Number indicates the subject was a major theme in the editorial. A number indicates a minor theme in the editorial.
Source: Oksenberg (1982).
The reorganization of the PLA results in a more integrated army. Mao Zedong partly undermines this unification by creating a special unit under his direct control.
The course of the Korean war forces the PLA to change its strategy and instead of relying on ideology motivation the High Command choses for a more pragmatic and professional approach. The role of the political commissars becomes less important.
The PLA, PLAAF and PLAN rely heavily on SU support in training of personnel as well on receiving and buying SU equipment. During the Korean War, the Chinese Army was able to regroup on a large scale. The following Chinese units were completely re-equipped or reorganized along the lines of the Soviet Army: 56 out of 106 army divisions, 6 tank divisions and an independent tank regiment, 101 (37 centimeter) anti-aircraft gun battalions, 5 field gun divisions and 1 city garrison gun division, 4 searchlight regiments, 9 radar regiments and independent radar battalions, 28 engineer battalions, and 10 divisions of railway corps, signal corps, and anti-chemical warfare corps. By early 1954, China had 28 air force divisions, 5 independent flight regiments, and 3000 plus aircraft, which either had been gifts or had been purchased from the USSR. However, the Chinese navy was not very well developed due to limited funds and technical problems....The military equipment provided by the Soviets was not up to date or advanced, and some of it consisted of US lend-lease surplus goods and materials left over from World War II. It is only after 1954 they become less dependent on the SU.
In Chinese society the status of soldiers is traditionally low. In 1950 when a system of classification is introduced the soldiers receive the highest status of good-class origins: See
He remarks “Ordinary ex-servicemen who were Party members tended to look down on their civilian comrades, particularly in the countryside. They were quick to criticize civilian cadres, moreover, because their political prestige gave them " the right to speak out" (fayanquan), made them " bold in making criticisms, bold in raising opinions," and freed them from the fear of being accused of being " backward " or " making [political] mistakes." White (1980). Page 201