Article 21 of the Common Program

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In his well-known statement, Mao Zedong made clear who holds authority over the military: "Communists do not pursue personal military power; they must never do so. Instead, they must secure military power for the Party and for the People. Every Communist must understand the truth that 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be permitted to command the Party."

In October 1949, Zhou Enlai emphasized the army's critical role, stating, The army and public security units are the main pillars of political power. You are the institutions responsible for the nation’s safety and prevention of threats—each carrying half of this responsibility. The army stands prepared for crises, but public security is needed every day.
In 1951, Zhu De emphasized that modernizing the army must not come at the expense of the troops' political awareness. The PLA must develop its various branches, enhance its technical capabilities, improve combat training, and strengthen its fighting power to fulfill its historic mission of defending the motherland and resisting imperialist aggression. This requires the entire army to engage in continuous, in-depth political education for officers and soldiers, constantly raising the army's political consciousness. The high morale and strong political integrity of the People's Liberation Army remain essential in overcoming any adversary.

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The political commissars are responsible for the political consciousness of the soldiers. The basis of this system is laid in the decision of the 6th Party congress of the CCP (June 18-July 11 1928) to establish, above the level of regiments, a system of political commissars. Their status, composition and influence change throughout the years. The main characteristics of the system remain the same: to political control the PLA, to ensure the loyalty to the party, to empower the moral, to enlarge the political consciousness, and to enlarge the unity between the soldiers and officers. The division between commanders and political commissar is not always clear; sometimes persons change their roles. Kondapalli (2005) describes the function of political commissar:
a) Overseeing a military unit
b) Ensuring the loyalty of troops to the CCP’s rule
c) Carrying forward CCP’s current political line, policies and principles ⁷
d) Overseeing civilian matters, personnel affairs, education
e) Enhancing the morale and entertainment of troops⁸
f) Studying closely the military personnel’s thinking processes and conduct towards rules and regulations and enhancing their political consciousness (sixiang juewu) and comprehension⁹
g) Reporting, conducting cadre meetings, investigation, study sessions, observing the three democracies [in the spheres of politics, military and economic affairs], and personnel responsibility system Amidst the Korean War, the emergence of heightened professionalism within the PLA significantly eroded the authority of the commissar, particularly at the unit level. Their traditional prerogative of countersigning all orders was often disregarded, particularly within company-level operations where the pressures of battle were most intense. By 1954, following the formal reorganization of the PLA modeled after Russian lines, the commissar found their role markedly constrained.
Speaking bitterness was used as a tool to raise the political consciousness of soldiers. Unlike in rural areas, where it involved direct confrontations and accusations, the PLA's speaking bitterness campaigns were conducted without the presence of those being blamed. Soldiers were not directly engaged in economic struggles with landlords over land or property. However, the purpose of launching these campaigns in the army was similar to that in villages: to boost morale and foster political awareness by invoking bitter memories and a sense of injustice. Ultimately, soldiers' personal traumatic experiences were channeled toward larger targets, such as the Nationalist Army and Chiang Kaishek. This method was specifically applied to defected GMD soldiers, with 75,000 soldiers defecting in 1947 and another 50,000 in 1948. These new recruits came from diverse political backgrounds and were often uncertain about the necessity of fighting in a civil war. Soldiers from wealthier families, for example, rejected the idea that landlords exploited tenants, believing instead that landlords provided jobs. The first step in politicizing these soldiers was fostering class consciousness, followed by guiding them to understand the socioeconomic relationship between the exploiters and the exploited.

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Mao Zedong developed the People’s war strategy during the 30’s and 40’s and used it also during the Korean War. The People’s War was based on the principle that people are more important than weaponry. A shortage of weapons can be compensated with high levels of moral and motivation of the soldiers. Food and wages are important elements to accomplish these high levels, also the relation between soldiers and officers is of importance. The officers have to set a good example. Political indoctrination is another weighty part of the strategy. The prospect of land reform reinforces the loyalty of the locals, which is also important. The quantity of combatants plays a pivotal role in People’s War strategies. A numerical advantage can be achieved either on a local or theater-wide scale by mobilizing not only regular troops but also the entire civilian population. In a People's War scenario, civilians assume various roles such as medics, intelligence operatives, security personnel, supply and engineering labourers, or guerrilla fighters. This type of warfare necessitates a comprehensive commitment from the civilian population, akin to a total war effort. The strategy of People’s War follows a straightforward approach. Initially, during the strategic defensive stage, the enemy is enticed into overextending and isolating themselves. Subsequently, in the strategic stalemate phase, the combined strength of Chinese morale and numerical superiority is leveraged in a guerrilla war aimed at attrition. Finally, during the strategic offensive phase, the enemy's strength is gradually diminished until they reach parity and then inferiority, leading to a transition to conventional warfare and eventual defeat of the enemy. It's important to recognize that guerrilla warfare is just one component of the broader concept of People's War. Guerrilla tactics are only one aspect of People’s War and not an end in themselves. Mao Zedong cautioned that as the Red Army advances, it must deliberately phase out its guerrilla characteristics to become more centralized, unified, disciplined, and effective—in essence, to adopt a more regular military structure. He noted that the Red Army was approaching a new stage of development in terms of technical equipment and organization, urging readiness to transition to this next level. The strategies of People’s War are a success during the war with Japan and during the Civil War. In both wars, the party with the most firepower and technology did not win the war. In first instance, the People’s war strategy is also a success in Korea, but during the war this strategy seems to have lost his momentum. One reason for its failure is the lack of support of the local Korean people. For decades, Chinese strategists have debated the direction of naval doctrine. In an early phase of this discussion, one faction argued that "people's war" theory was ineffective against technologically advanced adversaries like the United States and Japan. Another perspective, while agreeing that the Chinese navy should not solely protect the army’s coastal flank, contended that people’s war at sea simply needed to be adapted to "new historical" circumstances.
The support of the Chinese people for the Korean War is achieved by much propaganda work under the title "Resist America Aid Korea" in which elements such as patriotism and nationalism are applauded and pro-US sentiments are rejected. See Article 42.

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In 1952, the PLA began shifting focus from political awareness to greater professionalism, largely in response to lessons from the Korean War. Mao Zedong articulated this change, stating that the previous approach, which prioritized political work over operational staff work, had to be decisively reformed. While political work remained essential, the practice of assigning less skilled or less active individuals to commanding roles had hindered the effectiveness of the command structure. Mao emphasized the need to reverse this trend by appointing capable commanders with strong organizational and leadership skills to key positions at all levels, fostering a new work ethic and atmosphere in command organs. The influence of Soviet advisors and their training methods has significantly driven this transformation. The goal is to evolve from a primarily infantry-based land force to a combined land, naval, and air force equipped with modern technology, capable of coordinated, multi-branch warfare to defend against invasions. At military academies non-military teachers are allowed to give lessons in mathematics and physics. They are recruited from several universities, companies, and governmental departments to enhance the level of the military academies. In addition, the SU sends experts necessary to supplement the shortage of capable Chinese teachers.
In order to elevate the proficiency of the PLA, an initiative was launched targeting educated young individuals to become prospective officers. They were encouraged to fervently answer the nation's call and fill the esteemed "posts of glory" that awaited them. This call resonated strongly, as evidenced by the report on February 1, 1951, which indicated that approximately 250,000 individuals had applied for enrollment in officer schools. More than fifty percent of these applicants were members of the Communist Party or the Youth League. This initial cohort of candidates formed the foundation of the officer corps in the subsequent years. Before receiving their commissions, these cadets underwent an approximately eighteen-month training program with a significant emphasis on political education. Following the completion of this training, the cadets served six months in the ranks before being officially commissioned.
To increase the attractiveness of the army for married officers, the CMC decided in July 1953, to allow military officers who have served in the military for more than five years to have their families live together with them and receive limited benefits. In 1952, the CMC has decided that only division-grade and above military officers, aviation crew, and college instructors are allowed to take an annual leave once a year. In 1954, all unmarried officers who live separately from their parents and married officers who live separately from their spouses, are included.
In later years Mao Zedong will revoke this opinion and will favor political consciousness above professionalism.

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Chapter 3 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents