This opening section outlines the path that led to the creation of the Common Program. It commences with a brief overview of China's history from 1911 to 1949, followed by a more detailed examination of the collaboration between the CCP and other political parties and figures, collectively known as Minzhu Dangpai. This partnership ultimately gave rise to the Common Program and the establishment of a coalition government.
It defines the relation between the CCP and other political parties and social organization (Minzhu Dangpai) and the influence of the SU in preparing a consultative conference will be discussed.
It covers the 2nd plenum of the 7th Central Committee of the CCP. Here, the basis is laid for cooperation with the Minzhu Dangpai.
Details are given about the preparatory meeting between members of the CCP and Minzhu Dangpai in June 1949.
The preparation of the CCP for a complete seizure of power is described. Liu Shaoqi’s secret trip to the SU for aid and Mao Zedong’s “On the people's dictatorship.”
The Minzhu Dangpai’s attitude towards the CCP, towards the SU, and towards the role of government is highlighted.
It deals with the first plenum of the CPPCC in September 1949. The delegates are introduced. The value of the Common Program and the other decisions made at this plenum are delineated. The formation the new government, the appointment of new ambassadors, and the recruitment of cadres is also a topic.
Finally, the background of the cadres and the conflicts arising after the takeover are decribed.
All these items will be described in the following parts.
Introduction...
This opening section outlines the historical and political developments that set the stage for the Common Program, beginning with a brief history of China from 1911 to 1949. See Timeline 1912-1949. Following the 1911 revolution that ended the Qing dynasty, China transitioned into a republic under Sun Yat-sen, who soon handed power to Yuan Shikai to prevent civil war. However, Yuan’s rule failed to unify China, and his death in 1916 sparked a period of fragmentation, with regional warlords vying for control. The warlord era, which severely destabilized provinces like Sichuan, Shanxi, and Yunnan, finally concluded in 1930 with Jiang Jieshi’s victory over remaining warlord forces.
After consolidating power, Jiang targeted the CCP in a series of campaigns, but after initial failures, the CCP evaded capture through the Long March in October 1934. Meanwhile, Japanese occupation escalated, with invasions of Manchuria in the early 1930s and major cities like Shanghai (1937) and Hong Kong (1941).
Attempts to reunite China....
At the end in the 1930’s, only 3 parties are capable of completing the task of reuniting China. These are the Guomindang (GMD) with Jiang Jieshi as their leader, the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong, and the Japanese troops.
Message to all Compatriots on Resistance against Japanese and National Salvation
August 1, 1935 Declaration: Message to all Compatriots on Resistance against Japanese and National Salvation The August 1 Declaration is drafted by Wang Ming. It is a joint declaration of the Chinese Soviet Government ((1931–34), an independent government established by Mao Zedong and Zhu De in Jiangxi province in south eastern China) and the CCP. This call was made in Moscow during the Communist International. This seventh and last congress was held between July 25 and August 20, 1935.
in which the party called upon the GMD and other parties to end the civil war and to unite to fight against the Japanese invaders. On July 15, 1937, the CCP and the GMD declared to start a United Front against the Japanese occupiers. This
United Front
United Front Declaration
United Front Declaration 24 December 1936 The second United Front between the KMT and the communists was formally established, this time on the basis of a bloc without alliance between two separate groups; the communists reorganized their army as the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and put them nominally under KMT direction. https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Front-Chinese-history-1937-1945
was enforced after the kidnapping of Jiang Jieshi in December 1936. This abduction was organized by some GMD generals and only after interference of Zhou Enlai, Jiang Jieshi was set free.
Though tenuous, the United Front allowed the CCP to expand its support, transforming its image from a class-based movement to a national party advocating unity against foreign invasion. This period helped the CCP garner widespread support, even as tensions between the CCP and GMD persisted, with frequent skirmishes eroding trust between their forces. Nevertheless, the United Front enabled the CCP to advance its political goals and expand control over territories, establishing a foundation for broader reforms.
China circa the late 1930's
During the 1920s, numerous activists joined both the Guomindang and the CCP, forming connections and memories that persisted at the local level. These early bonds contributed to the massive support the CCP gained during the war against Japan, as many Chinese saw the Communists as the true successors of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary, anti-imperialist ideals. In the eyes of the people, the CCP seemed to embody the nationalist principles promoted by Guomindang propaganda and public education more authentically than the Guomindang itself.
Slyke (1970) distinguishes 5 phases in the United Front: 1923-1927; 1927-1937; 1937-1941; 1941-1945 and 1945-1949.
The history of the United Front lies beyond the scope of this site.
The civil war starts again....
Following Japan’s surrender in 1945,which was not due to a CCP or GMD victory over Japan, but rather because of Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allies following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the civil war between the CCP and GMD resumed despite attempts at peaceful negotiations, including the 1945 'Double 10 agreement'
Double 10 Agreement 10 October 1945
Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the GMD and the CCP.
The Chongqing talks, from 28 August to 10 October 1945, resulted in the Double Ten Agreement. Mao Zedong and United States Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley flew together from Yan an to Chongqing on 27 August 1945 to begin the negotiations
, which established basic terms for postwar reform. However, distrust led to renewed conflict, with both sides mobilizing for dominance. Although Stalin encouraged a coalition, he also advised Mao against aggressive actions that could provoke the U.S. He supported a consultative meeting to bring together the CCP, GMD, and other minor parties in 1946, but the talks failed due to deep-rooted hostilities. The CCP’s eventual military successes by 1948 rendered coalition government ideas obsolete, shifting the United Front’s focus toward mass support for a new regime.
Consultative meeting....
Between 10 and 31 January 1946, a consultative meeting convened. Besides, the GMD (8 delegates) and the CCP (7 delegates), the Chinese Youth Party (5 delegates) which was an extreme right-wing anticommunist party that sided with the GMD. The Youth Party had recently split from the Chinese Democratic League (CDL). CDL is represented by Zhang Lanand Luo Longji. The other 7 members represented the Nationalist Socialist Party with Zhang Dongsun and Zhang Junmai, two members Shen Junru and Zhang Shenfu represented National Salvation Association, Huang Yanpei was the participant of the Vocational Education Association, the Third Party was represented by Zhang Bojun and Liang Shuming represented the Rural Reconstruction Association. Nine nonpartisan individuals visited this meeting in Chongqing. The US sent an ambassador to Chongqing to assist with the negotiations. The SU also sent an ambassador to help the CCP secretly with the negotiations. The SU still recognized the GMD government. Stalin proposed that these groups, although ideologically different, could support CCP objectives by isolating imperialist influence. This tactic set the foundation for a coalition government that the CCP could later dominate while broadening its popular appeal. Stalin’s approach underscored the CCP’s commitment to portraying the new government as a democratic coalition rather than an outright communist state. The meeting was a failure and the CCP and CDL boycotted the end results.
A new United Front....
On December 25, 1947,
the CCP decided to form a complete new United Front with every party and person who wants to defeat the GMD. During 1948, the character of the United Front changed because the victory of the communist army (PLA) was at hand. Slyke poses the opinion:
“Now, however, the united front was changing in function from isolating an enemy to gaining popular support for the new regime”. In 1948, Stalin repeatedly urged Mao Zedong to compromise and form a coalition government with the Minzhu Dangpai. He argued that various opposition parties in China, representing the middle strata of the population and opposing the Guomindang faction, would continue to exist for some time. Stalin advised that the CCP should collaborate with these groups against reactionary forces and imperialist powers while maintaining a leading position. He suggested that some representatives of these parties might need to be included in a democratic government, which could be proclaimed a coalition government to broaden its popular base and isolate imperialists and their GMD allies. Stalin emphasized that this new Chinese government would be a national revolutionary-democratic government, not a communist one.
The formal groundwork for CCP collaboration with Minzhu Dangpai was laid during the CCP’s 7th Central Committee’s 2nd Plenum in 1949 See Part 5 , establishing a plan to engage these groups for the upcoming consultative meeting. In June 1949, CCP and Minzhu Dangpai members met in Beijing to discuss their respective roles in the new government. This meeting highlighted the CCP’s preparation for a full transition to power, evidenced by Liu Shaoqi’s secret trip to the Soviet Union to secure support and Mao Zedong’s influential work, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, which justified CCP leadership while acknowledging non-CCP representation.See Part 4 The attitudes of Minzhu Dangpai toward the CCP, Soviet influence, and their envisioned role in governance became pivotal. While Minzhu Dangpai leaders were wary of complete CCP control, they recognized the strategic advantage of aligning with the CCP over the GMD, especially given the CCP’s growing military success.See Part 3 This alignment set the stage for the September 1949 first plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), where delegates formalized the Common Program as the guiding framework for the new coalition government. This session confirmed the CCP’s approach to coalition governance, appointing ambassadors, recruiting cadres, and selecting Minzhu Dangpai representatives to present the image of an inclusive government.See Part 7
The section concludes by introducing the social backgrounds of new cadres and the internal conflicts that arose after the CCP’s takeover. Tensions between veteran CCP members and new recruits from *Minzhu Dangpai* reflected broader ideological and administrative challenges, which would shape the coalition’s effectiveness and stability in the years to come. These dynamics, along with other foundational elements of the Common Program and its role in state-building, are explored in detail in subsequent sections.See Part 8
The course of the Civil War 1946-1949....
The course of the Civil War 1946-1949
Early in 1949, Stalin cautioned Mao Zedong against crossing the Yangtze, fearing it might provoke a U.S. response that the Soviet Union would be unable to counter. He also relayed a Nationalist request for Soviet mediation in the Chinese civil war and discreetly sent Anastas Mikoyan—the first high-ranking Soviet official to visit Mao—to warn of the potential for a clash with the Americans.
Notes Documents...
Buzan (2020). "Both parties backed modernization, but they differed sharply about how best to accomplish it: state capitalism linked to the global economy and injected into the existing society for the KMT; autarchic central planning via a social revolution for the CCP.48" Page 15 [↩][Cite]
GMD campaigns against the PLA with forces respectively about as follows:
Fig. P1 GMD campaigns against the PLA 1930-1948
* 1st campaign ** 2nd campaign
The GMD lost every campaign except that of 1933. [↩]
Rudolph (1970). "However, when the conference finally convened in January 1946, the government had failed to implement the necessary reforms promised in the agreement. Not surprisingly, the public expectations of the conference merely ranged from cautiously optimistic to fatalistic.15 Already the concluding celebrations of the consultative conference were disrupted by attacks on DPG representatives. Both CCP and GMD refocused on solving the conflict through
the power of the gun rather than persuasion." Pages 284-285 [↩][Cite]
See Winter (2014).[Cite] Gaddis (1997) remarks "What is striking about Soviet and American policies regarding postwar China, therefore, is the extent to which they initially--if inadvertently--coincided. Both Washington and Moscow assumed that the Nationalists would reassert control over China in the wake of the Japanese surrender, and both sought to persuade the Chinese Communists to accept this outcome. Neither understood that the Communists and the Nationalists were not prepared to cooperate,29 neither foresaw that the Communists would prove so much more successful than the Nationalists in winning support among the Chinese people. The significance of these surprises would only slowly dawn, first in Washington and then in Moscow, but even then only through perceptual lenses borrowed from the Cold War in Europe." Page 60 [↩][Cite]
