Conclusions of Chapter 3 of the Common Program

The reorganization of the PLA results in a more integrated army. Mao Zedong partly undermines this unification by creating a special unit under his direct control.
The course of the Korean war forces the PLA to change its strategy and instead of relying on ideology motivation the High Command choses for a more pragmatic and professional approach. The role of the political commissars becomes less important.

Conclusion....

The PLA, PLAAF and PLAN rely heavily on SU support in training of personnel as well on receiving and buying SU equipment.
see document May 3, 1950
It is only after 1954 they become less dependent on the SU.
In Chinese society the status of soldiers is traditionally low. In 1950 when a system of classification is introduced the soldiers receive the highest status of good-class origins: See Article 7
There were six basic categories, listed in descending order of political status: (1) Long March veterans; (2) anti-Japanese war veterans; (3) " Liberation struggle " veterans from the 1945-49 Civil War; (4) " new veterans " who were in fact " uprising personnel" … from the Guomindang army; (5) Korean war volunteers; (6) ordinary conscripts under the new draft system: " White (1980). The politics of demobilized soldiers. Pages 190-191
This does not mean people look up to them
“By discharging them the PLA “separated the bones from the meat,” a union official claimed. According to an investigation by the cadre section of a Shanghai firm, all veterans were said to have “physical or political history problems or else were purged by their units.”
Diamant (2006) Stubborn myth. Page 25. PLA women who had served during the Korean war, were ostracized as were most Chinese POWs when they returned home.
Although the veterans have a different image of themselves “At the ideological level they tended to believe the honorific things said about them in the official media and often displayed an arrogant sense of political superiority (gongchen zijude jiaoao) towards civilian cadres and masses.”
White (1980). The politics of demobilized soldiers. Page 199 White remarks “Ordinary ex-servicemen who were Party members tended to look down on their civilian comrades, particularly in the countryside. They were quick to criticize civilian cadres, moreover, because their political prestige gave them " the right to speak out" (fayanquan), made them " bold in making criticisms, bold in raising opinions," and freed them from the fear of being accused of being " backward " or " making [political] mistakes."
Even in the parades there was no place for them. Chang-tai Hong (2007). Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950's. Page 149 Note 4


There were six basic categories, listed in descending order of political status: (1) Long March veterans; (2) anti-Japanese war veterans; (3) " Liberation struggle " veterans from the 1945-49 Civil War; (4) " new veterans " who were in fact " uprising personnel" … from the Guomindang army; (5) Korean war volunteers; (6) ordinary conscripts under the new draft system: "White 1980). The politics of demobilized soldiers. Pages 190-191 Back
Diamant (2006) Stubborn myth. Page 25. PLA women who had served during the Korean war, were ostracized as were most Chinese POWs when they returned home. Back
White (1980) The politics of demobilized soldiers. Page 199 White remarks “Ordinary ex-servicemen who were Party members tended to look down on their civilian comrades, particularly in the countryside. They were quick to criticize civilian cadres, moreover, because their political prestige gave them " the right to speak out" (fayanquan), made them " bold in making criticisms, bold in raising opinions," and freed them from the fear of being accused of being " backward " or " making [political] mistakes." Page 201 Back
Even in the parades there was no place for them. Chang-tai Hong (2007). Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950's. Page 149 Note 4 Back