Article 58 of the Common Program
Text
Article 58 of the Common Program

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad.

The exodus of Chinese migrants starts in the 19th century. Before this time emigration was more or less prohibited. This change arose from ‘push’ factors like famine, population pressure and political instability and from ‘pull’ factors like gold rushes in the US and Australia and employment in Southeast Asia on plantations. From 1870, after the second opium war, there is an increase of unskilled labourers (coolies) to the US and the colonies of the UK. In 1893, the Emperor decides to lift the prohibitions on emigration and emigrants are no longer considered as traitors. Qing officials try to get in touch with overseas Chinese to strengthen the ties with China. The GMD government continues this policy and stimulates the establishment of Chinese schools and associations abroad. Especially during the Japanese occupation, the government explicitly makes an appeal to the overseas Chinese for financial support.
After 1945 “…according to Nationalist government estimates more than 160,000 Overseas Chinese ‘returned’ to China in the four years between 1945-1949, many of them were fleeing post-war violence and mounting insecurity in Malaya, Indonesia and elsewhere in the region.”
Peterson Glen D. (2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge. Page 108
Table Overseas Chinese
Sources: Poston, Jr. Dudley L. & Mei Yu Yu, (1990). “The distribution of the Overseas Chinese in the Contemporary World”, International Migration Review, 24, 480-508 Lee Rose Hum (1956) “The Chinese Abroad”, Phylon , 17, Page 263 Purcell Victor (1951). The Chinese in Southeast Asia London. Page 2

In 1949 both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China claim to be the protector of Overseas Chinese.
Zhou Enlai states in his political report of October 23, 1951 "Lawful rights and interests of these people [the Overseas Chinese], as a result of unreasonable discrimination and even persecution on the part of certain countries, have been seriously infringed. This cannot but arouse serious attention and deep concern of the Chinese people." cited in Barnett A. Doak (1960). Communist China and Asia challenge to American policy. Harper & Brothers. Pages 185-186
"The PRC inherited the policies formulated by the earlier Kuomintang government with reference to the Overseas Chinese. As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, there were three aspects to the problem. 1) Since the Overseas Chinese were the responsibility of the Chinese Government, it got involved in Southeast Asian affairs.2) The nationality law promulgated by the KMT Government created ill will and distrust among the Southeast Asian nationalists. 3) The lack of integration of the Overseas Chinese made them an object of suspicion. What is more the powerful support extended by the CCP to the communist movements in Southeast Asian countries and the fact that the leaders and followers in the MCP (Malaysian communist party) came from ethnic Chinese further widened the schism between Beijing and Southeast Asian capitals. It may be recalled that during this period China used to denounce the newly independent governments in the region as the “running dogs of imperialism”".
Suryanarayan V. (2012) Peoples Republic of China’s Policy towards Overseas Chinese no page

