Part 2: CCP and other politicians 1948

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On May 1, 1948, Mao Zedong initiated efforts to form a new political conference with other parties and influential figures. In their May Day celebration slogan, the Central Committee (CC) extended an invitation, urging all democratic parties, groups, people’s organizations, and respected public figures to join in promptly convening a new Political Consultative Conference. The purpose was to discuss and organize a people’s representative congress to establish a democratic coalition government.
Already in October 1947, the PLA issued a manifesto declaring: “Unite the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and commercial elements, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, all democratic parties and groups, all national minorities, overseas Chinese everywhere and other patriotic elements — unite to organize a national united front to strike down the dictatorial government of Chiang Kai-shek and establish a democratic coalition government.” December 1947, Mao added to this statement "this united front must also be under the firm leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." This appeal resulted sometimes in friction in some political parties. For example, some members of the Reform Faction (RF) of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) were more oriented toward the CCP and supported on their own initiative the CCP declaration of May 1, 1948. This resulted in the purge of anti-CCP members. Members of others parties asked to participate in the CPPCC. Their request was denied. The RF was dissolved in September 1949 and Sha Yankai and Wang Shimin joined the CDL and visited the CPPCC.
On July 4, 1949, Liu Shaoqi reported to Stalin that the various parties and groups were unable to agree on a list of representatives for the consultative congress due to internal disputes. Lists of candidates could only be finalized once the CCP shared its recommendations. Despite these divisions, each democratic party and group had a few prominent leaders with significant influence, built through long-standing political involvement in China, and these leaders were the primary force holding their organizations together. Each party and group consisted of three factions: rightists, leftists, and centrists.
Once prominent leftist or centrist leaders were integrated into the CPPCC, the significance of the Minzhu Dangpai, as organizational structures diminished. In contrast, the Jiu San, which never exceeded a hundred members before 1949, was included in the CPPCC, representing university teachers and scientists. Its inclusion in the list of participating groups in June 1949 illustrates how the CPPCC welcomed small organizations like the Jiu San or the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. These groups expanded into organizational strongholds after the founding of the PRC, enabling them to reach specific segments of the Chinese elites.

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The response on the May 1st appeal is "overwhelming". Particularly from political leaders who have fled to Hong Kong after 1948 when Jiang Jieshi decided to forbid several political parties. Several responders had little political influence. The alliance of these splinter groups in Hong Kong with the CCP elevated their leaders from relative obscurity to prominence in the vibrant rumor mills of present-day China. Consequently, it was likely that by next year (1949), press dispatches and other reports on developments in China featured the names of numerous political parties, groups, and leaders that were previously virtually unknown, even to many within China itself. These politicians had nowhere to go but to the communist party to realize their ideals or they had to retreat into passivity. Not only politicians were positive, about 50% of the students were in favour of forming a coalition government.
The first talks between the CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai took place in the Northeast in August 1948, which was under the control of the PLA. Many of these political refugees in Hong Kong reached Harbin by boat and by crossing the border with North Korea. The communist spy Pan hannian was responsible for the transport of at least 350 sympathizers from Hong Kong to areas in the north controlled by the communists. They were eager to leave Hong Kong because the secret police of the GMD was persecuting them even in Hong Kong. Once the group arrived in Dalian, Zhou Enlai personally arranged a fine hotel, a banquet, and even a new set of clothes against the harsh Northern winter. While in the Northeast, several representatives of the Minzhu Dangpai toured both cities and rural areas under communist control. After gaining first-hand insight into the conditions—the achievements as well as the challenges—faced by leaders in the liberated areas, the democrats were finally prepared to join the CCP and begin their efforts in nation-building in earnest.
The secret meeting in Harbin (November 25, 1948) with members of the Minzhu Dangpai, like Shen Junru, Li Jishen and Zhang Bojun and on the CCP side with Gao Gang and Li Fuchun ended in the decision to establish a preparatory Committee to form a political consultative conference. The following statements were made:
(1) the new CPPCC preparatory committee is composed of representatives of the CCP and 23 units including democratic parties, people's organizations and non-party democrats who support the "May 1 slogan";
(2) The affairs of the preparatory meeting are responsible for inviting representatives of all parties participating in the new CPPCC, drafting meeting documents and convening formal meetings;
(3) The organization regulations of the preparatory meeting are recommended to be drafted by the CCP and sent to all parties for review. After approval, they will be formally adopted by the preparatory meeting.
(4) Decisions on the nature and tasks of the new CPPCC:
(a) The scope of participation of the new CPPCC is composed of representatives of various democratic parties, people's organizations and non-partisan democrats who oppose U.S. imperialist aggression, the reactionary rule of the Guomindang, and the oppression of feudalism and bureaucratic capital. All reactionary parties and reactionary elements must be excluded and not allowed to participate;
(b) The new CPPCC will be held in 1949, and the specific time and place will be decided by the preparatory committee;
(c) The main issues that should be discussed and realized at the CPPCC meeting are the formulation of a common program and the establishment of a coalition government. Only those parties, associations, and non-partisan leaders who openly opposed American imperialism, the reactionary GMD rule, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism would be admitted as members. Conversely, all reactionary parties or members who collaborated with the Nanjing Government would be automatically excluded.
Before and during these negotiations, the Minzhu Dangpai tried to make some major changes in the program. Anticipating upcoming transformations, Luo Longji, Zhang Lan and Huang Yanpei proposed in October to Wu Han several measures: the establishment of an assembly system, a balanced foreign policy that would maintain relations with both the USSR and the United States, allowing the Democratic League to leave the coalition government and become an opposition party, and preventing double affiliations of League members.
Rudolph (2021) observes prominent intellectuals such as Zhang Bojun (1895-1969) and Shen Junru possessed a valuable reserve of social and cultural capital, allowing them to effectively engage with social groups that were beyond the Communists' typical reach. In 1948, the writings of Li Jishen, Shen Junru, and Zhang Bojun exemplified how these political thinkers strategically reframed the proposals for a new consultative conference, appealing more to the Republican elites than the anti-capitalist or anti-bureaucracy slogans advocated by the CCP.
These intellectuals embraced the notion of a new consultative conference as the sole remaining path toward establishing a democratic, peaceful, and united "New China." They portrayed anyone who opposed their cause as reactionary individuals working against the best interests of the people. Their persuasive efforts aimed to bridge the gap between different political factions and garner support for their vision of a new China.

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Shortly hereafter, the negotiators of the CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai decided to draft a provisional program of action. One of the main clauses in this program is the right of the Minzhu Dangpai to decide not to sign the definitive agreement or to withdraw from the preparatory committee.
In reality, the Minzhu Dangpai did not have real power to make this kind of demand. This provision contradicted the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, where the minority is obliged to abide by the decisions of the majority. While the acknowledgment of the right to withdraw was granted to democratic factions, in reality, withdrawal would have rendered the minority effectively marginalized from the political sphere, rendering it merely symbolic. The finalization of the Common Program marked the initial phase in the establishment of the civil state and coalition government. This limitation was not an obstacle for the Minzhu Dangpai, the proposal to form a coalition government was a big step forward. The term "coalition" itself implied that there was a place for them from the outset. This represented a legitimacy they had never been granted by the Nationalists.

However, not only the Minzhu Dangpai wins in this situation, also the CCP has a lot to win. The CCP views these parties as highly significant, both symbolically and practically. In China, they served as channels to reach the "middle elements," the large segment of the population positioned between the CCP and the GMD.
The Democratic League emerged as a crucial ally sought by the CCP. With its independent nature and diverse membership, including students, businessmen, and intellectuals, it served as a valuable resource for the Communists in their pursuit of the ultimate goal: a socialist revolution of the urban proletariat.
The CCP not only invited the Zhi Gong Party as representatives of the Overseas Chinese but also individual delegates from overseas to participate directly in the united front, and as a separate constituency in its own right. The author of the New Year message (1949) of the CCP made a statement about joining the revolutionary cause. "We hold that the Chinese people's revolutionary camp must be expanded and must embrace all who are willing to join the revolutionary cause at the present stage. The Chinese people's revolution needs a main force and also needs allies, for an army without allies cannot defeat the enemy"

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On January 10, 1949, the Huai Huai campaign of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ended in a total defeat of the GMD army. In November 1948, the CCP started the campaign to push through from the Northeast of China to the Southwest in the direction of Shanghai. The PLA was able to mobilize more than 5 million peasants to fight against the GMD. The prospect of owing their own piece of land after victory is the trump card of the CCP. The consequences of the victory of the Huai Huai campaign were that Tianjin and later on Beijing fell in the hands of the PLA. Fu zuoyi , the GMD governor of Beijing, decided to negotiate with Lin Biao to arrive at a peaceful regime change. On January 31, 1949, the PLA marched peacefully into Beijing. People celebrated the Chinese New Year (the year of the Heavenly Ox) and the arrival of the troops. Beijing becamethe headquarters of the government and the CCP.

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On January 14, 1949, Mao Zedong proposed 8 points to use as a basis for negotiation with the GMD government. On April 1, 1949, Zhou Enlai held formal peace talks with GMD representatives in Beijing. On April 15, 1949, the GMD rejected the proposals of the CCP, and 6 days later the CCP took the decision to cross the Chang Jiang and to start an attack to conquer south China. Contrary to the strategy followed since 1927, the new approach in South China involved the PLA first capturing the cities and then advancing into the countryside, rather than surrounding the cities from rural areas. The push forward was very successful and at May 3, Hangzhou fell in the hands of the PLA, on May 16, Wuhan, on May 22, Nanchang, and on May 25, Shanghai. Jiang Jieshi decided to flee to Taiwan but later on, returned to Chongqing. On November 29, 1949, he left the mainland and settled on Taiwan.

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Moreover, in other Regions of China, the PLA was able to drive back and to eliminate GMD troops. In July 1949, the PLA won in Hunan, Jiangxi and in August in Lanzhou. The next month, Gansu and Qinghai fell in the hands of the communists. The GMD troops that are still fighting are geographically spread across the south, the southwest, and Taiwan. They are no longer capable to coordinate their actions. Most of the generals of the GMD no longer possess the political will and the military power to withstand the PLA forces. Most Guomindang generals have lost the political resolve and military strength to resist the PLA, with many defecting to the PLA along with their remaining soldiers. Mao Zedong remarked that as the PLA captures more cities, the number of war prisoners will likely increase significantly. Therefore, each district and unit must be well-organized in training these prisoners. In principle, no prisoner will be released; most will be incorporated into PLA ranks, while others will engage in production in the rear. Mao emphasized that these prisoners are the primary human resource for the PLA's victory over Jiang, and this understanding must be instilled throughout the Party.
Obtaining political allegiance from former soldiers in the GMD army involved a strategic approach by Women Federation cadres, leveraging gendered differences in political loyalty. They encouraged women to influence the men in their households. Grassroots cadres mobilized women to communicate with their families, urging husbands and sons to abandon secrecy, confess any wrongdoing to the government, and surrender their firearms. Additionally, cadres enlisted women to reveal which families possessed guns.
Table 1 shows the military strength of the PLA and the GMD in September 1949.

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A Soviet Embassy Counselor reported on the actions of Guomindang troops that refused to surrender. The retreating Nationalist Army left behind a landscape of devastation: bombed dams, tens of thousands of hectares of destroyed fields, missing or damaged railway locomotives and carriages, wrecked power plants and warehouses, and destroyed transportation and communication infrastructure, including telegraph and radio equipment. Upon abandoning Shanghai, the Nationalists demolished the international wireless station, blew up the main workshops at Jiangnan Shipyard and the oil tanks at Jiangwan airport, and scuttled four oil tankers along with ten ferries. When fleeing Wuxi, they set fire to over 1,000 trucks loaded with industrial equipment from Shanghai. More than 90 out of 100 railway bridges between Wuhan and Guangzhou were bombed, and at Hankou, the Nationalists destroyed over 30 ships and obliterated all rail bridges connecting the three cities of Wuhan.

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Road to Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents