Introduction to the Common Program

In September 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reached an agreement with other political groups and organizations, known collectively as the 'Minzhu Dangpai', to approve the Common Program—a constitutional framework intended to guide the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Minzhu Dangpai, seen by the CCP as representatives of the "national bourgeoisie," were crucial to the successful implementation of the Program, reflecting the CCP's initial inclusivity towards non-communist parties for a smoother state-building transition.

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This study treats the Common Program as more than a constitutional document; it represents a comprehensive plan for China’s political, social, and economic trajectory. Rather than a statement of ideals, the Program was intended as an actionable blueprint for governance, structuring the power dynamics within the new state. For China, the Program outlined a framework for transitioning from a war-torn, semi-feudal society to a socialist one, signaling the CCP’s commitment to moderating political transformation by affirming citizen freedoms, including speech and thought.
In the context of China, the Common Program represents a blueprint for regime change, state-building, and transition. The Common Program emerged during a pivotal moment: the end of the Chinese Civil War, in which the CCP defeated the Guomindang (GMD). Its guidelines represented Mao Zedong’s vision for a new China, founded on socialism and collectivism, yet flexible enough to allow collaboration with former adversaries and moderate forces. This balancing act between radical transformation and gradual reform was embodied in the Program, which portrayed the new regime as both progressive and inclusive. In practice, however, CCP policy often diverged from this ideal due to challenges in administration, limited expertise, and ongoing social disruption.

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Despite Mao Zedong’s symbolic prominence, he lacked complete control in the early PRC years, and government actions were influenced by various factions within the CCP. This study highlights that the years immediately following 1949 were marked by a decentralized policymaking process with significant practical constraints. The CCP’s efforts to exert authority over vast, diverse territories were impeded by limited resources, an agrarian economy, and insufficient social infrastructure. Instead of a straightforward progression toward communism, the PRC's early years witnessed multiple distinct revolutions in China, some overlapping and others conflicting with each other. These revolutions encompassed a range of social, economic, and political transformations, shaping the country's trajectory in diverse ways.

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The Common Program itself drew from ideological sources, including Mao’s writings—On New Democracy, On Coalition Government, and On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship. This ideological foundation allowed the CCP to justify a phased approach to state-building and offered a unique form of communist compromise with the Minzhu Dangpai. Notably, the Common Program avoided terms like "socialism" and "communism," signaling a provisional period rather than an immediate transition to a communist society. Zhou Enlai emphasized that this approach did not negate the socialist trajectory but rather required patient and demonstrable implementation to gain broad public support.
To actualize the Common Program’s goals, the CCP employed mass campaigns, leveraging them as tools for mobilizing the populace, neutralizing opposition, and advancing the regime's agenda. Although mass mobilization was presented as an effort to connect with citizens, it primarily followed a top-down approach driven by state elites. The Party wielded substantial power, with branches embedded at all administrative levels, underscoring the inseparability of Party and state—a “party-state” dynamic. This allowed the CCP to maintain close control over both urban and rural governance, ensuring consistent policy implementation across a politically diverse society.

Both the GMD and CCP regimes utilized mass mobilization.
The relationship between state and society also evolved significantly post-1949, with political systems dictating the organization of public life. Organizations like the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Youth Federation, and All-China Democratic Women’s Federation served as intermediaries between state and citizens, channeling public engagement through officially sanctioned groups while suppressing independent associations. This approach to governance facilitated the CCP’s penetration into everyday social structures, transforming previously autonomous organizations into state-aligned bodies.
The CCP’s reliance on grassroots organizations created a strong foundation for mobilization, as local cadres acted as conduits for state propaganda, collectivization efforts, and land redistribution measures. These grassroots organizations disseminated the Party’s message, persuaded households to participate in reforms, and organized public activities in alignment with national objectives
The CCP’s guerrilla experience shaped its approach, as seen in the Taihang Base Area (a CCP stronghold in Shanxi in 1939), where the Party experimented with governance models suited to local conditions. This principle of “doing the best according to local conditions” became central to the CCP’s campaigns, allowing for adaptability in policy implementation. By the 1950s, this local participation was formalized, especially in land reform, as successful local initiatives were promoted as models for national policy.
The CCP’s governance approach continued to evolve, culminating in the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), which drew on Soviet centralization strategies but adapted them to China's unique context. This period highlighted a divide between leaders advocating gradualist development and those, like Mao, pushing for more rapid change. The CCP’s decision to adopt a more centralized model during the Five-Year Plan reflected this internal tension, prioritizing rapid industrialization despite the challenges of coordinating local and central directives.
In this framework, the CCP deployed agents either locally-embedded or centrally-appointed. Locally-embedded agents often had strong connections with communities, enabling them to implement reforms effectively, though sometimes at the risk of insubordination. Centrally-appointed agents, conversely, tended to follow central directives closely but were often unfamiliar with local contexts, which limited their effectiveness. This study underscores that the CCP tolerated centrally-appointed agents’ inefficacies more than the disobedience of local agents, as the latter posed a more direct challenge to CCP authority and grassroots stability..
One illustrative case is the Land Reform campaign, where hybrid counties—those balancing locally-embedded and centrally-deployed agents—achieved the most effective outcomes. Locally-embedded agents’ familiarity with regional contexts enabled them to implement reforms sensitively, while centrally-appointed agents ensured adherence to CCP objectives. The CCP ultimately placed greater importance on stability and loyalty, often tolerating operational inefficiencies to maintain a unified political front.
Three major state-building campaigns took place between 1949 and 1953: the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (See Article 7) , the Land Reform (See Article 27) and the Movement to Resist America and Aid Korea (See Article 54). Each contributed to establishing CCP authority and reinforcing state control.

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The CCP’s collaboration with the Minzhu Dangpai began to fray in the early 1950s, driven by ideological shifts, particularly the CCP’s changing view of the bourgeoisie. Initially an ally, the bourgeoisie was redefined as an adversary under orthodox Marxist doctrine, following the Soviet model where bourgeois elements were eliminated as threats to the revolution. This conflict primarily stemmed from the CCP's perspectives on the relationship between the state and the Party. The CCP's position on this issue originates from a document released in September 1942, which established two fundamental principles regarding Party-state relations that later influenced the CCP's post-1949 approach:
1. The Party committee is the highest governing body and must provide unified leadership over all other organizations, including the government, military, and mass organizations.
2. Party leadership involves determining policies, but it should not directly intervene in or manage matters that fall under the government’s jurisdiction.

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The 1954 Constitution marked a pivotal shift away from the inclusive framework of the Common Program, with Mao Zedong signaling the end of the 'New Democracy' policy in favor of a committed socialist transformation. He criticized those within the Party who resisted the shift, labeling them “Right-deviationists,” and emphasized that socialist reform—especially in agriculture—was imperative. The new Constitution solidified the transition from a pluralistic, coalition-based model toward an explicit socialist state, setting the path for future economic and social reforms aimed at eradicating capitalist and exploitative systems.
The adoption of the 1954 Constitution ultimately concluded the Common Program’s role, reflecting the CCP’s evolving objectives and the growing dominance of socialist ideology. This study assesses the impact of the Common Program, recognizing its contributions to China’s early state-building and the ways it was gradually superseded by CCP policies that prioritized centralized control and ideological conformity.

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• © Peter van Meel Last update: October 2024
Historian graduated from the Vrije University Amsterdam with a specialization in the Modern History of China