The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Article 37 of the Common Program

Timeline Foreign Trade Relations

  • Region 1: Region 1: SU, Korea, Bhutan, Laos, Burma, Nepal, India, Pakistan,Vietnam and Mongolia
    Soviet Union
    3-10-1949 Soviet Union recognizes PCR
    14-2-1950 Sino-Soviet Trade Agreement

    16-12-1949 Burma recognizes PRC
    22-4-1954 Sino-Burmese Three Year Trade Agreement
    North Korea
    4-10-1949 North Korea recognize PRC
    16-11-1953 Zhou Enlai and Kim Il sung sign secret technological cooperation pact
    29-12-1949 India recognizes PRC
    2-1-1951 Sino-Indian trade agreement
    14-10-1954 Two-year agreement on trade
    6-10-1949 Mongolia recognizes PRC
    4-10-1952 10 year Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation
    5-1-1950 Pakistan recognizes PRC
    14-3-1953 Sino-Pakistani Cotton and Coal Agreement

    15-1-1950 DR Vietnam formally recognizes PRC
    19-1-1950 Sino Vietnam trade agreement on military supplies
    Region 2: Indonesia, Japan Philippines, Thailand, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Cambodia
    May 1952 Japanese delegation visits China
    1-6-1952 Sino-Japanese private trade agreement is signed

    7-1-1950 Ceylon recognizes PRC
    4-10-1952 Sino-Ceylonese General Trade Agreement

    13-4-1950 Indonesia recognizes PRC
    30-11-1953 Sino-Indonesian Trade Agreement
    Region 3: GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Hungary
    20-11-1949 Albania recognizes PRC
    3-12-1954 Sino-Albanian Agreement Concerning a Long-Term Chinese Credit to Albania
    27-10-1949 GDR recognizes PRC
    10-10-1950 Sino-GDR Trade Agreement for 1951
    4-10-1949 Hungary recognizes PCR
    22-1-1951 Sino-Hungarian Trade Agreement for 1951
    3-10-1949 Bulgaria recognizes PRC
    21-7-1952 Sino-Bulgarian Trade Agreement for Exchange of Goods and Payments in 1952
    3-10-1949 Rumania recognizes PRC
    19-1-1953 Sino-Rumanian Goods Exchange
    and Payment Agreement for 1953
    5-10-1949 Czechoslovakia recognizes PRC
    14-6-1950 Sino-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement for 1950
    5-10-1949 Poland recognizes PRC
    1-3-1950 Sino-Polish Barter Agreement
    Region 4: Scandinavia, the Netherlands, UK, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, FRG, Israel, France and US
    6-1-1950 UK recognizes PRC
    14-4-1952 Sino-British Trade Agreement

    1972 FRG recognizes PRC
    25-6-1952 Sino-West German Trade Agreement

    13-1-1950 Finland recognizes PRC
    21-9-1952 Sino-Soviet-Finnish Agreement on Supply of Commodities in 1952
    1971 Belgium recognizes PRC

    17-1-1950 Switzerland recognizes PRC
    14-9-1950 Sino-Swiss Trade Agreement
    The Netherlands
    27-3-1950 The Netherlands recognizes PRC
    14-4-1952 Sino-Dutch Trade Agreement
    1970 Italy recognizes PRC

    1964 France recognizes PRC
    14-4-1952 Sino-French Trade Agreement

    Region 5: Latin America, Arabia and Africa
    22-8-1954 Sino-Egyptian trade agreement

    23-10-1952 Sino-Chilean Trade Agreement

The Common Program is formulated in such a way that maximum flexibility regarding the development of the economy is possible. Articles 54-56 stipulate that the PRC can develop friendship with non-Soviet and even imperialist nations. These articles contradict the statement of Mao Zedong that China will not take the middle road, but will ‘lean to one side’. However, the economic, ideological and political reality forces the Chinese leaders to take a more pragmatic view. The political leaders of the CCP have to deviate from traditional Marxist theory. Socialism can only be accomplished by a revolution. Mao Zedong states: "the proportions of industry and agriculture in the entire national economy of China were, modern industry about 10 per cent, and agriculture and handicrafts about 90 per cent. This was the result of imperialist and feudal oppression; this was the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the society of old China; and this is our basic point of departure for all questions during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after victory. This gives rise to a series of problems regarding our Party's strategy, tactics and policy…The two basic policies of the state in the economic struggle will be regulation of capital at home and control of foreign trade." In other words, the proletariat class is too small and is not capable of conducting a socialist revolution at this moment. The economic situation compels the new regime to rely on essential materials from Western countries, because the SU cannot supply them.. On February 16, 1949, the CCP issues an instruction on foreign trade policy: "we should import as much as possible from the Soviet Union and the new democratic countries any goods they can supply. We should only export or import goods to and from capitalist countries that are not needed or cannot be supplied by the Soviet Union and the new democratic countries."
Therefore, Article 57 of the Common Program states: the People's Republic of China may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
Fig. 37.1: Trade shares of People's Republic of China (%)
Source: Sun (1968). Trade between mainland china and japan under the 'l-t'agreements. Page 59

Some concrete steps are taken. For the time being, private management of the import and export trade is allowed. Foreign firms are allowed to set up offices in China. "To develop a wider range of exportable materials, local governments were directed by the Central Committee to pay attention to developing exportable staple crops and products such as cotton, soy beans, salt, peanuts, tobacco, silk, fur, exportable handicrafts and manufactured goods. Loans and other incentives were to be used to encourage the increased production of exportable goods The GAC of the CPG promulgated on December 8, 1950 The Interim Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Trade, and the Trade Ministry of the Central People's Government (later renamed the Ministry of Foreign Trade) applied the licensing system to all import and export commodities from May 1951. From the outset, the new government prioritized the importation of industrial equipment and technology, considering them crucial for development. It was decided that traditional agricultural methods, operating within a reformed institutional framework, would suffice to achieve the necessary agricultural growth to support industrial goals. Fundamentally, China aimed to export sufficient quantities of food, textiles, and light industrial products to finance the importation of essential materials, equipment, and technology. Import duties were moderate or nonexisting for industrial equipment, raw materials, and other products essential for the development of heavy industry. Protective tariffs are levied on the imports of consumer goods. Production for exports always presides over production for domestic consumption. However, the government has to import Western grain because the domestic production is too low. Wheat is less expensive and contains higher protein than rice. Therefore, rice is exported and wheat is imported. Mao Zedong wants to become less dependent on these imports and suggests distributing grain rationally and to increase domestic production. The Central government accounts for this grain shortage by blaming black-market sales and hoarding.
On December 22, 1949, while Mao Zedong was in Moscow, he sent a telegram to the CC of the CCP, in which he stressed the necessity of trading with other countries (Germany, GB and the US) besides with the SU.

After the thirty-year Sino-Soviet treaty was signed on February 14, 1950, the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group (COCOM) decided in March 1950 to apply the same trade controls on China as on the SU and Eastern Bloc. After China participated in the Korea War, the China Committee (CHICOM) was established with the aim to restrict international trade with China, Hong Kong, and Macau. China, like all other communist countries (except Yugoslavia) lost its US most-favored nation status in 1951.
The CHICOM embargo list was about two times longer than the COCOM list. Neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland, as well India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan and the Arabian League were not members of the embargo club. The Chicom embargo seriously affects HK trade to PCR in volume and percentage. However, in the beginning of 1953 West European countries are increasing their export to the PCR The founding of the Sino-Polish Joint shipping company in Tianjin in 1951 was an attempt to undermine the embargo. See Article 36 "During this period, the PRC was able to build and maintain a complex trading network in Southeast Asia by mobilizing overseas Chinese merchants, European compradors, and party cadres"

The new government starts immediately by monopolizing the external trade, and all private elements are disposed of. Former middlemen between the foreign merchants and the Chinese traders could only keep working if they worked on behalf of the state trading companies. On March 10, 1950, the government established 6 state foreign trade corporations: Bristles Corporation, the Native Produce Export Corporation, the Oils and Fats Corporation, the Import Corporation, the Tea Corporation, and the Minerals Corporation. Soon 5 more corporations were established China Petroleum Corporation, the China Egg Products Corporation, the China Silk Corporation, the China Skin and Fur Corporation, and the China Industrial Material and Equipment Corporation. In 1954 the list expanded with 4 corporations: The China National Foodstuffs Export Corporation, the China National Cereals and Oils Export Corporation, the China Silk Export Corporation, and the China Miscellaneous Articles Export Corporation. All of these corporations have offices in important cities throughout the mainland. They are separate legal entities; each corporation is a separate accounting unit and operate as a separate company. the corporation is not a consuming or producing unit-it is a middleman in the planned economy. The Ministry of Foreign Trade supervises and controls the corporations.
In 1950, the government controlled 70% of imports and 54% of exports. In 1953, the numbers had increased to 92%. In the early 50’s, the intention and the organization of foreign trade of the government are distinctly socialist. ownership has still a dual character, however, also going in the direction of collective ownership. On March 10, 1950, the GAC promulgated   The Decisions on Procedures Governing the Unification of State-Operated Trade, and it outlines the government's goals of consolidating trade nationwide, directing the domestic market, balancing commodity supply and demand at both national and local levels, and facilitating the swift recovery and expansion of productive enterprises. Therefore, the government perceived economic growth and state oversight as closely interconnected. In other words, trade should leave the path of free trade and to become unified and support the socialist economy. In August 1952, the Ministry of Trade was divided into 2 ministries, one for internal and one for external trade. The foreign trade ministry has several corporations under control, like The China national Animal By-Products Imports and Export Corporation, like The China national Arts and Craft Imports and Export Corporation, and The China National Cereals, Oils Imports and Export Corporation. However, this system also exhibited a notable drawback, notably evident in trade dealings with Western nations and, to a lesser extent, with communist countries. This drawback was the limited direct connections between the buying and selling entities. Essentially, companies from Western nations were effectively prevented from engaging in direct communication with Chinese producers or buyers, leading to significant complications in trade with the PRC. As a result of this system, the exchange of information in trade between the PRC and other communist countries was more convoluted and sluggish.
The Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (PIT) is established in 1952 as an independent organ to establish contacts with foreign firms (of countries with no official ties with the PCR), to organize exhibitions of Chinese products in foreign countries, especially in Hong Kong, and inviting non-governmental trade delegations to China. The PIT is allowed to sign contracts and agreements, it is a non-governmental economic and trade organization composed of representatives and experts from the P.R.C.'s economic and trade circles. (Its board of directors includes officials from the MOFERT, the Bank of China, and other relevant departments.) One of the notable early achievements occurred on June 1, 1952 when a significant private trade agreement was signed with Japan. This agreement stipulated the exchange of £30 million worth of goods by the year's end. However, due to the Japanese government's refusal to sell certain restricted items like special steel, tin, locomotives, cranes, and trucks to China, only a small portion of the agreed-upon amount, approximately 5%, was actually traded. Nevertheless, this trade pact allowed Beijing to acquire essential commodities such as chemical fertilizer in exchange for coal. Consequently, the agreement ignited a heightened interest from Japan in the Chinese market, thereby exerting pressure on Tokyo to reconsider its trade restrictions with China. See also Article 56

The new government grappled with an ongoing battle against illicit coastal trade, particularly concerning Kong Yuan, director of the China General Customs Administration, who adopted a noticeably cautious stance reflecting his concerns that despite significant achievements in nationwide anti-smuggling efforts by customs, the smuggling situation persisted as a serious challenge. Despite increasingly stringent state regulations, various commodities continued to flow freely along the Chinese coast and penetrate into the interior regions. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of smuggling emerged as a crucial means to satisfy the everyday requirements of numerous individuals and various types of enterprises, including private and joint state-private entities. In the aftermath of the onset of the Korean War, notable figures such as Zhou Enlai and Bo Yibo advocated for the implementation of "organized mass smuggling" (zuzhi qunzhong zousi) in South China. The objective was to evade the United Nations embargo and procure vital resources, including fuel, medicine, and industrial hardware, which were urgently needed at that time. The main smuggling areas are along the coast, with Shanghai, Tianjin, Xiamen, Shantou and Guangzhou, but the primary source of smuggled goods came from the colonial enclaves Hong Kong and Macau.

The newly formed General Customs Administration, founded on October 19, 1949, still kept several employees who had worked for the GMD administration, like the former Deputy Inspector Ding Guitang. At the beginning they were valued for their technical and administrative expertise. During the Sanfan, several staff members are fired. On April 18, 1951, the Provisional Customs Law was promulgated. The law stressed the importance of differentiating between major and minor cases of smuggling. Major smuggling was seen as counter revolutionary activities. However, most smugglers were not political motivated but by economics. Throughout Wufan, the public was urged to help fight smuggling and the People’s Courts held public trials and rallies for accused smugglers. The government was less lenient to traffickers who were officials.
Two groups are treated with lenience, Overseas Chinese and minorities. Overseas Chinese were permitted to bring personal goods into China without paying duties. Consequently, numerous travelers and returnees endeavored to capitalize on their politically privileged status and connections to foreign markets for profit or even sustenance. Despite persistent official encouragements, extending into the 1960s, for them to utilize state-run enterprises, many Overseas Chinese persisted in utilizing illicit channels to fulfill their requirements. Minorities are allowed to exchange commodities of daily necessities in small volumes in and out of China tax free.
Despite all measures the administration took, "Smuggled consumer products continued to be openly peddled in Shanghai markets well into the 1960s even after various anti-smuggling campaigns, while similar black markets operated in other cities including Guangzhou and Tianjin.79 They attracted buyers from all walks of life,..."

Fig. 37.2: International trade PRC 1950-1954
Source: Zhang (1998). Page 39

Fig. 37.3 : Export PRC 1950-1954
Source: Yamanouchi (1965). Page 289

Fig. 37.4: Import PRC 1950-1954
Source: Yamanouchi (1965). Page 289
The nature of the trade is changing from daily necessities to production goods. Production goods needed for the construction of a socialist economy. The Sino-Soviet agreement of 1950 provided the PCR with a credit of $ 300 million "The credits and interest on them would be repayed by the PRC through deliveries of raw materials, tea, gold, and American dollars. Prices for raw materials and tea, quantities and dates of deliveries would be fixed by special agreement, with prices again geared to world market prices." However, a big part of the loan is used for purchase of war material for the Korea War and for expanding and rebuilding of the defense industry. Besides money, the SU also provided technical and technological documentation for the production of military equipment. In the period between 1949-1954 the trade balance of the PCR is negative, the import of production goods exceeds the export, so a part has to be financed by SU loans. On October 12, 1954, the SU and PCR signed a new agreement in which the SU provided China with a credit of 520 million rubles to finance the construction of 15 new industrial enterprises and the expansion of 141 enterprises already under construction. See Summary of 156 projects
"Agricultural produce-ranging from tea, silk and vegetable oils to cereals and hides-continues to dominate Chinese exports, although the proportion of non-ferrous and scarce metals in total exports- antimony, molybdenum, wolfram etc. has increased. Exports of pig iron and coking coal, which formerly went to Japan, are now exported to the USSR and Eastern Europe" The export of PRC is in the first 2 years limited to agricultural products from the north and north-eastern Regions. After the gradual restoration of the infrastructure, the export increased and "By 1952, nonferrous metals from the south and south-western areas of China occupied top place in the roster of Soviet imports from the PRC and the list of agricultural products now also expanded as the resources of China's central and southern provinces were tapped. 14"
Fig. 37.5: Foodgrain import and export 1949-1954
Source:Riskin (1991). Page 44
m. metric tons
Particularly in a province like Xinjiang, which is close to the border with the SU and rich in minerals, the change in trade volumes which took place, is abundantly clear.
Fig. 37.6: Change in trade SU-China & commodity exports to the SU 1950-1952

Soviet Union
On April 19, 1950, the first trade agreement between the SU and the PCR is signed, to emphasize the importance of the deal a ceremony was staged in Beijing on September 30, 1950. One of conditions is that prices for goods featured in Soviet-Chinese trade will be set in rubles on the basis of the prices existing on the world market. The preceding year served as an index for fixing prices. See article 4 of the agreement. In September 1949, the first commercial transactions between the SU and China were concluded. The North China Foreign Trade Company and Soviet foreign trade organizations came to an agreement to mutual deliver goods worth 31 million rubles. Given the poor transport situation in 1950, the bulk of the export to the SU were agricultural products from the north and northeast of China, later on, from 1952 onwards when the new regime had full control over the mainland, nonferrous metals from the south and southwest became the main export products. In addition, agricultural products from central and southern China became available for export.
Fig. 37.7: Trade with SU

