Conclusions of Chapter 6 of the Common Program
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
"On the one hand, the 1949 Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference enshrined ethnic equality, ethnic self-rule and ethnic solidarity as safeguards against Han chauvinism [35], 3; [36], 4. On the other, the CCP established its party organizations at every level of society to establish a more solid and centralized Chinese communist state."
Horowitz (2015). No Page
Horowitz states further on "Formal acceptance of Soviet-style federalism would make it easier for the USSR or other foreign powers to detach minority regions, and would also pose a bigger threat to Mao’s own power within the CCP." This is particularly true of the Xinjiang region, less for Tibet and other minority areas. See Article 51 The Chinese government cannot easily control the high Tibetan plateau without control over Xinjiang, whereas Xinjiang is easily controlled without Tibet.
"Gerry Groot has referred to the United Front as a “self-defeating secret weapon.” In particular, he is speaking of the corporatist structure that, he says, creates a gulf between United Front actors and the people they are meant to represent. 15 In minority regions such as Amdo, the challenge was perhaps more pronounced. Minority elites were never truly representatives of their coethnic constituencies. Instead, they were intermediaries and exemplars. Through the co-option of non-Han religious leaders and secular headmen, the Party intended to gain access to the masses with whom it had no prior relationship. Unlike traditional imperial practice, the United Front was not a strategy for managing and incorporating difference. From the start it was intended as a transformative vehicle of nation building and socialist transformation, one that depended on minority elites to act as agents of their own demise as a privileged class. Whether or not the United Front principles of gradualism and volunteerism could have overcome this contradiction became a moot point when they were overwhelmed by dynamics embedded in the Maoist project."
Bulag (2002). Page 207
Horowitz (2015). No Page [↩] [Cite]
Bulag (2002). Page 120 [↩] [Cite]