Article 20 of the Common Program
Text
Article of the Common Program

The People's Republic of China shall build up a unified army, the People's Liberation Army and people's public security forces, which shall be under the command of the People's Revolutionary Military Council of the Central People's Government; it shall institute unification of command, system, formation and discipline.


The war against the Japanese troops and the civil war resulted in 4 different armies of the PLA: the Northwest field army, the Central field army, the East field army and the Northeast field army. Each army had his own control and commando system, his own values and norms of discipline and his own way of fighting.For example
Su Yu
Su Yu (1907-1984)
, the commander of the East army used guerrilla tactics.
Liu Bocheng
Liu Bocheng(1892-1986)
, the commander of the Central army used his experience form SU training.
See for difference in stategy Martin Kenneth Andrew, “Tuo Mao: the operational history of the people’s liberation army” Bond University 2008 p. 164 and next. Schwarz (1969) notices. "During the war, the Communists had established several outer base areas behind Japanese lines (...). 1 The leaders of each base area formed small cohesive groups which changed little in membership during a long period of time (eight years), and shared extraordinary hardships. The cohesiveness and the length of time, if not the degree of hardship, were unprecedented in the history of Chinese Communism. They were the ingredients of clusters of friendship, trust, and loyalty that were to persist long after the war." Schwarz Henry G. (1969). Liu Shao-Ch'i and "People's War": A Report on the Creation of Base Areas in 1938. Page 1

Reorganization....

In November 1948 the leaders of the PLA reorganizes the armies in order to get better control and to unify the PLA. On January 15, 1949 the armies are renamed in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Field army. The reorganization makes it possible to incorporate old GMD soldiers in the PLA. The First Field army has 9 armies (1-9) of which 6 are original PLA personnel and 2 have recruits of 'defected' GMD troops. The Second Field army has 10 armies (10-19) all stemming from their own ranks. The Third Field army has 18 armies (20-37). 4 of them are recruits from GMD troops. The Fourth Field army has 21 armies (38-58). From the 50th all are recruited from GMD militaries, sympathizers and militias.
December 24, 1949
Kovalev
Kovalev, Mikhail Prokofevich (1896-1967)
(Stalin's personal representative in China) reports to Stalin on the situation in China and he warns "The number of the Guomindang-ists, for example, in some military units of generals Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng reaches 70-80%, at the same time former Guomindang-ists are not dispersed among the tried cadre units of the People’s Liberation Army, but are kept in their ranks almost in the same shape, in which they were captured. A small number of command political workers from the cadres of the People’s Liberation Army were appointed to these former Guomindang units. A situation like this conceals a serious danger from the point of view of stability and commitment of the military forces to the cause of the revolution."
Document: 24-12-1949 Kovalev reports to Stalin
Overall about 30 percent of the PLA soldiers have a GMD background. “…(b) former Nationalists, who tend to be apolitical and will fully accept their present, political masters so long as they can continue their military careers; (c) former Nationalists who take a more or less dim view of communism but see (and have) no realistic alternative to continued military service; (d) former Nationalists who are more or less willing to go along with the Communists politically; and, (e) professional soldiers, who have never had any strong political feelings and look to the army only for satisfaction of certain personal goals."
Hsia Chih-tsing e.o. (1953). China: An area manual 1. Geographical,. historical, and military background. The Johns Hopkins University. Page 147
From 1946 onwards the PLA starts "...Anti-Civil War Speaking-Bitterness Meetings () to transform the thought of Nationalist captives.72 During the massive New Style Army Reorganization campaign () of 1948, the method of "troops and civilians speaking together ()" was also used."
Wu Guo (2014) Speaking bitterness: political education in land reform and military training under the CCP, 1947–1951. Page 14. Speaking bitterness—(is) an activity of "articulating one’s history of being oppressed and exploited by class enemies and thus stimulating others" class hatred, and in the meantime consolidating one’s own class standpoint." Page 1.
During the Korean war many ex-GMD soldiers are sent to the front. See Article 54.
"The Fiftieth Army is the old Nationalist Sixtieth Army, with its original high-ranking officers, except that political officers have been added to it. This Army has been called upon to do much of the heaviest fighting for the Chinese Communist regime, and it is estimated that less than 20 percent of its original number have survived. The Communists apparently set out, to begin with, to test its loyalty, and seem to have regarded it, all along, as expendable."
Hsia Chih-tsing e.o. (1953). China Page 140. Ex GMD commandars Dong Qiwu, Liu Fei and Zeng Zesheng
The North China Field army is under direct control of the Headquarters of the PLA in Beijing and is stationed in and around the capital. It is often referred to as the Fifth Field army.

Recruitment....

Almost 50% of the PLA soldiers are recruited in the Northeast, the East and North. These areas are for some time under control of the PLA. The Southwest, Northwest and Central South have less recruited (18%) because these regions came later under the control of the PLA. Under these recruited are women who are active in a wide range of combat and noncombat military roles
Mulvenon James C. (1997). Professionalization of the senior Chinese officer corps. Rand. Page XIII. Chinese women soldiers did go to war during the Korean War as cultural workers, nurses, doctors, and telephone operators.
Joffe
Joffe Ellis (1964). The conflict between old and new in the Chinese army. The China Quarterly, 18. Page 124
states "In sum, the professional officers may be grouped in two broad categories. First, young men who joined the army, or became officers, after 1949 and who were trained and became professionals as the army was being modernised; these officers presumably occupy the lower levels of the command structure. Secondly, veteran guerrilla officers who were assigned to specialised military duties in the early fifties and who have since been intimately involved in the complex problems of the modernised army; these officers hold positions on the General Staff and occupy important command posts." Recruitment during the Korea War is done by mass campaigns. At mass meetings people are asked to volunteer. A committee visits the parents of those who refused to volunteer, to persuade them to send their sons to Korea. When this pressure failes a struggle meeting is sometimes hold to put even more pressure on the reluctants. Enrolment in 1950 and later is especially aimed at recruiting students especially technicians and medical students, and other medical personnel.

Revolutionary Military Council....

In October 1949 the CCP changes the
Revolutionary Military Council
October 20, 1949 People's Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government Front row from left: Su Yu, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Mao, Cheng Qian, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yi; middle row from left: Nie Rongzhen, Gao Gang, Zhang Zhizhong, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Yunyi, Liu Fei; back row from left: Lo Ruiqing, He Long, Cai Tingkai, Fu Zuoyi, Liu Bocheng
(RMC) from a party body to an organ within the CPGC, which controls the PLA. See Chart 3.
Chart General Organization of the People’s Liberation Army 1949
In 1954 it is reformed to the National Defense Council.
The CPGC convenes 6 times a year and cannot control the RMC neither can the Government Administration Council (GAC), because it is at the same level within the hierarchy. Mao Zedong heads the RMC and he is assisted by 7 vice chairmen of whom 6 have a CCP background and
Cheng Qian
Cheng Qian (1882-1968)
, a former GMD general who was once on the ‘most wanted’ list of the PLA. The members of the RMC are from the PLA and Rev. GMD, in this way, the United Front policy is guaranteed. The non-CCP members are all members of a subcommittee, which is founded on October 21, 1949 and has the assignment to study the national defense plans. This subcommittee was never heard from again.
Gittings John (1966). Military control and leadership, 1949-1964. The China Quarterly, 26. Page 85
Article 20 of the Common Program also states that the security troops and the regular troops will be under one command. The above mentioned reorganisation has to effectuate this aim. In reality the “…strong informal bonds of shared victories and defeats which would remain active among former comrades, especially if deactivation did not actually remove leaders from the geographic locale which their old Army had occupied.”
Whitson William W. (1971). Organizational perspectives and decision-making In the Chinese communist high command. Rand. Page 15
Even after the end of the Korean War “…unit by unit, to China, most of them were reassigned to the regions from which they had left for the war and where they had ended the Civil War.”
Whitson William W. (1969). The field army in Chinese communist military politics The China Quarterly, 37. Page 7

Mao Zedong undermines article 20 when in June 9, 1953 he decides to disconnect the Central Garrison Regiment of the security troops (originally named the Chinese Peoples' Public Security Center Column) . This new corps is responsible for the security of the party elite.
"…was nominally a PLA unit and was later named by the PLA General Staff Department as the PLA 8341 Unit. Despite its formal authority, the PLA was only responsible for providing logistical support and assisting with recruitment. It had no authority in commanding the 8341 Unit, nor was it intended to be involved in the detailed operations and decision making of the 8341 Unit. The creation of the 8341 Unit enabled Mao to have direct control of the security force guarding the top leaders through Wang Dongxing.”
Guo Xuezhi (2005). Mao’s challenge to institutionization: the case of the security apparatus. Page 7

Conclusion....

The reorganization of the PLA results in a more integrated army. Mao Zedong partly undermines this unification by creating a special unit under his direct control.


Literature Notes Documents...

1. See for difference in stategy Martin Kenneth Andrew, “Tuo Mao: the operational history of the people’s liberation army” Bond University 2008 p. 164 and next. Schwarz (1969) notices. "During the war, the Communists had established several outer base areas behind Japanese lines (...). 1 The leaders of each base area formed small cohesive groups which changed little in membership during a long period of time (eight years), and shared extraordinary hardships. The cohesiveness and the length of time, if not the degree of hardship, were unprecedented in the history of Chinese Communism. They were the ingredients of clusters of friendship, trust, and loyalty that were to persist long after the war." Schwarz Henry G. (1969). Liu Shao-Ch'i and "People's War": A Report on the Creation of Base Areas in 1938. Page 1. Back
3. Hsia Chih-tsing e.o. (1953). China: An area manual 1. Geographical,. historical, and military background. The Johns Hopkins University. Page 147 Back
4. Wu Guo (2014) Speaking bitterness: political education in land reform and military training under the CCP, 1947–1951. Page 14. Speaking bitterness—(is) an activity of "articulating one’s history of being oppressed and exploited by class enemies and thus stimulating others" class hatred, and in the meantime consolidating one’s own class standpoint." Page 1.Back
5. Hsia Chih-tsing e.o. (1953). China Page 140. Ex GMD commandars Dong Qiwu, Liu Fei and Zeng Zesheng Back
6. Mulvenon James C. (1997). Professionalization of the senior Chinese officer corps. Rand. Page XIII. Chinese women soldiers did go to war during the Korean War as cultural workers, nurses, doctors, and telephone operators. Back
7. Joffe Ellis (1964). The conflict between old and new in the Chinese army. The China Quarterly, 18. Page 124 Back
9. Gittings John (1966). Military control and leadership, 1949-1964. The China Quarterly, 26. Page 85 Back
10. Whitson William W. (1971). Organizational perspectives and decision-making In the Chinese communist high command. Rand. Page 15 Back
11. Whitson William W. (1969). The field army in Chinese communist military politics The China Quarterly, 37. Page 7 Back
12. Guo Xuezhi (2005). Mao’s challenge to institutionization: the case of the security apparatus. Page 7 Back
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