Article 7 of the Common Program

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See Timeline
Article 7 of the Common Program clearly states the actions the new regime will make against its staunch opponents. Determining the class status is a useful instrument to decide who is an enemy or a potential enemy. The CCP has set a system to define the class background and the class status of any person. The economic background of a family before 1949 determines the class background. Even the background of parents and/or grandparents is taken in consideration, because this experience can still influence a person. Mao Zedong appeared to adopt class as a state of mind. The present social position determines the class status. The class status is theoretically subject to change, but in practice it is almost unchangeable. Class origin labels are hereditary only in the patriline, and the sons of the bad-class sons but not the children of bad-class daughters bore the stigma in turn. Individuals were frequently categorized officially based on their own class designations, the class backgrounds of their parents, or their family's class origins. According to official policies, children from disadvantaged family backgrounds should have been treated differently from their parents. However, offspring of less privileged family backgrounds encountered discriminatory practices, affecting their opportunities and life trajectories.
Each person's class status was recorded in an official dossier. Introduced by the government in 1949, these dossiers typically contained a comprehensive account of an individual's political history. They included details about the person's family members, age, class background, affiliations, and any rewards received. Additionally, the dossier held self-reports, evaluations from peers and supervisors or teachers, as well as records of any official warnings or punishments. This dossier followed the individual throughout their life and was reviewed by superiors for decisions related to job applications, assignments, college admissions, disciplinary actions, promotions, or rewards and benefits.

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In 1933, a set of documents was issued with regard to determination of class status. The main criterion was based on whether the man and his family were engaged in manual labour and not on the amount of money that was earned. The 1933 documents are in the 1950’s only meant as reference. The task of determining class status was assigned to the masses and local cadres, leading to widespread confusion and disorder. Many cadres themselves lacked a clear understanding of the 1933 documents, and popular interpretations often relied on oversimplified criteria. For instance, a party directive criticized the common mistake of assigning class status solely based on whether an individual had been influential. In the case of the "poor peasant" class, the primary criterion often became whether the individual had endured significant hardship.
The people were classified into 3 origins:
I) Good-class origins:
(a) Politically red inheritances (the families headed by preliberation Party members, plus the orphans of men who died in the revolutionary wars): (1) Revolutionary cadres (2) Revolutionary army men (3) Revolutionary martyrs
(b) Working class: (Enterprise worker, Transport worker, Handicraft worker, Sailor and Pedicab worker) (4) Preliberation industrial workers and their families (5) Former poor and lower-middle peasant families. (slightly less than 1 percent of the population)
(II) Middle-class origins:
(a) Non-intelligentsia middle class: (1) Families of preliberation peddlers and store clerks, etc. (2) Former middle-peasant families
(b) Intelligentsia middle class: families of pre-liberation clerks, teachers, professionals, etc.
(c) The petty bourgeoisie: small shop owner, small factory owner, peddler (three categories – capitalists, white collar employees, and independent professionals made up 1.4 percent of the country’s population.)
(III)Bad-class origins:
(a) Families of former capitalists
(b) Preliberation rich peasant families
(c) Families of “bad elements” (a label denoting criminal offenders)
(d) Pre-liberation landlord families (Two categories – landlords and rich peasants made up 4.3 percent of the population)
(e) Families of counter-revolutionaries (those who served in the Nationalist government or army).

The figure 7.1 summarizes the features of the discourse: Although thematically separate, the narratives are intertwined as aspects of each influence the others. According to the regime, socialist progress necessitates the involvement of the petty bourgeoisie while also addressing their objectionable political conduct rooted in particular yet correctable traits and tendencies. The petty bourgeoisie is portrayed as both vital for nation-building and as an impediment to revolutionary transformation, representing a morally inferior segment of the population.
The regime viewed the petty bourgeoisie as an intermediate group between the exploiting and exploited classes, with its members primarily relying on their own physical and/or mental labor rather than benefiting from the labor of others. Since physical labor was seen as the source of exploitation, white-collar workers were portrayed as the core of the petty bourgeoisie. These individuals could be found across all areas—cities, towns, and villages.

Figure 7.2 shows the emphasis of the CCP on the position of workers and peasants and the relation between workers and peasants, for example: RMRB 07-02-1952: "Repulse Bourgeois Attack, Consolidate Leadership Right of Working Class", RMRB 27-02-1953: "False Peasant Models Must Not Be Tolerated" and RMRB 25-11-1953: "Consolidate the Workers' and Peasants' Alliance to Ensure the Realization of the General Line"

In villages, people were divided into four strata as “landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants”. (See figure 7.3) In many rural areas, there was no clear system of identifiable landlords, and the countryside was not traditionally feudal. Wheat farming in the North differed significantly from rice farming in the South, as well as from the more commercialized agriculture along the fertile Yangzi Valley. This is to say nothing of the nomadic regions in the Far West and Northwest, which had their own distinct characteristics.
In cities, the process of classifying individuals was never entirely systematic, but through a succession of political campaigns, families gradually came to be associated with labels such as capitalist, merchant, peddler, worker, or poor peasant. These class labels were inherited by individuals from their families without alteration for approximately 30 years until 1978. This was in contrast to the promise the CCP had made that landlords and rich farmers would have their class status changed after 3 years. Mao Zedong stated "Since it is the same old person who has been here all along, his old ways of thinking will have not died." Even poor peasants could lose their status, if they committed serious felonies or political errors.
All counterrevolutionary persons were deprived of their civil rights and punished. At the same time, they got the opportunity to reform themselves and to provide for their livelihood. If they persevered in their counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions, they will be severely punished. Besides this classification, other divisions existed, for example, in agriculture versus non-agriculture (hukou See Article 5), Han versus ethnic minority (ethnicity Chapter 6), male versus female (gender Article 6). It is commonly argued that class was the most significant category in Maoist China; however, when it came to the allocation of essential goods and services like food, clothing, housing, and health care, the urban/rural divide proved to be more critical than class. The urban supply system ensured that a "capitalist" in Beijing would have a better diet than a "poor peasant" in central China, despite the latter's more favorable class status.

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On March 18, 1950, the directive was published Directive on suppression of counterrevolutionary activities and on July 23, 1950  The instructions to suppress counter-revolutionary activities. All former members of the GMD, including those who served in security organizations or held prominent positions within the defeated GMD military, district party branches, or the Youth Corps, were required to register with local authorities. While time-consuming, the classification of these individuals primarily involved bureaucratic procedures and record-keeping, as clear guidelines existed along with confirming documentation trails. However, during the period of 1950-1953, the category of "counterrevolutionaries" also encompassed numerous individuals whose status was less definitive and didn't neatly fit into bureaucratic frameworks. Determining who fell under other counterrevolutionary classifications such as bullies, hardened bandits, leaders of counterrevolutionary sects , and traitors was a far more subjective process, especially in the absence of distinct criteria for distinguishing "counterrevolutionary crime" from outright "serious crime." The bandit forces were mainly the remnants of the GMD troops that stayed behind after the runaway of Jiang Jieshi to Taiwan. Traditional bandits and local militias raised by landlords to protect their belongings also form a threat for the new regime. As the Party's focus shifted from popular mobilization to consolidating power and building the regime, the bandits who once possessed "revolutionary potential" were redefined as "counterrevolutionaries."
For example, CCP cadres faced significant danger in Chengdu shortly after the city and its surroundings were captured in December 1949. In numerous market towns where Communist troops were not stationed, local residents engaged in nighttime sniping against political workers. In February 1950, a rural worker reported that over fifty of his colleagues had been killed in the Chengdu vicinity during the previous month alone. Across many rural areas, especially those bordering the Plain, dissatisfied individuals organized resistance groups. These groups were led by daring, courageous, or desperate figures among secret society leaders, affluent landlords and their followers, and former GMD petty army officers. At the height of the rural unrest in March, it was claimed that nearly 200,000 guerrilla bandits were disrupting the PLA and transportation routes throughout the province.
Until October 1950, the CCP and gangs (HuiMen and DaoMen ) had a long-term cooperation experience. The CCP benefited from the neutrality or uprising of the gang forces when entering Shanghai, Chengdu, and other places. Already in 1922, the CCP used gangs to launch strikes in several cities and at the works of the Beijing-Hangzhou railway. The peasant uprising in Hunan under the guidance of Mao Zedong made also full use of the power of local gangs. During the war against Japan, the PLA and several gangs supported each other. As long as the new regime was unstable, it needed the support of the local gangs. In his speech on 6 June 1950, Mao Zedong said "In short, we must not strike out in all directions. It is undesirable to hit out in all directions and cause nation-wide tension. We must definitely not make too many enemies; we must make concessions and relax the tension a little in some quarters and concentrate our attack in one direction. We must do our work well so that all workers, peasants and small handicraftsmen will support us and the overwhelming majority of the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals will not oppose us."
However, the situation changed with the outbreak of the Korean War. The CCP saw this as a good opportunity to suppress all counterrevolutionaries, including gang members. The movement was divided into 3 stages. The first stage is concentrated in the old liberate areas in conjunction with land reform, and this stage ended in October 1951. The second stage was nationwide; its focus was on elimination of counter-revolutionaries within the regime. In the newly liberated areas, the elimination of Daoist leaders had the priority. In October 1952 the main task was to completely ban the reactionary sects and eliminate the social soil where counter-revolutionary forces breed. Through top-down exhortation and grassroots reporting, former members of these organizations were compelled to identify themselves to the authorities, with promises of leniency for compliance. This enabled the CCP to identify "hostile elements" in urban areas and initiate the categorization process.
The ministry of public Security executed with increasing stringency the hukou system (See Article 5 ) to register members of secret organizations. Particularly in south China, where these sects remained unaltered popular. The ongoing presence of secret societies in South China under communist rule indicates that the spiritual and religious needs of the southern peasants were not fulfilled by the Communist Party's doctrines. In this context, this continuity serves as a defensive measure, reflecting the southern peasants' resistance to the authority imposed by the state.
In his speech at the 3rd plenum of the CCP on June 6, 1950, Mao Zedong gave further instructions on how to deal with the counter-revolutionaries. "Bandits, secret agents, local tyrants and other counter-revolutionaries, all of whom are menaces to the people, must be resolutely rooted out. On this question it is necessary to follow a policy of combining suppression with leniency without stressing one to the neglect of the other, that is, a policy of certain punishment for the main culprits, no punishment for those accomplices who act under duress and rewards for those who render positive services. The whole Party and nation must heighten their vigilance against the conspiratorial activities of counter-revolutionaries."
Before the suppression campaign, the CCP faced tangible threats to its authority from underground factions. Allegedly, arson carried out by GMD agents or sympathizers was common in urban areas, while remote regions experienced widespread rebellion. Following mass arrests during the suppression campaign, incidents of arson and assassinations targeting CCP cadres significantly diminished. The campaign effectively quelled lingering resistance that persisted after the Nationalist defeat in 1949. However, it remains unclear whether the purported "GMD agents" were directly acting on orders from the Nationalists in Taiwan or were simply locals dissatisfied with communist governance. Based on recent research into the Nationalists during the early Cold War period, it is improbable that the GMD had the capacity to coordinate substantial guerrilla campaigns in the distant Northeast in the immediate aftermath of its retreat from Mainland China. In China's Southwest, anti-communist insurgents did receive some support from remaining Nationalist units that had fled to Burma and Thailand in 1949. Westernized, Anglophone people were often regarded as counter-revolutionaries, and they were demeaned, executed, or committed suicide. For instance, in April 1951, a sub manager of the British textile firm Patons & Baldwins was executed along with his family in front of a crowd of 15.000 spectators.

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On October 10, 1950, (the double ten instructions) new measurements are announced to repress any counterrevolutionary activity. The  Directive on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities was intended 'to correct' the mistakes made by local governments of what several senior CCP members had characterized as the government’s 'excessive lenience'. These instructions were the follow-up of directives made on July 23, 1950. These were no longer considered severe and adequate. This campaign converges with the campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea. The double ten instructions provide guidelines who belong to the counterrevolutionaries and how to punish them. The instructions are vague. The local cadres have difficulties to distinct between ‘leaders’, who are to be treated harshly, and ‘followers’’, who are to be treated with leniency. Easy targets are the old GMD secret servicemen, bandits, local tyrants, and leaders of secret societies and sects. The timing of this decision was carefully planned, as Mao clearly explained to Luo Ruiqing the minister of public security,"Before, it was not the ideal time to launch a major crackdown against counterrevolutionaries because at that time we had not yet settled our financial problems and our relationship with some capitalists was still too tense. Now the situation is quite different. Our financial problem is under control and the war in Korea has just broken out. This is an opportunity not to be missed. It may be the only opportunity for us to suppress counterrevolutionaries. It is valuable for us. You must take this opportunity not only to eliminate the counterrevolutionaries, but above all to mobilize the masses"
There are evidently no clear-cut objective standards. In essence, individuals labeled as counterrevolutionaries were either previous holders of governmental authority, perceived as potential political rivals, or current influential figures within local social spheres such as religious leaders, secret societies, and community elites, regarded as continual sources of social structure and potential challenge to the authority of the Party-state. Much depended on the subjective opinion of the cadres, who regularly received contradicting decrees. One month the party top condemned the local leaders to be too lenient, the other month the party top reproached the local leaders for not been able to distinguish between ‘normal’ crimes and counterrevolutionary crimes. Sometimes Mao Zedong instructed cadres in detail: "In a big city like Shanghai, probably it will take one to two thousand executions during this year to solve the problem. In the spring, three to five hundred executions will be needed to suppress the enemy’s arrogance and enhance the people’s morale. In Nanjing, the East China Bureau should direct the party’s municipality committee … and strive to execute one to two hundred of the most important reactionaries in the spring."

Those accusation meetings and executions take place at a public place, following a more or less strict script. The accusers are fully coached to gain the sympathy of the audience and condemnation of the accused. For example, more than six million people, 58.66 % of the rural population of South Jiangsu, participated in mass accusation meetings, 151,412 people standing on the accusation stage and telling their own experience of being abused by counterrevolutionaries.
2 months later, Mao Zedong wrote: "In some localities in Shandong there is a tendency toward insufficient fervour, and in some localities there is a tendency toward doing things carelessly. These are two kinds of tendencies that generally exist in all the provinces and municipalities in the country, and attention ought to be given to correcting them in all cases. In particular, the tendency toward doing things carelessly is the most dangerous one. [This is so] because where there is insufficient fervour, it can always be brought up to a sufficient level through education and persuasion, and whether the counterrevolutionaries are executed a few days sooner or a few days later, it does not make much difference. But if things are done carelessly, and people are arrested and executed by mistake there will be very bad repercussions. Please exercise strict control in your work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries; it is imperative for you to be cautious in doing things and to correct any tendency toward doing things carelessly. We absolutely must suppress all counterrevolutionaries, but we also must absolutely not make arrests or carry out executions by mistake."

Figure 7.5 shows that the rate of executions was very high (2.35 per thousand, thus significantly exceeding the national quota of 0.5– 1.5 per thousand). Rates of arrest were also very high (1.44 percent of the population, compared with a national average of 0.46 percent [2.62 million] of the population of 574 million).
February 1951, Peng Zhen reported to the government that the persecution of the counterrevolutionary elements was magnanimous and "…thus aroused the dissatisfaction of various classes of people with the People's Government." The regulations of February 1951 were more severe. Of the 17 counterrevolutionary crimes defined, 13 were subject to death penalty, including high treason, incitement to defection, armed rebellion, espionage, spreading of counterrevolutionary ideas, illegal border crossing, organization or use of superstitious sects and secret societies for counterrevolutionary purposes, and other more common crimes, such as arson and looting. Death or life imprisonment is stipulated for over 95 per cent of the expected and specified crimes and the instructions have even retroactive force. This meant that even those people who committed any of the stipulated crimes before the CCP came to power, or even before the Party was founded, were liable to punishment.
During an inspection tour in southern China,Luo Ruiqing noted that provincial and local party committees remained overly cautious and reluctant to establish "links with the masses." He also felt that they were not thorough enough in their plans for implementing the campaign. He remarked that Guangdong lacked "sufficient firepower, suppression, commitment to the task at hand, and enthusiasm."
April 2, 1951, Mao Zedong once again instructed who were to persecuted. "We cannot include petty thieves, drug addicts, common landlords, ordinary Kuomintang members and members of the [ Sanmin Zhuyi Youth] League, and common officers in the Kuomintang army. Death sentences must be for those who have committed serious crimes only."
At the end of April, he introduced quotas "For example, Peking has a population of two million. Ten thousand people have been or will be arrested. Seven hundred have been killed, and another 700 should still be killed, altogether around 1,400, and that is enough." Figure 7.6 shows the statistics of Mianyang District in Sichuan, it displays the executions carried out and the planned executions.

In four counties, the number of people to be executed before April 15 exceeded the number of the previous two and a half months, and the number of executions in each county accounted for the total number of executions. The names of executed "counter-revolutionaries" were published daily in the newspapers. No fewer than 135,000 were executed in the first half of 1951. Those not executed were broken down in harsh labour camps.
On May 15, 1951, Mao Zedong wrote "The large number of prisoners who are to be sentenced to prison terms constitutes a considerable labor force. In order to reform them, to solve the difficulties of prisons, and in order not to let the counterrevolutionaries serving prison terms be fed without working for it, we must immediately take steps to organize the work of reforming people through labor." In the same instructions was written: "In order to guard against ‘leftist’ deviations that are developing within the movement of repression, we have decided that, starting on June 1st, nationwide, . . . the power of arrest will be restored to the exclusive authority of the Party committee and at the level of the prefecture. And the power to kill will be restored to the exclusive authority of the provincial government. The provincial government must send representatives to places faraway from the capital of a province. No place is exempt from this decision."

Mao Zedong was not afraid of comments as long as the verdicts are justifiable. "To strike surely means to pay attention to tactics. To strike accurately means to avoid wrong executions. To strike relentlessly means resolutely to kill all such reactionary elements as deserve the death penalty (of course, those who don't will not be executed). So long as we avoid wrong executions, we don't have to worry even if the bourgeoisie raises an outcry."
In a report in January 1954, Xu Zirong, then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security of China, stated that a total of 2.62 million people were arrested, of which 712,000 were killed, which was 1.31 per thousand of the country's population; 1.29 million people were sentenced to labor reform; Controlled 1.2 million people; education released 380,000 people. According to this statement, the "suppressing counter-revolutionary" killings exceeded the original target of one-thousandth of the population, greatly exceeding the task. However, it is likely that far more than this number were actually executed. Some people estimate that the number of people actually executed in the anti-revolutionary movement is between 1 million and 2 million people, or even more. The campaign was basically completed by October 1951, which should refer to the end of the first stage of the campaign. The entire campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries lasted for three years and lasted until the end of 1953.
On June 27, 1952, the Government adopted the Temporary regulations for the surveillance of counterrevolutionary elements". Article 4 of this regulation states "Persons placed under surveillance are subject to deprivation of the following political rights: a. The right to vote and to be elected, b. The right to accept an administrative post in a state institution, c. The right to enter the people's armed forces and the people's organizations, d. Freedom of speech, publication, assembly, unions, correspondence, choice of dwelling place, moving to other places, street processions and demonstrations, e. The right to enjoy the people's honors." Article 6 states the term of surveillance up to 3 years, but this can be prolonged. This surveillance applies only to the given person not to members of his family and friends (article 9) The following article states: "...everyone has the right to check on persons placed under surveillance and to report their illegal actions."

Some individuals gained advantages from reporting others. The entitlement to enroll in labour insurance wasn't automatic. Those accused of counterrevolutionary activities were typically among the ineligible. Conversely, those actively involved in suppressing counterrevolutionaries were often among the first to qualify for the new labour insurance, establishing a connection between obtaining social insurance, political involvement, and accusing others. As a result, a larger number of workers, eventually labeled as "politically backward but not counterrevolutionary" by external authorities, were also excluded or faced significant pay reductions based on group consensus. It was in the interest of the politically secure majority to exclude as many politically vulnerable individuals as possible from the emerging entitlement system, ensuring more benefits for the virtuous and deserving. This led to a natural inclination towards leftist ideology, with the masses advocating for the arrest and suppression of even those considered politically backward.
With the effective containment of counterrevolutionary activities and advancements in information-gathering capabilities, a more nuanced strategy for state security policing emerged gradually. Starting in 1953, the focus shifted towards identifying individual instances of counterrevolutionary behavior rather than resorting to large-scale violent suppression campaigns targeting groups labeled as counterrevolutionaries.

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The punishments varied from death penalty, imprisonment, suspended sentence and to be put under the supervision of the masses. The repression intensified during the year 1950. See also Article 17. Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing condemned the methods of "summonsing for education," "short-term detention," and "detention in trade schools" as ineffective, advocating for harsher punishments, including the death penalty for serious and repeat offenders. As the leniency policy fell out of favor, surveillance of politically suspicious individuals by community leaders, schools, and work units was intensified.
From July 1950 onward, opponents of the new government grew optimistic due to the anticipation of an American invasion triggered by the onset of the Korean War. The Korean War bolstered the confidence of former landlords and affluent peasants, who openly intimidated peasants by warning them to "maintain their old equipment and increase their efforts, as they would soon need to relinquish them due to the anticipated downfall of the Communist government. Consequently, peasants reestablished connections with "feudal" village associations, religious groups, fraternal and brotherly unions. These organizations had operated semi-underground since 'liberation' and had a partially criminal nature. The regime considered this potential threat as an omen to harden their attack on the counterrevolutionary forces.
Regardless of the actual occurrences of sabotage, espionage, and counterrevolutionary activities, and notwithstanding the genuine fear of counterrevolutionaries during 1950-1951, it is evident that the ensuing campaign was deliberately utilized for domestic political objectives. These objectives included rallying popular support behind the regime, expanding the coercive apparatus of the revolutionary state, and consolidating bureaucratic control. Apart from the presumed counterrevolutionaries and their sympathizers, the campaign targeted three other, less immediately apparent domestic "audiences": (1) urban residents and "middle elements" whose allegiance to New China was uncertain; (2) committed activists and lower-ranking "regular cadres" perplexed by the leniency and inclusiveness demonstrated by the new government in its initial year of power; and (3) senior local cadres and Party committees in numerous urban areas who had dutifully implemented the earlier policies of leniency aimed at stabilizing China's cities during the first year of New China's existence.
In June 1951, the GAC issued the Regulations on the Confiscation of Personal Properties of Counter-revolutionaries. This decree regulated the confiscation of properties of convicted counter-revolutionaries. Family members who cooperated with the CCP were allowed to maintain necessary properties. Families with low income might be allowed to keep all personal properties.

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Article 7 of the Common Program states the counterrevolutionaries get the opportunity to reform themselves through labour so as to become new men. In the course of time, 2 systems of hard labour develop. There are forced labour camps where the prisoners are supposed to reform through labour (Laogai) and these camps are meant for “serious” political prisoners and for “normal” delinquents. See Table . Already at the end of 1949, SU experts provided advice on how best to implement reform-through-labour in the PRC as the Soviet Union had done earlier in the Gulag prison camps. The Laogai is an element of the People’ s Dictatorship. It used existing prisons, which were changed into labour camps or newly built. In 1954, 217 mines and construction workshops (water supply or railway construction) and 640 agricultural companies were working as Laogai camps. Luo Ruiqing states "Large-scale production projects using convict labourers should be avoided at national defence points, in major cities, in important industrial zones, and in heavily populated regions; instead, we should steadily move convict labourers, step by step and group by group, to the Northwest, Northeast, and the Sichuan-Xikang border region of the Southwest where the land is vast and population sparse."
The other forced labour camps (Laojiao) are meant for criminals who are convicted for minor crimes, or for those persons who were not criminals while were politically aberrant and would bring about problems of unemployment if leaving them alone.
Besides these labour camps, there are also thought-reform institutions, in which prostitutes, beggars, vagrants, and petty thieves were re-educated. According to their captors in 1949, these individuals fiercely opposed the state and occasionally managed to impede its actions, yet their resistance wasn't classified as counterrevolutionary. The pervasive oppression from feudal, imperialist, and capitalist forces had inflicted significant harm on the Chinese nation, necessitating a profound and revolutionary overhaul for its salvation. Implicit in this narrative was the assurance that revolution and reform would ultimately lead to redemption, with reeducators anticipating that any resistance would gradually dissipate as the process of thought reform advanced.
The primary objectives of political work in labour reform camps were to uphold the party's exclusive and supreme leadership in ideological education and politics, ensuring that every party policy was faithfully implemented throughout the reform process. The political work units in the laogai camps operated under the supervision of the party committee secretary, in collaboration with the political work leaders in the public security agencies, akin to the structure observed in work units in urban areas. Initially, the criminal justice system reported numerous instances of successful reeducation. The last emperor, Pu Yi, served as a prominent example widely promoted in Chinese state propaganda. In addition to his well-known case, many Guomindang generals and officials, as well as Japanese war criminals, came forward to share their reeducation experiences in writing or interviews. These published accounts not only garnered support from many in China but also impressed numerous Western observers, who lauded the concept of transforming prisons into reformative schools. Many even expressed optimism that crime and punishment would eventually vanish altogether in China. On the other hand, the reputation of the reform through labour had a bad reputation. Therefore in 1954 the name of the institutes changed their names in “local stated owned” production units. Production took precedence over reform or punishment as the primary objective of prison labour, driven by the mandate for prisons to achieve self-sufficiency. Consequently, prisoners were viewed primarily as an exploitable labour force rather than as individuals in need of punishment or reeducation. Given that reform efforts were inherently reliant on production, it was inevitable that the goals of reform would often be overshadowed by economic demands. Despite strong appeals from the central government, the directive "reform first and production second" remained merely a slogan in labour camps. Additionally, Chinese imprisonment practices were characterized by isolating socially undesirable elements from the general population, leading to the establishment of prisons in remote districts.

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Chapter 1 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents
• Contact