Article 11 of the Common Program
Text
Article 11 of the Common Program
The People's Republic of China shall unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples throughout the world, first of all, with the U.S.S.R., all Peoples' Democracies and all oppressed nations.
It shall take its stand in the camp of international peace and democracy, to oppose imperialist aggression to defend lasting world peace.


Chinese ambassadors 1949-1954


Europe
Albenia: Xu Yixin (1954.09-1957.05)
Bulgaria: Cao Xiangren (1950.09-1954.10)
Denmark: Geng Biao (Concurrently)
(1950.10-1955.04)
Czechoslovakia: Tan Xilin (1950.09-1954.10)
Finland: Geng Biao (Concurrently)
(1951.03-1954.09)
GDR: Ji Pengfei (1953.10-1955.01)
GB: Huan Xiang chargé d’affaires (1954.10- 1962.06)
Hungaria: Huang Zhen (1950.08 - 1954.10)
The Netherlands: Zhang Yue (1954.12-1955.04
With rank of charge d'affaires
Norway: Geng Biao (concurrently)
(1950.10-1955.05, Minister)
Poland: Peng Mingzhi (1950.07-1952.04)
Zeng Yongquan (1952.09-1955.01)
Romania: Wang Youping (1950.08-1954.11)
Soviet Union: Wang Jiaxiang (1949.10 - 1951.02)
Zhang Wentian (1951.04 - 1955.01)
Sweden: Geng Biao (Concurrently)
(1950.09-1956.02)

Switzerland: 15-01-1950


Asia
DPR Korea: Ni Zhiliang (1950.08-1952.03)
India: Yuan Zhongxian (1950.09-1956.02)
Indonesia: Wang Renshu (1950.08-1951.11)
Huang Zhen (1954.11-1961.06)
Mongolia: Ji Yatai (1950.07-1953.07)
He Ying (1954.09-1958.08)
Myanmar [Birma]: Yao Zhongming (1950.08-1958.01)
Pakistan: Han Nianlong(1951.09-1956.02)
Vietnam: Luo Guibo (1954.09-1957.09)

Countries recognizing China

chronological



SU: 02-10-1949


(October 1949 Soviet Union ambassador)
Bulgaria: 03-10-1949
30 September 1950

Romania: 03-10-1949


(March 1950 Romanian ambassador)
Hungary: 04-10-1949
17 July 1950
Czechoslovakia: 05-10-1949
14 January 1950
Poland: 05-10-1949
12 June 1950
Yugoslavia: 05-10-1949
1955

Mongolia: 06-10-1949


(October 1949 Mongolia)

GDR: 27-10-1949


(24 June 1950 GDR ambassador)

Albania: 20-11-1949
13 September 1954

Birma: 16-12-1949


(August 1950 Birmese ambassador)

India: 29-12-1949


(20 May 1950 Indian ambassador)

Pakistan: 05-01-1950


(12 November 1951 Pakistani ambassador)
GB: 06-01-1950
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 07-01-1950
1957
Denmark: 09-01-1950
24 June 1950
Israel: 09-01-1950 No diplomatic ties
Norway: 10-01-1950
1955
Afghanistan: 12-01-1950 No diplomatic ties
1956
Finland: 13-01-1950
13 February 1951

Sweden: 14-01-1950


(12 June 1950 Sweden ambassador)
Vietnam: 15-01-1950
December 1950

Switzerland: 15-01-1950

28 December 1950

(August 1951 Swiss ambassador)
The Netherlands: 27-03-1950
11 december 1954
Indonesia: 13-04-1950
20 January 1951
Lichtenstein: 14-09-1950

Pro Soviet Union....

In January 1940 Mao Zedong clearly states his choice on the foreign affairs policy of the PRC: “In particular, Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance, and the revolution will fail.”
Document:January 1940 Mao Zedong "On new democracy"
And although Mao Zedong formerly shortly accepts the idea of walking a “third way” “the concept of an “intermediary zone” was put forward from the spring of 1946. This concept had rich connotations and far-reaching significance. One element of the concept was that the rivalry between America and the Soviet Union would not decidedly influence the political situation in China. However, the concept of an “intermediary zone” lasted for only a short period in the minds of the CPC leadership, because Moscow raised the theory of “two blocs” in September 1947.”
Niu Jun (2012). The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s Slavic Research Center. Page 83
In 1944 Mao Zedong is even positive about the US; “China must industrialize. This can be done — in China — only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together.”
Zhu Tianbiao(2001). Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy The China Review, 1, (1). Page 77
And in 1945 Mao Zedong is in favour of a visit to Washington instead of Moscow.
As we have seen in (Part 5) Stalin is not willing to accept a visit of Mao Zedong in Moscow, instead he sends
Mikoyan
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
.
At these secret meetings on February 1 and 4, 1949 Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Mikoyan agree that China belongs to the anti-imperialistic camp which is guided by the SU. There is no middle course available. See documents
Document: 01-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai
and
Document: 04-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
.
On the 2nd plenum of the CCP in March 1949 Mao Zedong states in his opening speech “As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are competing for such business. So far as possible, we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries.”
He continues “…plus the support of the working class of the countries of the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's economic construction will not be very slow, but may be fairly fast. The day is not far off when China will attain prosperity.”
05-03-1949 Report to the 2nd plenary session of the 7th CC of the CCP
Even after March 1949 the choice to join the SU is not final and Mao Zedong makes explicit openings to the West. In a talk with Kovalev, the Russian envoy in China Mao Zedong states he will accept loans from the US and have diplomatic relations with capitalist countries.
Document: 19-04-1949 Cable, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao [via Kovalev]
There are 2 important reasons for this idea. China needs some raw materials and capital goods which the SU can’t provide. Stalin still has diplomatic relations with the GMD regime
In August 1949 the Russian embassy is moved along with the GMD government to Chongqing.
and he has not unconditionally supported Mao Zedong.
In June 1949 Liu Shaoqi and
Gao Gang
Gao Gang (1905-1954) Party, state and military head Northeast China.
visit Stalin in Moscow. “Stalin considers the foreign policy principles we mentioned in our report to be correct. These principles are the conflict with imperialist countries and cooperation with the Soviet Union and each new democratic country; making use of contradictions within capitalist countries; developing China’s trade and commerce with all countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.”
Mao Zedong tells Kovalev the US are willing to loan about 300 million dollars to China. He considers this as an attempt “ …for saving American capitalism from a crisis (in accordance with the Marshall Plan) and for putting the Chinese people under the yoke, in the same way as they were able to do this under the Jiang Jieshi regime.” But Mao Zedong continues: “the CCP CC considers it possible to change the previously accepted point of view on the relations with the capitalist countries. Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into de facto relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations.”

Stalin promises to recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as a government is established. He also makes a commitment to conclude a comprehensive agreement with China when Mao Zedong is visiting the SU.
Finally the choice is made and announced on the radio on June 30, 1949. “That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front. "You are leaning to one side." Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.”
Document: 30-06-1949 Mao Zedong "On the people’s democratic dictatorship"
On July 19, 1949 Deng Xiaoping explains this policy to cadre of the party “Chairman Mao says we are leaning to one side on our own accord now to avoid being maneuvered into leaning to one side in the future.”
Document: 19-07-1949 Deng Xiaoping Break the blockade imposed by the imperialists

There are several other motivations for this option. One is the personal experiences of the 13 politburo members of the 7th Central Committee. Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai have no direct connection with the SU, all other members have been in the SU. Liu Shaoqi and Ren Benshi both have studied at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. This university has been set up to prepare students for the seizure of power in their motherland.
Zhang Wentian
Zhang Wentian (1900-1976) also known as Luo Fu ambassador to the Soviet Union (1951-1955)
,
Dong Biwu
Dong Biwu (1886-1975)
and
Lin Boqu
Lin Boqu (1886-1960)
studied at the Sun Yatsen University in Moscow. This university has been set up to prepare students for the seizure of power in China. It was a training camp for Chinese revolutionaries from both the GMD and CCP. In the 1930’s
Chen Yun
Chen Yun (1905-1995)
and
Kang Sheng
Kang Sheng (1898-1975)
were the Chinese representatives in the Comintern (alliance of communist parties).
After 1945 when the SU defeats Japan in the Northeast of China, Gao Gang and
Peng Zhen
Peng Zhen (1902-1997) First Secretary of the Beijing Committee of the CCP (1949-1966)
have on regular basis contact with Russian diplomats, military personnel and economic experts. Zhou Enlai is the person with much international experiences. He has visit Japan, and parts of Europe (France, GB, Germany and the SU) Zhu De has been in Germany and SU. Only Zhang Wentian (Japan and SU) and Dong Biwu have been in the US.
In an article of the Cominform bulletin of November 1948 Liu Shaoqi puts forward another motive to join the SU camp when he attacks the Yugoslavian leader Tito because he decides to stay outside of the SU camp. “Only the Communists and the international proletariat, only the Soviet Union and the New Democracies led by the Communist Parties are the most reliable friends of all oppressed nations fighting for their liberation from imperialist oppression, for national independence. To harbour mistrust and unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union and the New Democracies led by the Communist Parties and to regard “the capitalist countries as less dangerous to Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union”, as the Tito-ites are doing, is extremely erroneous and harmful”
Document: 1952 Liu Shaoqi Internationalism and Nationalism. Copper remarks "Mao was a nationalistic Chinese and a China chauvinist; this meant he was cognizant, perhaps even obsessed, with the fact China was once the dominant power of the world (its world, Asia) but had fallen from grace. Hence, Mao’s China could not be just an ordinary member of the Communist Bloc and subservient to the Soviet Union. Also, looking at the world from Mao’s eyes, his “revolutionary state” based on Lenin’s thesis of the importance of the Third World was a way to restore China’s historical greatness. This predestined the People’s Republic to play the role in world politics of fomenting change and working against established norms, but not just act as Moscow ordered" Copper John F. (2016). China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Volume I Nature, Scope, and Origins Page 55
Henry A. Kissinger reveals: “Years later the Chairman told Party leaders of the struggle required to gain Stalin's support: After the revolutionary victory, [Stalin] suspected that China would be like Yugoslavia and that I would become a Tito. Then I went to Moscow to conclude the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance [signed on February 14, 1950], but this involved a struggle. He [Stalin] did not want to sign it, finally agreeing to do so after two months of negotiations. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It began in the winter of 1950-51, during the Resist-America Aid-North Korea Campaign. He finally came to believe that we were not Yugoslavia, and that I was not a Titoist." Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, Washington, undated Memorandum February 1, 1972

On October 1938 Mao Zedong writes: "Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? We hold that he not only can be but must be.(...)And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism."
Document: October 1938 Mao Zedong The role of the Chinese communist party in the national war. Chen (2005) states: "While Soviet orthodoxy supported the nationalist revolution led by the Chinese Communists in their struggle for an independent state, it opposed nationalism in any socialist state. As the CCP took power in China, it was expected by communist ideology and by socialist brother states to demonstrate communist internationalism in its foreign policy: that is, to stand with other socialist countries and to take joint actions for the common course of socialism and communism. For the CCP, shouldering this new international responsibility with a state’s capacity became a new obligation, which it could not reject." Or as Premier Zhou Enlai put it, "socialist patriotism is not a narrow nationalism, but a patriotism aimed to strengthen national pride under the guidance of internationalism" Cited in Chen(2005) Page 41
During the politburo meetings from 6 to January 10, 1949 the members discuss the foreign policy and Mao Zedong warns them not to choose side for the US "The mistaken view prevailing among some Chinese people as well as some of our party members that exaggerates the strength of American imperialism must be constantly watched and overcome." This illusion could prove the source of danger as the Truman administration sought to salvage American interests in China. Facing defeat "sending its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organizing so-called oppositionists." He even imagined that Washington might grant diplomatic recognition as a way of securing its influence in China the better to push this strategy of "'destruction from within.”
Hunt Michael H.(1996). The genesis of Chinese communist foreign policy. New York. Page 196
Shortly after this meeting on January 19, 1949 the CC instructs on diplomatic issues “With no exception, we will not recognize any of those embassies, legations, and consulates of capitalist countries, as well as the diplomatic establishments and personnel attached to them, accredited by the GMD government. We will treat them only as common foreigners and give them due protection.” As for the party's attitude toward the United States, Mao stressed: “As American military attachés have been involved in direct support to the GMD's civil war efforts, we should dispatch our soldiers to supervise them and give no freedom of movement to them.” In contrast, the directive stressed that diplomats from the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries should be treated differently, as “the foreign policy of the Soviet Union … had been thoroughly different from that of capitalist countries.”
Cited in Chen Jian (1994). China's road to the Korean war: The making of the Sino-American confrontation. New York. Page 39

In order to regulate all foreign affairs every city has to appoint a special team which will deal any problem rising from this policy. Mao Zedong is convinced there is no future for the capitalistic nations and the model of Western democracy is not a good alternative for China instead the people’s dictatorship is the only way to handle the situation in China (See Part 8)
The choice for “leaning on one side” also means China will adopt the social, political and economic model of the SU. In 1949 the success of this model is apparent in the SU and the Eastern bloc. When Yugoslavia detaches itself from the Eastern bloc the CCP immediately condemns this step.
Two remarks on the contrast between the daily routine and the official foreign policy in the first years of the republic. “At the level of international diplomacy, the central government was focused on reorienting foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, but throughout the new country ground-level foreign affairs work was mostly directed towards managing the substantial legacies of a century of close interaction with Western countries.”
Howlett Jonathan J. (2014) Accelerated Transition British Enterprises in Shanghai and the Transition to Socialism. European journal of East Asian studies, 13. Page 167
Mao Zedong sees this contrast and reacts: “Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into de facto relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations.”
Document: 13-04-1949 Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin]
After the proclamation of the People's Republic Mao can finally visit Stalin in December 1949. On February 14, 1950 at the end of his visit a treaty is signed between the SU and the PRC.
Document: 14-02-1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China
See Article 55.

Anti-imperialism....

In 1939 Mao Zedong identified two important enemies of China: “They are imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country. For it is these two that are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of Chinese society at the present stage. The two collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people, and imperialism is the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the Chinese people, because national oppression by imperialism is the more onerous.”
Document: December 1939 Mao Zedong "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party"
In the same text Mao Zedong claims several areas “In defeating China in war, the imperialistic powers had taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Prescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Birma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong} France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao.” In 1954 edition of this text any reference to Birma and Nepal has disappeared, See dissertation Stoel W van der(1958). “Communist China’s policy toward the Afro-Asian Nations”, Carleton University, 1958. Page 143
In his interview in 1946 with
Anna Louise Strong
1946 Anna Louise Strong (1885-1970) American journalist and Zhou Enlai in Yenan,
Mao Zedong put forward that the struggle between American imperialism and the SU will at first not be fought directly but: “… a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question.”
Document: August 1946 "Talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong"
In June 1949 when the PLA prevails in the Civil War, Mao Zedong warns “... I think it is necessary to call people's attention to the fact that the imperialists and their running dogs, the Chinese reactionaries, will not resign themselves to defeat in this land of China. They will continue to gang up against the Chinese people in every possible way.”
Document: 15-06-1949 Mao Zedong Address to the preparatory meeting of the new political consultative conference
November 15, 1949 Liu Shaoqi states at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries” in Beijing: "...the fighters of national liberation wars in Viet Nam, Birma, Indonesia, Malaya and Philippines are acting entirely correctly …The experience of the victorious national liberation struggle of the Chinese people teaches that the working class must unite with all classes, parties and group and organisations willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings and to form a broad, nation-wide front, headed by the Working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party.”
Document: 23-11-1949 Liu Shaoqi Speech at the Trade Union Conference in Beijing (excerpt)

At this same conference
Li Lisan
Li Lisan (1899-1967)
, the vice president of the All-China Federation of Labor proposes to form an international revolutionary army.
Document: 23-11-1949 Li Lisan Speech at the Trade Union Conference in Beijing
This proposal disappears into oblivion.
In February 1949 Mao Zedong tells Mikoyan the CCP “…maintained contacts with the communist parties of Indochina, Siam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Birma, India, Malaya and Korea. At that time, the CCP had closer ties with the communist parties of Indochina and Korea but less close ties with other countries, with which they maintained contact mainly through liaisons in Hong Kong. The CCP had very little contact with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Mao proposed discussing and establishing an Asian Communist Information Bureau like the Cominform in Europe after the situation had stabilised in China.”
Shen Zhihua & Xia Yafeng (2014). Leadership transfer in the Asian revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform, Cold War History, 14:2. Page 199
From 1949 onwards most Asian communist parties orientate on the People's Republic of China instead of the Soviet Union. They see the Chinese model of revolution after some local adjustments as as a practical example for their own revolution. The ‘freedom fighters’ can count on financial and psychological support not on military.
The military support is limited to advising and training of guerrilla fighters. "In anticipation of a pan-Asian revolution, the CCP Central Committee issued an intraparty directive (drafted by Liao Shaoqi) on March 14 (1950). After the victory on the home front, the directive stressed, the CCP and the Chinese people now had an “unflinching international responsibility” to help, by all available means, the oppressed nations of Asia in their struggles for liberation. To do so was also necessary for “consolidating the triumph of the Chinese revolution on a worldwide scale.” Toward that end, the CCP must be ready to provide “warm and fraternal” support for the communist parties and revolutionary groups in various countries, in order to encourage their struggles” cited in Li Xiaoting (2014). The taming of the red dragon: the militarized worldview and China’s use of force, 1949-2010. PhD., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Page 58
To improve the ideological base of the Asian communist parties: "..., it started to prepare for the “First Study Group,’’ a training program for high-ranking officials from communist parties in Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Birma, and India. The study sessions lasted for one year, with CCP Politburo members as instructors and textbooks containing selected writings of Mao Zedong. The location of the Study Group was Zhongnanhai, Mao’s new headquarters.”
Sheng Michael M. (2014). Mao’s role in the Korean conflict: a revision. Twentieth-Century China, 39. (3). Page 273. Shen(2018) remarks "But the KWP (Korean Workers Party) did not send any delegates. This clearly indicates that Moscow had no plan to shift its control of North Korea over to Beijing." Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng (2018). A Misunderstood Friendship. Mao Zedong, Kim Il- Sung, and Sino-North Korean relations 1949-1976. Columbia University Press. Page 25
Under the leadership of Li Weihan the CCP establishes one year later a research committee to improve the relations with other Asian communist parties. China gives no overt support to these countries. The relation between the People's Republic of China and the foreign communist parties is more determined by strategic considerations than solidarity. The communist parties of Vietnam, Birma can count on concrete support. Thai and Malaysian communist parties, which both have many Chinese members, can only count on moral support.
The CCP leaders are convinced that true independence only can be achieved under the guiding of a communist party. Independence gained in a peaceful manner is no real freedom. These countries will stay colonies or semi colonies of the imperialistic countries. That is why: “Beijing thought “whether from economic, military, or political dimension, Birma’s nature has not been changed, it still is a typical colony country” after its independence.”
Fan Hongwei (2012). China–Birma geopolitical relations in the cold war. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 1. Page 79
In the conversations between Stalin and Liu Shaoqi they talk about the situation in Indochina and the rest of Asia. Stalin divides the world in 2 parts, the SU will focus on the West and China on the East. They agree the CCP will back the Vietnamese communist party in its independence struggle.

On December 24, 1949 Stalin and Mao Zedong once more agree to this division of spheres of influence. Both the SU, as the People's Republic of China compete for the favor of the Communist Party of India. In 1951 the Communist Party of India choses to follow the Russian model for revolution. Outside Asia the communist party of Algeria can count on moral backup from China.
Document: 26-10-1949 China Supports the Algerian People's Struggle for Liberation

The same day December 24, 1949 the Politburo in Beijing decides to send
Luo Guibo
August 1950 Front row from the left: Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Cháng Zhēng, Sun Desheng, Luo Guibo, Ho Chi Minh, Deng Yifan. Ho Chi Minh gives medals to CMAG
as special CCP envoy to the Vietnamese leader
Ho Chi Minh
Ho Chi Minh and Zhu De January 30, 1950
. In December the Vietnamese communist troops in cooperation with the PLA hunt down and destroy GMD forces in South China. Luo Guibo’s assignment includes improving the communication between the two parties and to gather data to assist the Vietnamese adequate.
“Liu (Shaoqi) stressed to Luo that ‘‘it is the duty of those countries that have achieved the victory of their own revolution to support peoples who are still conducting the just struggle for liberation’’ and that ‘‘it is our international obligation to support the anti-French struggle of the Vietnamese people."
Chen Jian (2001). Mao’s China and the cold war. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill. Page 121

At the end of January Ho Chi minh arrives in Beijing to meet with Liu Shaoqi. Mao Zedong who stays in Moscow gives his fiat to form a committee which will coordinate the aid to Vietnam.
Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen and Li Weihan are members of this committee.
Ho Chi minh goes to Moscow to meet with Stalin and Mao Zedong. Stalin refuses to give direct support and in accordance with the agreement refers him to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong is prepared to help Vietnam.
Tung Pham Hong (2012). The cold war and Vietnam 1945-1954: How did a nationalist struggle turn into a class struggle? in Lau Albert (Ed.), South East Asia and the cold war. Routledge. Page 165
See Article 54

Peace....

Shortly after the proclamation of the People's Republic the new regime sees three potential areas of conflict, in which foreign interference can bring China's position in jeopardy. These areas are Taiwan (Article 2) Korea and Indochina (Article 54)
At the first meeting between Mao Zedong and Stalin on December 16, 1949, he poses: “The most important question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to pre-war levels and to stabilize the country in general. Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a peaceful future. With this in mind the CC CPC entrusted me to ascertain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in what way and for how long will international peace be preserved.” Stalin reassures Mao Zedong, Japan, the US and the European countries are not planning any war. The current peace will last for 25 years or more. He notices smiling “..there is no one to fight with China, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to invade China?”
Document: 16-12-1949 Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong

The Chinese government wants to bring about world peace by several means for example, membership of the UN, the organization of World Peace Congresses and cultural and sports exchanges between countries.

United Nations....

The new regime does not want to rely only on the SU for peace. They also seek for membership of the UN and want to take over the seat of Taiwan. To accomplish this, Beijing seeks help from the SU. In the conversation between
Vyshinsky
Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky (1983-1954) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949–1953)
and Mao Zedong on January 6, 1950 the Russian minister supports the claim of the People's Republic on the seat on the Security Council and also argues that as long as the GMD delegate retains his seat the SU will not cooperate in the Council.
Document: 06-01-1950 Conversation between A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong
Two days later Zhou Enlai sends a cable to the UN in which he demands the expulsion of the Taiwan delegation.
Document: 07-02-1950 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai on UN
On January 10, 1950 the US government states they will block the membership of the People's Republic of China. 3 days later the SU delegation leaves the Security Council.
Document: 13-01-1950 Cable, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi
On August 1, 1950 the delegation is back
Document: 27-08-1950 Letter from Filipov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador in Prague, conveying message to CSSR leader Klement Gottwald
Notwithstanding this refusal Mao Zedong appoints Zhang Wentian as head of the delegation in case the People's Republic of China is allowed in the future to the Council.
Document: 18-01-1950 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi
In November 1950 China gets the opportunity to explain at the Security Council her position on the Korea War. The SU regime opposes this invitation.
Document: 09-11-1950 CC Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Roshchin with Message for Zhou Enlai
The Chinese diplomat
Wu Xiuchuan
Wu Xiuchuan (1908-1997) Chinese diplomat
takes the opportunity to claim the seat of the Taiwanese representatives. “… in denying admittance to a permanent member of the Security Council representing 475 million people, it cannot make lawful decisions on any major issues or solve any major problem … the people of China have no reason to recognize any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations.”
Document: 28-11-1950 Address of Ambassador Wu Hsiu-chuan of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, before the Security Council of the United Nations
Zhong Wenrui remarks “The purpose of Wu Xiuquan’s delegation could be summarized as: first, to provide direct diplomatic support to the Soviet Union in the United Nations; second, to accuse the Americans of invasion of the Chinese territory of Taiwan; third, to create a propaganda campaign to elicit support from the “peace loving” people around the world to condemn US invasion in Asia; fourth, to mobilize domestic popular support for the war efforts. The last one was mentioned repeatedly in Zhou’s speeches in those months” Zhong Wenrui (2013). Military-diplomatic adventurism: communist China’s foreign policy in the early stage of the Korean war (1950-1951) MA thesis, University of north Texas. Page 56
It is on October 25, 1971 the People's Republic of China becomes a member.

World Peace Council....

In April 1949 the SU, East European countries and communist parties from West Europe are holding a peace conference in Paris.
"Yet the proceedings of the congress demonstrated just how narrow the meaning of peace was. During the course of the sessions, the victory of the Chinese Communist armies was announced, bringing the assembled ‘peace’ delegates to their feet in an outburst of cheering. The delegates were asked if they wanted the Chinese war to continue. They answered with a thundering "Yes!" They were asked if they wanted peace now in China. They shouted "No!"153" Dobrenko Vladimir(2015) Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956. PhD thesis. The London School of Economics and Political Science. Page 70
A year later China sends a delegation with representatives from the CCP and the minzhu dangpai to the World Peace Council. In July 1950 China starts a campaign 'Signature for Peace Week'.
More than 200 million signatures against atomic bombs are collected. “In addition to the collection of signatures for the 'Stockholm Peace Petition', local branches of the 'Chinese Peace Congress’ were set up in many major Chinese cities, PRC delegations were dispatched to various international meetings and, upon their return, mass rallies were called to provide heroic welcomes; the Chinese press devoted generous coverage to such activities at home and abroad; and 'peace propaganda teams' were even organised to tour China's rural areas.”
Hu Chih-chiang (1984). Arms control policy of the people's republic of China 1949-1978. Oxford 1984 Page 20
Document: 22-02-1951 Kuo Muruo speech to the World Peace Council

The influence of the WPC is very limited.

The Geneva conference on Indochina and Korea. Intro ....

The Berlin conference in January 1954 (See Article 54 and Timeline ) results in a peace conference on Indochina and Korea. The SU has dragged out of these negotiations, China's presence at these peace conference on Indochina and Korea in Geneva in 1954.
Leading up to the meeting in Geneva the SU and China have regular contact. In April Zhou Enlai visits Moscow 3 times and the positions are matched to each other and the unexperienced Chinese delegation is trained in international deliberations. These consultations on the terms under which the Chinese will consider an armistice on the Korean Peninsula start in December 1950.
Document: 07-12-1950 Ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government
“Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in particular paid special attention to using the conference to announce that the “new China” had emerged as an important actor and prestigious force in international affairs. Zhou Enlai thus repeatedly emphasized internally that Beijing had to do everything possible to make the Geneva Conference a success.” Zhou Enlai expects unlike SU leaders many results of the conference “That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can jointly participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes”.
Chen Jian & Shen Zhihua (2008). The Geneva Conference of 1954. New evidence from the archives of the ministry of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Introduction. CWIHP bulletin 16. Page 8
The Chinese ambassador in the SU, Zhang Wentian says to foreign minister
Molotov
Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1953-1956)
“… the PRC is intent on taking an active part in the Geneva Conference and thinks that if no great successes are achieved at it, then any success here will be important since a path for active participation in international affairs is being opened for the PRC.”
Zhang Shu Guang (2007). Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung conferences, 1954–55. Cold War History, 7, (4). Page 514
During the Conference Zhou Enlai uses the opportunity to break through China's isolation on the world stage. No effort is spared. ”.. the PRC rented one of the grandest château available, the ―Grand Mont-Fleuri. The château was transformed into a museum as antiques were shipped from China to decorate its rooms and corridors. Zhou calculated that the international and media curiosity regarding the PRC would make the château a beehive of activities and elicited informal visits from foreigners. PRC press attaché Xiong Xianghui later estimated that 505 international groups and 3,800 people had visited the PRC’s premises.”
Pang Yang Huei (2011). The Taiwan Strait crises, 1954-1958: China, The United States and Taiwan. PhD., National University of Singapore. Page 84

Zhou Enlai speaks on several occasions with foreign affairs minister of the UK
Eden
Anthony Eden (1897-1977) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1951-1955)
, the foreign affairs minister of France
Bidault
Georges Bidault (1899-1983) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1953–1954)
and with the French premier
Pierre Mendes-France
Pierre Mendes-France (1907-1982) Prime Minister of France (1954-1955)
.
At an informal meeting there is even contact between Zhou Enlai and the American negotiator Walter Bedell Smith, who says: “I hope that our two countries can move toward a better mutual understanding.”
Document: 19-07-1954 Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and others, regarding the situation at the twenty-third restricted session
The US Secretary of State Dulles prevents further rapprochement and even refuses to shake an outstretched hand of Zhou Enlai. On a lower level there are negotiations on American POWs in China and Chinese students in the US. They come to no result but in 1955 there are talks between the Chinese and American ambassadors in Warschau. The contacts with the UK result in exchange of trade missions and change in the status of the UK representant to the status of chargé d’affaires.

The Geneva conference on Korea....

This conference tries breaking the deadlock after the cease-fire of 1953. See Article 54. Nineteen countries take part in this meeting.
US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, South Korea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, China, Philippines, North Korea, Thailand, Turkey, SU and UK
There are several issues on the agenda; the reuniting of Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the repatriation of prisoner of war.
The conference starts at April 26, 1954 and ends on June 15, 1954. The talks render no success on any subject. The end communiqué of the non-communist countries concludes: “We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none”
SU, China and North Korea did not sign. “Declaration by the sixteen” June 15, 1954 in Foreign Relations of the U.S (FRUS).1952~1954, Vol.16 Page 385

The Geneva conference on Indochina....

Before Zhou Enlai leaves for Moscow in April 1954, he has a fairly detailed negotiation plan drawn up with the key points: ceasefire, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina so that no foreign troops are stationed in the vicinity of South China and general elections to bring about a united Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Document: 04-04-1954 Draft Memorandum, 'A Comprehensive Solution for Restoring Peace in Indochina,' Prepared by the Vietnam Group of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Geneva Conference
China wants a deal on the whole of Indochina, the other countries want a separate concord on Laos and Cambodia because in those regions no French troops are present.
The aim to reach an agreement on reuniting Vietnam turns out to be impossible
Document: 20-06-1954 Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Wei Guoqing, Qiao Xiaoguang and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee, Regarding the Meeting between the Premier and Comrade Ding
and in an exchange between Zhou Enlai and Mendes-France, the Chinese politician suggests: “Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn’t [require] a [political]division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can’t intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections.”
Document: 23-06-1954 Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pierre Mendès-France
From July 3 to 5, 1954 Zhou Enlai and Ho Chih minh have a meeting in Liuzhou. Zhou Enlai convinces the North Vietnam delegation to accept the temporary partition of Vietnam and the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. In return the People's Republic of China will increase its support.
Document: 05-07-1954 Transcript, Ho Chi Minh's presentation at the Liuzhou Conference (excerpt) "(North Vietnam) accepted a diplomatic solution to the war in the summer of 1954 because doing so satisfied its relevant vital interests within its sense of the possibilities of the moment." Asselin (2011) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Conference: A revisionist critique, Cold War History, 11:2. Page 158
See Article 54
Shortly after the Geneva conference China is very satisfied with the results. Laos and Cambodia stay neutral, no intervention from the US in Indochina and a growing prestige as protagonist of the Afro-Asian opposition against imperialism.
The Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) proudly announces: “For the first time as one of the Big Powers, the People’s Republic of China joined the other major powers in negotiations on vital international problems and made a contribution of its own that won the acclaim of wide sections of world opinion. The international status of the People’s Republic of China as one of the big world powers has gained universal recognition. Its international prestige has been greatly enhanced. The Chinese people take the greatest joy and pride in the efforts and achievements of their delegation at Geneva”
Editorial of 22 July 1954 cited in Zhai Qiang (1992). China and the Geneva conference. The China Quarterly, 129. Page 121
On July 8, 1954 Mao Zedong proposes 11 new instructions about Chinese diplomacy. “[b]egin to establish a Southeast Asian peace zone, effect and develop cooperation in the zone, and sign non-aggression pacts or collective peace treaties”; “unite all peaceful forces (including government), isolate and split up U.S. [interests]”; “International Peace and United Front”, etc."
Cited in Fan Hongwei (2012), China–Birma Geopolitical Relations. Page 17
The PRC’s policy after Geneva was to build on the momentum and strive for a peace area in Southeast Asia and further to prevent US involvement in Asia. "While the PRC was attracting the states in Southeast Asia with trade and assurance of peaceful coexistence, the establishment of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia. Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the pact on September 8, 1954 in Manila. SEATO placed South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos under its protection.
alienated these same states from the US. Despite US efforts to enroll Asian members, most of them refused the organization, and only Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines joined SEATO....PRC leaders were satisfied SEATO was not popular in Southeast Asia, but at the same time, they were upset SEATO was finally established and Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were put under its protection, which, according to their understanding, violated the Geneva Agreements."
Wang Tao (2011) Isolating the enemy: US-PRC relations, 1953-56. Georgetown University. Pages 221-222

Exchanges of Sport and Culture....

The political leaders of China attach great importance to the exchange of culture and sport as a way to improve relations between countries. In 1950 until 1954 these exchanges take place between East European countries and People's Republic of China.
"As early as August 1949, at the dawn of the PRC, the CCP sent a basketball team to Hungary to participate in the Second World Festival of Youth and Students, an international event held within the Communist camp since 1947.75 Exchanges between the PRC and eastern European counties flourished in the 1950s. In August 1950, China sent volleyball and basketball teams to the Second World Student Congress in Prague.76 After the Congress, the two teams continued their tour in Czechoslovakia and Romania. In December 1950, the PRC welcomed its first foreign sport delegation – a basketball team – from the Soviet Union. The Soviet team toured Beijing and seven other major cities and played 36 friendly matches with local basketball teams. Two years later, a Polish basketball team visited China. Ten friendly matches were played in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Shenyang, which attracted a total of more than 100,000 spectators.77 In 1953, Chinese athletes participated in the Fourth World Festival of Youth and Students in Romania.78 In 1954, 128 Chinese athletes participated in the 12th Universiade in Budapest.79" Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang (2012) Representing the New China and the Sovietisation of Chinese sport (1949–1962), Page 17. A Chinese football team with 24 players trained in Hungary in 1954

In 1952 Chinese athletes take part in the Olympic Games of Helsinki.
"The top Communist leaders were so busy consolidating their power, building their nation, and fighting the United States in the Korean War that the upcoming 1952 Helsinki Olympics was not even on their radar screen. Had the Soviet Union not intervened, the People's Republic of China might not have thought about the Olympic movement or the Olympic Games until much later. But luckily for Beijing, the Soviets brought up both issues early enough for the Communist government to take part..." Page 77
In 1954 the People's Republic of China becomes a member of the IOC, but in 1958 Beijing decides to terminate the membership because Taiwan is also member of the IOC. For that reason they also resign from 11 international sport federations. See also Article 48 and Article 45 for more details on sport and culture. Chapter 7 discusses in detail several aspects of the foreign policy of China.


Literature Notes Documents...

-
2. Niu Jun (2012). The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s Slavic Research Center. Page 83 Back
3. Zhu Tianbiao(2001). Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy The China Review, 1, (1). Page 77 Back
8. In August 1949 the Russian embassy is moved along with the GMD government to Chongqing. Back
9.18-07-1949 Liu Shaoqi about his meeting with Stalin.
Mao Zedong tells Kovalev the US are willing to loan about 300 million dollars to China. He considers this as an attempt “ …for saving American capitalism from a crisis (in accordance with the Marshall Plan) and for putting the Chinese people under the yoke, in the same way as they were able to do this under the Jiang Jieshi regime.” But Mao Zedong continues: “the CCP CC considers it possible to change the previously accepted point of view on the relations with the capitalist countries. Whereas we formerly followed the course of non-recognition of capitalist countries and their diplomatic representative offices in China, i.e. the diplomacy of free hands, then now, with the taking of the central power into its own hands (as well as taking into account the special economic interests of the capitalist countries in Shanghai) we will be compelled to adopt the diplomacy of semi-free hands, i.e. on some occasions to enter into de facto relations with them, not allowing, however, the legal formalization of these diplomatic relations.” 13-04-1949 Kovalev reports to Stalin on conversation with Mao Zedong. See also note 17 Back
13. Henry A. Kissinger reveals: “Years later the Chairman told Party leaders of the struggle required to gain Stalin's support: After the revolutionary victory, [Stalin] suspected that China would be like Yugoslavia and that I would become a Tito. Then I went to Moscow to conclude the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance [signed on February 14, 1950], but this involved a struggle. He [Stalin] did not want to sign it, finally agreeing to do so after two months of negotiations. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It began in the winter of 1950-51, during the Resist-America Aid-North Korea Campaign. He finally came to believe that we were not Yugoslavia, and that I was not a Titoist." Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, Washington, undated Memorandum February 1, 1972 Back
15. Hunt Michael H.(1996). The genesis of Chinese communist foreign policy. New York. Page 196 Back
16. Cited in Chen Jian (1994). China's road to the Korean war: The making of the Sino-American confrontation. New York. Page 39 Back
17. Howlett Jonathan J. (2014) Accelerated Transition British Enterprises in Shanghai and the Transition to Socialism. European journal of East Asian studies, 13. Page 167 Back
21. In the same text Mao Zedong claims several areas “In defeating China in war, the imperialistic powers had taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Prescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Birma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong} France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao.” In 1954 edition of this text any reference to Birma and Nepal has disappeared, See dissertation Stoel W van der(1958). “Communist China’s policy toward the Afro-Asian Nations”, Carleton University, 1958. Page 143 Back
26. Shen Zhihua & Xia Yafeng (2014). Leadership transfer in the Asian revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform, Cold War History, 14:2. Page 199 Back
27. The military support is limited to advising and training of guerrilla fighters. "In anticipation of a pan-Asian revolution, the CCP Central Committee issued an intraparty directive (drafted by Liao Shaoqi) on March 14 (1950). After the victory on the home front, the directive stressed, the CCP and the Chinese people now had an “unflinching international responsibility” to help, by all available means, the oppressed nations of Asia in their struggles for liberation. To do so was also necessary for “consolidating the triumph of the Chinese revolution on a worldwide scale.” Toward that end, the CCP must be ready to provide “warm and fraternal” support for the communist parties and revolutionary groups in various countries, in order to encourage their struggles” cited in Li Xiaoting (2014). The taming of the red dragon: the militarized worldview and China’s use of force, 1949-2010. PhD., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Page 58 Back
28.Sheng Michael M. (2014). Mao’s role in the Korean conflict: a revision. Twentieth-Century China, 39. (3). Page 273. Shen(2018) remarks "But the KWP (Korean Workers Party) did not send any delegates. This clearly indicates that Moscow had no plan to shift its control of North Korea over to Beijing." Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng (2018). A Misunderstood Friendship. Mao Zedong, Kim Il- Sung, and Sino-North Korean relations 1949-1976. Columbia University Press. Page 25 Back
29. Fan Hongwei (2012). China–Birma geopolitical relations in the cold war. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 1. Page 79 Back
31. Chen Jian (2001). Mao’s China and the cold war. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill. Page 121 Back
32. Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen and Li Weihan are members of this committee. Back
33. Tung Pham Hong (2012). The cold war and Vietnam 1945-1954: How did a nationalist struggle turn into a class struggle? in Lau Albert (Ed.), South East Asia and the cold war. Routledge. Page 165 Back
42. Zhong Wenrui remarks “The purpose of Wu Xiuquan’s delegation could be summarized as: first, to provide direct diplomatic support to the Soviet Union in the United Nations; second, to accuse the Americans of invasion of the Chinese territory of Taiwan; third, to create a propaganda campaign to elicit support from the “peace loving” people around the world to condemn US invasion in Asia; fourth, to mobilize domestic popular support for the war efforts. The last one was mentioned repeatedly in Zhou’s speeches in those months” Zhong Wenrui (2013). Military-diplomatic adventurism: communist China’s foreign policy in the early stage of the Korean war (1950-1951) MA thesis, University of north Texas. Page 56 Back
43."Yet the proceedings of the congress demonstrated just how narrow the meaning of peace was. During the course of the sessions, the victory of the Chinese Communist armies was announced, bringing the assembled ‘peace’ delegates to their feet in an outburst of cheering. The delegates were asked if they wanted the Chinese war to continue. They answered with a thundering "Yes!" They were asked if they wanted peace now in China. They shouted "No!"153" Dobrenko Vladimir(2015) Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956. PhD thesis. The London School of Economics and Political Science. Page 70 Back
44. Hu Chih-chiang (1984). Arms control policy of the people's republic of China 1949-1978. Oxford 1984 Page 20 Back
47. Chen Jian & Shen Zhihua (2008). The Geneva Conference of 1954. New evidence from the archives of the ministry of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Introduction. CWIHP bulletin 16. Page 8 Back
48.Zhang Shu Guang (2007). Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung conferences, 1954–55. Cold War History, 7, (4). Page 514 See also at Further reading: Document: 02-03-1954 Preliminary opinions on the assessment of and preparation for the Geneva conference,' prepared by the PRC ministry of foreign affairs (drafted by PRC premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai) [excerpt] Back
49. Pang Yang Huei (2011). The Taiwan Strait crises, 1954-1958: China, The United States and Taiwan. PhD., National University of Singapore. Page 84 Back
51. US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, South Korea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, China, Philippines, North Korea, Thailand, Turkey, SU and UK Back
52. SU, China and North Korea did not sign. “Declaration by the sixteen” June 15, 1954 in Foreign Relations of the U.S (FRUS).1952~1954, Vol.16 Page 385 Back
57.Editorial of 22 July 1954 cited in Zhai Qiang (1992). China and the Geneva conference. The China Quarterly, 129. Page 121 Back
58.Cited in Fan Hongwei (2012), China–Birma Geopolitical Relations. Page 17 Back
59. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia. Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the pact on September 8, 1954 in Manila. SEATO placed South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos under its protection. Back
60. Wang Tao (2011) Isolating the enemy: US-PRC relations, 1953-56. Georgetown University. Pages 221-222 Back
61. "As early as August 1949, at the dawn of the PRC, the CCP sent a basketball team to Hungary to participate in the Second World Festival of Youth and Students, an international event held within the Communist camp since 1947.75 Exchanges between the PRC and eastern European counties flourished in the 1950s. In August 1950, China sent volleyball and basketball teams to the Second World Student Congress in Prague.76 After the Congress, the two teams continued their tour in Czechoslovakia and Romania. In December 1950, the PRC welcomed its first foreign sport delegation – a basketball team – from the Soviet Union. The Soviet team toured Beijing and seven other major cities and played 36 friendly matches with local basketball teams. Two years later, a Polish basketball team visited China. Ten friendly matches were played in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Shenyang, which attracted a total of more than 100,000 spectators.77 In 1953, Chinese athletes participated in the Fourth World Festival of Youth and Students in Romania.78 In 1954, 128 Chinese athletes participated in the 12th Universiade in Budapest.79" Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang (2012) Representing the New China and the Sovietisation of Chinese sport (1949–1962), Page 17. A Chinese football team with 24 players trained in Hungary in 1954 Back
62. "The top Communist leaders were so busy consolidating their power, building their nation, and fighting the United States in the Korean War that the upcoming 1952 Helsinki Olympics was not even on their radar screen. Had the Soviet Union not intervened, the People's Republic of China might not have thought about the Olympic movement or the Olympic Games until much later. But luckily for Beijing, the Soviets brought up both issues early enough for the Communist government to take part..." Page 77 "The delegation left for Finland on July 25 and arrived in Helsinki on July 29, one day before the closing ceremony. It failed to take part in any competition; only one of its swimmers participated in a preliminary competition and he failed to qualify for the next round.25 Even so, Beijing did participate in some of the Games’ cultural programs." Page 83. Xu Guoqi (2008) Olympic Dreams China and Sports 1895–2008 Harvard University Press. Page 77 and 83. See also Xu Guoxi (2008). China’s national representation and the two-China question in the Olympic movement. China Perspectives, 1, 19-28 Back

Documents....

02-03-1954 Preliminary opinions on the assessment of and preparation for the Geneva conference,' prepared by the PRC ministry of foreign affairs (drafted by PRC premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai) [excerpt]
15-06-1954 “Declaration by the sixteen”
April 1954 A chronicle of Principal events Relating to the Indo-China Question 1940-1954 Peking 1954
Continue to Chapter 2