Article 11 of the Common Program

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In this article, the focus lies on the relationship of the People's Republic of China with the Soviet Union. In his 1945 essay "On Coalition Government," Mao Zedong urged the GMD government to end its hostility towards the Soviet Union and to actively improve Sino-Soviet relations. He noted that the Soviet Union was the first nation to renounce unequal treaties and establish new, equitable agreements with China. During the GMD's First National Congress, convened by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924, and throughout the Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union was the only country to support China's war of liberation. When the anti-Japanese war began in 1937, the Soviet Union again took the lead in aiding China against Japanese aggression. The Chinese people hold deep gratitude towards the Soviet government and its people for their assistance. Mao emphasized that no comprehensive and lasting resolution to the issues in the Pacific could be achieved without the involvement of the Soviet Union.
Remarkable was the position of Stalin. The GMD government approached the SU leader, Stalin to mediate between GMD and the CCP in January 1949. Stalin was willing to do so and informed Mao Zedong of his plans. He immediately explained to Mao Zedong, he will make the terms for negotiations so strict, the GMD government will never accept them. In his telegram to Stalin, Mao Zedong rejected the mediation with a text proposal in a firm language. "The government of the USSR has always wished, and still wishes, to see China as a peaceful, democratic and united country. But it is for the people of China itself to choose the way to achieve peace, unity and democracy in China. The government of the USSR, relying on the principle of noninterference in the other countries’ internal affairs, cannot accept mediation between the two sides in the civil war in China Chinese people." On January 18, Stalin responded to the GMD in clear accordance with Mao’s insistence that foreign powers not be involved. It can be seen as a clear sign from the CCP to the SU, they want to be acted on as a partner, not as a subordinate.
The relationship with ‘freedom fighters’ in several Southeast Asia is also a subject of this chapter. These ‘freedom fighters’ are seen as partners against imperialism. Several initiatives to promote world peace are described with the emphasis on the Geneva conference on Indochina and Korea.

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In January 1940, Mao Zedong clearly stated his choice on the foreign affairs policy of the PRC: "In particular, Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance, and the revolution will fail." While Mao Zedong briefly entertained the notion of pursuing a "third way," the idea of an "intermediary zone" emerged in the spring of 1946, carrying significant implications. One aspect of this concept was the belief that the competition between US and the Soviet Union would not decisively impact China's political landscape. However, the notion of an "intermediary zone" was short-lived within the leadership of the CCP, as Moscow introduced the theory of "two blocs" in September 1947, leading to its swift abandonment. In 1944, Mao Zedong expressed himself even positive about the US; “China must industrialize. This can be done — in China — only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together.” And in 1945, Mao Zedong was in favor of a visit to Washington instead of Moscow.
As we have seen in Part 4, Stalin was not willing to accept a visit from Mao Zedong in Moscow, instead he sent Mikoyan. At these secret meetings on February 1 and 4, 1949, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Mikoyan agreed that China belongs to the anti-imperialistic camp which is guided by the SU. There is no middle course available..
On the 2nd plenum of the CCP in March 1949, Mao Zedong said in his opening speech: "As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are competing for such business. So far as possible, we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries."
He continues "…plus the support of the working class of the countries of the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's economic construction will not be very slow, but may be fairly fast. The day is not far off when China will attain prosperity."
Even after March 1949, the choice to join the SU was not final and Mao Zedong made explicit openings to the West. In a talk with Kovalev, the Russian envoy in China, Mao Zedong said he will accept loans from the US and have diplomatic relations with capitalist countries. There were 2 important reasons for this idea. China needed raw materials and capital goods which the SU could not provide. Stalin still had diplomatic relations with the GMD regimeand he had not unconditionally supported Mao Zedong. From 26 June to 14 August 1949, Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gang secretly visited Stalin in Moscow. "Stalin considers the foreign policy principles we mentioned in our report to be correct. These principles are the conflict with imperialist countries and cooperation with the Soviet Union and each new democratic country; making use of contradictions within capitalist countries; developing China’s trade and commerce with all countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe."
Stalin promised to recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as a government will established. He also committed himself to conclude a comprehensive agreement with China when Mao Zedong will visit the SU. Finally, the choice was made and announced on the radio on June 30, 1949. "That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front. "You are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road." On July 19, 1949, Deng Xiaoping explained this policy to cadre of the party "Chairman Mao says we are leaning to one side on our own accord now to avoid being maneuvered into leaning to one side in the future."
There are several other motivations for this option.

One is the personal experiences of the 13 politburo members of the 7th Central Committee. Peng Zhen and Peng Dehuai hade no direct connection with the SU, while all other members have been in the SU. Some children or adopted children are or were in SU. Liu Shaoqi and Ren Benshi both have studied at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. (Communist Eastern University.)

This university has been set up to prepare students for the seizure of power in their motherland. Zhang Wentian, Dong Biwu and Lin Boqu

have studied at the Sun Yatsen University in Moscow. In the 1930’s, Chen Yun , and Kang Sheng were the Chinese representatives in the Comintern (alliance of communist parties).

The CCP emerged with direct guidance from the Soviet Communist Party's Third International (Communist International), which also introduced Marxist ideology to the CCP. Prior to seizing power, the CCP had already undergone a process of "bolshevization." Consequently, the emulation of the Soviet model by the CCP, particularly following its establishment as the sole ruling party after the founding of the People's Republic, was an inevitable consequence of its affiliation with the Third International.
After 1945 when the SU defeated Japan in the Northeast of China, Gao Gang and Peng Zhen had regularly contact with Russian diplomats, military personnel, and economic experts. Zhou Enlai is the person with many international experiences. He has visited Japan, and parts of Europe (France, GB, Germany and the SU). Zhu De has been in Germany and SU. Only Zhang Wentian (Japan and SU) and Dong Biwu have been in the US.

Russia and China share similar historical trajectories, both experiencing prolonged periods of despotic monarchy and extensive histories of centralized bureaucracy. Consequently, the highly centralized Soviet model could be adopted in China with relative ease. Both nations were undergoing industrialization within economically underdeveloped agricultural contexts. In 1917, Russia was predominantly agrarian, with a rural population comprising 83.2 percent of its total populace, trailing behind Western powers both economically and culturally. Similarly, China encountered the challenge of industrializing within an agricultural framework that lagged behind economically.

Li Shaoqi puts forward another motive to join the SU camp when he attacks the Yugoslavian leader Tito because he decides to stay outside of the SU camp. "Only the Communists and the international proletariat, only the Soviet Union and the New Democracies led by the Communist Parties are the most reliable friends of all oppressed nations fighting for their liberation from imperialist oppression, for national independence. To harbour mistrust and unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union and the New Democracies led by the Communist Parties and to regard “the capitalist countries as less dangerous to Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union”, as the Tito-ites are doing, is extremely erroneous and harmful."
On October 1938, Mao Zedong wrote: "Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? We hold that he not only can be but must be.(...)And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism."

During the politburo meetings from 6 to January 10, 1949, the members discussed the foreign policy and Mao Zedong warned them not to choose side for the US "The mistaken view prevailing among some Chinese people as well as some of our party members that exaggerates the strength of American imperialism must be constantly watched and overcome." This illusion could prove the source of danger as the Truman administration sought to salvage American interests in China. Facing defeat "sending its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organizing so-called oppositionists." He even imagined that Washington might grant diplomatic recognition as a way of securing its influence in China the better to push this strategy of "'destruction from within."

Shortly after this meeting on January 19, 1949, the CC instructed on diplomatic issues "All embassies, government embassies, consulates and their affiliated diplomatic agencies and diplomats of capitalist countries recognized by the Kuomintang government will not be recognized until the People’s Republic of Treated as foreign nationals, but should be effectively protected. The military attaches of these countries should be treated the same as diplomats. However, for American military attachés who directly assisted the Kuomintang in fighting the civil war, they should send troops to monitor and must not be given freedom. ." In contrast, the directive stressed that diplomats from the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries should be treated differently, as "Regarding the embassies and consulates of the Soviet Union and new democracies and their diplomatic institutions and personnel, because their foreign policies are fundamentally different from those of capitalist countries, our attitude towards them should be fundamentally different"
To regulate all foreign affairs, every city had to appoint a special team which will deal with any problems rising from this policy. Mao Zedong is convinced that there is no future for the capitalistic nations, and the model of Western democracy is not a good alternative for China, instead the people’s dictatorship is the only way to handle the situation in China (See Part 8). The choice for “leaning on one side” also meant China will adopt the social, political and economic model of the SU. In 1949, the success of this model was apparent in the SU and the Eastern Bloc. When Yugoslavia detached itself from the Eastern bloc, the CCP immediately condemned this step.

Two observations highlight the disparity between the everyday activities and the formal foreign policy during the initial years of the republic. While the central government prioritized reshaping foreign policy towards the Soviet Union on the international diplomatic stage, grassroots foreign affairs efforts within the nascent nation primarily centered around handling the significant remnants of a century-long association with Western nations. Mao Zedong saw this contrast and reacts: "Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into de facto relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations." After the proclamation of the People's Republic, Mao Zedong can finally visit Stalin in December 1949. On February 14, 1950, at the end of his visit, a treaty was signed between the SU and the PRC. See Article 55.

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In 1939, Mao Zedong identified two important enemies of China: "They are imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country. For it is these two that are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of Chinese society at the present stage. The two collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people, and imperialism is the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the Chinese people, because national oppression by imperialism is the more onerous."
In his interview in 1946 with Anna Louise Strong Mao Zedong put forward that the struggle between American imperialism and the SU will at first not be fought directly but: "… a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question."
In June 1949, when the PLA prevailed in the Civil War, Mao Zedong warned "... I think it is necessary to call people's attention to the fact that the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chinese reactionaries, will not resign themselves to defeat in this land of China. They will continue to gang up against the Chinese people in every possible way."
November 15, 1949, Liu Shaoqi staid at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries” in Beijing: "...the fighters of national liberation wars in Viet Nam, Birma, Indonesia, Malaya and Philippines are acting entirely correctly …The experience of the victorious national liberation struggle of the Chinese people teaches that the working class must unite with all classes, parties and group and organisations willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings and to form a broad, nation-wide front, headed by the Working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party."
At this same conference, Li Lisan , proposed to form an international revolutionary army. This proposal disappeared into oblivion.
In February 1949 Mao Zedong told Mikoyan the CCP "…maintained contacts with the communist parties of Indochina, Siam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Birma, India, Malaya and Korea. At that time, the CCP had closer ties with the communist parties of Indochina and Korea but less close ties with other countries, with which they maintained contact mainly through liaisons in Hong Kong. The CCP had very little contact with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Mao proposed discussing and establishing an Asian Communist Information Bureau like the Cominform in Europe after the situation had stabilised in China."
Beginning in 1949, the majority of Asian communist parties shifted their focus from the Soviet Union to the PRC. They regarded the Chinese revolution model, with some localized adjustments, as a practical blueprint for their own revolutionary endeavors. These "freedom fighters" could anticipate financial and psychological support, rather than military aid.
To bolster the ideological foundations of the Asian communist parties, preparations commenced for the establishment of the "First Study Group." This initiative entailed a training program designed for senior officials from communist parties in Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, and India. The study sessions spanned one year, with members of the CCP Politburo serving as instructors and the curriculum comprising selected writings of Mao Zedong. The venue for the Study Group was Zhongnanhai, Mao's newly established headquarters. In 1949, during the conversations between Stalin and Liu Shaoqi they talked about the situation in Indochina and the rest of Asia. Stalin divided the world in 2 parts, the SU will focus on the West and China on the East. They agreed that the CCP will back the Vietnamese communist party in its independence struggle. On December 24, 1949, Stalin and Mao Zedong once more agreed to this division of spheres of influence. Both the SU, as the People's Republic of China competed for the favor of the Communist Party of India. In 1951, the Communist Party of India chose to follow the Russian model for revolution. Outside Asia the communist party of Algeria could count on moral backup from China. Wang Jiaxiang, declared in 1951 "Since Indonesia and many other Southeast Asian countries had already achieved their national independence, the CCP branches in these countries should be dissolved completely.³⁹ In 1952 the CCP Central Committee ordered the shutdown of its organizations abroad, ranging from youth groups and semiunderground civic associations to underground party headquarters. The CCP Central Committee encouraged its dismissed overseas cadres to return to the PRC by promising them recognition for their achievements and reassignment to new posts.⁴⁰"
Under the leadership of Li Weihan, the CCP established one year later a research committee to improve the relations with other Asian communist parties. China gave no overt support to these countries. The relation between the People's Republic of China and the foreign communist parties was more determined by strategic considerations than solidarity. The Communist Party of Vietnam, Birma could count on concrete support. Thai and Malaysian communist parties, which both had many Chinese members, could only count on moral support.
The CCP leadership believed that true independence could only be attained under the leadership of a communist party. They argued that independence achieved peacefully did not equate to genuine freedom, as such nations would remain colonies or semi-colonies of imperialist powers. As a result, Beijing viewed Burma’s independence with skepticism, concluding that “from an economic, military, and political perspective, Burma’s fundamental nature had not changed—it remained a typical colonial country.
December 24, 1949, the Politburo in Beijing decided to send Luo Guibo as special CCP envoy to the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh. In December, the Vietnamese communist troops in cooperation with the PLA hunted down and destroyed GMD forces in South China. Luo Guibo’s mission involved enhancing communication between the two parties and collecting information to better support the Vietnamese. Liu Shaoqi emphasized to Luo that “it is the responsibility of countries that have achieved revolutionary victory to assist those still engaged in a just struggle for liberation” and that “supporting the Vietnamese people in their fight against the French is our international duty.”
At the end of January 1950, Ho Chi minh arrived in Beijing to meet with Liu Shaoqi. Mao Zedong, who stayed in Moscow, gave his fiat to form a committee which would coordinate the aid to Vietnam. Ho Chi minh went to Moscow to meet with Stalin and Mao Zedong. Stalin refused to give direct support and in accordance with the agreement referred him to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong was prepared to help Vietnam. See Article 54

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This observation is particularly noteworthy. The theme of peace in the war culture of the 1950s deserves special attention for two key reasons. First, it indicates that both world revolution and internationalism held limited appeal for the Chinese people during this time. Only a year had passed since the end of the Civil War (1946-1949), and the population was not prepared for engagement in international conflicts. Chinese writers, artists, and journalists emphasized the defense of peace as the sole redeeming aspect of what was otherwise viewed as a senseless and brutal war." In 1950, Piccaso designed a dove as a symbol for the international peace conference. In the People's Republic of China, this dove became a common figure on many magazines, stamps (see Stamps) and propaganda posters (see below and Posters). The dove, as a symbol of peace, came to be regarded as a Chinese symbol of good fortune, on par with the dragon and phoenix. The realm of the doves represented a peaceful paradise, embodying the world in which the Chinese people either lived or aspired to live.

Shortly after the proclamation of the People's Republic, the new regime saw three potential areas of conflict, in which foreign interference could bring China's position in jeopardy. These areas are Taiwan, (Article 2) Korea, and Indochina (Article 54)
At the first meeting between Mao Zedong and Stalin on December 16, 1949, he posed: "The most important question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to pre-war levels and to stabilize the country in general. Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a peaceful future. With this in mind the CC CPC entrusted me to ascertain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in what way and for how long will international peace be preserved." Stalin reassured Mao Zedong, Japan, the US and the European countries are not planning any war. The current peace will last for 25 years or more. He noticed smiling "..there is no one to fight with China, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to invade China?"
The Chinese government wanted to bring about world peace by several means, for example, membership of the UN, the organization of World Peace Congresses, and cultural, sports and science exchanges between countries.

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The new regime did not want to rely only on the SU for peace. They also seek for membership of the UN and wanted to take over the seat of Taiwan. To accomplish this, Beijing sought help from the SU. In the conversation between Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong on January 6, 1950, the Russian minister supported the claim of the People's Republic to the seat on the Security Council and argued that as long as the GMD delegate retained his seat the SU will not cooperate in the Council. Two days later, Zhou Enlai sent a cable to the UN in which he demanded the expulsion of the Taiwan delegation. On January 10, 1950, the US government stated that they will block the membership of the People's Republic of China. 3 days later, the SU delegation left the Security Council.
On August 1, 1950, the SU delegation came back. Notwithstanding the refusal, Mao Zedong appointed Zhang Wentian as head of the delegation in case the PRC is allowed in the future to the Council. On September 30, 1950, Zhou Enlai warned: "Anyone who attempts to exclude the nearly 500 million Chinese people from the United Nations or who ignores and violates the interests of this one-fourth of mankind, imagining that any Far Eastern problem that directly concerns China can be solved arbitrarily without China’s participation, will certainly meet disaster"
In November 1950, China got the opportunity to explain to the Security Council her position on the Korea War. The SU regime opposed this invitation. The Chinese diplomat Wu Xiuchuan took the opportunity to claim the seat of the Taiwanese representative. "… in denying admittance to a permanent member of the Security Council representing 475 million people, it cannot make lawful decisions on any major issues or solve any major problem … the people of China have no reason to recognize any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations." It is on October 25, 1971, the People's Republic of China became a member.
Barrett (2019) shows in his study the ambivalent attitude of the CCP towards the UNESCO. Both before and after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, foreign affairs officials of the CCP at local and central levels displayed unexpected wariness, and at times, hostility towards an international organization as Unesco. Despite the PRC's efforts to secure membership in the UN, CCP officials sought to limit its activities and influence within the country. This apparent contradiction reflects a dynamic tension between pragmatism and ideology, mirroring the CCP's approach to foreign nationals, businesses, or organizations during the early years of the PRC. In their interactions with UNESCO, it seems that ideology took precedence over pragmatism.

While the PRC was involved in the Korean War, it perceived itself as a peace-loving nation, defining "peacefulness" within the framework of "collective security," a concept internationally shared. Within this discourse, peace did not imply the absence of war but rather the engagement in conflict against what was considered the "right" adversary. In the early 1950s, within the Eastern Bloc and consequently in the PRC, this adversary was identified as the Western camp, characterized as "imperialist" and "war-mongering." Thus, the Korean War was viewed as a "peaceful" conflict.
April 1949, the SU, East European countries and communist parties from West Europe were holding a peace conference in Paris. In October 1949, The CCP held a conference for the defense of world peace. A year later, China sent a delegation with representatives from the CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai to the World Peace Council (WPC). In July 1950, China started a campaign 'Signature for Peace Week'. Over 200 million signatures were gathered in opposition to atomic bombs. Alongside the signature campaign for the 'Stockholm Peace Petition,' local branches of the 'Chinese Peace Congress' were established in major cities across China. PRC delegations were sent to international meetings, and upon their return, large rallies were held to give them a hero's welcome. The Chinese press extensively covered these events both domestically and internationally, while 'peace propaganda teams' were organized to tour rural areas of China.
The influence of the WPC was very limited. From October 2 to 12, 1952 a Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions was held in Beijing. Its goal was to support the post-war ‘economic and cultural reconstruction’ in the world through the safeguarding of perpetual peace of the world. See Meeting.

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The political leaders of China attached great importance to the exchange of culture, sport and science as a way to improve relations between countries. In 1950 until 1954, these exchanges took place between East European countries and the People's Republic of China.
In 1952, Chinese athletes took part in the Olympic Games of Helsinki. In 1954, the PRC becomes a member of the IOC, but in 1958 Beijing decided to terminate the membership because Taiwan was also member of the IOC. For that reason, they also resigned from 11 international sports federations.
The success of private foreign scientific exchanges during this period can be attributed to several factors. First, the overseas academic experiences and transnational social networks of individual scientists served as valuable cultural and social capital, enabling them to overcome external blockades and garner support. Notably, scientists such as Tu Changwang and Qian Sanqiang , who studied in France and the United Kingdom—countries relatively more favorable toward the new China—benefited from their academic backgrounds and connections with left-wing scientists, in contrast to their colleagues who had studied in the United States.
Second, there was a growing understanding of the link between science, technology, and ideology. Both the United States and the Soviet Union at the time believed that science and technology were ideologically influenced. As a result, the Soviet Union restricted transnational scientific exchanges, while the United States sought to advance its political system through science and technology. In comparison, China, operating under the belief that technology transcends class and political systems, pursued a more pragmatic and inclusive approach to foreign scientific exchanges. This approach also removed communication barriers with countries lacking formal diplomatic relations and groups not yet part of international organizations. See also Article 48 and Article 45 for more details on sport and culture. Chapter 7 discusses in detail several aspects of the foreign policy of China.

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The Berlin conference in January 1954 (See Article 54 and Timeline ) resulted in a peace conference on Indochina and Korea. See 18-02-1954 Agreement Berlin Conference. The SU had dragged out of these negotiations, China's presence at these peace conference on Indochina and Korea in Geneva in 1954. Leading up to the meeting in Geneva the SU and China had regular contact. In April, Zhou Enlai visited Moscow 3 times and the positions were matched to each other and the unexperienced Chinese delegation was trained in international deliberations. These consultations on the terms under which the Chinese would consider an armistice on the Korean Peninsula started in December 1950.
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, in particular, were keen on utilizing the conference as a platform to declare the emergence of the "new China" as a significant player and respected entity in global matters. Internally, Zhou Enlai stressed the imperative for Beijing to exert maximum effort to ensure the success of the Geneva Conference. Zhou Enlai expected unlike SU leaders many results of the conference "That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can jointly participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes." The Chinese ambassador in the SU, Zhang Wentian said to foreign minister Molotov "… the PRC is intent on taking an active part in the Geneva Conference and thinks that if no great successes are achieved at it, then any success here will be important since a path for active participation in international affairs is being opened for the PRC."
During the Conference, Zhou Enlai used the opportunity to break through China's isolation on the world stage. Every effort was made as the PRC secured the rental of one of the grandest châteaux available, the "Grand Mont-Fleuri". The château underwent a transformation into a museum, adorned with antiques imported from China to embellish its rooms and corridors. Zhou anticipated that the international and media interest in the PRC would turn the château into a bustling hub of activity, attracting informal visits from foreigners. PRC press attaché Xiong Xianghui later approximated that 505 international groups and 3,800 individuals had visited the PRC's premises.
Zhou Enlai spoke on several occasions with the Foreign Affairs minister of the UK Eden the foreign affairs minister of France Bidault and with the French premier Pierre Mendes-France. Chinese representatives had also a meeting with West German businessmen. At an informal meeting, there was even contact between Zhou Enlai and the American negotiator Walter Bedell Smith, who said: "I hope that our two countries can move toward a better mutual understanding." The US Secretary of State Dulles obstructed further reconciliation efforts and even declined to shake hands with Zhou Enlai. At a lower diplomatic level, negotiations concerning American prisoners of war in China and Chinese students in the US took place but yield no tangible outcomes. However, in 1955, discussions occured between Chinese and American ambassadors in Warsaw. Additionally, engagements with the UK lead to the exchange of trade missions and a change in the status of the UK representative to chargé d’affaires.

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Article 4 of the Korean armistice states: "Recommendations to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides.⁶⁰ In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."
It took a long time before the conference took place. 2 complications caused problems, one issue was the refusal of the US to recognize the PRC and DRK, the other obstacle was, the unwillingness of the PRC and the DRK to meet under UN auspices because they considered the UN itself to have been belligerent in the Korean War. The four-power agreement eventually reached in Berlin in February 1954 stated that the Soviet Union would invite China and North Korea, and the United States would invite South Korea and others participants: Australia, Belgium, Canadia, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and the UK. The head of the delegation of China was Zhou Enlai. A staff of more then 200 people went with him, the most important aids were Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Li Kenong, Qiao Guanhua and Huang Hua.
The conference tried breaking the deadlock after the cease-fire of 1953. See Article 54. There were several issues on the agenda; the reuniting of Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the repatriation of prisoners of war. The conference started on April 26, 1954 and ended on June 15, 1954. The talks rendered no success on any subject. The end communiqué of the noncommunist countries concluded: "We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none." "Zhou Enlai cannily riposted by taking the microphone and proposing a concluding statement for the conference: "The states participating in the Geneva conference agree that they will continue their efforts towards achieving an agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korea question on the basis of establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea. As regards the question of the time and place for resuming appropriate negotiations, it shall be decided separately by the states concerned through negotiation."

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Before Zhou Enlai left for Moscow in April 1954, he had a fairly detailed negotiation plan drawn up with the key points: ceasefire, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina so that no foreign troops are stationed near South China and general elections to bring about a united Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The conference on Indo China started at May 8, 1954, one day after the defeat of French troops at Dien Bien Phu. It was attended by representatives of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, France, Laos, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Viet Minh (i.e., the North Vietnamese), and the State of Vietnam. China wanted a deal on the whole of Indochina, the other countries wanted a separate concord on Laos and Cambodia because in those Regions no French troops were present.
The aim to reach an agreement on reuniting Vietnam turned out to be impossible and in an exchange between Zhou Enlai, and Mendes-France, the Chinese politician suggested: "Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn’t [require] a [political]division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can’t intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections."
From July 3 to 5, 1954, Zhou Enlai and Ho Chih minh had a meeting in Liuzhou. Zhou Enlai convinced the North Vietnam delegation to accept the temporary partition of Vietnam and the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. In return, the PRC will increase its support. See Article 54.
Shortly after the Geneva conference, China was very satisfied with the results. Laos and Cambodia stay neutral, no intervention from the US in Indochina, and a growing prestige as protagonist of the Afro-Asian opposition against imperialism. The Renmin Ribao proudly announced: "For the first time, the People’s Republic of China, as one of the world’s major powers, negotiated major international issues with the major powers, and made its own contributions, which won praises from a wide range of public opinions in the world. The international status of the People's Republic of China as one of the world's major powers has been universally recognized, and its international prestige has been greatly enhanced. The Chinese people are extremely excited and honored by the efforts and achievements of our delegation."
On July 8, 1954, Mao Zedong proposed 11 new instructions about Chinese diplomacy. "[b]egin to establish a Southeast Asian peace zone, effect and develop cooperation in the zone, and sign non-aggression pacts or collective peace treaties”; “unite all peaceful forces (including government), isolate and split up U.S. [interests]”; “International Peace and United Front”, etc."
Following the Geneva Conference, the policy of the PRC aimed to capitalize on the momentum and work towards establishing a peace zone in Southeast Asia while also striving to prevent US intervention in the region. The PRC pursued this objective by engaging states in Southeast Asia through trade and offering assurances of peaceful coexistence. The formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) by the US had the opposite effect, alienating these states from American influence. Despite US efforts to recruit Asian members, most of the Southeast Asian states rejected SEATO, with only Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines opting to join. While PRC leaders were pleased that SEATO did not gain widespread acceptance in Southeast Asia, they were dismayed by its establishment and the subsequent inclusion of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam under its protection. This move was perceived as a violation of the Geneva Agreements, causing discontent among PRC leaders. ^{South East Asia Treaty Organization 1954.}

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Chapter 11 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents