Article 2 of the Common Program
Text
Article 2 of the Common Program

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China must undertake to wage the people's war of liberation to the very end, to liberate all the territory of China, and to achieve the unification of China.




On October 1, 1949, the day of the declaration of the People's Republic of China, the civil war is still going on. The intention of uniting the whole of the country is yet to be accomplished. This intention was already formulated on the second CCP congress in June 1922. See Part 1 The total victory is on hand but in the south of China there are still some obstacles to be taken. Table 9 shows these conflicts.
"A large number of sources refer to the ongoing military insecurity of rural areas in the only recently taken southwestern provinces of Sichuan. Guizhou, Guangxi. and Yunnan, where roughly one million "bandits" and eight hundred thousand tewu (Nationalist security agents) were said to be still active in late I949.9 By another estimation, the countryside in Guizhou was so “insufficiently pacified” that remnant Nationalists launched raids on local People’s governments with impunity, and "bandits” (tufei) still partially controlled nearly half (thirty-eight) of the province's counties until August of 1951. Over two thousand cadres, activists and sympathizers lost their lives before order was finally established.10"
Strauss Julia C.(2002). Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950-1953. Comparative Studies in Society and History,. 44, ( 1). Page 83

On November 6, 1949 the PLA is defeated when it attacks the Dengbu island. On November 29 the PLA takes over the town of Chongqing, the last residence of the GMD government. Jiang Jieshi leaves for the island of Taiwan. Shortly after this defeat the important cities Nanjing and Chengdu fall in the hands of the PLA. The objectives for 1950 are the elimination of the remnants of the Jiang Jieshi troops and conquer or integrate Taiwan, Hainan, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet in order to prevent the "American imperialists" of interfering. It will take up to June 1953 until the last enemies on the mainland are beaten. See for Hong Kong and Macao Article 55

Hainan....

Hainan
Hainan Island located in the South China Sea
is politically a part of the province of Guangdong. After the PLA controlled Guangdong in October 1949. It took preparation for the conquest of Hainan. On the island there is a communist resistance cell, which is very active. In the first week of March 1950 a vanguard of the PLA contacts this group
"So divergent were the mainland and Hainanese views of the island’s conquest, that, depending on one’s perspective, the Chinese Communist fight for Hainan island had lasted either two weeks or twenty-three years. The final and decisive push in the victorious campaign during the spring of 1950 took only a few weeks, as People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops landed on the island’s northern beaches and joined with the local guerrilla soldiers to defeat the Nationalist forces there. But these guerrillas, the Communist Hainan Column, had been fighting the Nationalists for twentythree years, since the spring of 1927.”
Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Culturing revolution: The local communists of China’s Hainan island. PhD., University of California. b7183687. Page 241
See also Part 13
The PLA conquers the island on April 30, 1950. The lessons of the disaster of the assault on Dengbu are learnt. Mao Zedong cables Lin Biao on December 18, 1949 instructions on sea-crossing operations in which he warns: “Sea-crossing operations are completely different from the experiences in all of our Army’s prior operations:”
Document: 18-12-1949 Issues that must be stressed in sea-crossing operations
Rudolph
Rudolph Jörg-Meinhard (1986). Die Taiwan-Politik der kommunistischen Partei Chinas (1921 bis 1982) PhD., Freien Universität Berlin. Page 69
remarks: “ In sehr kurzer Zeit überwanden Offiziere und Mannschaften den Mangel an Schiffen, lernten schwimmen, die Windrichtungen unterscheiden, Steuern und andere Seefahrttechniken..., bewältigten die Taktik des Krieges zur See.”
Translation "In a very short time overcame officers and men the shortage of ships, learned to swim, distinguish wind directions, navigate and other seafaring techniques ..., mastered the tactics of the war at sea."

The casualties on PLA side during this campaign are 4000 soldiers, mainly during the sea passage the troops suffer under the attacks of GMD warships. Yet this attack cannot be considered as a rehearsal for the attack on Taiwan.
"The PLA was successful in taking Hainan Island in large part because it was only fifteen miles from the Chinese mainland; its tactics there would be of little use against Taiwan, six times farther out.31 In fact, an invasion of Taiwan would require a major naval effort on the PRC’s part, including the gathering of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of ships and the training of tens of thousands of troops"
Elleman Bruce A.(2012) High seas buffer. The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950-1979. Naval war college press. Page 12

Murray
Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Page 285. About 100,000 Kuomintang troops are reported as having escaped to Hainan Island. They have abandoned their equipment while in flight; have been long unpaid; and are selling their clothing. Malaria, cholera, and typhus are prevalent.
notices another reason "While the Nationalist central authorities horded munitions and the best-trained troops on Taiwan, Nationalist forces on Hainan languished in bitterness. Many of these troops were ripe for Communist recruitment, and desertion was endemic among those who were healthy enough to make their way to the Communist base areas."

Taiwan....

June 1949 Mao Zedong discusses with General
Su Yu
Su Yu, Chu Qing, and their sons Su Rongsheng and Su Hansheng in Shanghai, September 1949
the situation of
Taiwan
Taiwan islands
and they conclude that soon rather than late the PLA has to invade Taiwan in order to protect the surroundings of Shanghai and the town itself against air raids (and less frequently on Amoy, Zhangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing,and other places.) from GMD planes. The conquest of Taiwan gets the highest priority. A real setback is the message Liu Shaoqi gets during his visit in June 1949 in Moscow. Stalin is not prepared to give air or sea support.

After the surrender of the GMD Second Fleet in Nanjing in April over 4,000 officers and sailors were retained in the PLA’s navy
Wang Gungwu (2003). Anglo-Chinese encounters since 1800 war, trade, science and governance. Cambridge University Press. Page 160 note 26
and “six out of the nine vessels of the Second Fleet that had gone over to the communists in 1949 were sunk by the navy that stayed loyal to the Nationalist government. The remnants of the force were strong enough to fight off the attempts by the PLA…”
Torda Thomas J. (2009). The first struggle for the Taiwan Strait: the October 1949 communist-nationalist battle of Quemoy island and its enduring significance. MITRE Corporation. No pagenumber
As soon as the takeover of Shanghai is consolidated, the PLA starts training 37.000 soldiers of the elite forces. Swimming lessons is one of the skills they have to master. The waters around Shanghai are dangerous because of snails. They cause schistosomiasis and within a couple of weeks 38% of the men are contaminated. “While it is unknown how much this affected the decision to immediately attack Taiwan, clearly the forward momentum had been lost. China‘s announcement of its engagement in the Korean War moved the United States from an unaligned position to one of active protection of Taiwan by its Seventh Fleet. By June 1950, only two months after the last treatment of the decimated soldiers, the window of opportunity had been lost.”
Gross Miriam Dara(2010). Chasing snails : Anti-schistosomiasis campaigns in the People's Republic of China. PhD., University of California. Page 65
When in January 5, 1950 the American president had decided not to intervene in any military incursion, the PLA immediately accelerates the training and asks for more Russian military equipment. In his talks with Roshchin, the Russian ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai explains the need for training “For the landing operations against Formosa we will certainly draw lessons from the sad experience of the battles for Shantou (Swatow), where we lost three and a half regiments (7 thousand fighters) in one small landing operation.”
Document: 15-11-1949 Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai
This invasion was part of the tactical plan to first conquer the islands before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. June 1950 the military headquarter decides to enlarge the number of invading armies to 16. Mao Zedong wants to finish the invasion before Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, starts his invasion of South Korea. (See Article 54)
Kim Il Sung starts his invasion in June 1950 and the Chinese leaders come to the conclusion to postpone the invasion. The main reasons for this delay are the possible obligations for aid to Kim Il Sung, the American blockade of the Taiwan Street and the stationing of American air fighters in South Korea.
On August 11, 1950 the decision is made to postpone the invasion until 1952. On August 26, 1950 during a meeting of the PLA top in Beijing Zhou Enlai has the opinion “Perhaps in order to induce the armed forces to agree to shelving the plan for liberating Taiwan for the time being, he added that victory in the Korean War would pave the way for the solution of the Taiwan issue.”
Cited in Niu Jun (2012) The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s. Comparative Studies on Regional Powers, Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies. 9. Page 87
His hopes are in vain, certainly when in February 1951 the US and Taiwan conclude a mutual defense treaty.
Document: 9-02-1951 Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Taipei. Garver (2016) remarks: "In the event of a Soviet-US war, Soviet submarines in the Pacific would attempt to interdict US ships deploying US men and war matériel forward to bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Soviet submarine operations in the Pacific were greatly hampered, however, by the need for those boats to transit relatively narrow and US-monitored straits exiting the Sea of Japan before they could reach the high Pacific Ocean where their American ship- ping targets would be. Submarine operations based on Taiwan would face no dangerous straits. Soviet boats operating from Taiwan could quickly reach deep water off the continental shelf under the protection of Soviet aircraft based on Taiwan. 23 If used by the PLA, Taiwan would not be militarily significant to the United States. If used by Soviet armed forces, however, it would pose a major threat to the United States in the event of a war against the Soviet Union. Beijing’s close military alliance with Moscow transformed for the United States the significance of potential control of Taiwan by Beijing.  Garver John W. (2016). China’s Quest The history of the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China. Page 37
In this agreement with Taiwan the US agrees to provide Taiwan with certain military materials for the maintenance of internal security and for the defense of Taiwan against possible attacks. Shortly after the Korean cease-fire in July 1953 is signed, the PLA starts thinking about a new Taiwan campaign. A critical phase begins when the US and Taiwan are talking about a military treaty.
"The crux of the problem might the understanding by the Chinese leaders of the scope of application of the US-Taiwan treaty. In their view, the treaty would cover islands along Zhejiang and Fujian coast and expand the scope blockade of mainland to “coast of Guangdong Province and Tokyo Bay”.[31] As a result, it would not only cause a protracted separation of Taiwan but also pose more serious security threat to the mainland. Consequently the PLA would not be able to fulfil its set plan of taking over coastal islands. In this sense, to take over islands held by KMT army was strategic action of both offensive and defensive purposes, which was designed to both create conditions for unification and prevent coastal islands from becoming strongholds against the mainland."
Niu Jun (2006) Chinese Decision-Making in Three Military Actions Across Taiwan Straits. in Michael D. Swaine, Tuosheng Zhang & Danielle F. S. Cohen (Eds.), Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (pp 293-326) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Page 299
On July 16, 1953 GMD troops invade and occupy the major part of Dongshan island, but the PLA defense is much stronger then expected and in the end the 2,700 GMD soldiers and 1,250 PLA soldiers are killed. The Dongshan Island Campaign lasted about three days and ended with a total victory of the PLA. In May 1954 the PLA undertakes action against small islands near Dachen before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. It resulted in the conquest of Dalushan islands near Zhejiang, Dongshan Island near Fujian, Yijiangshan islands and Dachen Archipelago near Zhejiang. See Table 9
On December 2, 1954 Taiwan and US conclude a military treaty and the momentum for capturing Taiwan is over.
Document: 2-12-1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China

Tibet....

In the Common Program Chapter 6 the CCP policy with respect to the minorities will be looked upon in detail. This paragraph focuses only shortly on the legitimacy of CCP’s Tibet policy, the military and diplomatic actions. February 6, 1949 during his conversation with SU envoy
Mikoyan
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
Mao Zedong explains to him the complexity of the situation regarding
Tibet
Tibet
. "In essence, it is a British colony, and only formally counts as China’s. Recently the Americans have been flirting with the Tibetans by various means…. Mao Zedong said that once we finish the Civil War and resolve internal political questions inside the country and when the Tibetans feel that we do not threaten them with aggression and treat them equally, then we will solve the subsequent fate of this region. With regard to Tibet we must be careful and patient, taking into account the complex regional mix there and the power of Lamaism.”
Document: 06-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
On July 8, 1949 the Tibetan authorities decrees that all Han Chinese people have to leave Tibetan territory. The GMD officials and their families leave under military escort the area. Five months later, on November 2, 1949 Mao Zedong receives a letter of the Tibetan authorities in which they declare the independent status of Tibet. “As regards those Tibetan territories annexed as part of Chinese territories some years back, the Government of Tibet would desire to open negotiations after the settlement of the Chinese Civil War.”
Cited in Goldstein Melvyn C. (2007). A history of modern Tibet: The calm before the storm, 1951-1955. University of California Press. Page 23
Mao Zedong is not prepared to negotiate and emphasizes Tibet is part of China and has an important strategical meaning for People's Republic of China. This viewpoint is equal to the policy of the GMD government. Both parties consider Tibet as an inseparable part of China.
"…the 'Chinese' commonality of the KMT and the CCP was obvious. Available information on the two parties’ Tibetan policies up to 1950 shows these identical elements: (1) Tibet was part of China; (2) the Tibetan question happened because of imperialist encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and the Tibetan authorities’ misjudgements; (3) the problem should be solved mainly with political means but military pressure was necessary; (4) some sort of regional autonomy should be established in Tibet to end its separation from China; (5) Tibetan religious and cultural practices would be retained but its political system must be changed for the sake of establishing the central government’s authority and control."
Liu Xiaoyuan (2012). Entering the cold war end other wars: The Tibetan experience, The Chinese historical review, 19 (1). Page 61
This is one of the reasons the US does not support the strive for independence of the Tibetan people.
A memorandum of April 12, 1949 explains "The (State) department therefore temporized and decided to keep its policy exible by avoiding the issue of the legal status of Tibet. A memorandum concluded that only if the Communists succeeded in gaining control of the mainland and the Nationalists disappeared would it be “clearly to our advantage” to deal with Tibet as an independent state.
Knaus John Kenneth (2003). Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan Resistance. Journal of Cold War Studies, 5, (3). Page 55
Knaus continues “Not until twenty months later did the State Department face the issue again and inform both the British and the Canadian governments that 'should developments warrant, consideration could be given to recognition of Tibet as an independent state.' These 'developments' never happened, as the exiled Nationalist government on Taiwan remained highly sensitive and vocal about any threat to its plans to 'return to the mainland'."
Because of the climatic conditions Mao Zedong has the opinion that the PLA has to invade Tibet between May and September. Any delay means a rescheduling until 1951.
The government of India tries to find a diplomatic solution of the affair and the CCP offers a ten terms for peace negotiations on May 29, 1950. Both attempts fail for one reason or another. Despite the climatic conditions the PLA starts in October 1950 a campaign to invade Tibet. Remarkable is the fact China has started a war at 2 fronts, one in Korea and one in Tibet.
On October 26, 1950 the Indian government sends a letter to Beijing condemning the invasion: "Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.”
Cited in The Department of Information and International Relations, (DIIR) (2008). A 60-point commentary on the Chinese Government Publication: A Collection of Historical Archives of Tibet. Page 145 Fisher notes "It was therefore important to the Indian position in Tibet that an agreement was reached between the Chinese and Indian Governments that converted the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a Consulate General. Such an agreement was announced on September 15, 1952. In return, the Indian Government agreed to the opening of a Chinese Consulate General in Bombay. It carried with it implicit recognition of China's suzerain rights, and gave no written guarantee of Tibetan autonomy." Fisher Margaret W., Rose Leo E.& Huttenback Robert A. (1963). Himalayan Battleground:Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh. Page 83
No other country protests.
The Tibetan army is not capable to withstand the PLA. "When CCP leaders and PLA officers were devising concrete strategies and tactics for the planned military operations, their main concern was how to maintain logistical supplies for their own troops, not how to crush resistance by the Tibetans. Mao was fully aware of the long-standing rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze. From the beginning, the Chinese authorities sought to gain the cooperation and support of the Panchen Lama in order to confer legitimacy on the CCP’s 'liberation of Tibet'."
Chen Jian (2006). The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union. Journal of Cold War Studies, 8, (3). Page 59
On November 10, 1950 after some skirmishes Beijing declares Tibet liberated. A month later, on December 19 the spiritual and political leader, the
Dalai Lama
14th Dalai Lama assumes full political power November 17, 1950
, flees to India. On May 30, 1951 a
Tibetan delegation
May 23, 1951 The Tibetan government signs the 17-Article Agreement
concludes an agreement with the Chinese government.
Document: 23-05-1951 The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful liberation of Tibet. Speech by Vice-Chairman Zhu De
The treaty determines Tibet as a part of China, but with some autonomy. The document is vague and assures the Tibetan respect for their values and institutions (namely the theocratic form of government) but on the other hand stipulates gradual changes in economic, social and political issues. Shortly after the signing of this agreement, the Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa. In the next year in April and May 1952 several riots occur in Lhasa, but these are soon brutally beaten down. Mao Zedong is well aware of the difficult situation in Tibet and on April 6, 1952 he sends a directive to CCP leaders handling the Tibet case.
The directive says "At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (i.e., put the Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe."
Document: 06-04-1952 On the policies for our work in Tibet
In August and again in September 1954 there are some uprisings and again they are beaten down.

Xinjiang....

During their conversation of February 4, 1949 Mao Zedong and Mikoyan also talked about Xinjiang (See Part 5) Mao Zedong is concerned about the SU backing of the rebels in their desire to form an independent state. Immediately after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang entered a period of political chaos when Han Chinese and Hui Muslim warlords exerted intermittent control, while the Uyghurs rebelled and proclaimed in the period 1933-1934 and 1944-1949 several declarations of independence in some areas of Xinjiang. The East Turkistan Republic (1944-49) was heavily supported by the Soviet Union. “Xinjiang’s fourteen different ethnic groups, many of them Muslim, at times had agitated for autonomy or independence, adding yet another layer of complexity to governing the region.”
Kraus Charles (2010). Creating a Soviet semi-colony? Sino-Soviet cooperation and its demise in Xinjiang, 1949-1955. The Chinese Historical Review, 17 (2). Page 130 Deng Liqun"...,the Soviet Consulate [in Yining] had issued as many Soviet citizenships as they could to people in the Three Districts, who still kept Chinese citizenship .... Nearly all officers at all levels of the Three Districts Revolutionary Government had dual citizenship. In this way, numerous things had to be reported to, and permissions were required from, the Soviet Consulates " Cited in Wang David (1996) Soviet citizenship in Xinjiang, Asian Studies Review, 19:3. Page 95
Mikoyan assures Mao Zedong there is no SU support for the attempt of independence.
Document: 04-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
In the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 the GMD government has reached an agreement in which the SU will refrain from actions in Xinjiang.
Document: 14-08-1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. "Stalin, ... during negotiations with the Chinese government in the summer of 1945, used Xinjiang and the CCP as bargaining chips by promising not to interfere in Xinjiang's affairs or assist the CCP, in exchange for the Chinese government's recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia and of Soviet privileges in Manchuria and the Far East." Wang (1997). The Xinjiang question of the 1940s: the story behind the Sino‐Soviet treaty of August 1945, Asian Studies Review, 21:1. Page 84
See also Document: 8-09-1937 Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
The SU don’t live up to this agreement.
The USSR was also actively involved in disseminating propaganda in Xinjiang. Soviet publications and other propaganda materials were widely circulated in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. Russian schools were established in Xinjiang with Soviet textbooks, and Soviet films were frequently shown...The USSR not only provided weapons and military training for the Muslim population in Xinjiang, but also had close ties with many of the rebellion’s leaders."
In January 1949 GMD officials try to negotiate a new economic deal with the SU as a replacement of the 1939 deal.
On June 16, 1939 a economic deal was signed between the SU and GMD government. This was China’s first equitable commercial treaty, which settled on a reciprocal basis all the commercial, maritime and legal issues between, individual and juristic persons of both parties. The treaty applied the most-favored-nation clause to both contracting parties12 as concerned export-import operations, customs and duties, the use of warehouses, the determination of methods for the checking and analysis of goods, the establishment of customs classification and the interpretation of the tariff (articles 1,2 and 4). The treaty also granted most-favored status to the ships of both parties in their ports with regard to the use of wharves and port services and the imposition of customs and other taxes. Following established international practice as to trade with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government recognized the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade; the commercial treaty therefore established a trade delegation attached to the Soviet Embassy in China, with branch offices in Tientsin, Shanghai, Ilankow, Canton and Lanchow. The Soviet Union granted in its turn the same status to Chinese merchants, industrialists, and individual and juristic persons residing on Soviet territory. Sladkovski History of Economic Relations Between Russia and China Page 207. See pages 207-214 on Soviet Union trade with Xinjiang. See also treaty between Xinjiang and SU of 1931
“It was reported at the time that the Russians were attempting to acquire monopoly rights in mining and trade. There was also speculation that on the Chinese[GMD] side an elaborate maneuver was being carried out to create a conflict of interest between the Russians and the Chinese Communists, by granting to the Russians exclusive rights in this frontier sector of Chinese territory. In the upshot, no new treaty was negotiated"
Lattimore Owen (1950). Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the inner Asian frontiers of China and Russia. Boston. Page 101
Mikoyan in his conversation with Mao Zedong does not mention this attempt to start talks about Xinjiang “...renewing trade and economic cooperation will help advance and strengthen our position in Xinjiang. It will not only promote cross-border trade,… but it will also 'legalize the Soviet Ministries of Metallurgy and Industry precious metal mining operations in the Altai and Yili border regions.”
Cited in Kinzley Judd Creighton (2012). Staking claims to China's borderland : Oil, ores and statebuilding in Xinjiang Province, 1893-1964. PhD.,University of California. b7358672. Page 322
These negotiations ended because the GMD did not agree with the demands of the SU. Stalin realizes that as long the GMD rules the SU will not be able to benefit from Xinjiang natural resources and therefore he backs Mao Zedong in his attempts to control Xinjiang.
Mao Zedong tells Mikoyan his plans for the future of Xinjiang “… in mind giving Xinjiang autonomy in general, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region”
Document: 04-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
Stalin advises “… to pay serious attention to Xinjiang, where there is oil in the subsoil and where you will be able to obtain cotton. It will be difficult for you without your own oil.” and continues “Therefore you should not delay for a long time the taking of Xinjiang. One army will be needed for this business.”
Document 18-06-1949 Cable to Mao Zedong [via Kovalev]
In his talks with Liu Shaoqi (See Article 11)Stalin reminds him not to delay the invasion of Xinjiang because of the risk of “… the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly.” Stalin makes also the suggestion to increase the number of Han Chinese in Xinjiang from 5% to 30%. "…by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection. In general, in the interests of strengthening the defence of China one should populate all the border regions by the Chinese."
Document: 27-06-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Stalin and CCP Delegation

Deng Liqun
Deng liqun (1915-2015) in Yining Xinjiang August 1949
, member of the June delegation of Liu Shaoqi, immediately leaves Moscow to make contact with the revolutionary government of North Xinjiang.
Not only Great Britain is interested in the region but also the US is trying to affect the situation in Xinjiang through their consulate in Urumqi. The CIA is active in this part of the world.
see Charles Kraus (2010)
Since November 1944 the present Xinjiang is divided in 2 areas. The republic East Turkistan, SU controlled. The other area around Urumqi is GMD controlled." On June 26, 1949 Guomindang General
Zhang Zhizhong
Beijing 1949 Zhang Zhizhong (1895 – 1969) GMD general meets Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong
declares he has broken with Jiang Jieshi and joins the PLA. 3 months later the remaining GMD troops (approximately 71,000 soldiers) revolt and the battle for Xinjiang is decided. Mao Zedong instructs the press “…on the PLA entering Xinjiang should not use the word 'captured' [zhanling] but should use the word arrived [daoda]; in the commentaries it should be mentioned that the authorities of the army and government in Xinjiang agreed with and welcomed the PLA’s rapid arrival.”
Document 21-10-1949 Letter to Hu Qiaomu on Writing a Report on the Arrival of the PLA in Xinjiang
"Stalin, realizing that the CCP did not have the resources to occupy Xinjiang, orchestrated extensive and vital Soviet support for the PLA mission to Xinjiang, including the use of forty Soviet Illyushin transport aircraft. Beginning on November 4, 1949, Soviet planes airlifted troops and supplies from Jiuquan to Hami and subsequently from Hami to Urumqi. These planes helped air lift more than 12,000 troops and thousands of tons of supplies into Xinjiang over several months."
Kraus Charles (2010). Page 141. See also document: 29-12-1949 Report of Cde. Peng Dehuai about the Situation in Xinjiang. See also document: 26-09-1949 Cable with Message from Mao Zedong to Stalin. Mao Zedong asks for SU air transport for troops and supplies into Xinjiang. And also document: 16-11-1949 Cable from Gromyko to Kovalev

A purge in 1951 removes pro-Soviet leaders in the east area of Xinjiang and political structures which have been instituted by the Soviets are dismantled. In May 1950, December 1951, March and December 1954 there are several revolts in Xinjiang. See Article 5 .
Zhou Enlai explains to Stalin in his conversation of September 19, 1952 the reasons for these uprisings. Sometimes the local politicians are insensitive for native customs “… which manifest themselves in unlawful confiscation of domestic animals, in the domain of religion, and the reduction of interest rates and land lease” and he notes “… that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals.”
Document:19-09-1952 Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai relies on a report from Wang Zhen, the First Party Secretary of Xinjiang, who states "Not giving consideration to the current stage of political, economic, and cultural development of the various nationalities, but blindly adopting the experiences of Han agricultural and even military areas; not paying attention to the finer aspects of history, culture, and traditions of the various nationalities, but focusing instead on their backwardness; emphasizing in an inappropriate way their opposition to narrow nationalism among local non- Han cadres and resolving problems in a rigid manner." Cited in Zhe Wu (2015). Caught between opposing Han Chauvinism and opposing Local nationalism The Drift toward Ethnic Antagonism in Xinjiang Society, 1952–1963. Page 310

The new government quickly starts a settlement policy. Demobilised military personnel (more than 20,000 demobilized PLA soldiers and about 80,000 soldiers from the GMD garrison who resided in the region prior to 1949) and political prisoners are sent to the region.
Starting in 1951 more than 10.000 prisoner are deported to Xinjiang and in 1954 the total number is more than 27.000 convicts. The first group of about 6,500 Border Supporting Youth arrived in Xinjiang from Shandong Province as early as 1954. They work in agriculture and animal husbandry, and build irrigation channels, construct roads, and develop industry.
Joniak-Lüthi Agnieszka (2013). Han Migration to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regio: Between State Schemes and Migrants Strategies Zcirschrifr fiir Edrnologie 138. Pages 158-159
Burhan
Burhan Shahidi (1894-1989)Chairman Xinjiang Provincial People's Government
, chairman of the Xinjiang government complains ”The region still lacks specialists engineers—in hydro-technology, agronomy, veterinary technology, medicine, veterinary medicine and teaching… and insufficient quantity of local national cadres in Xinjiang.” He asks the central government to allow to recruit from “… the Soviet Central Asian republics because they have a large collection of well-trained specialists from among Soviet citizens who previously lived in Xinjiang, who know well the situation in Xinjiang.”
Document: 22-02-1951 Reception of the Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government, Burhan
In 1954 some regional districts and prefectures receive autonomy and in on October 1955 Xinjiang becomes an autonomous region.

Mongolia....

In the February 4th talk between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, the latter raises some territorial issues on
Mongolia
Mongolia and Inner Mongolia
. (See Part 5) Outer Mongolia is since 1911 an independent, but SU controlled republic. On January 5th, 1946 the GMD government recognizes the independence of Outer Mongolia when in a plebiscite 98% of the Mongols were declared proponents of this independence. In reality the country is a satellite state of the SU. It is only in 1961 the United Nations admits Outer Mongolia as member.
Mao Zedong suggests the possibility of joining Outer and Inner Mongolia together as part of China. Mikoyan rejects this proposal. "…this is impossible because Outer Mongolia has long enjoyed independence. After the victory over Japan, the Chinese state, like the Soviet state, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia has its own army, its own culture, quickly follows the road of cultural and economic prosperity, she has long understood the taste of independence and will hardly ever voluntarily renounce independence. If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be [within an] independent Mongolia.”
Document: 04-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
2 days later on February 6, 1949 Mao Zedong agrees with Mikoyan by saying “…they respect the wish of Outer Mongolia to remain a sovereign state, and if it does not want to unite with Inner Mongolia, then one must take this into account, and we are not against this.”
Document: 06-02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
In other words he accepts a SU dominated buffer state at China’s frontiers. In January 1950 during the negotiations with Stalin about a new treaty Mao Zedong affirms “.. the recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence will continue to constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty.”
Document: 03-01-1950 Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC
On October 4, 1952 Mongolia and People's Republic of China conclude an
economic and cultural treaty
Beijing Tsedenbal and Zhou Enlai sign the agreement
for 10 years. The negotiations take place in Moscow. Zhou Enlai visits the Mongolian capital not until July 1954. The new government in Beijing is still unhappy and even during Mikoyan’s visit in April 1956 Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi note “…when the Soviet Union was celebrating the 300-year-anniversary of reunification of Ukraine with Russia, [some people] said in China that 300 years ago Mongolia already was a part of China and asked the question whether it could be re-united with China." Liu Shaoqi continued "The Chinese, consider Mongolia, like Taiwan, a part of their territory.”
Document: 30-01-1964 Information Memorandum, 'About the Claims of the Chinese Leaders With Regard to the Mongolian People's Republic
Mikoyan disagrees with this comparison. The same year Mao Zedong apologizes to a Mongolian delegation "In the past, we oppressed you, therefore now we want to admit our mistake. We not only do it so with you but with all national minorities inside the country. In the past, we oppressed them; therefore, if we now do not admit our mistakes, we cannot root out Great Han nationalist thinking and implement [principles of] equality of nationalities.”
Document: 24-09-1956 Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and the Delegation of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party [MRPR] and Comments on the Distribution of the Memorandum of Conversation

Conclusion....

The pledge to unite all of China under communist rule has been achieved to a large extent. Only the conquest of Taiwan has become impossible, partly due to the Korean War and the US military backup of Taiwan.

Literature Notes Documents...

1. Strauss Julia C.(2002). Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950-1953. Comparative Studies in Society and History,. 44, ( 1). Page 83 Back
2. Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Culturing revolution: The local communists of China’s Hainan island. PhD., University of California. b7183687. Page 241 Back
4. Rudolph Jörg-Meinhard (1986). Die Taiwan-Politik der kommunistischen Partei Chinas (1921 bis 1982) PhD., Freien Universität Berlin. Page 69 Back
5. Translation: "In a very short time overcame officers and men the shortage of ships, learned to swim, distinguish wind directions, navigate and other seafaring techniques ..., mastered the tactics of the war at sea." Back
6. Elleman Bruce A.(2012) High seas buffer. The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950-1979. Naval war college press. Page 12 Back
7. Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Page 285. About 100,000 Kuomintang troops are reported as having escaped to Hainan Island. They have abandoned their equipment while in flight; have been long unpaid; and are selling their clothing. Malaria, cholera, and typhus are prevalent. Back
8. Wang Gungwu (2003). Anglo-Chinese encounters since 1800 war, trade, science and governance. Cambridge University Press. Page 160 note 26 Back
9. Torda Thomas J. (2009). The first struggle for the Taiwan Strait: the October 1949 communist-nationalist battle of Quemoy island and its enduring significance. MITRE Corporation. No pagenumber Back
10. Gross Miriam Dara(2010). Chasing snails : Anti-schistosomiasis campaigns in the People's Republic of China. PhD., University of California. Page 65 Back
12. Niu Jun (2012) The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s. Comparative Studies on Regional Powers, Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies. 9. Page 87 Back
14. Niu Jun (2006) Chinese Decision-Making in Three Military Actions Across Taiwan Straits. in Michael D. Swaine, Tuosheng Zhang & Danielle F. S. Cohen (Eds.), Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (pp 293-326) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Page 299 Back
17. Goldstein Melvyn C. (2007). A history of modern Tibet: The calm before the storm, 1951-1955. University of California Press. Page 23 Back
18. Liu Xiaoyuan (2012). Entering the cold war end other wars: The Tibetan experience, The Chinese historical review, 19 (1). Page 61 Back
19. Knaus John Kenneth (2003). Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan Resistance. Journal of Cold War Studies, 5, (3). Page 55 Back
20. The Department of Information and International Relations, (DIIR) (2008). A 60-point commentary on the Chinese Government Publication: A Collection of Historical Archives of Tibet. Page 145 Fisher notes "It was therefore important to the Indian position in Tibet that an agreement was reached between the Chinese and Indian Governments that converted the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a Consulate General. Such an agreement was announced on September 15, 1952. In return, the Indian Government agreed to the opening of a Chinese Consulate General in Bombay. It carried with it implicit recognition of China's suzerain rights, and gave no written guarantee of Tibetan autonomy." Fisher Margaret W., Rose Leo E.& Huttenback Robert A. (1963). Himalayan Battleground:Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh. Page 83 Back
21. Chen Jian (2006). The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union. Journal of Cold War Studies, 8, (3). Page 59 Back
24. Kraus Charles (2010). Creating a Soviet semi-colony? Sino-Soviet cooperation and its demise in Xinjiang, 1949-1955. The Chinese Historical Review, 17 (2). Page 130. Deng Liqun states "...,the Soviet Consulate [in Yining] had issued as many Soviet citizenships as they could to people in the Three Districts, who still kept Chinese citizenship .... Nearly all officers at all levels of the Three Districts Revolutionary Government had dual citizenship. In this way, numerous things had to be reported to, and permissions were required from, the Soviet Consulates. " Cited in Wang David (1996) Soviet citizenship in Xinjiang, Asian Studies Review, 19:3. Page 95 Back
28."The USSR was also actively involved in disseminating propaganda in Xinjiang. Soviet publications and other propaganda materials were widely circulated in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. Russian schools were established in Xinjiang with Soviet textbooks, and Soviet films were frequently shown...The USSR not only provided weapons and military training for the Muslim population in Xinjiang, but also had close ties with many of the rebellion’s leaders." Back
29. On June 16, 1939 a economic deal was signed between the SU and GMD government. This was China’s first equitable commercial treaty, which settled on a reciprocal basis all the commercial, maritime and legal issues between, individual and juristic persons of both parties. The treaty applied the most-favored-nation clause to both contracting parties12 as concerned export-import operations, customs and duties, the use of warehouses, the determination of methods for the checking and analysis of goods, the establishment of customs classification and the interpretation of the tariff (articles 1,2 and 4). The treaty also granted most-favored status to the ships of both parties in their ports with regard to the use of wharves and port services and the imposition of customs and other taxes. Following established international practice as to trade with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government recognized the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade; the commercial treaty therefore established a trade delegation attached to the Soviet Embassy in China, with branch offices in Tientsin, Shanghai, Ilankow, Canton and Lanchow. The Soviet Union granted in its turn the same status to Chinese merchants, industrialists, and individual and juristic persons residing on Soviet territory. Sladkovski History of Economic Relations Between Russia and China Page 207. See pages 207-214 on Soviet Union trade with Xinjiang. See also treaty between Xinjiang and SU of 1931
Back
30.Lattimore Owen (1950). Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the inner Asian frontiers of China and Russia. Boston. Page 101 Back
31. Kinzley Judd Creighton (2012). Staking claims to China's borderland : Oil, ores and statebuilding in Xinjiang Province, 1893-1964. PhD.,University of California. b7358672. Page 322 Back
35. see Charles Kraus (2010) Back
39. Joniak-Lüthi Agnieszka (2013). Han Migration to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regio: Between State Schemes and Migrants Strategies Zcirschrifr fiir Edrnologie 138. Pages 158-159 Back

Further Reading
a. Han Enze (2011). From domestic to international: the politics of ethnic identity in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Nationalities Papers, 39, 6. Pages 950-951 Back
b. Clarke Michael Edmund (2004). In the eye of power: China and Xinjiang from the Qing conquest to the “new great game” for central Asia. 1759-2004. Griffith University. Back
c. 24-04-1948 Excerpt on Xinjiang from Minutes No. 63 of the VKP(b) CC Politburo Meetings
d. 01-10-1931 Sinkiang-USSR provincial agreement
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