

Dates of Meeting:

13-10-1950 and stayed in session through the night

Type of Meeting:

Politburo

Place of Meeting:

Beijing

Attendance:

Mao, Peng Dehuai, Gao

Major Agenda Items:

Korea, no SU air support

Speeches/Reports:

Peng Dehuai was angry when he heard the Soviet Union would not provide air support and said he wanted to resign as commander of the volunteers

Mao Zedong, "[Our troops should enter into the Korean War](#)," (wojun yingdang he bixu ruchao zuozhan), "If we do not send troops and allow the enemy to march to the Yalu river, it will encourage reactionary morale... It will be detrimental to all sides...the Northeast Frontier Army will be pinned down and the electricity supply for South Manchuria will be controlled. All in all, we believe that we should enter the war and we must enter the war."

October 13, 1950, The Selected Writings of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, p 144.

He convinced Peng and others that although the Soviet air force could not enter Korea at the beginning of the war, Stalin had promise to provide air protection of Chinese territory and provide China with large quantities of military equipment

Other Decisions and/or Actions:

- the meeting decided that even without the support of the Soviet air force, when U.S. troops were attacking Korea in force, troops must be sent to aid Korea no matter how great the difficulties.
- proceeding cautiously and avoiding a direct challenge to the United States.
- The result was revealed in Mao's telegram to Stalin via Zhou on that day, which conveyed the "unanimous opinion" of the Politburo that the CPV would intervene. Mao stated that the Chinese entry into the Korean War would "greatly enhance [our] interests in China, Korea, the Far East, and the world. Otherwise, by allowing the enemy to press to the bank of the Yalu, the domestic and international reactionary air would blow higher, and it would be disadvantageous to every side concerned."

Remarks:

1. Mao, Peng, and Gao made a careful study of the operational plan for after the volunteers entered Korea. After the meeting, Mao immediately telegraphed Zhou, "I have discussed with the comrades of the Political Bureau and they unanimously hold that it is advantageous for our troops to enter Korea." Due to lack of air cover, Mao decided that in the beginning the volunteers should only fight South Korean troops. The next day, Mao telegraphed Zhou again, briefing the latter on the specifics of operational deployment and stating that the date the volunteers would set out was October 19.
2. On the same day Mao Zedong summoned the Soviet ambassador to China, to an interview and said to him that China was unable to buy Soviet weapons in cash and had to get them on credit. In this way the 1951 national budget would not be disrupted and "the democratic parties would be more easily convinced of our argument for entering the war ."
3. The final consensus reached at the meeting of 13 October seemed to reflect this combination of concerns. According to Mao's summary of that consensus, military intervention was necessary above all to prevent the enemy from dominating the Yalu River and thus posing a constant threat to the Northeast. But it was also important for guaranteeing the North Koreans a secure base of operations and for denying imperialism a victory that would fan counterrevolutionary sentiments in China and internationally.
4. Mao sends Zhou a [telegram](#)