Most Overseas Chinese are (descendants) from South China, mainly from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. They are a heterogeneous group with 3 different language groups and different ethnic backgrounds. The lineage is more important than the length of the stay abroad, the country of birth or blending with other nationalities.
In 1909, the Qing government decides all children with a Chinese father or a Chinese mother (but with an unknown father) have the Chinese nationality. In 1929 the GMD regime continues this policy, so does the People's Republic of China in 1949.
This viewpoint causes many problems in several countries. (see below) Many Overseas Chinese have a double nationality. For example, of the 350,000 living in Burma over 74% have two nationalities. Besides this number there are also 140,000 persons with mixed Chinese, Burmese roots. 80,000 persons are born in Burma but have Chinese ancestors. In 1950, the People's Republic of China claims 11 million Overseas Chinese, in 1953 Taiwan claims 13 million. The difference according to Taiwan are the 2 million refugees since 1949.
This exodus, partly via Hong Kong (1950-1957), partly via Vietnam (1950-1953 and partly via Laos and Burma (1953), comes more or less to a halt in 1951 by China's strict emigration policy.
Only in 1959 there is a big exodus of refugees from Tibet.
More than 400,000 mainlanders arrive in Taiwan. See table 16
The Number of Mainlanders Entering Taiwan
. In 1950 as many as 100,000 refugees were coming to Hong Kong in a month. After 1950, this number decreases to 40,000 a year.
"Obwohl die Gesetzeslage eindeutig war und auch die kommunistische chinesische Regierung die Grenzen zur Kronkolonie 1950 schloß, endete die nunmehr irreguläre Zuwanderung keineswegs.907 Auch auf seiten der britischen Kolonialregierung wurde sie in den fünfziger Jahren weitgehend toleriert, was nicht unwesentlich zum Erfolg der auf arbeitsintensiver Produktion und niedrigen Lohnkosten basierenden Industrialisierung Hong Kongs beitrug.908" Translation: "Although the law was clear and the Communist Chinese government also closed the borders to the Crown Colony in 1950, the now irregular immigration did not end by any means On the part of the British colonial government, too, it was largely tolerated in the 1950s, which contributed to the success of Hong Kong's industrialization based on labor-intensive production and low labor costs." Giese Karsten (1999). Irreguläre Migration vom chinesischen Festland nach Taiwan Vom antikommunistischen Flüchtling zum (un)erwünschten Illegalen Historische Entwicklung seit 1949 Und empirische Befunde der achtziger und neunziger Jahre im Vergleich zu weiteren Zielregionen. PhD. Freien Universität Berlin Page 4-425
In total, more than 1 million refugees flee to Hong Kong.
The new regime defines an Overseas Chinese as huaqiao, this is someone who lives temporarily in a foreign country or in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Even Overseas Chinese with a foreign passport are considered to be huaqiao.
The new government in Beijing takes temporary measures in 1951 to better regulate immigration of Overseas Chinese.
"..in theory, Overseas Chinese were to be allowed exit permits so long as they possessed an identity card issued by the district-level people’s court attesting to their Overseas Chinese status. Nan fang ribao 7 January 1951. In October 1951 the Ministry of Public Security issued new regulations which restricted Overseas Chinese with a ‘landlord' designation from leaving the country freely. The regulations were tightened in spring 1952, and by 1953 newspapers in Hong Kong and elsewhere were reporting that Overseas Chinese who had been singled out during land reform for ‘criticism and struggle'(...) were forbidden to leave the country." Peterson Glen D. (2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge.page 187 note 87
These new regulations are specifically made to ease the immigration of Overseas Chinese from countries the People's Republic of China has no diplomatic relation with. They can enter the mainland via Hong Kong or Macao and they may leave the country after permission from the authorities.
Document: 02-08-1951 Temporary procedures for Overseas Chinese entering and leaving the country
Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan try to win the Overseas Chinese through extensive propaganda and practical interventions.
"Thus, when the CCP triumphed in 1949, many transnational families had been estranged for over a decade. Within months the PRC launched a major letter-writing campaign to aid transnational families in locating their missing relatives. Monitoring communications with family members overseas quickly became “one of the foremost concerns of all Overseas Chinese Affairs officials from the Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission to the basic level cadre”. Peterson (2007) House Divided: Transnational Families in the Early Years of the People's Republic of China, Asian Studies Review, 31:1. Page 27. Just after 1949 The PRC seemed to have won this fight. The Korea war and the methods used to trick out money from overseas Chinese damped the initial enthusiasm. See Oyen Meredith (2010). Communism, containment and the Chinese overseas. In Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu & Michael Szonyi (Eds.), The cold war in Asia. The battle for hearts and minds (pp. 59-94). Leiden.
Document: 18-03-1952 Reply Concerning Ideas for Strengthening Propaganda to International Chinese. "... returned Overseas Chinese. Most came back to China right after the socialist revolution in 1949 with patriotic feelings willing to help reconstruct the country. 294 Besides their language abilities, foreign-born Chinese also had insider's knowledge of the countries they came from, in terms of their lifestyle, customs and political situation. Many of these cadres came from Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Philippines. A considerable number of Overseas Chinese also returned from the US, France, Japan and Soviet Union 295 . As the Overseas Chinese had native or close-to-native linguistic skills, certain departments did not have to employ foreign experts. Throughout this period, the Overseas Chinese became influential members of the translation, editing and announcing teams. 296 Their participation in the foreign propaganda work was encouraged and awarded by the PRC regime." Ungor Cagdas (2009). Reaching the distant comrade: Chinese communist propaganda abroad (1949-1976). Binghamton University State University of New York Page 103
In 1952 the China News Service is esteablished. It serves mainly overseas Chinese and residents of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. See also Document: 25-09-1954 Chinese Communist Party, Plan of Action for Welcoming Home the Chinese Internationals
This often causes conflicts with local regimes. See Burma and Overseas Chinese.
The loyalty of overseas Chinese is often under discussion. “The new nation-states [in Southeast Asia] found themselves divided between those that sided with the Western powers and those that leaned towards China and the Soviet bloc. In this context, the Chinese sojourners in the region were much more vulnerable than others. If they remained sojourners, they were forced to choose between mainland China and the Republic of China in Taiwan. If they decided to settle and become citizens of the newly independent states, they had to convince the national governments of their change of loyalties. Even then, they remained politically suspect."
Wang Gungwu (1996) “Sojourning: The Chinese Experience in Southeast Asia”, in Reid Anthony (Ed) Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese (St Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin,). Page 10
After independence, newly formed governments follow a policy of political and economic nationalism. They try to minimalize the role of the old colonizer, the Indian and the Chinese traders and bankers. Skinner (1959) decribes four issues China and Southeast Asian countries had to address concerning the overseas Chinese after the Second World War, namely, the dominant role of overseas Chinese in the non-agricultural sector of Southeast Asia’s economies; the education of overseas Chinese; the legal identity and dual nationalities of the overseas Chinese; and the political integration of overseas Chinese into the newly independent Southeast Asian countries.
Skinner G. William (1959). Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 321. Page 138

The political role of the Overseas Chinese....

There are two institutes involved in relationship with the Overseas Chinese. One is United Front Department of the CCP, the other is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee (OCAC)of the government. It is a supra-ministerial organ under Premier Zhou Enlai’s GAC. Both work together in China and abroad. The OCAC coordinates between the several departments of the government which are dealing with the issue of the Overseas Chinese. The OCAC is concerned with the 13 million Chinese who live outside China’s borders, and with some 11 million ’domestic Overseas Chinese', the dependants and relatives who reside in the People's Republic of China.
The May Day 1948 slogans which are a call for a broad national united front against the GMD and for the New Democracy, (see Part 3) did not only arouse enthusiasm with the minzhu dangpai but also with overseas Chinese. "… this group (led by Tan Kah Kee) clearly took the inclusion of the huaqiao (Overseas Chinese) in the ‘democratic coalition’ as an accomplished fact, since their reply to the CCP CC indicated enthusiasm for a new PCC and its future protection of huaqiao interests’. 62 Such sentiments were hardly unique; the huaqiao in Malaya, Siam, Canada and even Cuba, followed suit, and CCP Chairman Mao Zedong confirmed their validity in a telegram to Tan on 1 October (1948), stating that the CCP would take care to seek the huaqiao’s views on China’s future. 63"
Lim Jin Li (2016). New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959. Pages 36-37. Lim continues "After all, they had earned their seat at the table because they had, as Mao said, made huge sacrifices for the anti-Japanese united front. 79 This entitled them to a role in the New Democracy, and to a benevolent qiaowu." Page 40
The
Zhi Gong Dang (ZGD)
September 1949 Chen Qiyou (1892-1970) leader of the ZGD speaks at the first plenum of CPPCC
sees itself as the representative of the Overseas Chinese in the CPPCC. The party sends six delegates to the founding conference of the CPPCC in September 1949. (See Part 10) Yet, the overseas Chinese have 13 delegates. The party is formed in 1925 in San Francisco and moved its headquarters in 1926 to Hong Kong. Later on, the party leaders settle in Guangzhou and finally in 1953 in Beijing. The role of the ZDG in the national and international policy is minimal “The Zhigong dang with its secret society connections, continued to represent the interests of Overseas Chinese. … remained obscure… In 1952 the (communist) Party stopped them recruiting although they continued in the CPPCC”
Groot G.(2004) Managing transitions: The Chinese communist party, united front work, corporatism, and hegemony. New York. Pages 72-73. Lim (2016) states: "In a CCP CC directive sent to its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches, Chen Qiyou and Situ Meitang were listed as Zhigong Party delegates, and separate from the huaqiao invitees, Tan Kah Kee, Feng Yufang, and Wang Renshu." Page 46
The policy towards the Overseas Chinese can be seen as a part of the foreign policy. It is an instrument of the anti-imperialsm policy. ”In the first two years of its rule, the party appears to have believed that the Overseas Chinese could be exploited successfully in the pursuit of its political objectives in Southeast Asia.”
Fitzgerald Stephen (1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China. PhD. Australian National University. Page vii
Like the GMD government of Taiwan, the People's Republic of China sends teacher to Overseas Chinese schools in Southeast Asia to make propaganda for the new regime. "The policy slogans (of the CCP) tended to echo those of the KMT; protection, remittances, education, culture, and patriotism, overlaid with the language of peace, democracy, internationalism, and anti-imperialism.1 The CCP stated repeatedly that its policies represented a complete break with the policy of the Kuomintang, but in these early years, the resemblance in words, if not in action, was unmistakable."
Fitzgerald(1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China.Page 193
The government undertakes little initiatives to improve the position of the Overseas Chinese and are mostly only interested in the question of family remittances
Fitzgerald Stephen (1970). China and the overseas Chinese: Perceptions and policies. The China Quarterly, 44. Page 8. Fitzgerald states in his dissertation: The CCP, on the other hand (compared with the GMD) , even at this early stage, was not prepared to allow Overseas Chinese problems to dominate any aspect of state policy, nor was it prepared to commit itself too readily on issues of protection which were of no potential benefit to China.Fitzgerald(1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China.Page 204
In 1954 the new constitution provides that the Overseas Chinese can sent 30 delegates to the newly formed National People’s Congress. Mao Zedong acknowledges the role and importance of the Overseas Chinese in financing and planning of the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. In his speech of December 25 1946 he calls up “Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.”
Document:25-12-1947 Mao Zedong, “The present situation and our tasks”
He Xiangning
October 1951, He Xiangning (1878-1972) Chairwoman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee and Song Qingling "
, the head of OCAC, reminds the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia of their duties. They have to form a united front with the native people and resist the power of the Europeans and American rulers in their place of residence and “.. to act as the "outer circle" of the vanguard of international Communism!”
Walker Richard Louis (1958) “The Continuing Struggle: Communist China and the Free World.” New York. Pages 65-66
The party established an uncompromising principle that Overseas Chinese policy is subordinate to foreign policy. The emphasis lies on pro-Chinese (communist) propaganda. In practice this meant the new Chinese government protests loudly against the persecution of Overseas Chinese in (British) Malay and at the other hand the government establishes relations with Britain. In 1954 the foreign policy changes (See Article 54) and the Overseas Chinese are no longer seen as instrument of the anti-imperialism policy. After 1954 Beijing tries to solve the disputes between Overseas Chinese and their governments through bilateral agreements. The Overseas Chinese are free to choose their nationality.
Zhou Enlai summarizes the problems that arise for the Overseas Chinese "The position of the Overseas Chinese in those countries which are unfriendly to China has been extremely difficult,"… "It is worth pointing out that in the past, reactionary Chinese Governments never made any attempt to solve the problem of Overseas Chinese nationality. This not only placed the Overseas Chinese in a difficult position, but was often the cause of discord between China and the countries of residence. In order to improve this situation, we are prepared to solve this problem, beginning with those South-East Asian countries with which we have diplomatic relations."
Document:15-09-1954 Zhou Enlai “Report to the First Session of the First NPC”
The Overseas Chinese are often seen as a fifth column, loyal to the homeland and since 1949 as communist (sympathizers). Some Overseas Chinese are recruited as spy, because they can be targeted as informants and agents “… in the context of cultural exclusivity, visits to China, contacts with relatives there, and continuous contact with Chinese communities.”
Brazil(no date) Chinese Intelligence Work, an Abbreviated History. Page 12
Below, the relations between the Overseas Chinese, the People's Republic of China and Asian states will be described. Between 1949-1959 about 400.000 Overseas Chinese decide to return to the mainland. They are mainly from Indonesia and Malaysia

The economic role of the Overseas Chinese....

In 1950 there about 11 million overseas Chinese. On the mainland there are about 30 million qiaojuan (Overseas Chinese dependents and/or relatives). Right from the start the new government takes control over the flow of funds, the ‘foreign exchange market’ and the circulation of gold, silver, diamonds and foreign currency. Strict rules are introduced.
Document:01-03-1950 Provisional regulations on currency control
Document:25-12-1950 Regulation on the implementation of currency control

The OCAC chairwoman, He Xiangning seeks the revitalisation of huaqiao remittances and tries to persuade them to buy ‘Chinese People’s Victory Bond'.
He Xiangning in a directive to Tan Kah Kee states: (i) To use many methods to spread the news as broadly and as far as possible to the haiwai huaqiao regarding the underlying principle and motive behind this bond issue. (ii) To encourage the huaqiao to subscribe to the issue and not be casual bystanders. (iii) To use the qiaojuan to approach their family and relatives overseas to subscribe because the dividends can be directed towards their family in China, and so too the bond certificates.91. Cited in Lim (2016). New China and its Qiaowu. Page 64
As of 1952 the Bank of China and the People's Bank of China has the cash flow almost completely under control. The OCAC takes measurement to improve the cashflow of the Overseas Chinese to the homeland. One of these measurements is the establishment of Overseas Chinese investment companies.
February 1951, the South China Enterprise Company is founded to stimulate investments by businessmen from Hong Kong and Macao. Private capital financies for seventy percent this private-state company. The state controls the firm.
These companies increase the supervision on the remittance. "The 1950s also saw a steady stream of Overseas Chinese commercial and industrial delegations visiting China to scout out opportunities for trade and investment. Known officially as ‘sightseeing delegations’ these were usually made up of representatives of what were described as Overseas Chinese ‘commercial and industrial Circles’ Many were from Hong Kong and Macao, but over time an increasing number were from other places as well, especially Indonesia, Singapore, Burma and even the US and Canada (when the Singapore Chamber of Commerce organized one such ‘sightseeing tour' to China in 1956, the delegation was officially received in Beijing by Tan Kah Kee).78"
Peterson(2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge. Page 96
Document: 02-08-1951 Regulations on the exit and entry national border of overseas Chinese 2-8-1951
Document: 25-09-1954 Chinese Communist Party, Plan of Action for Welcoming Home the Chinese Internationals

