Article 12 of the Common Program

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According to this Common Program article general elections were to be held on a short term to form a National People’s Congress (NPC). Prior to this general election, there will be elections on local level and a national census. The census started on June 30, 1953 and the results were published on November 1, 1954 Until then, local Representative Conferences of All Circles (RCAC) had to fulfil the tasks of the local people’s congresses. On July 31, 1949, the CC issued an instruction on the election of RCAC. In this order is stipulated “within two or at most three months after the liberation, cities with more than thirty thousand population should promptly hold a conference of representatives from various sectors. This is an important method for the Party and government to maintain close ties with the people.”

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On December 4, 1949, the central government issued  General Rules for the Organization of the Provincial People's Congress, specifying that final approval for their formation would rest with Beijing. The qualifications for representatives were outlined as follows: anyone opposing imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, who supports the common program and is at least 18 years old, is eligible for election as a representative, regardless of ethnicity, class, gender, or faith, with the exception of those suffering from mental illness or deprived of public rights.
In these elections, mayor, vice mayors, and other officials were elected. The following functions and powers of the provincial people’s congress shall be exercised:
1. Hearing and reviewing the work report of the Provincial People's Government.
2. Decide on the administrative guidelines and policies of the province.
3. Review and approve the budget and final accounts of the Provincial People's Government.
4. It is recommended to resolve matters related to the reform of the provincial government.
5. Election of the chairman, vice-chairmen and members of the Provincial People's Government to form the Provincial People's Government Committee.
In the interim period between the abolition of the military administration and the elections for the provincial and national NPC’s, the RCACs had to take over the administration. Mao Zedong remarked "We must endeavour to make a success of the conferences of people from all circles so that people from every walk of life can unite in a common effort. All matters of importance to the people's governments should be submitted to these conferences for discussion and decision. Representatives at these conferences must have the right to express their views fully; any attempt to hinder such expression is wrong.”
In reality, participants and voters did not enjoy much freedom. The list of candidates was made up of exactly the number of candidates to be chosen. There was no competition. The CCP controlled the founding of the RCACs. For instance, the party top decided to forbid elections in Shanghai for the position of mayor and vice mayor because as the newspaper Jiefang Ribao commented "It has to be admitted that, in nature, this conference is still not of the type of people's conference as approved by the Central Government for Peking.... As a result of the absence of certain objective conditions -the organizational power and the political consciousness of the masses are not yet up to the required standard-this conference can only follow in the footsteps of the first [Shanghai conference, . . . and] not yet assume powers similar to those of the Second People's Conference in Peking .... This conference ... is rather an inevitable extension and development of the first.... Given further time for development, this conference shall naturally assume the character of the people's conference convened in Peking.” A year later, the situation had improved and the RCAC elected the military commander Chen Yi as mayor.

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In his speech of February 28, 1951, Liu Shaoqi explained the methods of election in Beijing. “Eighty-three per cent of the Representatives of the Peoples' Congress are elected by the people; seventeen per cent are invited after agreement with the various circles; three per cent are nominated by the Government. All the representatives are not elected in the same way. Some of them are elected by the voters' assemblies, which make use of the factories, industrial enterprises, and colleges as units. The representatives of the peasants in suburbs, of business men, industrialists, youth, and women, and the Regional representatives, are elected by the electors' assemblies, which exercise the right of voting for the people at large."

The voting was regulated by secret ballot which took place only in colleges, where the voters were all literate and were experienced in voting. Elsewhere, the voting took place by a show of hands after the list of candidates had been discussed. The selection of candidates was regulated, for example, the electoral wards were delineated by the City Consultative Council of Beijing. Large industrial plants and higher educational institutions, each with several thousand voters, were entitled to elect three delegates. Smaller plants and institutions were allotted one or two delegates, while those with a minimal number of voters were amalgamated for the selection of a common delegate. City districts elected two or more delegates based on their population size. Electoral commissions were established in mills, factories, institutions, and educational establishments one month before the conference convened. Overall, 61 percent of the delegates to the third Beijing all-sections conference were elected through indirect ballot, 22 percent through direct ballot, 3 percent were appointed by the city government, and 14 percent were invited.
Liu Shaoqi stated secret and direct elections are only possible if everyone can write and read. He posits “…in the big cities should have three sessions annually; in the medium-sized and small cities, four sessions; in a province, one session; in a district, two sessions. The Peoples' Congress in villages should meet as often as it is stipulated in the laws.”
It is noted that by 1953, the election of 13,637,000 people's representatives to the All-Circle Representative Conferences at various levels, with around 75 percent of the representatives coming from the worker and peasant classes, signified the solidification of the proletariat's political leadership.
Zhou Enlai wrote in the magazine “People’s China” of October 1950 the remark: "...a few cities and counties" had convened People's Congresses; all other cities, and 1,707 counties, had organized Representative Conferences of All Circles; and "most" administrative villages had established one or the other." At the end of 1950, in 20 provinces and 7 other administrative units and in the cities Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Nanjing, the first meeting or more of the RCAC were convened. In August 1949, the Northeast Region, which had been under CCP administration for a longer period, even elected a people’s government. Commanders began to transfer authority to civil party cadres, partly because many units from Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army and Nie Rongzhen’s North China Field Army had been moved south to support ongoing military operations. In the rural districts the CCP has decided that two thirds of the membership should be elected from farm workers, poor peasants and new middle peasants, while one-third of the membership was to be elected from old middle peasants and other working elements. Deng Xiaoping disagreed with the allocation of these quotas. On March 6, 1950, during an enlarged meeting of the CPC East Sichuan Committee, he criticized the composition of a county conference where, out of 196 representatives, 133 were peasants, 19 were workers, and government representatives filled half of the remaining 44 spots. He remarked that such a conference could not be considered representative of people from all walks of life, but rather a peasants' conference, which would fail to unite the masses or distinguish the enemy effectively. Zhou Enlai wrote in the above-mentioned article also about the function of the RCAC "uniting various strata, parties, groups and nationalities among the people, and enabling both the government to hear the opinions of the people and the people to understand and supervise the work of the government.” In other words, the RCACs were advisory meetings. The majority of the delegates in these RCAC were members of the mass organizations. (See Table 10) The same organizations which were represented in the CPPCC. The RCACs were also used in the persecution of counterrevolutionaries. RCACs or enlarged RCACs organized mass rallies against counterrevolutionaries. For example, on March 24, 1951 in Beijing, March 29 in Tianjin, April 29 in Shanghai and Wuhan.
The establishment of RCACs encountered difficulties, particularly in southern China. In the province of Guangxi only 28 Xians out of 70 in total have elected a RCAC. The party did not always manage to exert full control over these RCACs. Initially, individuals benefiting from different industries collaborated, selecting one of their members to act as a manager of the local Business Federation and as a standing committee member of the local RCAC. Subsequently, they bribed the chief of a tax affairs bureau to leverage his influence and secure the position of business-section head in the Xian People's Government.

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On January 13, 1953, Mao Zedong announced the time was ripe to hold general elections for the NPC and to formulate a constitution. Mao Zedong ordered the other politburo members to read a list of compulsory readings. Mao Zedong and the highest leaders of the CCP personally oversaw the formulation of the constitution, although certain non-communist individuals also held significant roles in its development and interpretation. These individuals were experienced in the constitutional debates of the GMD era, and the intellectual and political currents of that period, with their inherent contradictions, tensions, concerns, and priorities, profoundly influenced the entire process. Mao Zedong said "…military activities on the mainland have already ended, land reform has already been basically accomplished, and people from all walks of life have become organized. Therefore, the conditions are now ripe for convening, according to the stipulation of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the National People's Congress and people's congresses at each local level." Only shortly before, Mao Zedong had a different opinion. In October 1952, Liu Shaoqi handed over a letter from Mao Zedong to Stalin, in which Mao Zedong proposed to postpone the elections and the formation of a National People’s Congress until after China had basically entered socialism. (See Meeting) Stalin disagreed. (See below) Mao Zedong conceded.
Stalin's criticism was that the process of formulating both the Common Program and Organic Law of the Central People’s Government was elitist and disconnected from the everyday concerns of ordinary Chinese, and therefore prompting the drafting of the 1954 constitution. The CCP aimed for the 1954 constitution to appear more accessible and democratic, though it did not anticipate its longevity. According to a constitutional report delivered by Liu Shaoqi on 15 september, 1954 Report on the Draft Constitution, the 1954 constitution was envisioned solely as an interim measure to facilitate China’s gradual transition towards a genuinely socialist society.
In the middle of 1954, there was an extensive discussion among the Chinese populace regarding political and social rights, citizenship duties, state symbols, political structures, and ideology. Numerous individuals posed insightful and often forward-thinking inquiries concerning law, citizenship, class dynamics, and political authority, and they proposed thought-provoking ideas for reform. However,rather than directly interpreting the draft constitution themselves, the masses primarily relied on the interpretations provided by its promoters and propaganda. This approach offered two advantages. Firstly, given that China's literacy rate in the 1950s was very low, the draft constitution was largely incomprehensible to the majority of the population. Therefore, instead of expecting the masses to read the draft constitution independently, the party deemed it more practical and efficient to have others explain it to them. Consequently, the masses' understanding of the draft constitution would inevitably be limited and superficial. However, through the interpretations provided by its promoters and propaganda, the masses could still connect with specific aspects of the draft constitution, such as those pertaining to gender equality and universal suffrage.
The big difference between the Common Program and the constitution of 1954 is, under the Common Program, the CCP tacitly acknowledged the coexistence of both capitalism and socialism. Compared to the Common Program, the 1954 constitution was more ideologically driven, as it outlined a socialist state-building trajectory for the next ten to twenty years. The 1954 constitution explicitly rejected the long-term coexistence of capitalism and socialism. The comforting tone found in the preamble of the Common Program, which highlighted the CCP's commitment to "uniting all democratic classes," was absent, replaced by the inclusion of numerous politically charged terms to depict the socialist transition. For instance, there was mention of gradually "eliminating" the "rich peasant" rural economy, and the state asserted its right to "expropriate" private property.
According to article 6 of the Organic Law of the CPPCC, a plenary session of the CPPCC shall be summoned once every three years by the National Committee. The CCP is reluctant to hold such a plenary session or to hold an election for the NPC. The party took the decision to postpone the elections. In October 1952, during Liu Shaoqi’s visit, he informed Stalin of this delay. Stalin was strongly against this decision. Stalin reiterated his stance and supported it with several points. Firstly, he noted that the government of the PRC had not undergone an electoral process. This absence of elections allowed adversaries to question its legitimacy, branding it as merely a self-declared military dictatorship. Secondly, the country lacked an official constitution. The Common Program provided little reassurance in this regard, as both its legitimacy and that of all PRC laws were shadowed by their origins in the unelected CPPCC. Thirdly, Stalin pointed out that the multi-party coalition government established by the Common Program posed a significant security risk to the CCP. Many members of the minor parties had close affiliations with foreign countries, particularly the United States and United Kingdom, and could potentially act as spies for these hostile powers. Stalin argued that the CCP could address these issues and undermine its adversaries' propaganda by simply holding elections in 1954. Given its substantial popular support and experience in mass mobilization, it was assured to dominate such elections.
Back in China, Liu Shaoqi convinced Mao Zedong and on December 24, 1952, the meeting of the permanent committee of the CPPCC decided to hold elections. The CCP and the minzhu dangpai adopt a list of candidates. A committee screened the candidates and in doubt the CCP took the final decision. The number of candidates did not exceed the number of seats in the NPC. The election of the NPC was an indirect election, the members of the provincial people’s congresses chose the members of the NPC. Deng Xiaoping explains this procedure by saying “… because most people were unfamiliar with national policies and the names of state leaders, subjecting top Party and government functionaries to a popular vote was impossible.” In reality, even this procedure is not followed. On July 5, 1954, the national committee of the CPPCC approved a list of candidates. The provincial people’s congresses chose almost unanimous these ‘authorized ‘candidates. For instance, in Beijing the election for deputies to the National People's Congress resulted "... 9 received 100 per cent of the votes (539 votes); 19 received one vote less than the full vote; 3 received 2 less; 2 received 3 less; while even the lowest one received only 4 less than the full vote. Even greater uniformity was shown in the election of 46 deputies to the National People's Congress by the Kwangtung Provincial People's Congress: 'The result of the voting showed that there was no invalid vote. All the 46 elected deputies were returned on from 99 to 100 per cent of the votes cast.”

It is notable that despite the party's transformation of elections from a mechanism of choice to a means of legitimizing appointed candidates, it wholeheartedly embraced its dominance in the electoral process and considered it entirely justifiable. In the elections of 1937 and 1947, the GMD state favoured certain outcomes, yet it did not outright forbid opposition or fully control competition. Conversely, the CCP's new system ensured a predetermined result in each election. To facilitate this system, the communist government mobilized a vast number of individuals from party organizations and the general populace. Never before had election preparation been executed with such meticulousness. The party's rationale can be summarized as follows: as the Communist Party regards itself as the party of the people, it naturally represents their interests, and therefore, what the party desires invariably aligns with the desires of the people. Consequently, rather than maintaining a low profile, the party actively promoted these elections as a novel form of democracy.
Furthermore, the election and the accompanying propaganda campaign, despite government statements to the contrary, were closely tied to the atmosphere of widespread political violence that marked the early years of the People’s Republic. While the election was officially not aimed at conducting a mass political campaign against “enemies,” it is understandable that many perceived it as such.

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This article 12 of the Common Program states that the NPC is the supreme organ of state power. In reality the power is vested in the CCP. As per a 1949 decision by the CCP Central Committee, party committees, rather than government agencies, were designated as the highest decision-making bodies within all work units. Decisions taken by these committees were mandated to be followed without question by all government agencies, military units, and mass organizations. Initially intended as a temporary measure to streamline the command of revolutionary forces, this arrangement evolved post-assumption of power, extending unified leadership across all societal domains. Under the influence of party radicals, this structure was frequently reinforced. Consequently, party committees were instituted in every governmental organization, with party secretaries wielding ultimate authority.

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Chapter 2 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents