Article 24 of the Common Program

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China has a long history of a complex system of wholly or partly self-sufficiency for the army. During the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) a system of 3 types was created: civilian farming land, dedicated military farming land, and joint military – civilian farming land. The armies received only limited financial support of the government. In this way the administration was able to limit the tax burden. The military played an essential role in controlling and developing the agriculture.
The Red Army (PLA) in the 1920’s and 30’s had to feed, clothe and arm itself because the supporters of the CCP were unable to finance the army. Mao Zedong "…regarded self-sufficiency as not only an essential means of survival for the Red Army but also politically virtuous as the military would not be a burden in the civilian population….(they) had to show that they were fundamentally different from the Nationalist regime, whose armies had a reputation for looting and exploitation of the local population."

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After 1949, the PLA played an important role in the rebuilding of the economy. It handed over more than 30 of its own factories and dozens of captured GMD factories and workshops. However, even after the transfer of infrastructure facilities, the PLA retained control of many factories and farms to ensure the tradition of self-sufficiency.
On February 8, 1949, Mao Zedong urged the PLA to focus on production work, stating, “The time has come for us to set the task of transforming the army into a working force. Failing to commit to this now would be a serious mistake.” This shift aimed to prepare the PLA for urban administration. In cities, the army was to learn skills for engaging with imperialists and Guomindang reactionaries, cooperating with the bourgeoisie, leading workers and organizing trade unions, mobilizing and organizing youth, uniting with and training cadres in newly liberated areas, managing industry and commerce, operating schools, newspapers, news agencies, and broadcast stations, handling foreign affairs, addressing issues with democratic parties and people’s organizations, balancing city and rural relations, solving supply issues for food, coal, and essentials, and managing financial matters. In short, the PLA would now take on all urban responsibilities previously unfamiliar to army cadres and soldiers.

On December 5, 1949, Mao Zedong expanded on plans for the PLA’s involvement in production and construction, stating that efforts must cover all sectors—economy, culture, and national defense. He acknowledged that state revenue was insufficient while expenditures were vast, posing a significant challenge. To address this, the entire population, under the leadership of the Central People's Government, must work to gradually restore and expand production. The PLA, in turn, should take on its share of production responsibilities. Only in this way can the army join with the entire nation in overcoming this challenge.

The army’s involvement in production is intended as a long-term measure, focused on promoting economic prosperity. Mao Zedong specified that this production should remain within areas such as agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, water conservation projects, handicrafts, and transportation projects—fields the army can effectively manage. Commercial enterprises, however, are strictly prohibited. Army leadership should conduct thorough investigations and studies to guide production efforts based on the specific conditions of their local stations.
Article 25 shows how demobilised soldiers also are used for production work. Chapter 4 will also deal with this.

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Chapter 3 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents