The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Article 2 of the Common Program

On October 1, 1949, the day of the declaration of the People's Republic of China, the civil war is still going on. The intention of uniting the whole of the country is yet to be accomplished. This intention was already formulated on the second CCP congress in June 1922. See Part 1 . The total victory is on hand, but in the south of China there are still some obstacles to be taken. Table 9 shows these conflicts. Numerous sources highlight the persistent military insecurity in the rural regions of recently acquired southwestern provinces such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Reports suggest that as late as 1949, approximately one million "bandits" and eight hundred thousand tewu (Nationalist security agents) remained active in these areas. According to another assessment, Guizhou's countryside was so inadequately pacified that remaining Nationalist forces conducted raids on local People’s governments without restraint. Additionally, bandits (tufei) retained partial control over nearly half (thirty-eight) of the province's counties until August 1951. The establishment of order came at a high cost, with over two thousand cadres, activists, and sympathizers losing their lives before stability was finally achieved.
On February 6, 1950, GMD planes bombed Shanghai. This resulted in severe damage—about 500 fatalities, 600 injuries, and 50,000 refugees. On November 6, 1949, the PLA is defeated when it attacks the Dengbu island. On November 29, the PLA takes over the town of Chongqing, the last residence of the GMD government. Jiang Jieshi leaves for the island of Taiwan. Shortly after this defeat, the important cities of Nanjing and Chengdu fall in the hands of the PLA. The objectives for 1950 are the elimination of the remnants of the Jiang Jieshi troops and conquer or integrate Taiwan, Hainan, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet to prevent the "American imperialists" of interfering. It will take up to June 1953 until the last enemies on the mainland are beaten. See for Hong Kong and Macao Article 55
A striking detail cannot be left unmentioned. In the conquest of Xinjiang, Hainan, Inner Mongolia, the fight was being waged against the GMD troops, but in Tibet the battle is being waged against the Tibetan army itself, the GMD troops had already been dismissed.

Hainan is politically a part of the province of Guangdong. After the PLA controlled Guangdong in October 1949. It took preparation for the conquest of the island. On the island there is a communist resistance cell, which is very active. In the first week of March 1950, a vanguard of the PLA contacts this group.
"So divergent were the mainland and Hainanese views of the island’s conquest, that, depending on one’s perspective, the Chinese Communist fight for Hainan island had lasted either two weeks or twenty-three years. The final and decisive push in the victorious campaign during the spring of 1950 took only a few weeks, as People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops landed on the island’s northern beaches and joined with the local guerrilla soldiers to defeat the Nationalist forces there. But these guerrillas, the Communist Hainan Column, had been fighting the Nationalists for twenty-three years, since the spring of 1927." See also Part 8
The PLA conquers the island on April 30, 1950. The lessons of the disaster of the assault on Dengbu are learnt. Mao Zedong cables Lin Biao on December 18, 1949, instructions on sea-crossing operations in which he warns: "Sea-crossing operations are completely different from the experiences in all of our Army’s prior operations:" Rudolph (1986) remarks: "In a very short time overcame officers and men the shortage of ships, learned to swim, distinguish wind directions, navigate and other seafaring techniques ..., mastered the tactics of the war at sea"
The casualties on PLA side during this campaign are 4000 soldiers, mainly during the sea passage the troops suffer under the attacks of GMD warships. Yet this attack cannot be considered as a rehearsal for the attack on Taiwan. "The PLA was successful in taking Hainan Island in large part because it was only fifteen miles from the Chinese mainland; its tactics there would be of little use against Taiwan, six times farther out.31 In fact, an invasion of Taiwan would require a major naval effort on the PRC’s part, including the gathering of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of ships and the training of tens of thousands of troops"
Murray (2011) notices another reason.
"While the Nationalist central authorities horded munitions and the best-trained troops on Taiwan, Nationalist forces on Hainan languished in bitterness. Many of these troops were ripe for Communist recruitment, and desertion was endemic among those who were healthy enough to make their way to the Communist base areas." The conquest of Hainan was especially of great propaganda value. It once again demonstrated the weakness of the GMD regime and the strength of the PLA. Hainan became strategic important.


June 1949, Mao Zedong discusses with General Su Yu the situation of Taiwan and they conclude that soon rather than late, the PLA has to invade Taiwan to protect the surroundings of Shanghai and the town itself against air raids (and less frequently on Amoy, Zhangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, and other places.) from GMD planes. The conquest of Taiwan gets the highest priority.
A real setback is the message Liu Shaoqi gets during his visit in June 1949 in Moscow. Stalin is not prepared to give air or sea support. Moreover, Mao Zedong during his visit in Moscow receives no full support from Stalin. Zhou Enlai tries again during his talk on February 4, 1950, in Moscow with the SU marshals, Bulganin and Vasilevsky, he asks the Soviet military leaders to organize the capture of Taiwan. Bulganin answer is negative. "In terms of Formosa, we will consider your plan but meanwhile we will provide our own opinion. We will not participate in this action directly. We scold and will scold sharply when Americans interfere in China’s own business, so we are not willing to go that far." His reply to Zhou Enlai to send volunteers is also negative. "No chance. If necessary, we would train your cadres by providing teachers to your naval and air force academies or give you some must-have utilities. It is also not allowed to hire a voluntary army in democratic countries. In this way, people or those countries which are against China will take advantage of it, and more importantly, it will become America’s great excuse for deploying troops to help the KMT. Thus, it is crucial to cultivate your own people rather than borrow ours." Aerial reconnaissance by the Soviet Air Force and the Chinese took place, a detailed map of Taiwan indicating possible landing sites on the island and the approach to it by ship was sent to Moscow and Beijing.
After the surrender of the GMD Second Fleet in Nanjing in April, over 4,000 officers and sailors were retained in the PLA’s navy and "six out of the nine vessels of the Second Fleet that had gone over to the communists in 1949 were sunk by the navy that stayed loyal to the Nationalist government. The remnants of the force were strong enough to fight off the attempts by the PLA…"
As soon as the takeover of Shanghai is consolidated, the PLA starts training 37.000 soldiers of the elite forces. Swimming lesson is one of the skills they have to master. The waters around Shanghai are dangerous because of snails. They cause schistosomiasis and within a couple of weeks 38% of the men are contaminated.
"While it is unknown how much this affected the decision to immediately attack Taiwan, clearly the forward momentum had been lost. China‘s announcement of its engagement in the Korean War moved the United States from an unaligned position to one of active protection of Taiwan by its Seventh Fleet. By June 1950, only two months after the last treatment of the decimated soldiers, the window of opportunity had been lost." See Article 48.
When on January 5, 1950, the American President had decided not to intervene in any military incursion, the PLA immediately accelerates the training and asks for more Russian military equipment. In his talk with Roshchin, the Russian ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai explains the need for training. "For the landing operations against Formosa we will certainly draw lessons from the sad experience of the battles for Shantou (Swatow), where we lost three and a half regiments (7 thousand fighters) in one small landing operation." That invasion was part of the tactical plan to first conquer the islands before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. In June 1950, the military headquarter decides to enlarge the number of invading armies to 16. Mao Zedong wants to finish the invasion before Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, starts his invasion of South Korea. (See Article 54)
Kim Il Sung starts his invasion in June 1950 and the Chinese leaders come to the conclusion to postpone the invasion. The main reasons for this delay are the possible obligations for aid to Kim Il Sung, the American blockade of the Taiwan Street and the stationing of American air fighters in South Korea.
On August 11, 1950, the decision is made to postpone the invasion until 1952. On August 26, 1950, during a meeting of the PLA top in Beijing, Zhou Enlai has the opinion: "Perhaps in order to induce the armed forces to agree to shelving the plan for liberating Taiwan for the time being, he added that victory in the Korean War would pave the way for the solution of the Taiwan issue." His hopes are in vain, certainly when in February 1951 the US and Taiwan conclude a mutual defense treaty. In this agreement with Taiwan the US agrees to provide Taiwan with certain military materials for the maintenance of internal security and for the defense of Taiwan against possible attacks. Shortly after the Korean cease-fire in July 1953 is signed, the PLA starts thinking about a new Taiwan campaign.
A critical phase begins when the US and Taiwan are talking about a military treaty. "The crux of the problem might the understanding by the Chinese leaders of the scope of application of the US-Taiwan treaty. In their view, the treaty would cover islands along Zhejiang and Fujian coast and expand the scope blockade of mainland to “coast of Guangdong Province and Tokyo Bay”.[31] As a result, it would not only cause a protracted separation of Taiwan but also pose more serious security threat to the mainland. Consequently the PLA would not be able to fulfil its set plan of taking over coastal islands. In this sense, to take over islands held by KMT army was strategic action of both offensive and defensive purposes, which was designed to both create conditions for unification and prevent coastal islands from becoming strongholds against the mainland."
On July 16, 1953, GMD troops invade and occupy the major part of Dongshan island, but the PLA defense is much stronger than expected, and in the end, the 2,700 GMD soldiers and 1,250 PLA soldiers are killed. The Dongshan Island Campaign lasted about three days and ended with a total victory of the PLA. In May 1954, the PLA undertakes action against small islands near Dachen before the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian. It resulted in the conquest of Dalushan islands near Zhejiang, Dongshan Island near Fujian, Yijiangshan islands, and Dachen Archipelago near Zhejiang. See Table 9 .
On December 2, 1954, Taiwan and US conclude a military treaty and the momentum for capturing Taiwan is over. Matsumoto (2010) remarks: "The scope of application of the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty was in essence limited to the island of Taiwan and Pescadores while the defense of the offshore islands was left open with a sentence added that the treaty would be applied to other areas as determined by a mutual agreement between the U.S. and Taiwan. The vague position of the treaty regarding the defense of the offshore islands, while not abandoned completely, reflected the U.S. government’s own vagueness on the issue. For the U.S. the primary intent of the treaty was to deter China, and by limiting its range of application to the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the U.S. was seeking to prevent any chance of the Kuomintang launching a counterattack against Chinese military action against the offshore islands."
Eastern China and the Taiwan Strait, 1949-1950
Source: Westad (2003). Page 298

In the Common Program, Chapter 6 deals with the government policy with respect to the minorities. This paragraph focuses only shortly on the legitimacy of CCP’s Tibet policy, the military and diplomatic actions. The religious aspects are described in Article 5.
On February 6, 1949, during his conversation with SU envoy Mikoyan Mao Zedong explains to him the complexity of the situation regarding Tibet. "In essence, it is a British colony, and only formally counts as China’s. Recently the Americans have been flirting with the Tibetans by various means…. Mao Zedong said that once we finish the Civil War and resolve internal political questions inside the country and when the Tibetans feel that we do not threaten them with aggression and treat them equally, then we will solve the subsequent fate of this Region. With regard to Tibet we must be careful and patient, taking into account the complex Regional mix there and the power of Lamaism."
On July 8, 1949, the Tibetan authority decrees that all Han Chinese people have to leave Tibetan territory. The GMD officials and their families leave under military escort the area. "Prior to its “liberation” in September 1949, the CCP had no physical presence Qinghai, few allies, and limited understanding of the Region’s ethnic composition, political and religious cleavages, or productive forces." Five months later, on November 2, 1949, Mao Zedong receives a letter of the Tibetan authorities in which they declare the independent status of Tibet. "As regards those Tibetan territories annexed as part of Chinese territories some years back, the Government of Tibet would desire to open negotiations after the settlement of the Chinese Civil War." Mao Zedong is not prepared to negotiate and emphasizes Tibet, is part of China, and has an important strategical meaning for People's Republic of China. This position is equivalent to the policy of the GMD government. Both parties consider Tibet as an inseparable part of China. The opinions of GMD and CCP on Tibet have striking similarities. (1) Both parties recognized Tibet as an integral part of China; (2) The Tibetan issue arose due to imperialist infringements on Chinese sovereignty and errors in judgment by Tibetan authorities; (3) While political means were preferred for resolution, military pressure was deemed necessary; (4) The establishment of some form of regional autonomy in Tibet was advocated to end its separation from China; (5) Tibetan religious and cultural traditions were to be preserved, but reforms to the political system were deemed necessary to consolidate the central government's authority and control.
This is one of the reasons the US does not support the strive for independence of the Tibetan people. Therefore, the US State Department adopted a cautious approach and opted to maintain flexibility in its policy by sidestepping the question of Tibet's legal status. The memorandum of April 12, 1949 concluded that it would only be "clearly to our advantage" to recognize Tibet as an independent state if the CCP gained control of the mainland and the GMD ceased to exist. It wasn't until twenty months later that the State Department revisited the issue and communicated to both the British and Canadian governments that "consideration could be given to recognition of Tibet as an independent state" if circumstances warranted. However, such circumstances never materialized, as the exiled Nationalist government in Taiwan remained deeply concerned and outspoken about any perceived threat to its plans of returning to the mainland.
Due to climatic conditions, Mao Zedong is of the opinion that the PLA has to invade Tibet between May and September. Any delay means a rescheduling until 1951. The government of India tries to find a diplomatic solution for the affair and the CCP offers ten terms for peace negotiation on May 29, 1950. Both attempts fail for one reason or another. Despite the climatic conditions, the PLA starts in October 1950, a campaign to invade Tibet. Remarkable is the fact China has started a war at 2 fronts, one in Korea and one in Tibet. On October 26, 1950, the Indian government sends a letter to Beijing condemning the invasion: "Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.” No other country protests.
The Tibetan army is not capable to withstand the PLA. As CCP leaders and PLA officers formulated specific strategies and tactics for the impending military operations, their primary focus was on ensuring the logistical support for their own troops rather than on suppressing resistance from the Tibetans. Mao Zedong was keenly cognizant of the historical rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze. From the outset, Chinese authorities aimed to secure the cooperation and endorsement of the Panchen Lama to lend legitimacy to the CCP's "liberation of Tibet." On November 10, 1950, after some skirmishes, Beijing declares Tibet liberated. A month later, on December 19, the spiritual and political leader, the Dalai Lama flees to India.
On May 30, 1951 a Tibetan delegation concludes an agreement with the Chinese government. The treaty determines Tibet as a part of China, but with some autonomy. The document is vague and assures the Tibetan respect for their values and institutions (namely, the theocratic form of government) but on the other hand stipulates gradual changes in economic, social, and political issues. Shortly after the signing of this agreement, the Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa.
In the years following the signing of the 17-point Agreement, several CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De, corresponded personally with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. These letters were sometimes accompanied by gifts. For example, in an October 1953 letter from Mao to the Dalai Lama, a list of gifts was included, such as four bolts of yellow satin. On the same day, Mao also wrote to the Panchen Lama and sent similar gifts to him. A deliberate distinction was made to acknowledge the Dalai Lama's superior position in Tibet— the Panchen Lama received only three bolts of yellow satin. This choice was intentional, as satin was traditionally among the gifts that Chinese emperors presented to rulers of "dependencies" or "tributary states," and yellow was the imperial colour. While it would be overstating the case to suggest that the Beijing-Lhasa relationship after 1951 retained all elements of the old tributary practices of the imperial period, it is noteworthy that such exchanges of gifts did not occur between top CCP leaders and any other regional officials in the PRC. Weiner (2020) notices "As is often noted, however, the provisions of the Seventeen-Point Agreement only applied to Central Tibet or, more specifically, the areas in which the Dalai Lama’s government had exercised control during the decades of “de facto independence” that followed the fall of the Qing Empire. Most of Kham and all of Amdo, therefore, were not party to the accord." However, these regions were protected by the so called "Three Nos": no division of property, no class struggle, and no class delineation”. The "Three Nos" policy had originated in Inner Mongolia. "Ulanhu (Chairman of the Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia in 1947) had already called for a halt of reform in the pastoral Region and pressed for a policy of "Three Nos and Two Benefits" (san bu liang Ii) for Inner Mongolia (...). He proposed that in the pastoral Region there should be no property distribution, no class labeling, and no class struggle. Herdlords (muzhu) and their herd workers (mugong) were regarded as symbiotic, with each benefiting the other.. "
In the next year in April and May 1952, several riots occur in Lhasa, but these are soon brutally beaten down. Mao Zedong is well aware of the difficult situation in Tibet and on April 6, 1952, he sends a directive to CCP leaders handling the Tibet case. The directive reads: "At present, in appearance we should take the offensive and should censure the demonstration and the petition for being unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the offensive in the future (i.e., put the Agreement into force) when conditions are ripe." In August and again in September 1954 there are some uprisings and again they are beaten down. The party lacked an underground organization in Tibet prior to the establishment of the PRC, and progress in setting up party branches was slow throughout the 1950s. Therefore, the CCP lacked reliable information about the situation in Tibet. "Even more consequential from an information- gathering perspective was the low proportion of Tibetans among party members in the region."

In this part of China, the majority of the population are Uyghurs. Chapter 6 of the Common Program deals with the government policy with respect to the minorities and Article 5 deals with the religious aspects. During their conversation of February 4, 1949, Mao Zedong and Mikoyan also talked about Xinjiang. (See Part 4) Mao Zedong is concerned about the SU backing of the rebels in their desire to form an independent state. Immediately after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang entered a period of political chaos when Han Chinese and Hui Muslim warlords exerted intermittent control, while the Uyghurs rebelled and proclaimed in the periods 1933-1934 and 1944-1949 several declarations of independence in some areas of Xinjiang. The East Turkistan Republic (1944-49) was heavily supported by the Soviet Union. "Xinjiang’s fourteen different ethnic groups, many of them Muslim, at times had agitated for autonomy or independence, adding yet another layer of complexity to governing the Region." Mikoyan assures Mao Zedong, there is no SU support for the attempt of independence. In the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, the GMD government has reached an agreement in which the SU will refrain from actions in Xinjiang. The SU do not live up to this agreement.
In January 1949, GMD officials try to negotiate a new economic deal with the SU as a replacement of the 1939 deal. At the time, there were reports indicating that the Russians were seeking to obtain exclusive mining and trade rights. Additionally, there were speculations suggesting that the GMD government was orchestrating a complex scheme to sow discord between the Russians and the Chinese Communists by offering the Russians exclusive rights in a particular frontier area of Chinese territory. Ultimately, no new treaty was negotiated as a result of these developments. Mikoyan in his conversation with Mao Zedong does not mention this attempt to start talks about Xinjiang. In a December 1948 memo to Stalin, Mikoyan wrote that it was in the Soviet government’s best interest to quickly finalize an agreement with the Chinese side in Xinjiang. "...renewing trade and economic cooperation will help advance and strengthen our position in Xinjiang. It will not only promote cross-border trade,… but it will also 'legalize the Soviet Ministries of Metallurgy and Industry precious metal mining operations in the Altai and Yili border Regions." These negotiations ended because the GMD did not agree with the demands of the SU. Stalin realizes that as long the GMD rules, the SU will not be able to benefit from Xinjiang natural resources and therefore he backs Mao Zedong in his attempts to control Xinjiang.
Mao Zedong tells Mikoyan his plans for the future of Xinjiang "… in mind giving Xinjiang autonomy in general, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous Region." Stalin advises: "… to pay serious attention to Xinjiang, where there is oil in the subsoil and where you will be able to obtain cotton. It will be difficult for you without your own oil." and continues "Therefore you should not delay for a long time the taking of Xinjiang. One army will be needed for this business."
In his talks with Liu Shaoqi, (See Article 11)Stalin reminds him not to delay the invasion of Xinjiang because of the risk of "… the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly." Stalin makes also the suggestion to increase the number of Han Chinese in Xinjiang from 5% to 30%. "…by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich Region and for strengthening China’s border protection. In general, in the interests of strengthening the defence of China one should populate all the border Regions by the Chinese."
Civil war West China 1949-1951
Source: Westad (2003). Page 300
Not only Great Britain is interested in the Region but also the US is trying to affect the situation in Xinjiang through their consulate in Urumqi. The CIA is active in this part of the world. Deng Liqun a member of the June delegation of Liu Shaoqi, immediately leaves Moscow to make contact with the revolutionary government of North Xinjiang.
Since November 1944, the present Xinjiang is divided in 2 areas. The republic East Turkistan, SU controlled. The other area around Urumqi is "GMD controlled." On June 26, 1949, Guomindang General Zhang Zhizhong declared, he has broken with Jiang Jieshi and joins the PLA. 3 months later, the remaining GMD troops (approximately 71,000 soldiers) revolt and the battle for Xinjiang is decided.
Mao Zedong instructs the press ""…on the PLA entering Xinjiang should not use the word 'captured' [zhanling] but should use the word arrived [daoda]; in the commentaries it should be mentioned that the authorities of the army and government in Xinjiang agreed with and welcomed the PLA’s rapid arrival."
Stalin recognized the insufficient resources of the PLA for an invasion of Xinjiang and arranged significant and crucial Soviet assistance for the PLA's operation in Xinjiang, which involved deploying forty Soviet Illyushin transport aircraft. Commencing on November 4, 1949, Soviet aircraft airlifted troops and supplies from Jiuquan to Hami, and later from Hami to Urumqi. These planes facilitated the airlift of over 12,000 troops and thousands of tons of supplies into Xinjiang over the course of several months.
No underground CCP organizations were available in Xinjiang to begin performing administrative tasks, the old ethnic cadres of the local government in this area remained on their posts. Many of these cadres sought a relationship with the new regime in Beijing as a sort of satellite state, like the relation that formerly existed with the SU. The establishment of Communist rule and the building of a Party organization in Xinjiang was entirely the work of the PLA. A purge in 1951 removes pro-Soviet leaders in the east area of Xinjiang and political structures which have been instituted by the Soviets are dismantled. However, the SU influence is partly guaranteed in the supplementary agreement of February 14, 1950. (See Article 55) and partly as an important trade partner, in March 1950, three agreements regarding establishing joint Sino-Soviet ventures in Xinjiang on airplane, oils, nonferrous metal were signed. The Soviet Union provided the expertise, while the People's Republic of China supplied the labor force. The new government witnessed a further deterioration in financial conditions, with inflation soaring by over 100 times. Consequently, the CCP urgently sought to revive trade with the Soviet Union in Xinjiang to provide sustenance not only for the local population but also for the PLA soldiers.
In May 1950, December 1951, March and December 1954 there are several revolts in Xinjiang. See Article 5 . "Since the 1950s, Turkey has provided political asylum for thousands of Uighurs and other Turkic people from Xinjiang.145 In particular, two prominent leaders of the ETR – Muhammad Amin Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin fled China and ended up in Turkey in the early 1950s." Zhou Enlai explains to Stalin in his conversation of September 19, 1952, the reasons for these uprisings. Sometimes the local CCP politicians are insensitive for native customs "… which manifest themselves in unlawful confiscation of domestic animals, in the domain of religion, and the reduction of interest rates and land lease." and he notes "… that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals." The Khotan uprising of December 1954 in southern Xinjiang, led by a Pan-Turkic organization known to Chinese authorities as the Amin group and led by Abdimit, is widely recognized as the first major incident of resistance to CCP control in the region. This period was marked by tension in Xinjiang as the CCP implemented its policies of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, reducing rents, opposing local tyrants, and carrying out land reform, mirroring efforts happening elsewhere in China. Religious leaders in Xinjiang, some of whom held significant control over large waqf landholdings, were natural targets for these campaigns. More than 140 rebels were arrested, often with the assistance of local informants, while an additional seventy surrendered voluntarily. Although most were eventually released after undergoing re-education, twenty-seven individuals identified as core rebels remained in custody.
In Xinjiang, where many people led nomadic lifestyles, daily activities such as herding, hunting, or fishing often took place on both sides of the border. Additionally, individuals could freely visit friends and relatives or seek employment across the border without the need for official documentation. The establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s tended to dissuade the Chinese state from fortifying the border, both in terms of ideology and diplomacy. Ideologically, the Marxist-Leninist perspective emphasized proletarians' commitment to internationalism rather than nationalism. Based on this viewpoint, both the Soviet Union and China asserted that the Sino-Soviet border was merely symbolic.
The new government followed Stalin’s advice and starts a settlement policy. Demobilized military personnel (more than 20,000 demobilized PLA soldiers and about 80,000 soldiers from the GMD garrison who resided in the Region prior to 1949) and political prisoners are sent to the Region. Starting in 1951, more than 10.000 prisoners are deported to Xinjiang and in 1954 the total number is more than 27.000 convicts. The first group of about 6,500 Border Supporting Youth arrived in Xinjiang from Shandong Province as early as 1954. They work in agriculture and animal husbandry and build irrigation channels, construct roads, and develop industry. See also Article 55.
Fig. 2.1: Changes in ethnic composition in Xinjiang, 1949-2004
Burhan Shahidi , chairman of the Xinjiang government, complains "The Region still lacks specialists engineers—in hydro-technology, agronomy, veterinary technology, medicine, veterinary medicine and teaching… and insufficient quantity of local national cadres in Xinjiang." He asks the central government to allow to recruit from "… the Soviet Central Asian republics because they have a large collection of well-trained specialists from among Soviet citizens who previously lived in Xinjiang, who know well the situation in Xinjiang." In 1954, some Regional districts and prefectures receive autonomy (By the end of 1954, more than 50 percent of the province’s area had been allotted to autonomous townships, districts, counties, and prefectures) and in October 1955 Xinjiang becomes an autonomous Region.

In the February 4th talk between Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, (See Part 4) the latter raises some territorial issues on Outer Mongolia.
Outer Mongolia is since 1911 an independent, but SU-controlled republic. On January 5th, 1946, the GMD government recognizes the independence of Outer Mongolia when in a plebiscite 98% of the Mongols were declared proponents of this independence. The GMD government demands the assurance that the SU, in the future, does not support the Chinese Communists or the Xinjiang rebellion, and recognizes the sovereignty and administrative integrity of Northeast China.
Remarkable is the fact that the CCP in 1923 accepted the independence in the following words. "...on the basis of China’s political reality, further following the spirit of respecting national self-determination, we should not force those people who are different from us economically, in national history, and linguistically, to suffer with us from the pain of imperialist and warlord rule." In reality, the country is a satellite state of the SU. It is only in 1961 the United Nations admits Outer Mongolia as member. Mao Zedong suggests the possibility of joining Outer and Inner Mongolia together as part of China in his conversation with Mikoyan. Mikoyan rejects this proposal. "…this is impossible because Outer Mongolia has long enjoyed independence. After the victory over Japan, the Chinese state, like the Soviet state, recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia has its own army, its own culture, quickly follows the road of cultural and economic prosperity, she has long understood the taste of independence and will hardly ever voluntarily renounce independence. If it ever unites with Inner Mongolia it will surely be [within an] independent Mongolia." 2 days later on February 6, 1949, Mao Zedong agrees with Mikoyan by saying "…they respect the wish of Outer Mongolia to remain a sovereign state, and if it does not want to unite with Inner Mongolia, then one must take this into account, and we are not against this." In other words, he accepts a SU-dominated buffer state at China’s frontier. In January 1950, during the negotiations with Stalin about a new treaty, Mao Zedong affirms: ".. the recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence will continue to constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty."
The key aspect to consider here is the interconnection between the Chinese assertion regarding the independence of Outer Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet joint statement regarding the annulment of the 1945 treaty, both forming essential components of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. In essence, the swift resolution of the Mongolian issue depended on the nullification of the 1945 treaty, along with its associated agreements and appendices. This strategic move by China compelled Stalin to decide between maintaining control over Mongolia or northeastern China.
On October 4, 1952 Mongolia and People's Republic of China conclude an economic and cultural treaty for 10 years. The negotiations take place in Moscow. Zhou Enlai visits the Mongolian capital not until July 1954. The new government in Beijing is still unhappy and even during Mikoyan’s visit in April 1956, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi note: "…when the Soviet Union was celebrating the 300-year-anniversary of reunification of Ukraine with Russia, [some people] said in China that 300 years ago Mongolia already was a part of China and asked the question whether it could be re-united with China." Liu Shaoqi continued "The Chinese, consider Mongolia, like Taiwan, a part of their territory." Mikoyan disagrees with this comparison. The same year Mao Zedong apologizes to a Mongolian delegation "In the past, we oppressed you, therefore now we want to admit our mistake. We not only do it so with you but with all national minorities inside the country. In the past, we oppressed them; therefore, if we now do not admit our mistakes, we cannot root out Great Han nationalist thinking and implement [principles of] equality of nationalities."

Strauss (2002). Page 83 [↩] [Cite]
Dengbu is apart of the Zhoushan islands. This battle occurred from 3 November 1949 to 5 November 1949 and resulted in a GMD victory [↩]
Murray (2011). Page 241 [↩] [Cite]
Rudolph (1986). Page 69. Original text: "In sehr kurzer Zeit überwanden Offiziere und Mannschaften den Mangel an Schiffen, lernten schwimmen, die Windrichtungen unterscheiden, Steuern und andere Seefahrttechniken..., bewältigten die Taktik des Krieges zur See." [↩] [Cite]
Elleman (2012). Page 12 [↩] [Cite]
Murray (2011). Page 285. [Cite] About 100,000 Kuomintang troops are reported as having escaped to Hainan Island. They have abandoned their equipment while in flight; have been long unpaid; and are selling their clothing. Malaria, cholera, and typhus are prevalent. [↩]
After the relocation of the GMD government to Taiwan, the ROC air force launched several strategic bombing campaigns on the mainland. Shanghai suffered 26 airstrikes from October 1949 to February 1950. On February 6, 1950 the largest airstrike occurred, dropping more than 60 bombs destroying several power companies and killed or injured more than 1400 residents. The PRC requested SU air cover, which Stalin granted. An air defense group army was dispatched with 127 planes. On March 7, 1950, the first Soviet Air Force landed at Xuzhou Airport and started to patrol the skies. [↩]
Wei (2012). Pages 165-166 [↩] [Cite]
Wang (2003). Page 160 note 26 [↩] [Cite]
Torda (2009). No page number [↩] [Cite]
Gross (2010). Page 65 [↩] [Cite]
Niu (2012). Page 87 [↩] [Cite]
09-02-1951 Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Taipei.
Garver (2016) remarks: "In the event of a Soviet-US war, Soviet submarines in the Pacific would attempt to interdict US ships deploying US men and war matériel forward to bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Soviet submarine operations in the Pacific were greatly hampered, however, by the need for those boats to transit relatively narrow and US-monitored straits exiting the Sea of Japan before they could reach the high Pacific Ocean where their American shipping targets would be. Submarine operations based on Taiwan would face no dangerous straits. Soviet boats operating from Taiwan could quickly reach deep water off the continental shelf under the protection of Soviet aircraft based on Taiwan. 23 If used by the PLA, Taiwan would not be militarily significant to the United States. If used by Soviet armed forces, however, it would pose a major threat to the United States in the event of a war against the Soviet Union. Beijing’s close military alliance with Moscow transformed for the United States the significance of potential control of Taiwan by Beijing.  Garver (2016). Page 37 [↩] [Cite]
Niu (2006). Page 299 [↩] [Cite]
Matsumoto (2010). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Weiner (2020). Page 4 [↩] [Cite]
Liu (2012). Page 61 [↩] [Cite]
Knaus (2003). Page 55 [↩] [Cite]
See Sheng (2006b). [↩] [Cite]
DIIR (2008). Page 145 [Cite]
Fisher notes "It was therefore important to the Indian position in Tibet that an agreement was reached between the Chinese and Indian Governments that converted the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a Consulate General. Such an agreement was announced on September 15, 1952. In return, the Indian Government agreed to the opening of a Chinese Consulate General in Bombay. It carried with it implicit recognition of China's suzerain rights, and gave no written guarantee of Tibetan autonomy." Fisher (1963). Page 83 [↩] [Cite]
"Mao Zedong ordered that when the PLA ventured into Tibet, it refrained from consuming local food. During the early 1950s, achieving self-sufficiency for the PLA was more of an aspiration than a reality. According to one Chinese source, in 1952, the PLA cultivated 943 hectares of land, enabling it to fulfill all its vegetable requirements and 30 percent of its grain needs. Consequently, grain and rice had to be sourced through imports and purchases from Tibetan aristocrats and monasteries. With the consent of the Indian government, China transported 28 million pounds of rice from Guangdong Province to West Bengal and subsequently to Tibet." Wemheuer (2014). Page 179 [↩] [Cite]
"To encourage Tibetan resistance without appearing to be involved, the British gave incentives to the Indian government to funnel arms to the Tibetans. ...US intervention remained limited to an “unofficial and unsigned” supportive letter urging the Dalai Lama to denounce the agreement and seek asylum abroad" Han (2014). Pages 165-166 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2006). Page 59. [Cite]
See also 06-08-1949 Telegram about Panchen Lama [↩]
Liu (2010). Page 159 [↩] [Cite]
Weiner (2020).Page 204 [↩] [Cite]
Bulag (2002). Page 120 [↩] [Cite]
Dimitrov (2023). Pages 151-152 [↩] [Cite]
Kraus (2010). Page 130. [Cite]
Deng Liqun states "...,the Soviet Consulate [in Yining] had issued as many Soviet citizenships as they could to people in the Three Districts, who still kept Chinese citizenship .... Nearly all officers at all levels of the Three Districts Revolutionary Government had dual citizenship. In this way, numerous things had to be reported to, and permissions were required from, the Soviet Consulates." Cited in Wang (1996). Page 95.[Cite]
Mao (2017) states "On the eve of the CCP takeover in late 1949, being all but isolated from China proper geographically and facing the historical inadequacy of transportation and communication, this Region was more appendage to the Soviet Union than the Chinese state. " Mao (2017). Page 23 [↩] [Cite]
14-08-1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. "Stalin, ... during negotiations with the Chinese government in the summer of 1945, used Xinjiang and the CCP as bargaining chips by promising not to interfere in Xinjiang's affairs or assist the CCP, in exchange for the Chinese government's recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia and of Soviet privileges in Manchuria and the Far East." Wang (1997). Page 84 [↩] [Cite]
"The USSR was also actively involved in disseminating propaganda in Xinjiang. Soviet publications and other propaganda materials were widely circulated in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. Russian schools were established in Xinjiang with Soviet textbooks, and Soviet films were frequently shown...The USSR not only provided weapons and military training for the Muslim population in Xinjiang, but also had close ties with many of the rebellion’s leaders." Han (2011). Page 950.[Cite]
Shen (2012b) remarks "Soviet influence and control was exercised through the Association of Soviet Citizens Abroad, “a country within a country,” not through occupation of territory or by treaty. Stalin was thus in a good position to concede on Xinjiang, and thereby deprive the Chinese Communists of any justification to put Xinjiang on the agenda." Shen (2012b). Page 73 [↩] [Cite]
On June 16, 1939 an economic deal was signed between the SU and GMD government. This was China’s first equitable commercial treaty, which settled on a reciprocal basis all the commercial, maritime and legal issues between, individual and juristic persons of both parties. The treaty applied the most-favoured-nation clause to both contracting parties12 as concerned export-import operations, customs and duties, the use of warehouses, the determination of methods for the checking and analysis of goods, the establishment of customs classification and the interpretation of the tariff (articles 1,2 and 4). The treaty also granted most-favoured status to the ships of both parties in their ports with regard to the use of wharves and port services and the imposition of customs and other taxes. Following established international practice as to trade with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government recognized the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade; the commercial treaty therefore established a trade delegation attached to the Soviet Embassy in China, with branch offices in Tientsin, Shanghai, Ilankow, Canton and Lanchow. The Soviet Union granted in its turn the same status to Chinese merchants, industrialists, and individual and juristic persons residing on Soviet territory. Sladkovski (1966). Page 207. [Cite] See pages 207-214 on Soviet Union trade with Xinjiang.
See also treaty between Xinjiang and SU 01-10-1931 Sinkiang-USSR provincial agreement [↩]
Lattimore (1950). Page 101 [↩] [Cite]
Kinzley (2012). Page 322 [↩] [Cite]
Weiner (2023) "Despite concerted efforts for over more than a decade, by 1949 the CCP had experienced only limited success attracting support from China’s Northwest Sino-Muslim communities, while some of its worst battlefield defeats had come at the hands of Muslim-led armies.4" Page 209 [↩] [Cite]
"At a 1951 conference in Ghulja, the former seat of government of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (of which more below), a group of Uyghur leaders proposed the establishment of a “Republic of Uyghurstan” with the capacity to regulate all its internal affairs. Xinjiang CCP officials—on instructions from Beijing—hastily convened a meeting to condemn the proposal and ensure that this “incorrect idea” not spread widely." Bovingdon (2004). Page 12. [Cite]
The “Three Anti” campaign was not to uncover financial misconduct among the cadres but to eliminate Han chauvinism, and local nationalism in Xinjiang [↩]
Mao (2017). Page 57 [↩] [Cite]
Han (2010). Page 124 [↩] [Cite]
19-09-1952 Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai relies on a report from Wang Zhen, the First Party Secretary of Xinjiang, who states "Not giving consideration to the current stage of political, economic, and cultural development of the various nationalities, but blindly adopting the experiences of Han agricultural and even military areas; not paying attention to the finer aspects of history, culture, and traditions of the various nationalities, but focusing instead on their backwardness; emphasizing in an inappropriate way their opposition to narrow nationalism among local non- Han cadres and resolving problems in a rigid manner." Cited in Zhe (2015). Page 310 [↩] [Cite]
Dillon (2004). Pages 52-54 [↩] [Cite]
Mao (2017). Page 119, note 283 [↩] [Cite]
Mao (2017). Page 119. "...the Xinjiang-Soviet border had seven checkpoints, frontier stations, and sentry posts, to inspect goods and people and patrol the border. The patrolling methods available to the border guards were primitive: either by foot or on horseback.... However, the Chinese side of the Xinjiang-Soviet border remained porous." Page 222 [↩] [Cite]
Joniak-Lüthi (2013). Pages 158-159 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Bulag (2012). Page 98 [↩] [Cite]
Garver (2016). "CCP propaganda during the postwar struggle used this charge of "chumai guotu" (selling out the national territory) quite effectively against Chiang" Page 38 [↩] [Cite]
Shen (2015). Page 57
During the meeting between Mao Zedong and Stalin, Zhou Enlai states that the PRC is planning to make a statement on the issue of independent status of Mongolia. This statement is needed to satisfy the Minzhu Dangpai because the CCP has announced to reject all treaties accredited by the GMD. The communiqué of Sino-Soviet treaty explicit states "Both Governments affirm that the independent status of the Mongolian People’s Republic is fully guaranteed as a result of the plebiscite of 1945 and the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the PRC" RMRB 15-02-1950 "The governments of China and the Soviet Union announced the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and at the same time signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the People's Republic of China on China's Changchun Railway, Luda and Loans" [↩][Cite]

Further Reading
a. Han (2011). Pages 950-951 [↩] [Cite]
b. Clarke (2004). [↩] [Cite]
c. 24-04-1948 Excerpt on Xinjiang from Minutes No. 63 of the VKP(b) CC Politburo Meetings
d. 01-10-1931 Sinkiang-USSR provincial agreement

Chapter 1 of Common Program