Hong Kong Already in February 1949, a group of Chinese merchants in Singapore set up a barter deal with China. Shipments of rubber from Malaya were shipped to Hong Kong in exchange for soya beans from Northeast China.
Fig. 37.8: Trade with Hong Kong
Source: Hung (1968). Page 3-3a
Source: Cain (1995). Page 48

"After 1951, Mainland China reaps an enormous amount of export surplus in her trade with Hong Kong and this surplus forms an important portion of foreign exchange for her to cover her trade deficits elsewhere end to repair her external debts." On December 3, 1950, the US administration introduced a complete embargo for PRC, Hong Kong and Macau. The US asked her allies to do the same. The UK government tried a different approach for Hong Kong. In the aftermath of the International Economic Conference in Moscow not only the PCR established the PIT (see above ) but also a Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade was founded. The members of both councils had close ties with Chinese-British trade companies before 1949. The UK refused to implement shipping controls. Indeed, British business maintained its connections with mainland China through Hong Kong. Shipping companies registered in Hong Kong, as well as in Singapore, Liberia, and Panama, facilitated the alteration of British or Chinese goods, making it challenging to ascertain their true origins and enabling trade through Hong Kong to persist. While many of these shipping companies displayed the British flag, approximately 50 percent of the shipping services utilized for Socialist China's trade were provided by vessels flying the Greek flag. According to Shao's analysis in 1991, it became evident during the latter half of 1950 that the Chinese government's trading activities had a significant presence in Hong Kong. This presence encompassed various entities involved in trade, banking, and other sectors, which were inherited from the previous regime, along with their assets and personnel. Additionally, new enterprises affiliated with Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were established, functioning as branches of these respective organizations. Some of these enterprises were established as Hong Kong-based companies, with or without explicit official affiliations. It became apparent that these newly formed organizations had effectively established their reputation, prompting many European firms to prefer engaging with them rather than maintaining previous business connections.
Fig. 37.9: China's export to Hong Kong 1952-1954 (%)
Source: Cain (1995). Page 48
However, there was a decline which can be attributed to three primary factors: 1. The "Three Antis" and "Five Antis" Movements on the mainland essentially halted business activities during the first half of the year. 2. Direct shipments of edible oil from the mainland to Eastern European buyers reduced Hong Kong's entrepot trade correspondingly. 3. Western European countries decreased their import quotas for edible oils to reduce their foreign exchange expenditure.

India Pakistan The main product India export to China are jute products. Wang (1973) notices a political motive regarding foreign trade " In 1951, when India was facing a severe famine, China supplied India with a large quantity of rice under a barter arrangement. According to the June 8, 1952, issue of Jen min jih pao, an agreement was signed in the fall of 1951 between China and India which stated that China was to supply India with 66,000 tons of rice and 442,000 tons of sorghum. On May 26, 1952, a second agreement was signed for 100,000 tons of rice, and on October 13, 1952, a third agreement was signed for 50,000 tons of rice. From 1952, the volume of trade between the P.R.C. and India increased very rapidly until 1956, when it reached a plateau. It seems likely that this trade had considerable influence on India's position in the international arena in regard to matters affecting the P.R.C."
On October 14, 1954, India and China signed a two-year trade agreement, outlining a comprehensive list of goods that each country would export to the other. Chinese exports encompassed cereals, machinery, minerals, silk, animal products, paper and stationery, chemicals, and oils, while Indian exports comprised grams, rice, pulses, unmanufactured tobacco, minerals and ores, wood and timber, fibers, textiles, skins, chemicals, and machinery. The immediate impact of the treaty was notable: trade during 1954–55 saw a seven-fold increase compared to the previous year, although it represented a relatively small portion of India's global trade, amounting to only 1.2 percent.
The trade with Pakistan consists largely of the export of raw cotton and jute and the import of cotton twist and yarn. "...,in 1952, Pakistan had exported $ 84 million worth of commodities to China and only $2.2 million value of imports from China. Both sides trade volume reached $86 million. However, the export volume was decreased in next year’s and the bilateral trade volume in 1953 $7.2 million, in 1954"
Fig. 37.10: Trade with India and pakistan
Source: May 11, 1960 JPRS11560

As seen in (Article 56) Burma is the first noncommunist country which recognizes the People's Republic of China, however the realtionship is tense. As a gesture of goodwill, in December 1954, the PRC procured 150,000 tons of Burmese rice at a price higher than the prevailing world market rate, as stipulated in a trade pact between the two nations. Concurrently, the United States provided food aid, including rice, to countries in the region, thereby driving down the market price of rice, a key export commodity for Burma. This economic development adversely affected Burma's economy. Additionally, tensions arose because Burma's government was in conflict with the Taiwan government and the United States due to their failure to address the presence of Nationalist Chinese soldiers who had fled China in 1949 and were still stationed in Burma, exerting significant influence over certain regions of the country.
North Korea
Copper (2016) highlights that despite Beijing's inclination towards secrecy, China has disclosed some relevant information regarding its military and economic assistance to North Korea. In October 1951, General Chen Yi of the PLA stated that the Chinese government had supplied 897 planes, 33 artillery pieces, 17 anti-aircraft guns, and two tanks to support the "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign. However, quantifying the monetary value of this aid proved challenging due to the absence of published prices for Chinese weapons. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that China offered significantly more military and economic assistance during that time than the aforementioned list suggests, and certainly continued to provide even greater support later on. Furthermore, Copper notes that China's aid to North Korea underwent a shift towards a more formal and less classified framework in late 1953, following the signing of an armistice that brought an end to the hostilities. During this period, China announced the cancellation of a debt totalling $56.9 million and offered new assistance in the form of a nonrepayable grant amounting to $338 million, designated for the purpose of repairing war-related damages. Additionally, China allocated funds to cover the expenses of its troops remaining in North Korea.

In the 1950s, the US government dictated the foreign policy of Japan. The US-Japan Security Treaty signed on September 8, 1951, gave the Japanese few possibilities to make official contacts with the PCR.
In 1952, the Council for Furthering Japanese-Chinese Trade started its activities. This was a private organization organized by Japanese businessmen. On June 1, 1952, and October 29, 1953, trade agreements were concluded with the People's Republic of China. These agreement were valid for one year. The goods China exports are coal, iron ore, but the most important is rice. Japan delivers chemicals, equipment, and transportation media. " Under the terms of each of the first three Sino-Japanese trade agreements, the total volume of twoway trade provided for sixty million pounds sterling,45 but for the first agreement, the actual transactions only amounted to 5.05 per cent of the total sum; for the second, 38.8 per cent; ... Peking blamed the United States for the Japanese failure to fulfill the trade obligations but had no legal recourse to force the Japanese government to remedy the situation.47"
Fig. 37.11: Trade with Japan

Ceylon Singapore
Fig. 37.12: Trade with Ceylon and Singapore

On October4, 1952, Ceylon and PRC made a trade agreement about a rubber-rice barter. Ceylon was affected by a worldwide rice shortage and a severe drop in rubber prices. China had a surplus in rice and a shortage on natural rubber due to the embargo.

The Eastern Europe countries did not have an independent policy towards the Chinese government. They acted in line with the directives of the SU. The main directive of this policy is to aid a ‘brotherly’ nation. In the 1950s, the Beijing government recognized to some extent the lack of complete independence in Czechoslovak politics concerning the PRC and did not anticipate any significant deviations in the Czechoslovak-Chinese relations from the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, this situation was somewhat advantageous for both the Czechoslovaks and the Chinese. This observation can be applied to all Eastern Europe countries under SU control. Both the Soviets and the Chinese showed a keen interest in learning from and adopting practices from Eastern and Central Europe. Conversely, the Central Europeans and the Chinese demonstrated greater enthusiasm for fostering trade and collaboration with each other compared to their interactions with the Soviets. They voiced concerns about the initial requirement to go through Moscow as an intermediary in their budding exchanges.
Fig. 37.13: Trade with Communist countries

