Part 8: Complaints about recruitment

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Six different groups can be distinguished to ameliorate the cadre shortage. They were (1) existing cadres generally known as "old cadres," (2) young high school or college graduates, (3) activists from mass movements such as land reform (most of them came from the worker and peasant classes), (4) old nonparty intellectuals who were scattered throughout the society, (5) demobilized PLA men, and (6) selected officials from the former Nationalist government. The latter ones were re-educated. In Beijing, there were three institutions involved in these attempts to alter their attitudes. The soviet experts who helped at these programs were not satisfied with the ‘soft’ approach of these former GMD officials and were not convinced they really had changed their attitude and behaviour. The CCP also tried to solve the shortage problem of capable officials by starting a training program for students on special training facilities. In the spring and summer of 1949, almost 50.000 students had followed a training to serve as civil officials in south China.
These fresh cadres lacked systematic political education and had not endured the hardships of revolutionary warfare. City leaders anticipated that these newly appointed officials, along with the southbound cadres, would constitute the majority of government institutions, with the retained GMD employees making up less than 30 percent. However, in reality, CCP cadres formed the majority only in the Bureaus of Public Security (80 percent) and Finance (60.2 percent), while in departments such as Health, Education, Labor, Public Projects, Industry and Commerce, and Internal Affairs, they represented the minority (19–36 percent). There is a big difference between the party cadres of north China and south China. Mainly the northern party cadres are illiterate and have a rural background. The cadres of the south, namely, from Guangdong, are from the city and have had an education. However, as the CCP extended its influence into Guangdong after 1949, there was a gradual reversal in the educational composition of the party. The lower ranks started to be filled with illiterate activists. Simultaneously, the indigenous leadership comprising intellectuals and students who had joined the party during the Japanese occupation was purged in the early 1950s. Many of its prominent members were subsequently replaced by northern cadres who exhibited greater loyalty to the party center.
At the local administration level, the CCP faced significant challenges in identifying capable individuals. There was an ongoing process of unknown upward mobility, with laborers and peasants attaining economic or political positions that would have been unattainable under the GMD regime or the previous imperial rule. Many of these individuals lacked the qualifications for their roles, with their social background being their primary credential. As the civil war neared its conclusion and land reform initiatives concluded, numerous CCP cadres found themselves confronting uncertainty. They struggled to address emerging issues among the rural populace, hesitated to adhere to party regulations, and no longer perceived personal benefits from continued party service. The allure of the revolutionary cause waned, and some cadres questioned the rationale for enduring further hardships when there were limited gains to be obtained. The possibility of relocation to southern regions or conscription into the military instilled fear and anxiety among some cadres, leading to the renouncement of their party membership or deep depression. These complex circumstances fostered a sense of disillusionment among certain CCP cadres during this period.
The method to keep non-communist and ex-GMD party cadres on their jobs was, in the eyes of many CCP members, a big mistake and not justified. Many peasants viewed becoming a state cadre in mutual aid teams or cooperatives (see Article 29 ) as an escape from the hardships of farming. Securing a government job meant joining the state payroll system and leaving behind the difficult life of a peasant. Each month, they would receive a stable salary sufficient to support their families. Faced with such a rare and appealing opportunity, rural Party members, village model laborers, and activists were eager to seize it. To land these positions, some farmers were even willing to inflate production figures to attract the attention of CCP county cadres or higher-level officials.
In 1951, reports from Guangdong highlighted growing resentment among illiterate village cadres, who felt increasingly frustrated that intellectuals from the old society were quickly gaining power solely due to their superior educational backgrounds. They did not necessarily blame the intellectuals themselves but held the Communist Party accountable for neglecting its moral obligation and historical responsibility to the peasants. Recruitment issues also emerged in other areas. For instance, there was a shortage of performers for propaganda teams. Performers were often recruited randomly from the streets, including two teenage girls and an elderly woman who juggled plates in public. Another cadre brought in a former singing girl from a brothel. All of these individuals were classified as formal cadres and received benefits from the supply system. However, this approach to forming a propaganda team proved costly, and the performance of rural ballads was not well-received in the ‘foreign’ port city of Qingdao.
Mao Zedong needed to clarify these tactics to his veteran party members. "Don’t assume you deserve special treatment because of your wartime accomplishments. Remember, one democratic figure can be as valuable as an entire army. By gaining the support of someone like Li Jishen, we potentially saved the lives of twenty to thirty thousand comrades and secured military victory one or two years earlier than anticipated. This is how we will proceed, and it is the only feasible approach, whether you agree with it or not."
Li Jishen ,Fu Zuoyi , Chen Mingren , Wei Lihuang Cheng Qian , ,Tang Shengzhi were some of the former GMD generals who got high positions in the new regime. There were complaints about "…ex-Kuomintang officials, who were trying to be more Communist than the Communist, were very much worse than any of the regular Communist." Not all GMD cadres were lucky. Many of them were imprisoned and sent to Fushun re-education camp in Liaoning or executed in 1950 or 1951. For example, the generals Gan Qingchi, Gong Xianxiang and Gan Fang. Others were put under house arrest and several of them committed suicide, for example Chen Guang. Middle to low-ranking GMD officers, special agents, and foot soldiers were the one suffered the most. CCP considered them untrustworthy. Most of them were executed in the "Zhen Fan" period from 1950 - 1951. In the period of 1950-1954, about 400 GMD generals deceased several of them in a natural way, some of them during battle and a couple of them as communist spies. The rest of them died in the hands of the PLA. See the table below which indicates death rate of GMD generals during the period of 1950-1954.

For example: On December 12, 1950, in Yuanling, a public trial was organized for tens of thousands of people and a meeting was held to execute Wang Yuanhua, Pan Zhuangfei, and Zhou Zhenhuan. They were all 3 GMD regiment commander and had received "life safety guarantee"

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In a letter to his nephew, Chen Yun emphasized, "You must remember that communists have the same rights as ordinary citizens under the laws of the state, and they should set an example by strictly adhering to these laws. The activities of revolutionary party members should solely aim to serve the people, with no expectation of reward." On November 8, 1949, Chen addressed party cadres regarding the tensions between old and new members: "The core issue lies in the relationship between veteran and new cadres. The 'new' cadres fear that the 'old' cadres do not trust them, while the 'old' cadres worry that the newcomers may not be dependable." He further advised, "Veteran comrades should not judge East China based on the experiences of Northeast China from a few years ago, and comrades from East China should avoid clinging to outdated perspectives about the Northeast."
Despite Chen Yun's words, cadres enjoyed numerous advantages, both symbolic and material, distributed according to their rank (twenty-six levels, or even thirty if the lowest state servants are included). For example, the front rows in theaters were always reserved for Communists, access to Beijing Hospital was limited to families in ranks one to seven, elite schools were reserved for the children of high-ranking cadres, and only the children of Party members and Communist Youth League members were permitted to study abroad, among other privileges.
A common complaint echoed in reports was dissatisfaction arising from food shortages, which sharply contrasted with the situation experienced by central leaders. In Beijing, akin to other communist capitals, exclusive stores were designated to serve the leadership. These stores exclusively stocked premium-grade meat, enabling high-ranking cadres and their families to procure unlimited quantities of pork. In fact, two such specialized stores in Beijing alone contributed to 16 percent of the capital's pork consumption. One district in Anshan, called "Taiding," was an exception to the general lack of funding for non-production-related construction. See Article 45. Originally built by the Japanese during the colonial period for high-ranking managers, it became the residential area for top CCP officials and Soviet experts after the founding of the PRC. The district was expanded in the 1950s with new Soviet-style houses and amenities, creating a privileged enclave for the city’s elite. Taiding was heavily guarded, and its residents enjoyed exclusive facilities, reinforcing a continuity between colonial and socialist eras.
Even in the laogai camps, (see Article 2 for anyone with a skill or the required professional know-how got ‘easier tasks’. In 1954, in western Qinghai province, the people holding such jobs were Communists who had “made mistakes” and were treated as first-class prisoners.
U's (2012) analysis, reveales that the ruling regime of the time provided a remarkable array of privileges to a select group of individuals outside the CCP. This exclusive category consisted of leaders from minor political parties, esteemed intellectuals, and prominent figures who had collaborated with the CCP in toppling the GMD government. These individuals enjoyed various advantages, including direct access to state leaders and influential assemblies, access to confidential policy information and participation in debates, prestigious appointments, government-funded travel and accommodation, and other perks. The extensive deference, honours, and authority bestowed upon these elites, coupled with the knowledge, connections, and resources they gained through their involvement in the united front, often fostered a personal, intellectual, and even emotional affinity towards the regime. However, it is important to note that not all aspects of the united front were viewed favourably by these elites, as they also experienced burdensome or punitive measures such as political re-education and wealth deprivation.

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According to historical analysis, the social background of individuals seeking employment within the party played a significant role in the selection process. Urban members were given preferential treatment compared to those with predominantly rural experiences. The primary source of potential political cadres stemmed from worker and peasant activists who were deemed politically reliable due to their recruitment from the most impoverished sectors, which had benefited greatly from the Communist revolution. However, their lack of formal education posed a challenge. Nevertheless, the regime justified their advancement into cadre positions by highlighting their extensive practical experience and steadfast class perspective, which enabled them to quickly grasp administrative practices once in office. This particular group predominantly filled entry-level positions, often serving in their hometowns or Regions. Their career trajectory typically involved first engaging as activists in mass movements, followed by party membership, and ultimately assuming leadership roles within newly established party-state institutions. In 1949, 13% of the administrators are members of the CCP. The decision made during the CCP Plenary Session in March 1949, which shifted the focus of the revolution from rural areas to urban centers, led to numerous challenges. Rather than embracing its rural revolutionary roots, the party criticized rural characteristics and work methods, favoring individuals with urban expertise over those it deemed purely village-born cadres. This preference persisted throughout the 1950s, as party doctrine continued to assert that cities would lead villages.
After the revolution's triumph in 1949, the millions of peasants who had enlisted in the revolutionary army emerged as the primary pool of cadres for the state bureaucracy. Having inhabited and thrived in urban administrative hubs, they had forged personal connections while upholding social bonds with their rural kin. These connections served as a conduit for rural residents to seek access to opportunities and resources beyond their local spheres. The substantial influx of rural laborers into the urban workforce during the 1950s further solidified the social networks linking urban and rural domains.
The shift from rural to urban leadership resulted in a gradual change of CCP’s focus on the working class and less on the peasantry. The CCP considers itself as the political party of the Chinese working class; the advanced and organized force of the working class. However even in 1951 the majority of the party members were peasants. North China, which has served as a major communist base during the civil war and where the party therefore has long been entrenched in the countryside, about 1,500,000 of its 1,800,000 members in that Region (as of mid-1951) awee of peasant origin. Peng Zhen said in 1951: "a political party of the working class may overlook the social composition of its membership; that it may neglect to fully utilize all possible conditions to improve its social composition, that is, to increase the proportion of workers among its membership." and Thomas (1953) concludes: "It is clear that party leaders will continue to be uncomfortable as long as this disparity between theory end reality continues."

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On Hainan, tensions emerged between communist guerrilla leaders and newly arrived communist cadres. By 1951, a wave of "southbound cadres" came to Hainan to replace local leaders, who were perceived to be too lenient toward the island’s landlords and wealthy capitalists due to their local connections. This led to growing resentment between the veteran revolutionaries of the Hainan Column and the incoming southbound cadres. Many of these new cadres were young urban intellectuals or students dispatched to towns and villages to disrupt the existing local order.
The conflicts that occurred in Hainan possessed a historical backdrop, as explained by Murray (2011). The Hainan Communists were deeply committed to the cause of national revolution, and their struggle had ingrained them within the very fabric of the island. Throughout much of their arduous journey, the mainland Communists were unable to provide significant support, prompting the Hainan Column to forge an alliance with the indigenous Li population of the island. This alliance proved vital in enabling their survival within the rugged southern interior of Hainan. However, when the mainland Communist leadership issued orders in 1946 for the Hainan Column to abandon the island and relocate their forces to Shandong in the north or Vietnam in the southeast, the Hainan command staunchly rejected these directives, deeming them impossible to execute. With deep respect, they respectfully refused to comply with the orders, citing the unique circumstances and challenges they faced on the island. See also Article 2
In Tianjin, interactions among rural cadres, underground party members, and retained bureaucrats revealed that many rural officials, despite their numerical superiority, initially felt embarrassed and were ultimately sidelined as urban initiatives advanced.
The distribution of seized goods—houses, cars, and other items—caused significant unease due to its unequal nature. City leaders moved into villas by the lakeshore, district leaders received large houses downtown, and privileges like cars, special meals, and personal servants were reserved exclusively for top officials. Meanwhile, most southbound cadres lived in conditions worse than those of the old employees who had been retained. Additionally, formal occasions often required superiors and subordinates to maintain a polite distance. Despite the liberation, the old urban elite continued to lead their lavish lifestyles, which appeared unjustifiably extravagant to the peasant cadres.