Article 20 of the Common Program

---

The war against the Japanese troops and the civil war resulted in 4 different armies of the PLA: the Northwest Field Army, the Central Field Army, the East Field Army and the Northeast Field Army. Each army had his own control and commando system, his own values and norms of discipline, and his own way of fighting. For example Su Yu , the commander of the East army, used guerrilla tactics. Liu Bocheng , the commander of the Central army, used his experience from SU training. Mao Zedong had introduced this decentralized command during the campaigns against the Japanese invaders. "The more extensive the area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance between the higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus give those operations a character conforming more closely to the local requirements, so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the ability to work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfully expand guerrilla warfare."
In the decisive period of the Civil War, Mao Zedong remarked "Carrying out a large- scale war requires implementing commands with a high degree of unity, which requires construction of a unified command structure to coordinate and command every unit’s war operations, as well as to take responsibility for the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.’" In 1949, upon the establishment of the PRC, the PLA comprised over five million soldiers, predominantly consisting of light infantry. Notably, the PLA was devoid of branches like a navy or air force, with only a minor fraction of ground forces specializing in combat arms like artillery or armored units. Furthermore, there was an absence of a tradition in combined arms operations necessitating coordinated actions among various combat arms within the ground forces.

---

In November 1948, the PLA leadership initiated a reorganization of the army aimed at enhancing control and consolidating unity within the PLA. This marked the first instance where the PLA outnumbered the GMD army numerically. However, despite this numerical advantage, deficiencies persisted in terms of equipment, notably in artillery, armor, air power, and transportation. Subsequently, on January 15, 1949, the armies were renamed as the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field Army, facilitating the integration of former GMD soldiers into the PLA ranks. The First Field Army has 9 armies (1-9) of which 6 are original PLA personnel and 2 have recruits of 'defected' GMD troops. The Second Field Army has 10 armies (10-19), all stemming from their own ranks. The Third Field Army has 18 armies (20-37). 4 of them are recruits from GMD troops. The Fourth Field Army has 21 armies (38-58). From the 50th, all are recruited from GMD militaries, sympathizers, and militias.

The leadership decided not only to reorganize the PLA into field armies, which have the task for national defense, but also established the Chinese People’s Public Security Forces (CPPSF) for maintaining domestic order. Zhou Enlai explained the function of the latter "...maintain local public order, deter the activities of the enemy and ensure the country’s border defense."
On March 5, 1954, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Railway Corps was formally established. Its predecessor was the PLA’s Railway Corps which on May 16, 1949, and was placed under the leadership of the Ministry of Railways. By 1954, the PLA’s Railway Corps contained some 80,000 people. These actions signaled the evolution of a regionally oriented railway military unit into a national entity, tasked with the crucial responsibility of ensuring seamless transportation of military resources and the mobilization of troops nationwide.
On December 24, 1949, Kovalev, Stalin’s representative in China, warned Stalin that former Guomindang members made up 70-80% of some units under generals Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng. These ex-Guomindang members were not integrated into established PLA units but kept together in their original formations, with only minimal PLA political officers overseeing them. Kovalev highlighted this as a serious risk to the stability and revolutionary commitment of the military forces. In general, around 30 percent of PLA soldiers originated from a GMD background. These individuals typically fall into several categories: former Nationalists who remained apolitical and were willing to fully embrace their current political leadership as long as they could pursue their military careers; others who, while harbouring reservations about communism, perceived no feasible alternative to staying in the military; some who were relatively open to aligning with Communist ideology; and finally, professional soldiers whose allegiance primarily lied in personal aspirations rather than strong political affiliations, viewing the army merely as a means to fulfil specific personal objectives. Starting in 1946, the PLA initiated "Anti-Civil War Speaking-Bitterness Meetings" aimed at reshaping the mindset of GMD prisoners of war. Additionally, during the extensive New Style Army Reorganization campaign of 1948, the approach of "troops and civilians speaking together" was implemented. See Article 21.
During the Korean war, many ex-GMD soldiers were sent to the front. See Article 54. The Fiftieth Army, formerly known as the Nationalist Sixtieth Army, retained its original senior officers but now included political officers. This army has been heavily engaged in combat for the Chinese Communist government, and it is believed that fewer than 20 percent of its initial members have survived. From the outset, the Communists appeared to assess its loyalty and regarded it as expendable throughout its service. The North China Field Army is under direct control of the Headquarters of the PLA in Beijing and is stationed in and around the capital. It is often referred to as the Fifth Field army.
The proposed deployment of China’s forces in the plan (Figure 20.2) reflected its threat assessment. These deployments indicated that China would not pursue a strategy of "luring the enemy in deep." Instead, the focus was on maintaining the capability to decisively defeat enemy units on the main battlefield, which the PLA refers to as annihilation operations.

On August 25, 1952, the CMC decided to build fortifications in five key areas (see map), with the northeast identified as the main strategic direction. These areas included the Liaodong Peninsula, the coast from Qinhuang Island to Tanggu (near Tianjin), and the Jiaodong Peninsula (Shandong Peninsula). Additionally, fortifications were planned for the Zhoushan Islands near Shanghai and Hainan Island. In January 1953, the CMC approved a plan to construct 184 defensive areas by 1956, later extended to 1957. Starting in the fall of 1952, Peng inspected coastal regions, beginning with the Liaodong Peninsula, to identify potential American landing zones and direct fortification efforts.

One of the consequences of the reorganization of the PLA is the lack of opportunities for women to join or to make careers in the army.

---

Almost 50% of the PLA soldiers are recruited in the Northeast, the East, and North. These areas were occasionally or for a longer time under the control of the PLA. The Southwest, Northwest and Central South have less recruited soldiers (18%) because these Regions came later under the control of the PLA. Under these recruited were women who were active in a wide range of combat and noncombat military roles In summary, professional officers can be divided into two primary categories. First, there are the young recruits who joined the army or rose to officer ranks after 1949, receiving training and professional development during the army's modernization period. These officers likely occupy lower-level positions within the command structure. Second, there are the veteran guerrilla officers who were reassigned to specialized military roles in the early fifties. They have since played crucial roles in addressing the complexities of the modernized army, often holding positions within the General Staff and assuming important command posts.

An example of the recruitment system can be seen in Shanghai. Shortly after the city's takeover began, the East China Military and Political University aimed to enroll 30,000 individuals aged 18 to 28 with at least a junior high school education at its Suzhou and Nanjing campuses. The PLA also sought 3,000 "intellectual youths" from Shanghai, aged 18 to 30 with similar educational backgrounds, to join the Southward-bound Service Corps, assisting with propaganda, mobilization, and other key tasks for the takeover of other cities and regions. Numerous additional opportunities for intellectual youths to join the PLA emerged, with age requirements varying depending on the recruiting organization. Recruitment during the Korea War is done by mass campaigns. At mass meetings, people are asked to volunteer. A committee visited the parents of those who refused to volunteer, to persuade them to send their sons to Korea. When this pressure failed, a struggle meeting was sometimes held to put even more pressure on the reluctant. From 1950 onward, enrolment efforts were particularly targeted towards attracting students, especially those specializing in technology and medicine, as well as other medical professionals, to bolster national defense capabilities. In December 1950, in response to this need, the Central Committee issued a directive to mobilize 120,000 young students and workers within a year to enrol in military academies. This initiative aimed to cultivate a new generation of military experts proficient in modern military technologies.
A noticeable trend emerged during the mutual aid and cooperative movement in late 1952 and early 1953, making army recruitment much easier. Peasants began joining the army with great enthusiasm. Whereas in previous years it had been challenging to recruit them, this year, the difficulty was convincing them to return home from the recruiting stations. This dramatic shift, likely influenced in part by the winding down of the Korean War, also reflected the peasants' growing pessimism about their future in rural areas.

---

In October 1949, the CCP changed the Central Military Council (CMC) from a party body to an organ within the CPGC, which controls the PLA. See Chart 3 General organization of the PLA and Background CMC members. In 1954, it is reformed to the National Defense Council and a new CMC was established under the CCP’s Central Committee, which included only CCP members. Mao Zedong chaired this new CMC, while its members now included Deng Xiaoping.

The CPGC convened 6 times a year and was unable to control the CMC, neither could the GAC, because it was at the same level within the hierarchy. The CMC determined military policy and strategy, it is also involved in budgeting, training, military technology, command of forces, militia work, approving promotions of officers at division level and above, and political indoctrination. In the six years following 1949, all military intelligence and local (political) intelligence departments were overseen by the PLA. Between 1950 and 1955, these departments were referred to as the CMC Liaison Department. During this time, Zhou Enlai was responsible for intelligence operations. He spearheaded the CCP’s covert intelligence efforts, insisting on substantial resource allocation across various intelligence sectors, including human intelligence, technological intelligence, military tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence, and foreign intelligence. The primary aim of these intelligence activities was not to export revolution, but to actively defend against potential threats. Mao Zedong headed the CMC and he was assisted by 7 vice chairmen, of whom 6 had a CCP background and Cheng Qian, a former GMD general who was once on the ‘most wanted’ list of the PLA. The members of the CMC were from the PLA and Rev. GMD, in this way, the United Front policy was guaranteed. The non-CCP members were all members of a subcommittee, which was founded on October 21, 1949, and had the assignment to study the national defense plans. This subcommittee was never heard from again.

In April 1952, Su Yu, the deputy chief of the general staff, suggested that the CMC should first establish China's strategic guidelines before drafting any development plans. While the CMC did not formally define a strategic guideline at that time, Su's report led to the clarification of several "urgent strategic issues," which were later integrated into the PLA's five-year plan. Peng Dehuai became responsible for the daily military affairs on behalf of the CCP on July 19, 1952. Effectively, Peng Dehuai oversawall aspects of military concerns. The significance of Mao Zedong's role remained paramount. Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Mao prioritized securing unwavering loyalty from the PLA, particularly focusing on security forces and army units responsible for safeguarding the capital. Mao's authority over the PLA hinged on his exclusive power in appointing army officers. During the early 1950s, all appointments of PLA officers at the rank of army corps commander and higher necessitated Mao's approval.
Article 20 of the Common Program also states that the security troops and the regular troops will be under one command. The above-mentioned reorganization is intended to achieve this objective. In practice, the enduring informal connections forged through shared triumphs and challenges persisted among former comrades, particularly if deactivation did not physically separate leaders from the geographic area their former army once occupied. Following the conclusion of the Korean War, units gradually returned to China, with many being reassigned to the regions they had departed from for the war, and where they had previously concluded the Civil War.
Mao Zedong undermined article 20 when in June 9, 1953, he decided to disconnect the Central Garrison Regiment of the security troops (originally named the Chinese Peoples' Public Security Center Column). This new corps is responsible for the security of the party elite. Initially designated as a PLA unit, it was later officially designated by the PLA General Staff Department as the PLA 8341 Unit. Despite its nominal affiliation, the PLA's role was primarily logistical support and assistance with recruitment. The PLA lacked command authority over the 8341 Unit and was not intended to be directly involved in its operational or decision-making processes. The establishment of the 8341 Unit allowed Mao to exert direct control over the security force responsible for protecting top leaders through Wang Dongxing.

---

Chapter 3 of Common Program