Article 47 of the Common Program

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In November 1949, the new government founded a special bureau (Kepu) to promote science. This bureau has 4 important goals:
1. To enable labourers to learn scientific production
2. To disseminate knowledge of natural science
3. To cultivate patriotic spirit in promoting inventions from the labourer class
4. To spread knowledge of health and hygiene. The fundamental concept behind the CCP policy is that science is a collaborative activity. According to this viewpoint, a scientific concept emerges from the collective social experience and is therefore considered communal property. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of scientific endeavors hinges on factors such as organizational structure, societal context, leadership, and the ideological stance of scientists themselves.

The setbacks of this top-down project of science dissemination and the bottom-up one of mass science were the lack of funds , the lack of organization and political backing, which undermined mass science. "Mass science was most influential in areas of technology, where workers and peasants had obvious and unproblematic experience to contribute." An other setback to develop mass science was the attitude of scientists, who made science appear more difficult and incomprehensible than it is. The masses can be overwhelmed by the prestige and authority of scientists with a bourgeois background. The top-down project was better organized (in 1950, the All-China Federation of Scientific Societies and the All-China Association for the Dissemination of Scientific and Technical Knowledge are founded) and funded.
To control the teaching materials, new textbooks for elementary and secondary schools had to be published. Especially textbooks on history and geography had to be revised. The temporary standard elementary school curriculum for world history emphasized the increasing power of the socialist bloc, emphasizing the imminent liberation of all colonies, which would result in the eradication of the aggressively imperialist faction. To elaborate on this concept, geography textbooks were revised to more explicitly address the two-camp issue, as the subject necessitated the study of all continents and nations, with an emphasis mandated by authorities on contemporary international affairs.
In early Communist China, science education for children went beyond just teaching facts. It was designed to shape young minds and build a new kind of citizen – the "New Person." There was a focus on practical skills: Children learned science through hands-on activities and by connecting it to real-world problems, like improving farming or building a stronger nation. An other focus was promotion of patriotism by emphasizing teamwork, love for the country, and the idea that understanding nature would help China become a powerful and prosperous nation. Children were taught to see nature not just as something to admire, but as a resource to be used wisely to benefit humanity. This reflected the government's goal of modernizing the country through industrialization and technological advancement. Essentially, science education was a tool to instill communist values and create a generation dedicated to building a socialist society.

