Conclusions of Chapter 2 of the Common Program
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
People's Daily Editorials
X
A Number indicates the subject was a major theme in the editorial. A number indicates a minor theme in the editorial. Source: Oksenberg Michel and Henderson Gail (1982). Research guide to People's Daily editorials, 1949-1975



These main editorials contain titles as February 4, 1949, Strive for the Establishment of New Democratic Peking, or May 16, 1950 New Constructions in Democratic Regimes in the Big Cities, or February 3, 1953 Resolutely Rectify Coercive Work Style in Postal and Telecommunications Agencies.
Under pressure of Stalin Mao Zedong decides to hold elections. These elections are completly manipulated, sometimes violence is used.
"From time to time, each district also received reports from the work teams about threats to the electoral process. Alleged offenders were punished at show trials or by specially established “election courts” so that they could serve as negative examples. At the height of the election campaign in Shanghai, eight people were denounced at mass show trials and charged with the crimes of “sabotaging the election” and “counter revolution.” Five of these eight were also accused of murder and received the death penalty, while the remaining three were sentenced to serve prison terms ranging from five to ten years." Zhang Jishun (2014). Creating “Masters of the Country” in Shanghai and Beijing: Discourse and the 1953–54 Local People's Congress Elections. Page 1078

Conclusion...

Overt military control is less, as the opponents of the regime are disabled. Under the surface the military keep control in factories, institutions and governance .
The big difference between the old and the new judicial system is the role it plays in society. In the old system legislation was an instrument of the government to maintain order in society. Most civil cases were handled by family councils and guild bosses. The state did not interfere in those affairs.
Under the new rule legislation has a different role, “… has socialized private property and thus changed the foundation of law. It uses legal instruments as a dynamic means to remold the society and to promote the economy. Party cadres represent the will of the state, which in reality is but a facade for the Party.”
Hsiao Gene T.(1965). The role of economic contracts in communist China. Page 1060
During this period the criminal process served as a blunt instrument of terror. Campaigns, as Zhenfan (see Article 7), Sanfan (see Article 18) and Wufan (see chapter 4) are instruments to crush all sources of political opposition. "In short, the army, the police, and the regular and irregular courts implemented the directive of Chairman Mao to serve as instruments for oppressing the hostile classes and for inflicting "legalized" violence and lesser sanctions upon all those who were deemed to be "reactionaries" and "bad elements."
Cohen Jerome Alan (1968). The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963: An Introduction. Page 10
"While the CCP leadership wanted to build on its revolutionary experience, no grand blueprint was actually in place for how to administer justice in a complex urban setting. Very soon, seemingly irreconcilable internal differences came to the surface. Two distinct concepts were in play: one was to establish a Soviet-style legal system with a professional, hierarchical, and largely independent judiciary, and the other was to build a decentralized, revolutionary system that was based on strict party control, the participation of the masses, and the involvement of local units and nonprofessional personnel. Neither concept could generate any agreement. As a result, the party was almost constantly switching back and forth between implementing bureaucratic and campaign modes of law enforcement in the first decades of CCP rule."
Mühlhahn Klaus (2009). Criminal justice in China. Page 177
These campaigns caused economic disruption and caused fear and terror for many.
These campaigns, like many other campaigns has little lasting effect on the attitude of cadres. An Ziwen (director of the CCP's central organization department) points out: “After a mass campaign is over, many flaws and errors assailed during the campaign may re-emerge. They may even re-emerge to a greater degree. Some people self-congratulate themselves for having discovered some patterns from repeated campaigns. They would get prepared before a new campaign began and pretend to be active and honest. Sometimes they could even shed a few drops of tears while making self-criticisms or confessions. Yet no sooner is the campaign over than they would return to their old selves.102 An Ziwen continues “… particularly pinpointed the problem of post-campaign vengeance by officials who had received criticism or denunciation from subordinates, an action known as “zheng ren”(to fix someone) or “chuan xiaoxie” (literally, to give someone tight shoes to wear: i.e. make things hard for someone). This practice became familiar to many Chinese in the many political campaigns that were to follow.103”.
Cited in Lü Xiaobo (2000). Cadres and corruption. Page 54

Despite the development of various organs at national and local level where one can complain about the administration and party, the implementation and results remain weak.
"From time to time, each district also received reports from the work teams about threats to the electoral process. Alleged offenders were punished at show trials or by specially established “election courts” so that they could serve as negative examples. At the height of the election campaign in Shanghai, eight people were denounced at mass show trials and charged with the crimes of “sabotaging the election” and “counter revolution.” Five of these eight were also accused of murder and received the death penalty, while the remaining three were sentenced to serve prison terms ranging from five to ten years." Zhang Jishun (2014). Creating “Masters of the Country” in Shanghai and Beijing: Discourse and the 1953–54 Local People's Congress Elections. Page 1078 [↩]
Hsiao Gene T.(1965). The role of economic contracts in communist China. Page 1060 [↩]
Cohen Jerome Alan (1968). The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963: An Introduction. Page 10 [↩]
Mühlhahn Klaus (2009). Criminal justice in China. Page 177 [↩]
Cited in Lü Xiaobo (2000). Cadres and corruption. Page 54 [↩]