Article 20 of the Common Program

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The war against the Japanese troops and the civil war resulted in 4 different armies of the PLA: the Northwest Field Army, the Central Field Army, the East Field Army and the Northeast Field Army. Each army had his own control and commando system, his own values and norms of discipline, and his own way of fighting. For example Su Yu , the commander of the East army, used guerrilla tactics. Liu Bocheng,the commander of the Central army, used his experience from SU training. Though they employed different tactics, the Long March represents a unique civil-military elite structure to many scholars, signifying either (1) the firm establishment of Party control over the military or (2) the creation of a tightly bound coalition of civil and military leaders with shared perspectives. In the first view, the PLA is seen as entirely under CCP control, while in the second, China’s military and political leaders form a unified elite shaped by a prolonged armed struggle, holding nearly identical views on most issues. The Long March underscores the blending of civil and military roles in communist China, with Party and army leaders overlapping. Figures like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping are often viewed as embodying both civil and military identities.
Mao Zedong introduced decentralized command during the campaigns against Japanese invaders. He argued that as an area grows larger and the situation more complex, with greater distances between higher and lower levels, it is essential to grant more independence to lower-level units. This approach allows operations to better align with local conditions, enabling lower levels and local personnel to develop the skills to work independently, handle complex situations, and effectively expand guerrilla warfare.
In the decisive period of the Civil War, Mao Zedong remarked "Carrying out a large- scale war requires implementing commands with a high degree of unity, which requires construction of a unified command structure to coordinate and command every unit’s war operations, as well as to take responsibility for the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.’" In 1949, upon the establishment of the PRC, the PLA comprised over five million soldiers, predominantly consisting of light infantry. Notably, the PLA was devoid of branches like a navy or air force, with only a minor fraction of ground forces specializing in combat arms like artillery or armored units. Furthermore, there was an absence of a tradition in combined arms operations necessitating coordinated actions among various combat arms within the ground forces.

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In November 1948, the PLA leadership initiated a reorganization of the army aimed at enhancing control and consolidating unity within the PLA. This marked the first instance where the PLA outnumbered the GMD army numerically. However, despite this numerical advantage, deficiencies persisted in terms of equipment, notably in artillery, armor, air power, and transportation. Subsequently, on January 15, 1949, the armies were renamed as the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field Army, facilitating the integration of former GMD soldiers into the PLA ranks. The First Field Army has 9 armies (1-9) of which 6 are original PLA personnel and 2 have recruits of 'defected' GMD troops. The Second Field Army has 10 armies (10-19), all stemming from their own ranks. The Third Field Army has 18 armies (20-37). 4 of them are recruits from GMD troops. The Fourth Field Army has 21 armies (38-58). From the 50th, all are recruited from GMD militaries, sympathizers, and militias.

The leadership decided not only to reorganize the PLA into field armies, which have the task for national defense, but also established the Chinese People’s Public Security Forces (CPPSF) for maintaining domestic order. Zhou Enlai explained the function of the latter "...maintain local public order, deter the activities of the enemy and ensure the country’s border defense."
On March 5, 1954, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Railway Corps was formally established. Its predecessor was the PLA’s Railway Corps which on May 16, 1949, and was placed under the leadership of the Ministry of Railways. By 1954, the PLA’s Railway Corps contained some 80,000 people. These actions signaled the evolution of a regionally oriented railway military unit into a national entity, tasked with the crucial responsibility of ensuring seamless transportation of military resources and the mobilization of troops nationwide.
On December 24, 1949, Kovalev, Stalin’s representative in China, warned Stalin that former Guomindang members made up 70-80% of some units under generals Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng. These ex-Guomindang members were not integrated into established PLA units but kept together in their original formations, with only minimal PLA political officers overseeing them. Kovalev highlighted this as a serious risk to the stability and revolutionary commitment of the military forces. In general, around 30 percent of PLA soldiers originated from a GMD background. These individuals typically fall into several categories: former Nationalists who remained apolitical and were willing to fully embrace their current political leadership as long as they could pursue their military careers; others who, while harbouring reservations about communism, perceived no feasible alternative to staying in the military; some who were relatively open to aligning with Communist ideology; and finally, professional soldiers whose allegiance primarily lied in personal aspirations rather than strong political affiliations, viewing the army merely as a means to fulfil specific personal objectives. Starting in 1946, the PLA initiated "Anti-Civil War Speaking-Bitterness Meetings" aimed at reshaping the mindset of GMD prisoners of war. Additionally, during the extensive New Style Army Reorganization campaign of 1948, the approach of "troops and civilians speaking together" was implemented. See Article 21.
During the Korean war, many ex-GMD soldiers were sent to the front. See Article 54. The Fiftieth Army, formerly known as the Nationalist Sixtieth Army, retained its original senior officers but now included political officers. This army has been heavily engaged in combat for the Chinese Communist government, and it is believed that fewer than 20 percent of its initial members have survived. From the outset, the Communists appeared to assess its loyalty and regarded it as expendable throughout its service. The North China Field Army is under direct control of the Headquarters of the PLA in Beijing and is stationed in and around the capital. It is often referred to as the Fifth Field army.
The proposed deployment of China’s forces in the plan (Figure 20.2) reflected its threat assessment. These deployments indicated that China would not pursue a strategy of "luring the enemy in deep." Instead, the focus was on maintaining the capability to decisively defeat enemy units on the main battlefield, which the PLA refers to as annihilation operations.

On August 25, 1952, the CMC decided to build fortifications in five key areas (see map), with the northeast identified as the main strategic direction. These areas included the Liaodong Peninsula, the coast from Qinhuang Island to Tanggu (near Tianjin), and the Jiaodong Peninsula (Shandong Peninsula). Additionally, fortifications were planned for the Zhoushan Islands near Shanghai and Hainan Island. In January 1953, the CMC approved a plan to construct 184 defensive areas by 1956, later extended to 1957. Starting in the fall of 1952, Peng inspected coastal regions, beginning with the Liaodong Peninsula, to identify potential American landing zones and direct fortification efforts.

One of the consequences of the reorganization of the PLA is the lack of opportunities for women to join or to make careers in the army.

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Almost 50% of the PLA soldiers are recruited in the Northeast, the East, and North. These areas were occasionally or for a longer time under the control of the PLA. The Southwest, Northwest and Central South have less recruited soldiers (18%) because these Regions came later under the control of the PLA. Under these recruited were women who were active in a wide range of combat and noncombat military roles In summary, professional officers can be divided into two primary categories. First, there are the young recruits who joined the army or rose to officer ranks after 1949, receiving training and professional development during the army's modernization period. These officers likely occupy lower-level positions within the command structure. Second, there are the veteran guerrilla officers who were reassigned to specialized military roles in the early fifties. They have since played crucial roles in addressing the complexities of the modernized army, often holding positions within the General Staff and assuming important command posts.

An example of the recruitment system can be seen in Shanghai. Shortly after the city's takeover began, the East China Military and Political University aimed to enroll 30,000 individuals aged 18 to 28 with at least a junior high school education at its Suzhou and Nanjing campuses. The PLA also sought 3,000 "intellectual youths" from Shanghai, aged 18 to 30 with similar educational backgrounds, to join the Southward-bound Service Corps, assisting with propaganda, mobilization, and other key tasks for the takeover of other cities and regions. Numerous additional opportunities for intellectual youths to join the PLA emerged, with age requirements varying depending on the recruiting organization.
Recruitment during the Korea War is done by mass campaigns. At mass meetings, people are asked to volunteer. A committee visited the parents of those who refused to volunteer, to persuade them to send their sons to Korea. When this pressure failed, a struggle meeting was sometimes held to put even more pressure on the reluctant. From 1950 onward, enrolment efforts were particularly targeted towards attracting students, especially those specializing in technology and medicine, as well as other medical professionals, to bolster national defense capabilities. In December 1950, in response to this need, the Central Committee issued a directive to mobilize 120,000 young students and workers within a year to enrol in military academies. This initiative aimed to cultivate a new generation of military experts proficient in modern military technologies.
A noticeable trend emerged during the mutual aid and cooperative movement in late 1952 and early 1953, making army recruitment much easier. Peasants began joining the army with great enthusiasm. Whereas in previous years it had been challenging to recruit them, this year, the difficulty was convincing them to return home from the recruiting stations. This dramatic shift, likely influenced in part by the winding down of the Korean War, also reflected the peasants' growing pessimism about their future in rural areas.

During this period 1949-1954, military recruitment in China varied significantly by region, depending on local political stability, economic conditions, and the level of Communist Party control.

North China was the major source of PLA manpower due to large rural populations. Large numbers of volunteers during the Korea War came from these provinces, especially Shandong and Henan. In the Northeast, high numbers of workers and technicians were recruited into specialized military units. In East China, conscription efforts were weaker in major cities, but rural areas (Anhui, northern Jiangsu) provided large numbers of troops. The PLA faced difficulties convincing urban youth to enlist, as many saw better opportunities in industry or trade. In South China, the PLA focused on pacifying the region before mass recruitment, because anti-communist guerrilla activity in remote areas (e.g., western Guangdong) made recruitment difficult. Many young men sought economic opportunities in Hong Kong, Macau or Southeast Asia. Sichuan had one of the largest populations, making it a key recruitment base in the Southwest. In the ethnic minority regions (Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou) had weak CPC control, therefore recruitment was low and political persuasion and incentives were required.The Northwest is sparsely populated, Shaanxi was a strong base for voluntary recruitment, with many veterans from the Long March.

There was economic resistance in rural areas, especially in provinces like Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan, families relied heavily on young men for labor in the fields. The enlistment of young male laborers disrupted agricultural productivity, leading to food shortages and economic hardship. So, families often resorted to hiding eligible men or bribing officials to exempt them from service. In many regions, particularly in North and Southwest China, peasants were already burdened by heavy taxation to support military campaigns and reconstruction efforts. Recruitment was seen as an additional economic sacrifice. In industrial hubs like Shanghai, Manchuria, and Tianjin, factory workers resisted enlistment due to the fear of losing jobs or the inability to support their families.
Cultural and social opposition, for instance traditional family values. Confucian family norms emphasized the importance of male descendants staying with their families to maintain the household and honor ancestors. Military service disrupted these traditions, especially in rural areas. In provinces like Fujian and Guangdong, young men avoided recruitment by claiming their responsibility to care for aging parents. In minority regions, distrust of the government played a significant role. Enlistment was seen as a tool for assimilation into Han Chinese culture. Language barriers and cultural differences also complicated recruitment efforts in minority regions.
Religious Objections, particularly Muslims in Northwest China and Buddhists in Tibet, resisted recruitment on spiritual and ideological grounds, opposing violence and war under the new Communist regime.
Political and Ideological Resistance, in southern and coastal provinces like Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang, loyalty to the GMD remained strong. Many locals resisted recruitment into the PLA, fearing it would betray their allegiance to the Nationalists. There were some communities, which harbored anti-Communist guerrillas, who actively discouraged enlistment through intimidation and propaganda. In regions like western Guangdong and southwestern Sichuan, bandit groups and local warlords opposed PLA control and actively sabotaged recruitment efforts and in Yunnan and Guizhou, remote mountainous areas provided safe havens for deserters and draft evaders. Families often hid young men in remote areas or neighboring villages to avoid conscription or entire families migrated to neighboring countries like India, Burma, or Mongolia.
The CCP's land reform campaigns, which often involved violent confrontations with landlords and wealthier peasants, created animosity and distrust, further fueling recruitment resistance.
There are regional differences in the opposition of enlistment. For instance, reports of extreme conditions in the Korean War discouraged recruitment in North China. In this regions, many families had already lost members to past wars (Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and Chinese Civil War (1946–1949)) and were reluctant to send more sons. This led in some villages that mothers and wives often staged protests to keep their male relatives from being drafted. In the Northeast, many young men sought employment in state-run factories to avoid enlistment. The PLA took countermeasures and required factories to send quotas of workers to the PLA. In East China, doctors issued fraudulent health reports to prevent young men from being drafted or upper-class families found ways to avoid sending their sons to the military. In Northwest China, Uyghurs and Kazakhs saw the PLA as a foreign force and poor living conditions made military service unattractive. Heavy military presence in Xinjiang, with forced conscription in some cases, was the answer of the PLA. The government offered food, land, and money to encourage enlistment.

To address resistance, the CPC implemented a combination of propaganda, incentives, and punitive measures. Political Campaigns were used to promote military service as a patriotic duty. The recruitment campaigns emphasized class struggle, portraying enlistment as a way for poor peasants to rise against landlords and imperialists. The PLA offered compensation to families of recruits, including grain, money, and tax exemptions. and in urban areas, the CCP guaranteed that workers' jobs would be held for them upon returning from military service. In ethnic minority regions, the CCP attempted to recruit local leaders and elites to gain their cooperation in military enlistment.
If these methods did not work, the PLA used forceful conscription and punished families of draft evaders and public trials and denunciation meetings to discourage anti-recruitment sentiment.
In summary, between 1949 and 1954, the PLA relied on voluntary enlistment, with recruitment efforts closely coordinated with local civilian officials. The period was marked by regional variations in recruitment and instances of local resistance, reflecting the complex socio-political landscape of early PRC history.
As the PLA grew more professional, the government realized the need for a structured recruitment system. In 1953, the CPC began drafting the first Military Service Law to introduce mandatory conscription. In 1954, a national registration system for military-aged men (18+) was introduced in preparation for the upcoming law. While preparing for conscription, the PLA still relied on voluntary enlistment to fill its ranks. Veterans from the Korean War were reintegrated into the PLA or placed in reserve units. The Military Service Law of 1955 was enacted on July 30, 1955, introducing selective conscription and from 1955 onward, the PLA officially transitioned to a system where some men were drafted, though voluntary service remained dominant. See figure 20.3.

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In October 1949, the CCP changed the Central Military Council (CMC) from a party body to an organ within the CPGC, which controls the PLA. See Chart 3 General organization of the PLA and Background CMC members. In 1954, it is reformed to the National Defense Council and a new CMC was established under the CCP’s Central Committee, which included only CCP members. Mao Zedong chaired this new CMC, while its members now included Deng Xiaoping.

The CPGC convened 6 times a year and was unable to control the CMC, neither could the GAC, because it was at the same level within the hierarchy. The CMC determined military policy and strategy, it is also involved in budgeting, training, military technology, command of forces, militia work, approving promotions of officers at division level and above, and political indoctrination. In the six years following 1949, all military intelligence and local (political) intelligence departments were overseen by the PLA. Between 1950 and 1955, these departments were referred to as the CMC Liaison Department. During this time, Zhou Enlai was responsible for intelligence operations. He spearheaded the CCP’s covert intelligence efforts, insisting on substantial resource allocation across various intelligence sectors, including human intelligence, technological intelligence, military tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence, and foreign intelligence. The primary aim of these intelligence activities was not to export revolution, but to actively defend against potential threats. Mao Zedong headed the CMC and he was assisted by 7 vice chairmen, of whom 6 had a CCP background and Cheng Qian, a former GMD general who was once on the ‘most wanted’ list of the PLA. The members of the CMC were from the PLA and Rev. GMD, in this way, the United Front policy was guaranteed. The non-CCP members were all members of a subcommittee, which was founded on October 21, 1949, and had the assignment to study the national defense plans. This subcommittee was never heard from again.

In April 1952, Su Yu, the deputy chief of the general staff, suggested that the CMC should first establish China's strategic guidelines before drafting any development plans. While the CMC did not formally define a strategic guideline at that time, Su's report led to the clarification of several "urgent strategic issues," which were later integrated into the PLA's five-year plan. Peng Dehuai became responsible for the daily military affairs on behalf of the CCP on July 19, 1952. Effectively, Peng Dehuai oversawall aspects of military concerns. The significance of Mao Zedong's role remained paramount. Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Mao prioritized securing unwavering loyalty from the PLA, particularly focusing on security forces and army units responsible for safeguarding the capital. Mao's authority over the PLA hinged on his exclusive power in appointing army officers. During the early 1950s, all appointments of PLA officers at the rank of army corps commander and higher necessitated Mao's approval.
Article 20 of the Common Program also states that the security troops and the regular troops will be under one command. The above-mentioned reorganization is intended to achieve this objective. In practice, the enduring informal connections forged through shared triumphs and challenges persisted among former comrades, particularly if deactivation did not physically separate leaders from the geographic area their former army once occupied. Following the conclusion of the Korean War, units gradually returned to China, with many being reassigned to the regions they had departed from for the war, and where they had previously concluded the Civil War.
Mao Zedong undermined article 20 when in June 9, 1953, he decided to disconnect the Central Garrison Regiment of the security troops (originally named the Chinese Peoples' Public Security Center Column). This new corps is responsible for the security of the party elite. Initially designated as a PLA unit, it was later officially designated by the PLA General Staff Department as the PLA 8341 Unit. Despite its nominal affiliation, the PLA's role was primarily logistical support and assistance with recruitment. The PLA lacked command authority over the 8341 Unit and was not intended to be directly involved in its operational or decision-making processes. The establishment of the 8341 Unit allowed Mao to exert direct control over the security force responsible for protecting top leaders through Wang Dongxing.

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Chapter 3 of Common Program