Foreign countries, with the US and Canadian authorities taking the lead, impose restrictions on financial transactions with China. These actions have major effect on the amount of money Overseas Chinese send to the People's Republic of China. 1950 a total sum of 60 million is transmitted, a year later in 1951, the amount has decreased to 41 million.
The members of the family who stayed behind on the mainland, are often obliged to hire manpower to be able to exploit the farmland. There are considerable differences in the size of the Overseas Chinese agricultural land, ranging from 34 mu to 2500 mu. During the land reform campaign, their class status is determined as “landlord”
Article 24 of the Land reform law deals with the land and houses of the Overseas Chinese. Document: 30-06-1950 The Agrarian Reform law. Document: 30-06-1950 Decisions concerning the differentiation of class status in the countryside. On November 6 1950 special measurements are proclaimed to regulate the land reform for Overseas Chinese “…made it difficult to assign class designations to Overseas Chinese. It is not surprising that the practices of dealing with property of Overseas Chinese underwent such fluctuation during the course of land reform.” Vogel Ezra (1969) Land Reform in Kwangtung 1951-1953: Central Control and Localism. China Quarterly 38, Page 40. Peterson states "The CCP view of the Overseas Chinese vacillated, from local capitalists and feudal exploiters" (during the investigation of class status during land reform) to "labouring people" and members of a patriotic united front. Bureaucratic confusion and organizational difficulties paralleled this confusion of image and policymaking: local cadres were unsure of whether to exploit class differences and promote class struggle amongst the domestic Overseas Chinese, or smooth over class divisions in the interests of maintaining the united front. Peterson Glen D. (1979). The overseas Chinese areas of rural Guangdong and socialist transformation, 1949-1956. Master University of Manitoba. Page 167
and they are often the victim of popular fury.
"Popular resentment of the privileges enjoyed by transnational families was easily manipulated by village officials who themselves were under considerable pressure from above to make violent class struggle the focal point of Land Reform. Indeed, the experience of transnational families during Land Reform provides one of the earliest examples of how post-1949 Maoist revolutionary culture stigmatised not only private wealth but all forms of social and cultural difference that could be identified as “foreign” [ yang]." Peterson (2007). House Divided Page 35. See also Ravenholt Albert (1951). Why did the Chinese communists blunder?
"The incidence of violent persecution of Overseas Chinese appears to have risen markedly following the arrival of the northern cadres and the ensuing ‘rectification' of the provincial Party apparatus, which began in April 1952.89 The following month Hong Kong newspapers reported that Taishan county authorities had ordered the execution of some thirty landlords, ‘including many Returned Overseas Chinese’.90 In the following weeks and months, Hong Kong newspapers reported regularly on the execution of Overseas Chinese landlords and suicides committed by distressed Overseas Chinese."
Peterson (2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Page 51
See for the position of the women left behind Article 6
Some local authorities try to protects these families, but in the early months of 1952 Mao Zedong sends
Tao Zhu
Tao Zhu (1908-1969)
to Guangdong to end this safeguard and to accelerate the Land Reform in South China. More than 6000 cadres are dismissed. Lim (2016) argues "The competition that the qiaowu (Overseas Chinese affairs) practitioners confronted in the 1950s was not so much with ideological factions in the CCP leadership, but with its local membership. For most of the 1950s, the highest-echelons of the Chinese party-state approved of prioritising economic imperatives in qiaowu. Yet, the conflict between qiaowu and the ‘ideological approach’ was mostly at a lower level, because of local cadres and officials who could not accept, or understand youdai (preferential treatment) policies. It was not, therefore, that qiaowu competed with more-ideological factions within the CCP; it was rather that the CCP attempted to practice qiaowu (and youdai) in contradiction to its own ideological impetuses. 48 It was thus not that the CCP had ‘conflicting approaches’ to its qiaowu, as much as the party-state’s qiaowu was in contradiction to its own quest for socialist transformation."
Lim Jin Li (2016). New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959. Page 30
December 1954 the class status of the Overseas Chinese families is changed to ‘middle farmers’. February 23, 1955 the government decides to validate the remittance and the acceptance of this money has no consequences for the class status of the recipient.
Peterson, “Socialist China and the huaqiao, the transition to socialism in the Overseas Chinese Areas of rural Guangdong, 1949-1956” Modern China,14 (3) Page. 309-335.The families are allowed to use the remittance for traditional marriages and funerals. They are also allowed to buy special consumer goods,, which are not generally available. They are a privliged class. This ends in 1957
Document: 18-03-1952 Reply Concerning Ideas for Strengthening Propaganda to International Chinese

The political and economic role of the Overseas Chinese has gradually become less important. Partly caused “…Land Reform of 1950-1953 probably had the most far reaching effect because it greatly weakened the binding strength of the community due to the elimination of the ownership of large land holdings, especially clan land, and confiscation of land owned by overseas families. As the lineages began to disintegrate, loyalty among Chinese emigrants towards their families and lineages started to lose its basic foundation.”
Choi C.Y (1975). Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Sydney University Press. Pages 57-58
Document: 07-03-1955 Notice on Strengthening Party, Group Members’ and Cadres’ Connections to Chinese Internationals
The zhenfan (see Article 7), the sanfan (see Article 18) and the wufan (see chapter 4) also have great negative impact on the value of the remittances that are sent to the PRC. See also Article 37 which states to adopt measures necessary to facilitate remittances.

Indonesia and the Overseas Chinese....

After the power transfer of the Netherlands in 1949, the Indonesian government determines that everyone will be given the Indonesian nationality within 2 years if no protest is recorded. The People's Republic of China states all Overseas Chinese who want to change nationality have to receive approval of Beijing. “Although the government of Indonesia formally recognized the PRC in 1950, they deliberately delayed an exchange of ambassadors so as to not provide a channel for communication between the ethnic Chinese and Beijing. Their fears were confirmed in 1953 when the Chinese embassy in Jakarta was used to rally the local Chinese in support of Beijing’s cause against Taiwan.”
Carter Lauren (1995). “The ethnic Chinese variable in domestic and foreign policies in Malaysia and Indonesia.” Simon Fraser University. Page 28
The leaders of the People's Republic of China are afraid of the GMD influence on Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. They want to strengthen their influence and eliminate the GMD organisations. The Chinese ambassador Wang Renshu immediately starts negotiations to open several consulates. These talks result in the opening of four consulates on Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. The GMD-regime has 7 consulates.
In 1953 almost 700.00 Overseas Chinese who are born in Indonesia, do not change their nationality. One reason for this choice “Early students, virtually all from Chinese-language schools, felt they would have little opportunity for tertiary study in an independent Indonesia and that education in science and the professions was of a higher quality in China. Training in Shanghai remained world class…”
Godley Michael R., Coppel Charles A.(1990). The Pied Piper and the Prodigal Children. A Report on the Indonesian-Chinese Students who went to Mao's China. Archipel, 39. Page 180
Some of them want to return to Indonesia after their training but "Most felt extremely positive about the 'liberation* of the mainland. They also expected bright futures as doctors, scientists teachers and technocrats. While the re-sinification taking place in Chinese-language schools in Indonesia was surely a factor in the decision to go, most of our informants still placed education over political considerations."
Godley(1990). The Pied Piper. Page 180

Burma and the Overseas Chinese....

In the early 1950’s there live about 350000 Overseas Chinese in Burma (this is about 1,6% of the total Burmese population) About 250000 have double nationality. The Burmese government has no desire to force the Overseas Chinese to choose between Burmese or Chinese nationality. They are afraid of intervention of the People's Republic of China. “A second secretary of the Chinese embassy in Rangoon was particularly given the responsibility for manipulating the Chinese community. Nevertheless, the P.R.C. did not make the Chinese minority a serious problem of internal security for Burma, because it was too busy with other matters. In addition, lack of influence among Burma's Chinese and a desire not to provoke open confrontation with the Burmese government may also restrain Peking's actions.”
Liang Chi-Shad & Scalapino Robert A. (1990). Burma and the People's Republic of China. Burma's foreign relations: Neutralism in theory and practice. New York. Page 64 See also Document: 11-10-1950 Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Burma, 'National Day Celebration Task Summary'
December 1954 Mao Zedong has a meeting with the Burmese premier U Nu and he reassures him that China has no intention to export the revolution to Burma or to support an Overseas Chinese communist party.
Pang Yang Huei (2011). The Taiwan Strait crises, 1954-1958: China, The United States and Taiwan. PhD., National University of Singapore. Pages 137-138
During this visit no bilateral agreement is signed.
In 1956, Zhou Enlai once again assures the Burmese government that also without an agreement the problems can be solved. He demands from the Overseas Chinese who have kept their Chinse nationality to refrain from political activities and “some overseas Chinese who have stayed for long in Burma, have become Burmese citizens by having acquired Burmese nationality…. As long as they have made the choice on a voluntary basis, and as permitted by the local laws, obtained the nationality of their residing country, they are no longer regarded as Chinese citizens.”
Fan Hongwei (2008b). Sino-Burmese relations during the early period of diplomatic relations between the two countries (1950-1953). The Kyoto review of Southeast Asia, 10. No page number See also Document: 22-06-1956 Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Burmese ambassador U Hla Maung.

Vietnam and the Overseas Chinese....

The Qing Empire and the GMD government have negotiated with the French colonial regime for a special status of the Overseas Chinese in Vietnam. They received the privileges to establish their own schools, the freedom of vocation and protection against tax-discrimination. “By the time Vietnam regained her independence from the French in 1954, the situation was already such that no Vietnamese government could rest in peace without assimilating the powerful and pervasive Chinese or at least ascertaining their political loyalty. Significantly enough, in spite of the uneven distribution of Chinese in Vietnam and the continuing political turmoil in Indochina, both Hanoi and Saigon were equally anxious to see the Chinese fully integrated into Vietnamese society”
Chang Pao-min (1982) The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute over the Ethnic Chinese. China Quarterly, 90. Page 196
In 1955 the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam agree Hanoi will register all Overseas Chinese and treat them as if they are Vietnamese. The Overseas Chinese may voluntarily adopt Vietnamese nationality after a period of ideological training.
The South Vietnamese government determines in 1955 that all children from mixed marriages are Vietnamese and in 1956 that all Chinese born in Vietnam are Vietnamese. After political and economic pressure of the local Chinese community, Saigon eases the measures. "In January 1955 the Chinese ambassador told… that ‘the agents of Jiang Jieshi exert an extremely strong influence’ on Haiphong’s 40,000 Chinese inhabitants. The ambassador went on to say that the Chinese minority in Vietnam had been, by and large, reluctant to join the anti-colonial resistance movement."
Szalontai Balazs (2005). Political and economic crisis in North Vietnam, 1955–56. Cold War History, 5, (4). Page 411

Korea and the Overseas Chinese....

The connection between Korea and the CCP dates from the late 30’s and early 40’s. (See Article 54 ) Like in other Asian states the CCP and the GMD are eager to recruit Overseas Chinese to their camp. “The fear that Overseas Chinese, in Korea and beyond, were ideologically and materially supportive of the Guomindang (GMD) invigorated and gave urgency to the work of Ding Xuesong (丁雪松) and other leading Chinese Communist cadres in Korea, who earnestly desired to build a reliable base of support for the CCP among the Overseas Chinese.9 Though (…), it is equally important to note that the Nationalist Party (GMD), represented by Ambassador Shao Yulin (邵毓麟) in Seoul, was just as obsessed with the political persuasion of the Overseas Chinese in Korea.10"
Kraus Charles (2014). Bridging East Asia’s Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950 The Journal of Northeast Asian History 11, (2). Page 42
In 1946 the CCP and the Korean Workers’ Party(KWP) start an Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee within the KWP and in October 1946 the Overseas Chinese Federation (OCF) is founded as a grassroot organization. The OCF penetrated down to village level and tries to form occupational, youth and women’s groups. Elementary schools are opened and in 1949 there are about 50 elementary schools in North Korea.
During the civil war, Overseas Chinese took care of wounded PLA soldiers from Shandong and Southern Manchuria. How successful the OCF was, is difficult to measure. “…the Overseas Chinese community was materially rich but politically and socially uncultured, allegedly the resultof the absence of CCP influence.41"
Kraus(2014). Bridging. Page 53
During the Korea War, the Overseas Chinese are forced to donate money to the CCP.

Singapore, Malaya and the Overseas Chinese....

The Overseas Chinese dominate the trade in this important trade center. One of the most distinguished traders Tan Lark Sye (陳六使) openly supports the People's Republic of China because he is of the opinion the GMD government is corrupt and not efficient During the Korea War he is a proponent of lifting the rubber embargo. Although he is a supporter of the People's Republic of China, he has never the intention to return to the mainland. Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚), an important industrialist decides to return to Beijing, (see Part 7 ) The rest of his family stays in Singapore.
Lim Jason (2012). Chinese merchants in Singapore and the China trade, 1819-1959. Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, 5. Page 80
The position of the Overseas Chinese in Malaysia is complicated, because of the existance of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP is almost entirely composed of Overseas Chinese. In June 1948, the MCP starts its armed struggle against the British colonizer. As soon as the CCP has established control, the CCP provides the MCP with literature and propaganda. It is unable to provide material support. “The CCP had never openly supported the MCP or urged the Chinese in Malaya to join the insurgency. By early 1951, it was already apparent that the party was no longer prepared even to suggest by implication and ambiguity that it approved of Overseas Chinese taking up arms against the British.”
Fitzgerald Stephen (1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China. PhD. Australian National University. Page 240
The MCP failed to win the struggle. In 1952 the British government expelled 700 Overseas Chinese. They found work at state farms on the island Hainan.

US and Overseas Chinese....

The absence of diplomatic relation between the US and the People's Republic of China hinders the position of the Overseas Chinese in America. In addition, Taiwan is conducting an open struggle to keep and retain the Overseas Chinese in the United States in their camp, backed by the anti-communist wind blowing in the US over the years. This policy backfired because “…to suspect all new arrivals from China as potential spies. Heavy-handed application of immigration laws in the United States opened propaganda opportunities for the PRC and embarrassed the perennially weak ROC government for being unable to protect its citizens.”
Oyen Meredith ( 2007). Allies, enemies and aliens: Migration in U.S.-Chinese relations, 1940-1965. PhD., Georgetown University. Page 7
After the start of the Korea War the position of the Overseas Chinese becomes even more hazardous, Many Overseas Chinese students leave the US for the mainland.
Guldin Gregory Eliyu (1994). The saga of anthropology in China: From Malinowski to Moscow to Mao. New York. Pages 81-83. He describes the choice students and scientist make to stay in the US or to leave for People's Republic of China. In 1949, the US adopted a law that facilitates the right of asylum for Chinese students. About 5000 students make use of this law. Li Hongshan (2008). U.S.-China educational exchange : state, society, and intercultural relations, 1905–1950. Rutgers University Press . He states: “Although there were over four thousand Chinese students in the United States by the end of 1949 and most suffered from financial difficulties, very few considered the option of going to Taiwan. They either turned to the American government for help in order to continue their education in the United States, or returned to China despite the Communist control.” Page 191. Li poses “Over six hundred of them went back home with travel grants paid by the United States government” Page 171
The American government tries to stop this exodus of students and scientists. Qian Xuesen, the rocket specialist is most famous victim of this policy. After June 1951, the restriction on migration becomes even more severe and 120 students are not allowed to leave the country for the People's Republic of China. September 10, 1955 China and the US agree that the US abandons the restriction in exchange for the release of American POWs from the Korean War. Qian Xuesan is also allowed to leave. In the years 1945-1955 some 700 Chinese students and scientists return to the China. Most of them play an important role in the development of science in the People's Republic of China.
“A quarter of a century later in 1981, 344 (or 86 percent) of four hundred in the PRC's Academia Sinica were recognized as having received at least part of their higher education abroad. Out of the 344, 59.3 percent or 204 were educated in the US, with most of them arriving in America during the mid-1940s and returning to China in the late 1940s or mid-1950s” Lai Him Mark (no date). The Chinese-Marxist left, Chinese students and scholars in America, and the new China: mid-1940s to mid-1950s. The Free Library. Page 15. see also Wilhelm Alfred D. Jr. (1994). The Chinese at the negotiating table, style and charateristics. Washington.Pages 249-250. With the passing of the Displaced Person’s Act of 1948, a quota of 15,000 Chinese claim refugee status and change their citizenship to American. In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act allowed for persons living in Communist countries to vie for American citizenship. Of the 205,000 places, 2000 were allotted to Chinese.

Literature Notes Documents...

1. Peterson Glen D. (2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge. Page 108 Back
2.Sources: Poston, Jr. Dudley L. & Mei Yu Yu, (1990). “The distribution of the Overseas Chinese in the Contemporary World”, International Migration Review, 24, 480-508 Lee Rose Hum (1956) “The Chinese Abroad”, Phylon , 17, Page 263 Purcell Victor (1951). The Chinese in Southeast Asia London. Page 2 Back
3. Zhou Enlai states in his political report of October 23, 1951 "Lawful rights and interests of these people [the Overseas Chinese], as a result of unreasonable discrimination and even persecution on the part of certain countries, have been seriously infringed. This cannot but arouse serious attention and deep concern of the Chinese people." cited in Barnett A. Doak (1960). Communist China and Asia challenge to American policy. Harper & Brothers. Pages 185-186 Back
4. Suryanarayan V. (2012) Peoples Republic of China’s Policy towards Overseas Chinese. No page http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1044 The People's Republic of China made no nationality law of their own. Back
5.In 1909, the Qing government decides all children with a Chinese father or a Chinese mother (but with an unknown father) have the Chinese nationality. In 1929 the GMD regime continues this policy, so does the People's Republic of China in 1949. Back
6. Only in 1959 there is a big exodus of refugees from Tibet. Back
8. "Obwohl die Gesetzeslage eindeutig war und auch die kommunistische chinesische Regierung die Grenzen zur Kronkolonie 1950 schloß, endete die nunmehr irreguläre Zuwanderung keineswegs.907 Auch auf seiten der britischen Kolonialregierung wurde sie in den fünfziger Jahren weitgehend toleriert, was nicht unwesentlich zum Erfolg der auf arbeitsintensiver Produktion und niedrigen Lohnkosten basierenden Industrialisierung Hong Kongs beitrug.908" Translation: "Although the law was clear and the Communist Chinese government also closed the borders to the Crown Colony in 1950, the now irregular immigration did not end by any means On the part of the British colonial government, too, it was largely tolerated in the 1950s, which contributed to the success of Hong Kong's industrialization based on labor-intensive production and low labor costs." Giese Karsten (1999). Irreguläre Migration vom chinesischen Festland nach Taiwan Vom antikommunistischen Flüchtling zum (un)erwünschten Illegalen Historische Entwicklung seit 1949 Und empirische Befunde der achtziger und neunziger Jahre im Vergleich zu weiteren Zielregionen. PhD. Freien Universität Berlin Page 4-425 Back
9. "..in theory, Overseas Chinese were to be allowed exit permits so long as they possessed an identity card issued by the district-level people’s court attesting to their Overseas Chinese status. Nan fang ribao 7 January 1951. In October 1951 the Ministry of Public Security issued new regulations which restricted Overseas Chinese with a ‘landlord' designation from leaving the country freely. The regulations were tightened in spring 1952, and by 1953 newspapers in Hong Kong and elsewhere were reporting that Overseas Chinese who had been singled out during land reform for ‘criticism and struggle'(...) were forbidden to leave the country." Peterson Glen D. (2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge. Page 187 note 87 Back
11."Thus, when the CCP triumphed in 1949, many transnational families had been estranged for over a decade. Within months the PRC launched a major letter-writing campaign to aid transnational families in locating their missing relatives. Monitoring communications with family members overseas quickly became “one of the foremost concerns of all Overseas Chinese Affairs officials from the Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission to the basic level cadre”. Peterson (2007) House Divided: Transnational Families in the Early Years of the People's Republic of China, Asian Studies Review, 31:1. Page 27. Just after 1949 The PRC seemed to have won this propaganda fight. The Korea war and the methods used to trick out money from overseas Chinese damped the initial enthusiasm. See Oyen Meredith (2010). Communism, containment and the Chinese overseas. In Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu & Michael Szonyi (Eds.), The cold war in Asia. The battle for hearts and minds (pp. 59-94). Leiden. Back
14. Wang Gungwu (1996) “Sojourning: The Chinese Experience in Southeast Asia”, in Reid Anthony (Ed) Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese (St Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin,). Page 10 Back
15. Skinner G. William (1959). Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 321. Page 138 Back
16.Lim Jin Li (2016). New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959. Pages 36-37. Lim continues "After all, they had earned their seat at the table because they had, as Mao said, made huge sacrifices for the anti-Japanese united front. 79 This entitled them to a role in the New Democracy, and to a benevolent qiaowu." Page 40 Back
17. Groot G.(2004) Managing transitions: The Chinese communist party, united front work, corporatism, and hegemony. New York. Pages 72-73. Lim (2016) states: "In a CCP CC directive sent to its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches, Chen Qiyou and Situ Meitang were listed as Zhigong Party delegates, and separate from the huaqiao invitees, Tan Kah Kee, Feng Yufang, and Wang Renshu." Page 46 Back
18.Fitzgerald Stephen (1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China. PhD. Australian National University. Page vii Back
19.Fitzgerald(1969) Overseas Chinese Page 193 Back
20. Fitzgerald Stephen (1970). China and the overseas Chinese: Perceptions and policies. The China Quarterly, 44. Page 8. Fitzgerald states in his dissertation: The CCP, on the other hand (compared with the GMD) , even at this early stage, was not prepared to allow Overseas Chinese problems to dominate any aspect of state policy, nor was it prepared to commit itself too readily on issues of protection which were of no potential benefit to China.Fitzgerald(1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China. Page 204 Back
22.Walker Richard Louis (1958) “The Continuing Struggle: Communist China and the Free World.” New York. Pages 65-66 Back
24.Brazil(no date) Chinese Intelligence Work, an Abbreviated History. Page 12 Back
27.He Xiangning in a directive to Tan Kah Kee states: (i) To use many methods to spread the news as broadly and as far as possible to the haiwai huaqiao regarding the underlying principle and motive behind this bond issue. (ii) To encourage the huaqiao to subscribe to the issue and not be casual bystanders. (iii) To use the qiaojuan to approach their family and relatives overseas to subscribe because the dividends can be directed towards their family in China, and so too the bond certificates.91. Cited in Lim (2016). New China and its Qiaowu. Page 64 Back
28.February 1951, the South China Enterprise Company is founded to stimulate investments by businessmen from Hong Kong and Macao. Private capital financies for seventy percent this private-state company. The state controls the firm. Back
29.Peterson(2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge. Page 96 Back
32.Article 24 of the Land reform law deals with the land and houses of the Overseas Chinese. 30-06-1950 The Agrarian Reform law.30-06-1950 Decisions concerning the differentiation of class status in the countryside. November 6 1950 special measurements are proclaimed to regulate the land reform for Overseas Chinese “…made it difficult to assign class designations to Overseas Chinese. It is not surprising that the practices of dealing with property of Overseas Chinese underwent such fluctuation during the course of land reform.” Vogel Ezra (1969) Land Reform in Kwangtung 1951-1953: Central Control and Localism. China Quarterly 38, Page 40. Peterson states "The CCP view of the Overseas Chinese vacillated, from local capitalists and feudal exploiters" (during the investigation of class status during land reform) to "labouring people" and members of a patriotic united front. Bureaucratic confusion and organizational difficulties paralleled this confusion of image and policymaking: local cadres were unsure of whether to exploit class differences and promote class struggle amongst the domestic Overseas Chinese, or smooth over class divisions in the interests of maintaining the united front. Peterson Glen D. (1979). The overseas Chinese areas of rural Guangdong and socialist transformation, 1949-1956. Master University of Manitoba. Page 167 Back
33."Popular resentment of the privileges enjoyed by transnational families was easily manipulated by village officials who themselves were under considerable pressure from above to make violent class struggle the focal point of Land Reform. Indeed, the experience of transnational families during Land Reform provides one of the earliest examples of how post-1949 Maoist revolutionary culture stigmatised not only private wealth but all forms of social and cultural difference that could be identified as “foreign” [ yang]." Peterson (2007). House Divided Page 35 See also Ravenholt (1951) “Why did the Chinese Communists Blunder?.” Back
34.Peterson Glen D.(2013). Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. Page 51 Back
35. Lim (2016). New China and its Qiaowu. Page 30 Back
36.Peterson Glen D. (1988) “Socialist China and the huaqiao, the transition to socialism in the Overseas Chinese Areas of rural Guangdong, 1949-1956” Modern China,14 (3) Page. 309-335. The families are allowed to use the remittance for traditional marriages and funerals. They are also allowed to buy special consumer goods, which are not generally available. They are a privileged class. This ends in 1957 Back
38.Choi C.Y (1975). Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Sydney University Press. Pages 57-58 Back
40.Carter Lauren (1995). “The ethnic Chinese variable in domestic and foreign policies in Malaysia and Indonesia.” Simon Fraser University. Page 28 Back
41.Godley Michael R., Coppel Charles A.(1990). The Pied Piper and the Prodigal Children. A Report on the Indonesian-Chinese Students who went to Mao's China. Archipel, 39. Page 180 Back
42.Godley(1990). The Pied Piper. Page 180 Back
43.Liang Chi-Shad & Scalapino Robert A. (1990). Burma and the People's Republic of China. Burma's foreign relations: Neutralism in theory and practice. New York. Page 64 See also 11-10-1950 Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Burma, 'National Day Celebration Task Summary' Back
44.Pang Yang Huei (2011). The Taiwan Strait crises, 1954-1958: China, The United States and Taiwan. PhD., National University of Singapore. Pages 137-138 Back
45.Fan Hongwei (2008b). Sino-Burmese relations during the early period of diplomatic relations between the two countries (1950-1953). The Kyoto review of Southeast Asia, 10. No page number. See also 22-06-1956 Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Burmese ambassador U Hla Maung. Back
46.Chang Pao-min (1982) The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute over the Ethnic Chinese. China Quarterly, 90. Page 196 Back
47.Szalontai Balazs (2005). Political and economic crisis in North Vietnam, 1955–56. Cold War History, 5, (4). Page 411 Back
48.Kraus Charles (2014). Bridging East Asia’s Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950 The Journal of Northeast Asian History 11, (2). Page 42 Back
49.Kraus (2014). Bridging. Page 53 Back
50.Lim Jason (2012). Chinese merchants in Singapore and the China trade, 1819-1959. Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, 5. Page 80 Back
51.Fitzgerald Stephen (1969) Overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China. PhD. Australian National University. Page 240 Back
52.Oyen Meredith ( 2007). Allies, enemies and aliens: Migration in U.S.-Chinese relations, 1940-1965. PhD., Georgetown University. Page 7 Back
53.Guldin Gregory Eliyu (1994). The saga of anthropology in China: From Malinowski to Moscow to Mao. New York. Pages 81-83. He describes the choice students and scientist make to stay in the US or to leave for People's Republic of China. In 1949, the US adopted a law that facilitates the right of asylum for Chinese students. About 5000 students make use of this law.
Li Hongshan (2008). U.S.-China educational exchange : state, society, and intercultural relations, 1905–1950. Rutgers University Press . He states: “Although there were over four thousand Chinese students in the United States by the end of 1949 and most suffered from financial difficulties, very few considered the option of going to Taiwan. They either turned to the American government for help in order to continue their education in the United States, or returned to China despite the Communist control.” Page 191. Li poses “Over six hundred of them went back home with travel grants paid by the United States government” Page 171 Back
54.“A quarter of a century later in 1981, 344 (or 86 percent) of four hundred in the PRC's Academia Sinica were recognized as having received at least part of their higher education abroad. Out of the 344, 59.3 percent or 204 were educated in the US, with most of them arriving in America during the mid-1940s and returning to China in the late 1940s or mid-1950s” Lai Him Mark (no date). The Chinese-Marxist left, Chinese students and scholars in America, and the new China: mid-1940s to mid-1950s. The Free Library. Page 15. see also Wilhelm Alfred D. Jr. (1994). The Chinese at the negotiating table, style and charateristics. Washington.Pages 249-250. With the passing of the Displaced Person’s Act of 1948, a quota of 15,000 Chinese claim refugee status and change their citizenship to American. In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act allowed for persons living in Communist countries to vie for American citizenship. Of the 205,000 places, 2000 were allotted to Chinese. Back
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