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Mass organizations like All-China Federation of Labor, the New Democratic Youth League, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and the All-China Democratic Women's Federation engaged in rigorous educational and propaganda efforts, often establishing their own educational institutions and releasing publications tailored to their members. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association primarily operated at this level, actively advocating for Soviet ideology, technology, and culture in China. To achieve this objective, it arranged nationwide lecture tours featuring teams of Soviet experts, artists, and intellectuals from various disciplines. See also Article 45 .
In the early years of the PRC, the low overall educational level prompted a nationwide push to expand basic education, driven by ideological goals of reducing class disparities and practical needs for a skilled workforce. However, resource constraints led policymakers to focus on the more immediate benefits of improving secondary and tertiary education in urban areas, prioritizing efficiency over equitable access to education. The Ministry of Education provided the state schools with funding, uniform standards, and curricula. In 1951, one-third of all primary and general secondary school teachers worked in minban (people-run) schools, predominantly located in rural areas. For example, by 1949, over 90% of Guangdong's 30,000 primary schools relied on lineage-based support, while publicly owned primary schools made up only 6% and were almost entirely urban. Consequently, rural education in pre-1949 Guangdong was predominantly a private, lineage-driven enterprise. In the early 1950s, the land reform campaign dismantled lineage-based support for education in Guangdong, leaving no alternative funding mechanisms in place. Existing schools suffered further setbacks due to widespread fear and distrust of the new government. Rumors circulated that children attending Communist schools would abandon their filial duties, and workers participating in Communist literacy classes risked being forcibly conscripted to liberate Taiwan or exiled to Hainan if they refused. On December 30, 1949, Qian Junrui stated that, except for some bad private schools which should be taken over, most private schools should be protected. The number of private schools increased rapidly. Not until August 2, 1952, the Ministry of Education decided that private schools should be taken over completely. Lacking fiscal and organizational capacity, the implementation and enforcement of a uniform national school system was doomed to fail. In 1953, as a result of the first 5 year plan (in which most resources are needed for direct economic development), it was decided that no additional state-run primary schools would be established in rural areas. Villages hadthe responsibility for their own primary education and had to establish minban schools on a voluntary basis. Funds were accumulated by "voluntary" donations, confiscated goods from the land reform activities, and special taxes and fees. Minban schools were often established in former ancestral halls and temples, without desks or chairs, and there was a shortage of teachers. Teachers in the early PRC were both politically powerless and economically vulnerable. Their heavy reliance on local communities for financial support left them exposed to retaliation from local powerholders. These powerholders not only resented the financial burden of supporting local intellectuals but also sought to exert control over school activities. As a result of this policy, two distinct divisions were cultivated and perpetuated in society: one between urban and rural areas, and another within rural regions themselves, dividing economically prosperous regions capable of supporting educational advancement from those with fewer resources.
The educational system was splitted into academically oriented state-run schools in the cities and vocationally oriented village-run schools in the countryside. The educational institutions had dual objectives: one was to furnish candidates for advanced academic institutions, and the other was to supply the workforce needed for productive activities. A minority of the graduates could secure admission to higher-level schools, while the majority would contribute to labour-intensive work. Enlisting millions of newly skilled workers imbued with knowledge and political awareness to participate in socialist industrialization constituted a crucial mission in the realm of socialist development. To ensure the proactive involvement of graduates in labour production, three strategies were implemented. Firstly, the educational administrative department was tasked with enhancing labour-focused education for students. Secondly, the Communist Youth League was responsible for disseminating active propaganda and aiding in the cultivation of accurate societal perspectives. Lastly, outstanding graduates who attained remarkable accomplishments in labour production were to be widely recognized and celebrated.
Before 1949, tertiary education has been restricted to young men (sometimes women) of privileged backgrounds. A second restriction of accessibility was geographically. Most universities are located on the eastern coast of China. The chart below shows the slow rise in the particpation of sons and daughters of workers and peasants in tertiary education. It displays an indication of rural enrollment although there is no division between worker - peasant enrollment.

"Children from old elite families continued to make up the majority of students at China’s top universities and they were in a better position than their parents to embrace the expectations and opportunities presented by the new regime."

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Before 1949, preschool facilities hardly existed and they were only accessible for the rich. In 1950, about 140.000 children went to kindergarten, most of them went to private, church-related institutes. After 1949, one important function of kindergartens and preschools is freeing mothers to enter the workforce. Especially, the ACFDW argues that these institutions strengthen the female workforce and productivity. "The Federation helped to expand the number of daycare centers, from the preexisting 147 facilities in 1949 to 15,700 in 1952; women workers increased threefold during that time.¹⁸ Among these daycare facilities, 2,738 were factory day-care centers; 4,345 were neighborhoodbased; 148,200 were “busy season” day care centers serving roughly 850,000 children whose mothers were working in the fields in the countryside.""
Shortly after the onset of the cooperative movement, certain rural administrations in Shanxi initiated trials of childcare mutual aid teams and seasonal childcare centers to alleviate the strain on female labor during peak farming seasons. In the spring of 1951, Xigu Village established one of the first seasonal childcare teams in Shanxi, which proved highly effective in releasing female laborers for agricultural work. Consequently, the number of such teams rapidly increased from one to six. Recognizing the success of Xigu's initiative, the provincial government swiftly adopted and disseminated the model of childcare teams and seasonal centers throughout the province. However, some older women expressed concerns about potential disruptions caused by crying children, hygiene issues, and interpersonal conflicts among adults if childcare was not managed properly. Younger women voiced their reluctance to have their children taken away from them, emphasizing that caring for children was tiresome for them and would be even more so for older individuals. Even the nurses and caretakers assigned to the childcare centers harbored apprehensions, citing fears of gossip, lack of trust from mothers, potential illnesses among children, and the exhausting nature of childcare duties.
In 1951, the ministry of education issued temporarily rules for kindergartens "enhance the health of children, develop their intelligence, nourish their moral responsibility, and cultivate their initial aesthetic values so that they can be developed in full. This lays the foundation for their primary school education, and, simultaneously, it eases a mother’s burden of child care, allowing her to participate freely in the new political, economic, cultural, and social life."
In the kindergartens, children are learned to praise Mao Zedong and to condemn Chiang Kai-shek in several songs. The special love that Mao Zedong has for children is emphasized. "...multiple methods—games, singing, storytelling, drawing, and site visits—were systematically used to socialize children politically to serve the Communist revolution."

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Special schools, mainly for blind and deaf children, were founded by foreign missionaries. In total, there were in 1949 more than 40 special schools for blind and deaf people. Following the restructuring of the education system in 1951, the special schools were categorized as a variant of social education, deviating from their prior status as an integral component of the public education system. Social education inherently represented an informal educational approach, distinct from the structured formal education offered by public schools. Broadly speaking, the informal standing of special schools gave rise to several adverse outcomes: education for children with disabilities was regarded as less prioritized, public schools were not mandated to furnish educational provisions for children with disabilities, causing them to study in distant locations, and the educational quality within special schools lagged behind the standard education delivered by public schools. 'Useless disabled people' shall learn skills to be no longer a burden to society, and be separated from the rest of society. They can not compete in the examination culture existing in China, in which only excellent students are selected for further study. Teachers are unable to look after disabled children because class sizes vary from 45 to 60 children, so no individual teaching is impossible.

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June 1, 1950, the GAC issued the directive on developing spare-time education for workers and staff members. Priority was clearly given to political education (a rudimentary education in the doctrine of “class struggle” and the workers' role in the new society) and literacy classes (a literacy standard of 1,000 characters was to be attained by all workers within 3 to 5 years). The program was coordinated by the trade unions—the mass organization for workers, the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Education. Qian Junrui stated in May 1950 "In order to cultivate intellectuals from among workers and peasants the sole use of worker-peasant vocational school is insufficient...This kind of student will have left his original work post to devote spare-time to study and and not full-time. The courses in the short-course middle schools for the workers and peasants will be mainly literature and mathematics. 'Outside of this there will be physics, history, geography, biology, and the common sense of hygiene."
The program was financed from the cultural and educational fund which the factory or enterprises contributed to the trade union organization. The guiding principle was "To combine education with politics and to combine education with production." The Hangzhou Normal School (HNS) exemplified a restructured schedule, particularly in its mission to prepare elementary school teachers. The HNS incorporated the following activities into all students' schedules: (1) 6–10 hours per week dedicated to agricultural production, encompassing tasks like cultivating vegetables, tending to poultry, and gardening; (2) engagement in industrial work within mechanical, clothing, or shoe factories; and (3) voluntary work on weekends and holidays.

As can be seen in the chart above, the number of spare-time students who moved on to tertiary education was very low. The percentage rose from 0.3% in 1950 to 5.2% in 1954.
Yang Xiufeng outlines the problems the program is facing. "inadequate speed in establishing a complete spare-time educational system from primary school through university levels ; no guarantee of study time for workers; inadequate numbers of qualified teachers; low qualifications of the students; lack of funds. ⁹" In 1953, the Renmin University started with correspondence education and this was later on copied by numerous other universities and colleges throughout China.
In the magazine Chinese Youth Bulletin, a publication of the All China Federation of Democratic Youth, a student of Tsinghua People's University, explained the purpose of his study. "Theory is closely linked up with practice throughout the four years. Take me for example, I am studying metal processing. I will have three stages of practical training in our leading factories for 28 weeks; first, as a technical worker, under the guidance of a foreman; second, as assistant to the head of a workshop in a factory, and third, as assistant to an engineer. Finally, I will be asked make rationalisation proposals. If examinations the university and the factory show they are sound, they will be adopted. "So I am confident when I graduate, I will have had good, practical engineering experience that will qualify me fully for my profession."

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Despite the CCP's efforts to eradicate illiteracy, there was minimal progress in improving either school-age or adult literacy throughout the entire thirty-year span from 1949 to 1979. The literacy rate remained stagnant at around 32 percent during this time. Fudan University demographer Dai Xingyi divided China ...into three model zones in terms of literacy success: Zone A, where illiteracy is minimal, which includes Beijing-Shanghai-Tianjin and Liaoning, and Jilin, Heilongjiang, Guangdong, Hunan; Zone B, the middling or relatively average zone of lesser literacy but considerable cultural richness (Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Guangxi, Shanxi, Hubei, Anhui, etc.); and Zone C, the western border provinces where literacy education has floundered (Gansu, Qinghai, Tibet, etc.). There are several reasons for this lack of improvement.
First of all, CCP focused their efforts on the PLA, because soldiers must have the ability to obey written orders and be ideological equipped.
Secondly, to reach out to the masses, the CCP used mainly visual (pictorial magazines, cartoons, posters, woodblock prints, and peasant dances) and oral (revolutionary songs, public announcements, and radio) media. In Mao's strategy, political mobilization and effective communication held greater significance than overall literacy. Despite many villagers remaining unable to read printed materials like books, magazines, or newspapers, efforts focused on raising political awareness, a form of political literacy. Various means such as discussions, songs, theatrical performances, and direct persuasion were utilized, extending from the political network towards, but not entirely reliable reaching into, the village. These methods leveraged existing village communication traditions rather than relying solely on formal educational institutions.
Thirdly, after 1949, the new regime needed cadre not so much for military and political struggle but for complex management and administrative tasks of state-building and planned economic development. Even with the provision of ample resources to enhance the skills of these cadres, the outcomes were disappointing. Moreover, local authorities often hesitated to allow village cadres to attend such schools, typically located in county seats, out of fear that they might exploit the opportunity to escape rural areas or view these schools solely as a path to advancement. Consequently, positions in these schools were frequently awarded to elderly revolutionaries as a form of recognition and to individuals deemed expendable by local officials. Furthermore, these schools were not widely available: when they were eventually dissolved due to their lack of success in 1955, there were only eighty-seven such institutions nationwide, with a total enrollment of just 51,000 students. To provide context, during the same period, the overall number of state cadres surged from 720,000 to over 5 million, while Party membership increased from 4.5 million to 10.7 million by 1956.
The founding of cultural centers was also an instrument to combat illiteracy. During the Qing period, and later on during the GMD period, these centers were used for combating illiteracy, educating the masses, and developing patriotism. The CCP used these centers to spread ‘progressive’ thoughts to the masses, the CCP condemned the GMD centers as serving only the interests of capitalism and imperialism. Promoting hygiene was another key task of the cultural centers. During the Patriotic Hygiene campaign in 1952 they played a key role. The cultural centers organized communal meetings, mounted street exhibitions, and made public media announcements on the importance of sanitation. The cultural centers facilitated community gatherings, arranged street exhibitions, and disseminated public announcements regarding the significance of sanitation. CCP officials perceived significant benefits in this grassroots approach, as the centers were situated in familiar environments, programs were conducted in accessible language for the masses, and direct dialogue could be established between officials and local residents. The most marginalized members of society would encounter a compassionate attitude that fostered trust. Ideally, when fully operational, these centers would serve as a direct link between the government and the ordinary citizen.

Cultural centers sprang up all over China, including in minority nationality Regions. Following the introduction of the first 5-year plan, cultural centers underwent a significant shift towards increased politicization. In December 1953, the Ministry of Culture issued new directives for cultural centers titled "Instructions on Reforming and Strengthening Cultural Centers and Cultural Stations." The government mandated that henceforth, the centers must adhere to the "general line of socialism" by promoting official policies, organizing campaigns to combat illiteracy, assisting in the development of amateur art groups, and disseminating knowledge about industrial and agricultural production. However, similar to numerous other initiatives, the cultural centers faced challenges due to limited funding and shortages of manpower. Despite repeated government endorsements, many officials, including those in prominent positions within the Ministry of Culture, did not regard these grassroots organizations with seriousness. One proposed solution to the personnel shortage was the recruitment of what municipal officials referred to as "activists" or "core members" — individuals outside the CCP who had deep local connections and sympathized with the Communist cause. Regular recruitment of such individuals was demanded to address this issue.

One obstacle to eliminate illiteracy has to be mentioned, the CCP introduced a whole new set of vocabulary, mostly political terms, like cadre, workers, land reform, republic and elections (See Article 4). These words were necessary to explain the government’s policies. Other words were needed to form slogans, or to introduce military vocabulary to civilian actions. In the period between 1949 and 1950, certain private publishers held a significant advantage over newly established state publishers. Editors of these publishers had already completed drafts for major encyclopedic dictionaries, poised to dominate the markets in the first two years post-1949. As the PLA entered Shanghai in May 1949, these publishers only needed a few weeks for revisions to adapt the dictionaries to the new political landscape. While adjustments were made, such as deleting entries related to Nationalist rule in China and incorporating information about New China, most publishers prioritized rapid production to swiftly bring new works to bookstores.
There is still another reason to be mentioned for the shortage of enhancements. The extreme linguistic variation in China. In Guangdong alone, there are 3 main subdialects (Yue, Min, and Hakka) with their own local variations. Not to mention several minority languages.
The first policy statement on worker-peasant education in 1951 stipulated that literacy education was forbidden in areas which has not yet undergone land reform, which in 1950 meant most of China. The revolutionary task of land reform was more important than the battle against illiteracy, which was considered a potential distraction from the main business of political mobilization during land reform and during other political campaigns, like "Resist America and Aid Korea". In the "newly liberated" areas, there was a potential risk that literacy could fuel political resistance to land reform, leading to cautious approaches that sparked further opposition. Reports from Guangdong in 1951 highlighted growing resentment among illiterate village cadres, who saw intellectuals from the old society quickly gaining positions of power solely due to their educational advantages. This resentment was not always directed at the intellectuals themselves but at the Communist Party, which they accused of neglecting its moral duty and historical debt to the peasants. The reemergence of the old elite fueled protests against the new regime, as it often resulted in the promotion of "feudal" ideas rather than the spread of Communist ideology.
'Winter schools' or 'seasonal spare-time schools' had as the main subject during lesson political mobilization, literacy was a side issue. Various topics were presented; for example, the Korean War and the "liberation" of Taiwan, opposition to US imperialism, Sino-Soviet friendship, the "general line for the transition to socialism", mutual-aid teams, explaining the new constitution, promoting cooperativization, and popularizing the policy of compulsory grain purchases. The textbooks for political education should be the Common Program. By the end of 1954, the enrollment of spare time primary and secondary schools for workers was 2.9 million.

In 1953, the government divided the degree of literacy into three levels. The first level for peasants (1000 characters), the second for urban workers (1500 characters), and the third for cadres and factory workers. The latter needed to know 2000 characters, plus have the ability to read simple books and newspapers and write 200-300 character reports. The campaign suffered also like literacy campaigns elsewhere in the world: teacher shortages, 'childishness' of teaching materials, conflicts between school schedules and farm-work cycles, and funding problems. Literacy promotion extended to various avenues such as newspaper reading groups, utilizing school children as tutors for adults within their families, night schools, integrating education with women's spinning groups, organizing cooperative groups to learn during rest periods and meals, among other methods. This form of education, known as social education, operated beyond formal institutional settings, aiming to impart a range of knowledge including politics, literacy, updates on events within China and globally, as well as accounting, among other subjects.

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In 1938, Mao Zedong had radical ideas on reforming the Chinese writing system "In order to hasten the liquidation of illiteracy here we have begun experimenting with Hsin Wen Tzu—Latinized Chinese. It is now used in our Party school, in the Red Academy, in the Red Army, and in a special section of the Red China Daily News. We believe Latinization is a good instrument with which to overcome illiteracy. Chinese characters are so difficult to learn that even the best system of rudimentary characters, or simplified teaching, does not equip the people with a really rich and efficient vocabulary. Sooner or later, we believe, we will have to abandon characters altogether if we are to create a new social culture in which the masses fully participate. We are now widely using Latinization and if we stay here for three years the problem will be solved." As the situation during the war in China became increasingly difficult, the program for Latinization more or less disappeared. In 1950, Mao Zedong changed his opinion. "Mao Zedong, presumably reflecting a collective decision of the government, ...ordered that reform of the writing system should start with simplification of characters, that writing reform "should not be divorced from reality or make a break with the past," and that the effort to create a new alphabetic system should abandon the previous use of Latin letters and concentrate instead on devising a "national-in-form" set of symbols based on Chinese characters " One of the reasons Zhou Enlai explained "All those who had received an education, and whose services we absolutely needed to expand education, were firmly attached to the ideograms [sic]. They were already so numerous, and we had so many things to upset, that we have put off the reform until later." In the following years, a Latinization program continued and resulted in 1956 in Pinyin, but this writing system would have only a secondary role (as a means to facilitate the recognition and correct Mandarin pronunciation of characters during literacy training) and that the primary emphasis would still be on simplification of characters. In 1956, the Chinese Script Reform Association published a list of 2236 characters which could be simplified.

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