the Koreans. In hindsight, it is clear that choosing Vietnam as the battleground, or the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait, would have posed far greater challenges for us.
The treaty of February 14, 1950, with the SU, obliged the latter to help the PRC. Beijing wanted neither American soldiers nor Russian troops on its territory. They were concerned about the potential loss of the significant industrial region in the Northeast. According to the secret protocol, citizens from third countries, such as the US and Britain, were prohibited from settling or engaging in any industrial, financial, trade, or related activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Similarly, the Soviet Union would enforce similar restrictions in the Soviet Far East and the Central Asian republics. This agreement aimed to shield Manchuria from external interference. Stalin's effort to solidify the strategic complex before the Korean War underscored his meticulous attention to establishing a favorable strategic environment. Mao Zedong might have felt compelled to comply, having recently forged an alliance with the Soviet Union crucial for the PRC's economic advancement and national security. Mao understood the importance of providing the assistance Stalin expected, as a triumph over the US army would ensure Stalin's fulfillment of the newly ratified treaty, albeit reluctantly, with Mao. Additionally, Mao was aware that he couldn't successfully occupy Taiwan without Soviet assistance.
Preventing a wave of refugees from flooding into Northeast China was a key factor in Beijing's internal rationale for intervening in Korea. The alternative would have been to tolerate the quasi-permanent presence of North Korean consulates and enclaves scattered along the border, from Dandong to Ji’an/Tonghua and further north to Yanbian.
Domestic factors also played a significant role in the decision-making process. According to party sources, the American intervention in Korea, particularly the Inchon landing, provided hope for China's counterrevolutionary factions. Various resistance groups, now bolstered by landlords, secret societies, and unemployed soldiers, perceived better prospects on the horizon and intensified their opposition. Their actions included widespread acts of violence that extended into the Northeast, the logistical hub for Chinese forces in Korea. They also spread rumors and intimidated local party officials. A common sentiment expressed was: "You're like a frog in a well, unaware of the broader situation and still in chaos. The third world war is imminent, and the Nationalist army will soon return." On October 10, 1950, the CC announced the instructions to suppress the contra revolutionaries. See Article 7 . The national campaign against US aggression was also a part to counteract internal problems. See Article 49. In its editorial of December 25, 1952, the Renmin Ribao remarked: "…as the facts of the past two years have proved, the struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea is still a great driving force for the construction work of our country in all aspects. …, the struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea not only did not cause the interruption of our country's economic recovery and reconstruction work, on the contrary, it further promoted the successful completion of this work." A sixth reason to support the Koreans can also be traced to a historical factor; the aforementioned assistance of Korean soldiers to the PLA. Throughout the Chinese Civil War, there had been ongoing political, military, economic, and cultural interactions along the Sino-Korean border. Notably, the northern provinces of North Korea served as a crucial refuge for PLA soldiers and supplies during critical phases of the civil war in the northeast. This sanctuary spared numerous lives and valuable resources from destruction by the GMD forces. Zhou Enlai expressed the band as follows: “China and Korea are neighbouring countries as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth are exposed to the cold. If the DPRK is subjugated by US imperialism, there will be no security for northeast China.” A reason which also should be mentioned is the prestige China and Mao Zedong will gain in Asia from resisting the US. “…the perceived American disdain for China as a weak country and the Chinese as an inferior people made them angry… how to face the ‘US imperialists’ was to the CCP a problem concerning values and beliefs, which was related to their feelings as Chinese”
Article 11 of the Common Program shows that anti imperialism is an important factor in foreign affairs of the PCR. Mao considered the Korean War within the broader framework of the ongoing Asian revolution, where Communist China held significant sway. He saw it as the "proletariat internationalist duty" of the Chinese to counter American aggression in Korea and aimed to catalyze a wave of revolution in the East, following China's example. Mao believed that Communist China's security could only be ensured through revolutions spreading across Asia, or even globally. This dedicated commitment to revolution clarifies Mao's readiness to engage in the conflict prior to the Inchon landing and China's assertive objectives during the war.
Naturally, there are downsides to consider. The nation has been embroiled in conflict for over 15 years. Critics highlighted several obstacles: firstly, the country had yet to recover from prolonged warfare; secondly, land reform remained unfinished; thirdly, the 'liberation' of Taiwan and Tibet still loomed, alongside the need to eradicate bandits and remnants of the GMD on the mainland; fourthly, the Chinese military was inadequately equipped and trained; fifthly, a segment of the population and the army harbored anti-war sentiments. Consequently, they argued that unless absolutely necessary, it would be preferable to avoid war altogether, or alternatively, China should wait for three to five years until it was adequately prepared to intervene. In 1951, about 60 percent of China's tax revenue went to the defense budget, most of which was spent on purchasing Russian weapons.

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On October 25, 1950, the CVA crossed the border. Mao Zedong ordered to form an invasion defends the intervention: “In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory” The next day the CCP informed the public. Entering the war was not only a necessity but also a feasible endeavor, as we can certainly prevail against US imperialism, which is essentially a paper tiger. Despite the economic superiority and better-equipped status of their army of the US, its global aggression faces widespread opposition from people worldwide, leading to its isolation. The US exhibits military vulnerabilities, with an overly extended front, a distant rear, insufficient troop strength, and low morale. Former powerful allies like Britain and France are no longer as influential, and Japan and West Germany are yet to be fully armed. The US no longer holds a monopoly on atomic weapons, and, in any case, these do not determine the outcome of victory or defeat. The ultimate triumph belongs to the Chinese and Korean people.

Mao Zedong was responsible for the overall strategy. Zhou Enlai hasdthe general command. He received the most important information and he displayd the most essential information to Mao Zedong. Peng Dehuai had the command in Korea in cooperation with the Korean army. The combined command of the CVA and the Korean People's Army (KPA) held authority over all regular and irregular units of both forces in Korea. Additionally, it managed military administration concerning logistics, railways, ports, and airfields. Upon consultation with Moscow, the leadership in Beijing permitted North Korea to transfer its army divisions to Manchuria for restructuring and training. By late October and early November, nine divisions had crossed the border and were deployed in the Northeastern and Yangtse River regions, with plans to open a pilot school for 2,600 pilots. During the Korean War, China's Northeast played a crucial role as a rear area for both the CVA and the KPA. On July 31, 1953, Peng Dehuai received North Korea's highest award. During the ceremony, Peng expressed reluctance in accepting the award, suggesting that it should have been given to "old pockmarked Gao Gang" for his leadership in the home front and logistics efforts during the war. The "Resist America Aid Korea" movement, which was a nationwide campaign, had a significant impact across all provinces and regions of China. However, Manchuria and the Northeast Government played a leading role in the campaign, serving once again as a testing ground for China's first modern conflict involving extensive logistics networks, air support, and considerable mechanization. To address the challenges posed by the war, the Northeast Government and Gao Gang were granted extraordinary powers by the central government. Gao played a crucial role in coordinating efforts between the CVA in Korea, Soviet military assistance, KPA, and the CC in Beijing, which implemented a nationwide mobilization campaign. Gao Gang travelled twice to North Korea (08-11-1950 and 25-01-1951 - 30-01-1951) and once to SU (09-06-1951 - 20-06-1951) to coordinate war planning, a highly unusual step for a Regional leader.

On November 2, Chinese and American troops had the first skirmishes. That same month on the 25th, Mao Zedong’s son Mao Anying was killed during an American bombardment. The CVA campaign was very successful and on December 28, crossed the 38th latitude and shortly hereafter the South Korean capital Seoul was captured. See Map, Map, and Map. In November 1950 , China reacted positive to an attempt of the UN to solve the Korean affair. The attempt to achieve a truce came to nothing. Two months later, the UN attempted a new effort to come to a truce. Mao Zedong had the opinion that the US has two options: “1.Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. …2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.” Therefore Mao Zedong was not interested in a diplomatic solution. On February 1, 1951, the UN condemned the PRC as aggressor in the Korean conflict.

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January 1951, the front turned and the UN troops started to march to the North, the Chinese and North Korean troops were cornered. April 22, 1951, the CVA undertook a desperate attempt to turn the tide, this 5th campaign was a disaster. There were over 200.000 casualties. On the battlefield, the situation turned into a stalemate around the old demarcation line. Beijing was also losing on the diplomatic terrain, the UN accepted a resolution for an economic boycott of China. This reversal compelled the Chinese leadership to extensively discuss the situation in Korea with Stalin and Kim Il sung. On June 3, 1951, Kim Il sung arrived in Beijing to talk about an armistice. Mao Zedong convinced the Korean leader to accept the old border and to prepare himself for a protracted war. Stalin wanted to continue the war. In June 1951, Gao Gang, Kim Il sung and Stalin negotiated about the conditions to talk about an armistice June 23, The Russian ambassador to the UN, asked for the possibilities to come to negotiations. Mao Zedong supported this request because it gave them the upper hand and he hoped “If negotiations begin, it is extremely necessary that you (Stalin) personally lead them, so that we do not find ourselves in a disadvantageous position.” Stalin did not want to be maneuvered in this position and gave the responsibility totally in the hands of the Chinese. “In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him]” July 10, 1951, the negotiations started in Kaesong (North Korea). There were several obstacles to overcome. The most important was the distrust of both parties. Zhou Enlai explained “They (USA) attempt to delay the negotiations by displaying their strength, creating tension and pressuring us in order to reach a cease- fire on favourable terms. “But he adds: “We are willing to settle the Korean, Far East and world problems peacefully, but we must not fear righteous, anti-aggressor wars for that is the only possibility of obtaining a lasting peace.” The position of the demarcation line was also a big obstacle. On October 25, 1951, the discussion resumed. This time in Panmunjon village in the Demilitarized Zone. Stalin warned Mao Zedong to slacken the talks. “We consider it correct that the Chinese/ Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations”. Mao Zedong was also convinced that these delay techniques were profitable for China. In this way he got the newest SU weaponry and learned modern fighting techniques. Stalin expressed irritation regarding these arms shipments. He chastised the Chinese for attempting to acquire all the weapons within one year, stating that it was "physically impossible and entirely unthinkable." The Chinese negotiators mistrusted the US based on the peace negotiations between the GMD and the CCP during the civil war. After examining the history of cease-fire negotiations during the Chinese civil war, the CCP leadership harbored profound distrust and suspicion of American mediation and involvement. They ultimately rejected the impartiality of Marshall's mission (1945-1947), believing that the cease-fires mediated by Marshall were schemes to enable Nationalist troops to regroup for subsequent attacks. However, they also maintained a pragmatic stance toward cease-fires. On November 27, 1951, both parties reached an agreement on the position of the demarcation line. A big issue during the negotiations were the prisoners of war.The Chinese demanded that each POW shall return to his fatherland, the other party that each POW can decide for himself where to go. Many Chinese POWs wanted to go Taiwan, which was unacceptable for Beijing. The talks bog down on this topic. On a small scale the fighting resumed. In August and September 1952 Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Kim Il sung had talks with Stalin. The latter was convinced the POWs have to return to their fatherland. On March 30, 1953, after the death of Stalin, Zhou Enlai announced China agreed on the repatriation of the wounded and to the free choice of each POW in his destination. A clear victory for the UN.

“Some 50,000 Chinese and North Korean POWs refused repatriation, but any assessment of the value of this moral and propaganda victory must be tempered by the knowledge that the additional 15 months of fighting cost more than 125,000 UNC and some 250,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties” On April 26, 1953, the negotiations started again, but also the preparation for a new military campaign.

Even on July 13, the CVA started a new campaign which lasted until July 27, the day the truce was signed by both parties. The SU were too busy with national problems (who will be the successor of Stalin) and political unrest in East Europe to interfere.The economic embargo on strategic goods was not withdrawn.

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The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteer Army, victorious forever!

A Korean delegation led by Kim Il sung visited the People's Republic of China from November 12 till November 25, 1953. The visit resulted in a ten-year economic and cultural treaty. In 1955, the CVA started its withdrawal. At the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il sung in November 1957, they decided to have a complete withdrawal of the CVA from Korea. On October 26, 1958, the last Chinese soldiers left Korea. See Poster 1959

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Chapter 7 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents