Article 18 of the Common Program

---

Since 1949, the CCP recruited more than 2.5 million new members. This resulted in a total of 4.5 million members in 1950. This growth causes many problems. In his May Day address, Liu Shaoqi acknowledged challenges arising from the vast territory under CCP control, heavy workloads, a shortage of experienced cadres, and limited training time. While recognizing significant achievements, he also emphasized the importance of addressing shortcomings and errors, particularly the issue of arbitrarily enforcing orders. Liu stressed the need for a balanced perspective, acknowledging both successes and flaws, and called for criticism, self-criticism, and cadre training to rectify these issues. The Central Committee had committed to these corrective measures to improve governance and performance.
In May 1950, a nationwide rectification campaign started. Two months later Mao Zedong wrote "Since the membership of our Party has grown to 4,500,000, we must henceforth follow a prudent policy in expanding the Party organization, be strict in preventing political speculators from gaining Party membership and take proper measures to clear out those already in. We must pay attention to admitting politically conscious workers into the Party in a planned way in order to increase the proportion of workers in the Party organizations. In the old liberated areas, in general Party recruiting in the villages should stop. In the new liberated areas, in general the Party organizations in the villages should not expand until agrarian reform is completed in order to prevent political speculators from worming their way into the Party." The central point of this campaign was ‘commandism’, this was defined as carrying out party or government work by issuing orders without educating, convincing and mobilizing the masses. The campaign aimed to address "intra-elite tensions," which arose between "old" cadres, "new" cadres, and retained personnel. The "old" cadres joined the CCP during a time when victory was uncertain, while the "new" cadres became members after the establishment of the PRC or when victory was imminent, most of whom were students and intellectuals. The retained personnel were officials from the GMD government who remained in their positions after 1949. The "old" cadres considered themselves superior to both the new cadres and retained personnel and often demanded privileges. However, important roles were frequently filled by "new" cadres due to abilities that the "old" cadres may lack. See also Part 8. The emphasis of the campaign was to educate the cadres not to punish them.
In June 1951 Bo Yibo ascertained that after the successful implementation of the Land Reform, many party cadres were stopping their political activities and sometimes even became an obstacle for further reforms. "(They) wanted a rest and laid down, holding that the driving away of the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek and the carrying out of agrarian reform were to them a revolutionary success. Hence they become politically vulgar, could not visualize what things to do, and felt contented with a "basket of bread, a pot of sour vegetables and sitting on a k'ang ". They don't bother with such great movements as the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and the Resist-U.S. and Aid-Korea campaign."
Gao Gang was afraid for an environment where members party “…all hire labor and give loans at usurious rates, then the Party will become a rich peasant party. This would mean the complete collapse of the people's regime and the Party organ in the face of attacks launched by the rural bourgeoisie. This, of course, would be intolerable to us.” A majority of the cadres stopped their political activities and focused only on the welfare of their own families and after the Land Reform they were more interested in a status quo than in changes towards a socialist transition to reverse this trend in the countryside, the party took several measures like better training and political campaigns.
Another issue to consider is the rapid succession of political campaigns between 1950 and 1954. Miscommunication and misunderstandings regarding the new state's intentions, goals, and methods were widespread. The disparity between political ambitions and the limited time available for enacting significant political and social changes allowed for improvisation; there was only so much "new" (language, policies, concepts) that individuals—including officials—could assimilate. As a result, cadres often opted for familiar (yet sometimes unsuitable) political techniques and language rather than risk making a political misstep.

---

See Timeline
On November 30, 1951, the CC made a statement concerning the struggle against corruption, waste, and bureaucratic behaviour in the party, the PLA, and the government. These are the 3 evils (sanfan). The focus within the campaign lied on graft. "We need to have a good clean-up in the whole Party, which will thoroughly uncover all cases of corruption, whether major, medium or minor, and aim the main blows at the most corrupt, while following the policy of educating and remoulding the medium and minor embezzlers so that they will not relapse. Only thus can we check the grave danger of many Party members being corroded by the bourgeoisie, put an end to a situation already foreseen at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and carry out the principle of combating corrosion then laid down. Be sure to give all this your attention."
This announcement referred to Mao Zedong's opening speech at the 2nd plenum of the 7th party congress on March 5, 1949. He warned “With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may be some Communists, who were not conquered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation…. The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle."
The party started the campaign on a big scale and asks the people to join. "..the broad masses, including the democratic parties and also people in all walks of life, should be mobilized , the present struggle should be given wide publicity, the leading cadres should take personal charge and pitch in, and people should be called on to make a clean breast of their own wrongdoing and to report on the guilt of others. In minor cases the guilty should be criticized and educated; in major ones the guilty should be dismissed from office, punished, or sentenced to prison terms (to be reformed through labour), and the worst among them should be shot. The problem can only be solved in these ways."
In his report of June 6, 1950, Deng Xiaoping explained the problem of bureaucratic behaviour "There are two ways of working diligently: one is to perform the work well and accomplish one's tasks by carrying out the policies and maintaining close ties with the masses; the other is to appear busy while actually just ordering people about, thus going against the policies, becoming separated from the masses, not completing any tasks, and damaging the Party's reputation. We should distinguish between these two ways of working diligently, promoting the correct way and opposing the incorrect way. Some of the Party comrades who are guilty of bureaucratism also work very diligently, hence the new expression, ``busy work bureaucratism'"

---

This campaign made victims in the lower echelons of the party but also at higher levels. The most important victims were Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan both leading cadres in Tianjin. They were arrested in February 1952 and executed after a quick trial. The majority of Liu and Zhang's offenses revolved around embezzlement and misappropriation of state funds and bank loans, which were primarily invested in office production projects. However, Liu and Zhang executed these projects with exceptional efficiency, soliciting assistance from Tianjin businessmen with questionable backgrounds, dispatching agents on procurement trips to the northeast and Hankou, and offering gifts such as watches, pens, and cash to maintain the satisfaction and silence of colleagues.
These executions were completely in line with Mao Zedong’s remarks "In minor cases the guilty should be criticized and educated; in major ones the guilty should be dismissed from office, punished, or sentenced to prison terms (to be reformed through labour), and the worst among them should be shot. The problem can only be solved in these ways." Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan were so called "big tigers" (a “tiger” is a senior, high-ranking official who uses their position for personal gain). On January 30, 1952, Li Fuchun put forward six criteria for determining the "big tiger":
1. Individuals who embezzle more than 100 million yuan;
2. Individuals who embezzle less than 100 million yuan, but great losses to the country;
3. The organizer and mastermind of a collective embezzlement case of more than 100 million yuan;
4. The embezzlement of more than 50 million yuan, with a serious nature, such as deducting relief food, embezzling donations to resist the United States and Aid Korea;
5. Those who colluded to steal economic information, or used their positions to enrich themselves, causing the country to lose more than 100 million yuan;
6. Those who concealed state property at all levels or failed to report bureaucratic capital, which was worth more than 100 million yuan.
Despite the quota established in January 1952 calling for the arrest of 500 "tigers," Gao Gang cabled Mao Zedong on February 6, informing the Central Committee that an astonishing 4,000 large "tigers" had been captured in the Northeast, along with an additional 25,000 medium and small "tigers." Three days later, Mao congratulated Gao on his achievements, remarking that "of the six regional governments, the Northeast People’s Government was in first place." However, while Mao emphasized that the Northeast should serve as a model for other regions in China, he recognized that achieving similar high arrest numbers might not be feasible elsewhere.

---

This campaign and the Wufan campaign Article 30 hadsevere economic and personal consequences. On February 22, 1952, Deng Xiaoping informed Mao Zedong the consequences of the Sanfan campaign: a 50% reduction in tax income and a rising amount of unemployment. In Shanghai, a 1951 audit by the city tax bureau found that out of 9,100 businesses investigated, 81 percent had committed tax evasion.

On March 2, 1952, the party decided to lower the punishments. "… cadres guilty of corruption involving sums under one million yuan (100 yuan of the new currency) would not be considered corrupt elements and would not be liable to administrative disciplinary action if the circumstances of the crime were not serious and the crimes were admitted. Even in cases involving sums over 100 million yuan (10,000 new yuan) criminal punishment could be avoided with a frank confession and the restitution of the money. Lack of experience and incompetence are identified as the primary causes of these crimes. Consequently, due to the large number of individuals affected by this aspect of the campaign, the Party Center implemented a retroactive policy mandating leniency towards leaders whose projects failed or underperformed, particularly if it was their first or second such failure in their career. The distinction between criminal activities, lack of experience, or incompetence, and what was termed as "bureaucratism" became exceedingly blurred.

On March 15, 1952, Mao Zedong appointed Liu Shaoqi to lead the campaign. By this point, the campaign had taken a disastrous turn, prompting Mao to conclude it swiftly. Liu was tasked with managing the aftermath while Mao withdrew to the "second line." Neither the army nor even the Chinese Volunteers Army (CVA) in Korea escaped the campaign. Mao stated, “According to my estimate, among the one million Volunteers [in Korea] you may catch a few hundred tigers, and you should strive to reach this target.” However, on February 17, 1952, the campaign stopped in Korea because it jeopardized directly the warfare. It appeared to be hard to differentiate between political and military leaders in the CVA, this problem arose also in the 6 Regional bureaus where many cadres had civil as well military functions.
On March 5, 1952, Mao Zedong chose not to extend the campaign to rural areas. By then, millions in military and civilian roles had already become targets of Mao's initiative, leading to political upheaval that effectively paralyzed the entire state system. The mounting pressure from Mao permeated throughout the country, resulting in a nationwide hunt for "tigers." This environment of fear led to widespread psychological and physical torture, prompting many individuals to resort to suicide, self-mutilation, or desertion.
At the end of the campaign, almost 4 million cadres within the government and the party were screened. About 31% (1.23 million) were found guilty of smaller crimes. On October 5, 1952, the sanfan officially ended. Mao Zedong continued to struggle against bureaucratic behaviour "..combat bureaucratism in our leadership organs at all levels and among our leading cadres. At present among a good number of the basic-level organizations and basic-level cadres, serious commandism and breaches of law and discipline are occurring.² The occurrence and breeding of such phenomena cannot be separated from the bureaucratism in our leadership organs and among our leading cadres. Take, for instance, the organs at the level of the Center; a good number of leading cadres in a good number of ministries and departments are still satisfied with merely sitting in the government offices writing decisions and issuing directives, paying attention only to arranging and assigning work but not paying attention to going down to the lower levels to get an understanding of conditions and to inspect the work.
In March 19, 1953, the Wuduo campaign was launched against too many meetings, too many tasks, too many organizations, concurrent posts, and official documents and forms. Greater emphasis was placed on intensive training for basic-level cadres to enhance their leadership abilities and work methodologies. Work teams at higher levels were directed not only to ensure implementation but primarily to educate local cadres in suitable skills, refraining from treating them merely as messengers. Training programs for village cadres were intensified. The village party branch was encouraged to master the skills of division of labor (fen kung), enabling the branch secretary to delegate tasks to the expanding network of cadres and activists, thereby broadening political participation and involvement in policy implementation.
In many places, the mediation teams, which were introduced after the 2nd Judicial work conference (see Article 17.), are abolished during the Wuduo campaign because they were seen as superfluous or ineffective. Mao Zedong was well aware, bureaucracy will be hard to tackle, and he called the party to be open-minded to critics from the public. He wanted the people to write letters to the party. See Article 19.

---

Chapter 2 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents