The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954



Generally speaking, the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and the Soviet Union and related documents signed on 14 February were what the Chinese had hoped to attain. They protected China’s sovereignty and economic interests and paved the way for New China to abolish all its unequal treaties with foreign countries. But for Stalin, the Soviet strategic goal secured through the Yalta agreements and the Sino–Soviet Treaty of 1945, that is, access to the sea and ice-free ports in the Pacific, would be lost—at the end of 1952 at the latest. ...First, the easy solution and outcome of the talks on the Mongolian question—one of the two factors in the Soviet strategic goal in the Far East—removed a major source of discontent and a potential block in Stalin’s mind. At the same time, Stalin knew very well that China was trying to trade its concession on Mongolia for Soviet concessions on the Chinese Changchun Railway.
Second, the USSR and the United States were locked in a global cold war. One of Stalin’s important strategic steps was to bring China into the socialist bloc headed by the Soviet Union in order to control the situation in Asia and confront the Americans. This was the basic reason for the Soviets to ally with New China. page 58 Third, Stalin might have had a well-conceived plan by which he could abandon Soviet interests in northeast China while maintaining Soviet strate- gic objectives in the Far East generally. He was bound to search for a com- pensatory measure to foster this traditional Russian aspiration. As a result, the Korean issue found its way onto Moscow’s agenda and Stalin’s map. At this time, only the Korean Peninsula could in some measure satisfy the So- viet Union’s desire for a suitable base for its Pacific fleet, an ice-free port on the Pacific Ocean that could be linked with the shortest possible rail link to the eastern part of the Soviet Union. The core of the plan was to change the Soviet policy towards the Korean Peninsula from a defensive posture north of the 38th parallel to an all-out offensive strategy. page 59 Fourth, it was quite possible that out of his resentment against Mao, Stalin decided to give Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader, a green light for his invasion plan
In the long run, the Chinese experiences during the Korean had a profound effect on the future development of China's strategy and foreign policy. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders not forget Stalin's betrayal at a crucial juncture, leaving troops without proper air support, thus making China vulnerable pursuing its established goals in the war. The reliability of the ing to one side" approach, the cornerstone of Communist early foreign policy, was thus in doubt. In contemplating the of the Korean War, Mao could not ignore the role played by technology and equipment in a modern war. The Chinese achieve victory largely because of their backwardness in the logical fields. In the years to come, Mao would still emphasize importance of the "human factor" in modern warfare—in any the Chinese had pushed the Americans back to the 38th Parallel the Chinese-Korean border by outnumbering the UN forces sessing, in Mao's belief, a higher mental status. He would for the development of China's own atomic bomb. The future of China's foreign policy and security strategy would be conducted in a setting where the Korean War had left its indelible stamp. Chen Jian (2016). China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950—1951. page 41.

Groot describes "...more extreme examples of wasted talent, such as intellectuals who had returned from overseas but were then forced to work as cart pullers and cigarette sellers. There were chemists teaching languages, philosophers acting as librarians, and lawyers as bookkeepers. 54"managing transitions the chinese communist party, united front work corporatism and hegemony. Page 76

Shen (2015). Page 57 [↩] [Cite]
Shen (2015). Page 60 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2016). Page 41 [↩] [Cite]

Chapter 7 of Common Program