Article 23 of the Common Program

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In his address to the party congress in April 1945, Mao Zedong emphasized the significance of the militia. He stated that the strength of the army lies in its coordination with the people’s self-defense corps and the militia—vast armed organizations of the masses. In the Liberated Areas of China, all men and women, from youth to middle age, voluntarily and democratically organize into the people’s anti-Japanese self-defense corps without neglecting their productive work. The most capable members of these self-defense corps, except for those who enlist in the army or guerrilla units, are integrated into the militia. Without the cooperation of these mass armed forces, defeating the enemy would be impossible. On April 26, Zhu De again emphasized the crucial role of the militia. He noted that the vast militia force in the liberated areas was unprecedented, and that they had now mastered the organization of these corps—a significant achievement with far-reaching impact. Once established, militia units can either support regular armed forces in battle or take on independent combat tasks. They are also essential for protecting the population’s production efforts. In many areas, militia units have been organized for joint defense and coordinated combat missions, marking the beginnings of these units evolving into regular local forces. Additionally, militia and self-protection units actively participate in production activities, allowing military and production efforts to be closely coordinated.
Once the CCP gained control, local militias, especially "self-defense corps" and "landlord troops," were labeled as "anti-Communist" or "anti-people" entities. The Communists mandated these groups to disband all operations by January 15, 1949. Members were obligated to register and surrender all significant documents, broadcasting gear, and weaponry. Failure to register would result in the leaders of these organizations being deemed criminals.
The ACFTU, the CCP, and the PLA were entangled in a power struggle over control of the militia. Complex political dynamics had emerged among them regarding the role and authority over the militias, with workers primarily being mobilized as recruits rather than serving as their own organizers. Nevertheless, some individuals persisted in acting independently, such as by resisting orders to disarm. The broader working class, particularly in 1949 and the early 1950s, often resisted these state-run militias, which frequently failed in their intended task of suppressing working-class radicalism. During the land reform campaign, the militia held a monopoly on violence, preventing work teams and ordinary peasants from taking justice into their own hands. However, the "speak bitterness" rituals created an emotionally charged environment that was challenging to control. Millions of lives were lost in the Land Reform Campaign, with some falling victim to militia firing squads and others to agitated villagers. Neither work teams nor ordinary peasants were sanctioned to administer justice independently.

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In November 1950, the CCP decided to let the militia grow to 5% of the population (about 23 million people). Everybody between the age of 18 and 31 years old could apply for the militia. The task of this militia is maintaining local order and giving support to the Land Reform and picking up "criminals" who stand trial in the people’s tribunals. The main task of the militia is mainly suppressing riots in tax collection and the introduction of agricultural reforms. The role of supporting the regular army disappears, although the recruiting of militia troops occurs during the Korean War. As the war in Korea drags on, the average citizens became more alert of domestic enemies. In February 1950, there were 109 militias in Shanghai, "Yet, by the end of 1950, Shanghai citizens had organized 742 Winter Defense Service Teams staffed by 29,691 members. Up to April 1951, the number of Service Team reached 2020, and membership expanded to 174,846." On May 16, 1951, the CC and the RMC issued the "Directive on Strengthening the Construction of Militias". The directive proposed the implementation of a universal militia system throughout the country for all male citizens aged 18 to 30. The principle of voluntary participation in the militia practiced in the past years is changed into general participation. It stipulated that all young men of the right age shall have the right and obligation to participate in the militia as long as they were in good health and regardless of ethnicity, race, social origin, and education level. The target of 23 million recruits was not met for two main reasons. Firstly, the prioritization of recruitment into the regular armed forces over the militia during the Korean War resulted in some militia members being enlisted into the regular army. Secondly, the focus on modernizing the PLA took precedence over militia activities, leading to a decline in the attention and resources allocated to militia work. The militia was expanded from 5 million in 1950 to 12,8 million in September 1951. 700.000 militias were recruited for the Chinese People's Volunteers
The PRC possessed weak naval capacity to impose authority over the coastal waters of the mainland. To solve this problem an organized maritime militia was established. Fishermen were recruited, because they were the only experienced mariners. "The CCP targeted the fishing communities, creating fishing collectives and work units, enacting strict organizational control, and conducting political education.⁸" March 6, 1950, more than 200 Beihai militiamen dispatched 140 large and small ships to cooperate with the Fourth Field Army of the PLA to occupy Weizhou and the maritime militia played an important role in the conquest of Hainan (see Article 2).

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On December 11, 1952, entered into force the new regime of militias. It regulated the formation of militia on provincial, Regional, district, city, and village levels. The militia should from now on enforce the bond between the PLA and the masses (especially with the farmers). The PLA supplied weaponry and training. A definite division existed between rural and urban areas, with no militias allowed in the urban districts of major cities. It was explicitly forbidden for factories, mines, shops, and enterprises to form militia groups among their employees. Conversely, in rural areas, militia development, supervised by the military, was emphasized as a national priority.
In practice, the militia underwent minimal training, and their duties occasionally involved patrols or tasks that deviated from the intended purpose of the militia. There have been instances where militia members were asked to perform duties such as standing guard outside local cadre offices or acting as an honor escort, which were unrelated to their intended role. It was crucial that militia activities did not interfere with agricultural production. Regarding national security, the militia's contribution was limited, as they were not adequately equipped to combat rebels; this responsibility fall to the regular army.

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After July 1953, Peng Dehuai launched a significant challenge to the institutional basis of Mao’s military strategy, mandating a 10-30 percent reduction in the militia and diminishing the regular military's involvement in their training. He reportedly referred to the militia as “a heap of flesh.” On July 30, 1955, the Second Meeting of the 1st National People’s Congress ratified the Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China, which stipulated the People’s Republic of China shall practice a military service system based mainly on conscription. According to this law, China started to practice conscription in 1956.

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Chapter 3 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents