The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Guomindang and foreign governments, and shall recognize, abrogate, revise, or re-negotiate them according to their respective contents.
Chinese concessions to foreign countries during the Empire period
Portugal Macau 1557-1999
United Kingdom Hong Kong 1841-1997
United Kingdom Shanghai 1846-1943
United States Shanghai 1848-1943
France Shanghai 1849-1943
United Kingdom Amoy (Xiamen) 1852-1949
United Kingdom Tianjin 1860-1940
United States Tianjin 1860-1940
International Beijing 1861-1945
France Guangzhou 1861-1946
France Tianjin 1861-1946
United Kingdom Hankou 1861-1927
United Kingdom Jiujiang 1861-1927
United Kingdom Zhenjiang 1861-1929
United Kingdom Guangzhou 1861-1945
International Shanghai 1863-1943
Germany Hankou 1895-1917
Germany Tianjin 1895-1917
Japan Taiwan 1895-1945
France Hankou 1896-1946
Russia Hankou 1896-1924
Russia Chinese Eastern Railway Harbin 1896-1952
Japan Chongqing 1897-1943
Japan Suzhou 1897-1943
Japan Hangzhou 1897-1943
France Zhanjiang 1898-1946
Germany Qingdao 1898-1914
Japan Tianjin 1898-1917
Japan Hankou 1898-1943
Russia Dalian 1898-1945
United Kingdom Weihai 1898-1930
Russia Tianjin 1900-1924
Italy Tianjin Tianjin 1901-1917
Austria-Hungary Tianjin 1902-1917
Belgium Tianjin 1902-1931
International Xiamen 1903-1945
France French Railway Kunming 1904-1940
Japan South Manchuria Railway Zone Dalian 1905-1945
Japan Qingdao 1914-1922
United Kingdom Weihai 1930-1940
This article of the Common Program deals with the old treaties and agreements between China and foreign countries. It mentions no criteria indicating which preexisting agreements were to retain their validity. Mao Zedong has definite ideas about the elimination of the unequal treaties:
“The Chinese people welcome the steps taken by many foreign governments in renouncing their unequal treaties and concluding new, equal treaties with China. However, we maintain that the conclusion of equal treaties does not in itself mean that China has actually won genuine equality. Genuine and actual equality is never the gift of foreign governments, but must be won mainly by the Chinese people through their own efforts, and the way to win it is to build a new-democratic China politically, economically and culturally; otherwise there will be only nominal and not actual independence and equality. That is to say, China can never win genuine independence and equality by following the present policy of the Kuomintang government.” See Table 11
Map of the Treaty Ports in 1920
All treaties of the GMD government will be examined but also the ones of the Empire. February 1, 1947, the CCP revealed the criteria for review of the treaties: disadvantageous loans, special rights for trade, shipping, and other special economic, military, and judicial rights for foreign countries.
The absence of any reference to border treaties in the Common Programme suggests that China's new leadership had not fully acknowledged their significance in international law. Indeed, during the initial years of the PRC, the leadership appeared somewhat uncertain in its handling of China's borders. In the early 1950s, given the ambiguity surrounding numerous existing borders and the CCP's focus on the Korean War, efforts were made to delay the resolution of border disputes with China's neighboring countries whenever feasible.
Unequal treaties...
Territories lost by China during and after the Qing dynasty
Beijing was eager to negotiate the Treaty of Nanjing of August 29, 1848. This treaty between the Empire and the UK regulated the existence of free trade ports in Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai and the status of Hong Kong as a crown colony.
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, these unequal treaties evolved into symbolic representations. They were regarded as mythic, emphasizing the significance of belief over historical accuracy. The narrative of National Humiliation was perpetually recounted in Chinese educational institutions, mass media platforms, and numerous compulsory study sessions attended by Chinese citizens. The myth of National Humiliation occupied a central position in the political culture of the PRC.
Hong Kong and Macao...
Remarkable was the attitude of the new government towards Hong Kong
The base of the foreign affairs policy was the struggle against imperialism and the restoration of China’s dignity. After Guangzhou (October 12, 1949) fell into the hands of the PLA, the common opinion was that the next step would be Hong Kong. In November 1948, Qiao Guanhua, the CCP spokesman in Hong Kong, told the local newspaper the PLA had no intention to overtake the city but wants to solve the problem in a diplomatic way. The reasons for this behavior are pure pragmatic. Articles 55, 56, and article 26 of the Common Program give this possibility. The rapid reconstruction of the Chinese economy has priority and this means to be able to trade with capitalist countries. On March 5, 1949, during the plenum of the CCP, Mao Zedong justified this policy;
“For this reason and because China's economy is still backward, there will be need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy… This is not only unavoidable but also economically necessary. But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will not be unrestricted and uncurbed as in the capitalist countries.”
He continued with the remark China should trade with socialist and capitalist countries. Stalin approves this method.
Hong Kong is essential as a transit port for primary goods. The city is the only free trade port between Shanghai and Singapore and it is the only possibility to buy materials the SU can’t deliver. Even during the GMD regime, Hong Kong is an important trading partner for the PLA areas in the north of China. During the blockade of Shanghai in June 1949, Hong Kong was of significative importance.
Yet this status quo of Hong Kong and Macao evoked protests. Neither the PRC government nor any other Chinese government since the Revolution of 1911 had recognised the validity of the Hong Kong treaties. November 18, 1949, students and workers demanded the annexation of Macao.
Many Overseas Chinese used the banking facilities in Hong Kong to transfer money to their families on the mainland. These remittances were an important source of income for families and the state. See (Article 37)
The British administration extended an offer of consulate status to the Chinese government, which Zhou Enlai declined due to its implication of Hong Kong's separation from China. As a result of this informality imposed by colonial rule, communist Chinese operatives in Hong Kong functioned through a network of trade officials who maintained dual roles within entities such as the Central Military Commission, the Bank of China, or the Xinhua News Agency's "Security Department."
About the same considerations applied to the situation of Macao. August 28, 1949, the CCP established the Nam Kwong trading company to facilitate the trade between China and Macao. On November 9, 1949, a CCP spokesman stated:
“The People’s Liberation Army is not an occupation force; therefore, the position of neighbouring Macau shall be fully respected. We hope also that the Macau Government will respect the PLA. (…) We have not sent troops to the border Region between Macau and China or to the neutral zone between Portugal and China. This demonstrates clearly that the PLA troops stationed in Zhongshan district respect absolutely the behaviour of the Government of our neighbouring territory”.
Zhou Enlai confirmed this status quo of Macao during his visit to Stalin in September 1952. May 18, 1951, the UN imposed a trade embargo against the People's Republic of China because of their role in the Korea War, See (Article 54). The role of free trade ports Hong Kong and Macao became of even greater importance.
Hong Kong and Macao were between 1950 and 1953 after the SU, the most important trade partners.
Treaties with the Soviet Union...
The August 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance emerged as the most significant among the unjust treaties inherited by the New China from the old regime. Under this treaty, China was compelled to relinquish its sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, recognize its independence, concede Port Lüshun in Northeast China as a naval base to the Soviet Union, and jointly administer the Changchun Railway, which connected Manchuria and Dalian, with the Soviet Union.
These privileges of the SU were an obstacle for a good relation with the SU. Particularly the minzhu dangpai were opposed. For example, Chen Yinque regarded the policy of “leaning to one side” as losing cultural independence of China.
Therefore the CCP had to renegotiate the treaty of 1945. During the first meeting between Mao Zedong, and Stalin, the first mentioned immediately declared he wanted a new treaty and he wanted economic aid.
Stalin was in favor of continuation of the 1945 treaty
and to keep the management of the Zhongchang Lu (Chinese Changchun Railroad KChZhD). Stalin considered this supervision as a vital aspect of his strategy to have an ice-free harbor in the Pacific.
Mao Zedong was not in a hurry to solve this problem.
“The present situation with regard to KChZhD and Port Arthur corresponds well with Chinese interests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate to effectively fight against imperialist aggression. In addition, KChZhD is a training school for the preparation of Chinese cadres in railroad and industry.”
Mao Zedong had more urgent issues he wanted to solve in a new treaty.
“The new treaty must include the questions of political, economic, cultural and military cooperation. Of most importance will be the question of economic cooperation.” After almost two months of negotiations, both parties signed a new treaty on February 14, 1950. There was a fundamental disagreement over the interpretation and pursuit of certain terms. The Soviet Union emphasized unity, downplaying the importance of sovereignty, while China opposed forming a single entity with the Soviets. The term "alliance" was included in the treaty at Soviet insistence, yet this did not mean the Chinese intended to fully integrate with the Soviet Union. This difference in perspectives, along with the Soviet Union's misjudgment and misunderstanding of China’s intentions, indicated that China's achievements had inspired some degree of confidence within the USSR toward the CCP. However, the Sino-Soviet alliance remained inherently unstable, as the Soviet Union’s aim to control the CCP deepened the rift, eventually rendering it irreparable. The SU will provide a $300 million loan during 5 years and this sum has to be paid back before December 31, 1963. The interest rate is 1%. Compared with Poland, this is not a good deal. This country received $450 million without interest.
In a secret protocol, the stationing of SU troops in Northeast China was regulated. They will leave the country before the end of 1952.
Mongolia and Soviet Special Rights in China’s Northeast
Source: Garver (2016) Page 39
A "supplementary agreement" deals with.
“Rights to concessions will not be granted to foreigners either on the territory of the Far Eastern Territory and Central Asian Republics of the USSR or on the territory of Manchuria and Sinkiang of the Chinese People's Republic and the activity of industrial, financial, trade, and other enterprises, institutions, societies, and organizations with the participation in direct or indirect form of the capital of third countries or citizens of these countries will not be permitted.”
By August 1952, the Chinese government had naturalized around 3,000 aliens from India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and deported a few who refused to become Chinese citizens.
Yet, another secret protocol regulated the position of Russian personnel who were working in China.
There were about 150.000 soldiers and civil workers from the SU working in the PRC. They were not subject to Chinese jurisdiction but to SU. The SU experts lived in special quarters. This situation was more or less to be compared with the old foreign concessions in Shanghai before 1949. See Article 59
Especially the public agreement on the Sino-Soviet Petroleum Co., Ltd. in Sinkiang; the Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Sino-Soviet Non-Ferrous and Rare Metals Co., Ltd. in Sinkiang; and Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Sino-Soviet Civil Aviation Co., Ltd. of March 27, 1950 evoked a large resistance from Chinese students. Zhou Enlai expressed their grievances as follows:
“why doesn’t the Soviet Union give us machinery, [and] can’t we exploit [Xinjiang’s oil and metals] ourselves? Why do [we] want to run [the companies] jointly? Share profits?”
Zhou Enlai did not answer this rhetorical question.
Mao Zedong was very concerned about the public reaction to the treaties and he personally regulated the press releases.
",...it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency's editorial. No
inappropriate opinions should be allowed."
After the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, the relationship between the SU and the PRC became better. The new SU leaders improved the status of the PRC above all other People’s Democratic Republics. On March 9, 1953 at Stalin's funeral, Zhou Enlai was chosen from the mass of foreign political leaders to stand alongside the members of the Soviet Party Presidium. The new leaders were keen to gain the favor of the Chinese leaders. From the Russian perspective, this eagerness stemmed from the departure of Stalin, as his successors required stronger political support from their Chinese comrades to uphold leadership in the communist world. Firstly, Mao Zedong held seniority over them in terms of age and revolutionary experience. Moreover, the CCP wielded considerable power, boasting approximately 10 million members.
Outer Mongolia...
In February 1949, Mao Zedong accepted the independence of Outer Mongolia in a meeting with the SU politburo member Mikoyan.
Mikoyan recounted, in a 1960s-era report to the CPSU Central Committee, Stalin’s message to Mao ,
"The leaders of Outer Mongolia support the unification of all the Mongolian Regions of China with Outer Mongolia to form an independent
and united Mongolian state. The Soviet government does not agree with this plan, since it means taking a number of Regions from China, although this plan does not threaten the interests of the Soviet Union. We do not think that Outer Mongolia would agree to surrender its independence in favor of autonomy within the Chinese state, even if all the Mongolian Regions are united in one autonomous entity."
On January 3, 1950, Mao Zedong once more recognized the status of Mongolia.
The independence of Mongolia remained a difficult to digest event for the Chinese. (See Article 2).
Xinjiang...
See for a short history of Xinjiang Article 2.
On March 27, 1950, the SU and the People's Republic of China concluded the negotiations on joint ventures in Xinjiang. The agreement was in fact a continuation of the discussion between the GMD government and the SU in July 1949. The military situation of the GMD in Xinjiang deteriorated rapidly, so no conclusion was reached. The agreement originated from the additional agreement of February 14, 1950 (see above). Two joint ventures will exploit the oil, gas and non-ferro metals in Xinjiang. The 3rd will set up civil aviation.
Peng Dehuai and Deng Liqun, both administrators of the Region, had pressed Mao Zedong to restore the trade between SU and Xinjiang as soon as possible.
Xinjiang benefitted significantly from aid and technological assistance provided by the Soviet Union. In exchange, the SU gained ongoing access to Xinjiang's oil and mineral reserves. During this period, there was generally a level of tolerance towards many former East Turkestan Republic officials and other individuals with pro-Soviet leanings.
The Chinese press emphasized that in the joint ventures
“the two shareholders own the same number of shares and enjoy equal rights in any of such corporation.”
However, protests started
“…bringing in Soviet capital did not go down well with a large portion of the intellectual public. In cities such as Beijing and Nanjing, vast multitudes of students launched demonstrations in opposition to the act."
The government had to publicize a pamphlet of 82 pages titled Handbook on China-Soviet Economic Cooperation in April 1950. The RMRB has several articles which praise the agreements (for example, April 4, April 5, and April 23, 1950).
After the death of Stalin, Mao Zedong was eager to end the joint structure of the companies. Khrushchev was also eager to do China a favour. During Khrushchev visit in September/ October 1954, he declared the abolishment of the joint ventures at the beginning of 1955. In order to foster industrial development in Xinjiang, it would have been beneficial for the Sino-Soviet cooperation to continue for a longer duration, allowing the Chinese side to enhance its technical readiness. However, driven by a desire to alleviate pressure from the GMD government in Taiwan, the CCP prioritized demonstrating the self-sufficiency of the Chinese government over seeking aid from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, China requested additional experts to support its development efforts, including: (1) teams of specialists to survey and plan the comprehensive use of the Yangtze River's hydraulic resources; (2) 40 to 50 construction experts to assist in managing 11 construction companies in emerging industrial cities; (3) eight urban planning experts to aid in the planning and reconstruction of Beijing; and (4) 57 experts in railway design and six in railway construction to be deployed before 1955.
Sino-Soviet Companies
Debts...
During the Qing dynasty and the GMD period, several countries had invested in railways and other infrastructural projects. These investments were often financed with loans. Article 3 of the Common Program states “The People's Republic of China must abolish the prerogatives of imperialist countries in China. It must confiscate the bureaucratic capital and put it into the possession of the people's state.”
Following the lead of numerous revolutionary regimes of the twentieth century, the PRC opted to renounce the debts incurred by its predecessors. This decision was not only pragmatic but also understandable for a nascent government emerging from years of conflict and internal turmoil, burdened with substantial debts and lacking foreign exchange reserves. The new regime perceived its legitimacy as stemming from both state succession and state continuity. Unlike the strict adherence to the Soviet theory, which posits that states undergoing fundamental social revolutions are distinct legal entities from their predecessors, the PRC appears to adopt a more flexible approach. This difference may be attributed to the PRC's aspirations to inherit China's seat in the United Nations Security Council and its sovereign rights over Taiwan, among other factors.
“… Where China's vital rights are involved, such as representation in the United Nations, the CPR has insisted that the treaties concluded in the name of China by the Kuomintang government before 1949 have devolved upon it by dint of its take-over of the mainland; (b) The same attitude applies to "executed" or "dispositive" treaties signed by Kuomintang as well as earlier Chinese governments (such as those relating to boundary).”Hsiung (1972). Page 240. The PRC recognizes the multilateral treaties on "Prohibiting chemical and bacteriological warfare 1925" and the "Geneva Conventions". The PRC also recognized the "Cairo Declaration 1943" and "Potsdam Proclamation 1945". [↩][Cite]
Shen (2015). Page 95. and he continues: "With regards to border treaties previously signed by the Nationalists, the new regime neither explicitly endorsed nor rejected such past agreements. Where it had inherited disputes from the Nationalists, it advocated a temporary preservation of the status quo. At the same time, however, the Central Committee ordered relevant departments to conduct research into border conflicts in the interests of resolving them in the future." [↩][Cite]
During the nineteenth century, the Qing state faced several intrusions: Opium Wars (1839-1842) (1856-1860), the Sino-French War (1883-1885) in the south, the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) in the east. [↩]
Garver (1993). Pages 7-8.[Cite] After 1945 China is a member of the Security Council of the UN. See also Scott (2008). [↩][Cite]
05-03-1949 Mao Zedong “Report to second session of 7th CC” "It has even been reported that the CCP and the British did strike a nine-point secret deal as early as August 1945 on the future of Hong Kong. Under this deal, the Communists promised not to try to re-take Hong Kong in exchange for the rights of legal presence of the CCP representatives and propaganda in Hong Kong. A result of the mutual secret communications, some historians note, was Britain’s recognition of the PRC in 1950." Yu (2015). Page 43 [↩][Cite]
Stalin reaffirms this idea in a cable to Chen Yun. “..., the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle against the imperialists. Therefore [we] advise to encourage the trading activities of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside, let’s say trade with Hong Kong and with other foreign capitalists. The Chinese communists must decide for themselves which goods to buy and which to sell.”26-04-1949 Stalin cable to Kovalev[↩]
25-07-1949 Mao Zedong Telegram to Liu Shaoqi on asking help for airforce Price (2019) remarks "The distinction in business terms to be made by the British policy in Hong Kong toward the KMT and the communists might not seem so great. But thinking so would be a mistake. The British colonial government allowed the communists to use Hong Kong as an indirect supply depot and finance centre for the Korean War. But it stepped outside of a policy of mere communist and KMT equivalence in business freedom when it allowed the KMT to fund and train its militants to cross the border on
suicide missions." Page 23 [↩][Cite]
Moisés (2008). Page 230. [Cite] "By 1952...border skirmishes not just in Hong Kong but also in Portuguese Macau, where the presence of an estimated 100,000 Nationalist operatives and sympathizers heightened tensions and provoked violent clashes within Macau and on the border.34 ..., tensions decreased, thanks in part an agreement by the PRC to sell Macau necessary supplies such as fresh vegetables and rice in return for “strategic materials” otherwise embargoed by the United Nations." Steele (2016). Page 99 [↩][Cite]
"Around 5,000 tons of goods flowed through the porous borders of Hong Kong and Macao into the PRC each month." Pang (2011). Page 37 [↩][Cite]
Yang (2005). Page 2. [Cite] The treaty is signed on August 14, 1945. Fairbank (2006) notices "...as part of the Yalta agreement of February 1945, President Roosevelt had already tried to settle China’s fate by arranging with Stalin for a Chinese–Soviet treaty between the Nationalists and the USSR. The terms were that the Soviets would recognize and deal only with the Nationalist Government of China, while the Nationalists in turn acknowledged the Russian recovery of their former imperialist rights in the Northeast along the railways. Stalin promised to withdraw Soviet troops within three months from the Japanese surrender. As it turned out, this would be November 15, 1945, and thus the CCP would have a three-month period in which to infiltrate the Northeast as best they could in competition with the Nationalists, who would be transported by the Americans. Since the Nationalists saw that the CCP even on foot was beating them into the Northeast, they asked the Soviets to stay longer, and Soviet troops did not depart until May 1946..." Page 329 [Cite] Garver (2016) "But the same Yalta agreement legitimized Moscow’s preeminence in Eastern Europe, and the overturn of the Yalta agreement in the Far East might lead the United States to challenge the Yalta arrangements in Eastern Europe in an effort to redress the global balance in Washington’s favor. Thus, Soviet interests and Stalin’s attitude toward alliance with new China were equivocal." Pages 33-34 [↩][Cite]
14-02-1950 Agreement on the Changchun railway. Port Arthur and Dalny Protocol between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on the unimpeded transport of Soviet troops and military equipment on the Chinese Changchun Railway in the event of a threat of war in the Far East. 02/14/1950, Moscow [↩]
Source: Garver (2016). Page 159
Garver remarks "China, although it was Moscow’s most populous ally, received only $790 million, or about 13 percent of all Soviet aid during the period ending in 1962. China’s share was considerably less than East Germany’s $1,353 million or Poland’s $914 million.27" [Cite][↩]
On 23-11-1953 Sino-North Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement is signed. "Quite possibly to show its moral superiority over the Soviet Union, China announced in 1953 that it would forgive North Korea all the loans (...)—which was remarkable considering they were financed with Soviet concessional loans that China itself had to repay." Rudyak (2021). No Pagenumber[Cite] RMRB: 24-11-1953. "Negotiation Communiqué of the Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is particularly concerned about the economic recovery of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after its war-torn situation. In view of the huge expenditure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the cause of healing the wounds of war and restoring the national economy, the Government of the People's Republic of China, in the period ending December 31, 2003, all supplies and expenses of the Government of the People's Republic of China to assist the DPRK will be donated to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea free of charge. At the same time, in order to further aid the DPRK, the government of the People's Republic of China has decided to allocate an additional RMB 8 trillion yuan within the four years from 1954 to 1957 and donate it to the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea free of charge as a means of restoring its national economy.[↩]
"In contrast, all other foreign consulates—the U.S., Britain, India, and Pakistan—had either preemptively closed prior to the arrival of the PLA or been forced out by the CCP by 1953. The three Soviet consulates operating under the PRC provided excess opportunity for the Soviet Union to report on events in Xinjiang, closely monitor Soviet interests in the province, and to lobby for special rights and privileges for Soviet nationals (Suqiao) in Xinjiang province. Interestingly, these consulates were not subordinate to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, acting under guidance sent directly from Moscow”Kraus (2010). Page 159 [↩][Cite]
Goncharov (1993). Pages 125-126. [Cite] In general,
those who worked in administrative, government, or military sectors were called advisers, those who worked in factories and mines were called experts, and those
who worked in schools were 'professors' or 'teachers'. [↩]
27-03-1950 Agreement on the Sino-Soviet Petroleum Co., Ltd. in Sinkiang; the Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Sino-Soviet Non-Ferrous and Rare Metals Co., Ltd. in Sinkiang; and Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Sino-Soviet Civil Aviation Co., Ltd. See 05-04-1950 RMRB "Cheer for the future of China's industrialization, the whole country supports the three Sino-Soviet agreements, and thanks the Soviet people for the great internationalism spirit." The article poses the question "Should it be allowed to use foreign capital to develop Chinese industry and to cooperate with foreign capital to establish joint stock companies? We can respond responsibly: Under appropriate conditions, this is permitted in principle. Not only with the Soviet Union, but also with other new democracies and even some capitalist countries, not only establishing these three joint-stock companies, but also other appropriate joint-stock companies and even certain business concessions, are all permitted in principle. In fact, it is still needed sometimes. If we are within the proper scope and do it properly, this will first of all be of great benefit to the Chinese people." 02-01-1950 Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong on SU joint metal and oil companies in Xinjiang The agreement Sino–Soviet Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Company was signed on 28 July 1951 and began its operation in the southern Manchurian city of Dalian. Xiao (2024) "these companies played a significant role in Sino–Soviet economic cooperation in the early 1950s. Nearly 90% of all transfers for non-military purposes from the Soviet Union to China between 1950 and 1955 were funnelled through the four joint-stock companies" Pages 30-31 [Cite][↩]
"...the news of the Sino-Soviet signing of the two joint slack company agreements involving Xinjiang petroleum and nonferrous metals has caused a very great commotion among Beijing students. They are suspicious that the two agreements might harm China’s sovereignty. Many Youth League members are raising doubts and difficult questions for discussion. They have asked for an explanation, Some even have cursed Soviet aggression and the traitorous People's Government while others preferred to tear up their Youth League membership than submit to the will of the People’s Government” Liu Shaoqi cited in Reardon (2002). Pages 50-51 [↩][Cite]
Shen (2016). "Concerning … mixed joint-stock companies, …blame should not be placed on the Soviets. …, when Mikoyan visited Xibaibo in 1949, Chinese leaders invited the USSR to manage jointly owned and leased companies in China, and during Mao’s visit to the USSR, China on its own initiative proposed establishing joint-stock companies in Xinjiang." Pages 129 [↩][Cite]
12-02-1950 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi Klinger (2017) states Beijing's "frontier problem" during the early Communist era was addressed through militarization, industrialization, and resource extraction, particularly on the Mongolian frontier. To overcome infrastructure and technological deficiencies, Beijing granted resource and military concessions to the Soviet Union to develop oil and mining interests in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. This led to divergent interpretations: one views these concessions as unfavorable, imposed by Stalin, while another sees them as part of Mao's strategy to connect Soviet and Chinese economies. The Chinese leadership aimed to industrialize regions like Baotou using Soviet technology and aid, in exchange for access to mineral resources. The Sino-Soviet relationship was portrayed positively in Chinese media, showing industrial and military cooperation. However, despite extensive Soviet influence, Chinese Communist control was expected to increase. The narrative of the PRC's founding often overlooks the continuity of Soviet privilege in Chinese territory, contrasting it with European and Japanese colonialism. Transforming regions like Baotou and Bayan Obo required significant labor and the establishment of permanent settlements. Maoist planners encouraged migration to address shortages in eastern China and secure the frontier with Han Chinese, leading to a significant increase in the Han population in Inner Mongolia between 1953 and 1982. Pages 87-88
[↩][Cite]
14-02-1950 Mao Cable from Moscow re Revisions in the Editorial A New Epoch in Sino-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation. Li (2018) cites the Central Propaganda Department with special instructions on how to handle questions from the rank and file.
"The propaganda for the treaty should emphasize the important parts and focus on the overall history of Sino-Soviet relations, the benefits of the treaty to China and its contrast with various unequal treaties. Commentaries in publications should not be based on isolated interpretations of a single word or sentence in the treaty, nor should speculations be made about the reasons for certain special terms. So far some newspapers have answered a few specific questions such as why the Chinese Eastern Railway and the port of Lushun won’t be returned to China until the end of 1952. This is not appropriate for the following reasons. First, such isolated explanations will only mislead
readers to dig into unnecessary details while neglecting the full picture. Second, because such questions concern bilateral diplomatic policies, superficial and partial explanations should not be published in writing. Given the fact that questions concerning the terms of the treaty have been raised from all over the country, it is better to mention them in passing in general explanations. Except for purely technical questions, no specific answers should be publicized." 16Li (2018). Pages 30-31 [↩][Cite]
The SU shipbuilding facilities in Dairen become a joint venture in 1951 [↩]
“in order to solve the difficulties encountered in Xinjiang and to build up Xinjiang, I believe it is necessary to have vigorous Soviet assistance.” He also explained that the Chinese, with limited resources and expertise, would simply be unable to solve Xinjiang’s economic problems alone.” Peng Dehuai cited in Kraus (2010). Page 144 [↩][Cite]
Mao (2017). Page 85.[Cite] Kraus (2010) ads "Conscious that in 1950 many Chinese students had predicted that the Soviets would violate Chinese sovereignty, the editorial adopted the dubious tone that the termination of Sino-Soviet joint ventures was the result of Chinese technicians having “gained sufficient experience to administer them on our own.”"Kraus (2010). Page 136 [Cite] Ginsbergs (1976) remarks "Then, in 1954, in connection with the transfer to the PRC of Soviet shares in the joint stock enterprises, China assumed the obligation to compensate the USSR for the value of these assets through supplementary shipment of goods spaced over a number of years.47" [↩][Cite]
01-02-1947 Statement of the CCP concerning agreement between GMD and foreign countries 