In 1950 the trade balance was positive, 70 million US$, in 1951 it became negative -50; 1952: -105; 1953: -215 and in 1954 -205
Fig. 37.14: Trade with Poland and Czechoslovakia

Poland Poland expands his merchant fleet to export railway equipment, steel and tractors from the SU and other East Bloc countries, on the route to China, the ships load rubber at Ceylon. Officially the China-Polish Joint Shipping Company was established on 29 January 1951 in Beijing and went into effect in June of that year. Each side agreed to contribute six ships and establish head offices in Gdynia and Tianjin (later moved to Shanghai) The ownership of the Chinese ships was kept confidential. Both governments had a 50% share. The company started with 4 old vessels. Poland was placed third after the GDR and Czechoslovakia as trade partner of the PRC.
Like other East Bloc countries, Czechoslovakia helped Beijing overcome the problems arising from the trade embargo. Czechoslovakia became an important trade partner in relatively advanced technologies and in deliveries of military equipment. Machinery, trucks, and pipes were among the main commodities (construction materials, compressors, cars, buses, tractors, telephones, turbines, boilers, telecommunications equipment, diesel motors, and other goods) exported. During the Korea war they supplied military equipment (for example almost 100 airplanes). The PRC, in return delivered iron ore, wolfram, molybdenum, tungsten, zinc, oil, wool, leather, tobacco, fish, meat, seeds, beans, rice, poultry, and other agricultural products. On May 6, 1952, an agreement concerning scientific and technical co-operation was signed.
GDR "In July 1953, China provided East Germany with 50 million rubles worth of food. At the time Mao said: “They are much harder up than we are. We must make it our business to take care of them.” East Germany, of course, had a standard of living much, much higher than China.239" The GDR exported optical equipment and helped with radio, cement, and sugar-processing factories.

Fig. 37.15: Trade with Western Europe
Source: Yamanouchi Kazuo (1965). Changes in markets in Chinese foreign trade and their background. Page 297 The twelve Westem European countries are Austria,Belgium and Luxemburg,Denmark,Finland,France,Italy,Netherlands,Norway,Sweden,Switzerland,UK,and West Gemany. US dollars
Trade with Western countries includes, vegetable oil, oil seeds, tea, wool, silk and foodstuff. Import tractors, electric power equipment, machine tools, chemical products. Wheat is imported from Canada and Australia in 1953 and 1954. In 1953 Belgium, Luxemburg, and FRG export chemical fertilizers. Finland exports paper and wood pulp. " The contract under which Finland made trade with China was a tree party contract where Soviet was the third party. Soviet acted as the clearing party under the contract and the trades between the countries was settled in rubles." Switzerland exports dye, textile machinery, and medicines.
"...both West Germany and China recognized the importance of each other’s products. For the Federal Republic, China was simply too important as a source of raw materials. Some materials such as tungsten and soybean could simply find no comparable substitutes outside China. Others such as bristle and egg yolk could be imported from China at a lower price.62 In China, the quality of the West German products attracted the communist government to do business." Trade between the two countries took place in a indirect way, all goods outbound to and inbound from China had to go through third countries.

Fig. 37.16: Trade with United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany

From June 28 till July 9, 1954, a Chinese trade mission visited the UK. "They were given specific instructions by the authorities in Beijing to explain China's good faith and desire to normalise trade with Britain, and to be even-handed towards various British trade groups. The mission held discussions with about 25 trade associations, visited some 19 works, attended two well-arranged exhibitions, and held business talks with 56 firms."
Fig. 37.17: Summary of the value of merchandise consigned from China to UK 1949-1954
Source: Shao Wenguang (1991). China, Britain and businessmen: political and commercial relations, 1949-57. Page 65
Class I: food, drink and tobacco Class II: raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured Class III: articles wholly or mainly manufactured Total: including miscellaneous items
Belgium France and Italy
Fig. 37.18: Trade with Belgium France and Italy

The agreement between France and the PRC in 1954 was politically driven. France sold one million tons of wheat to China, a deal that France deemed economically advantageous. This transaction played a significant role in paving the way for French diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China.

US Canada
In 1950, after the start of the Korean War, the trade between the PRC and US and Canada is almost nihil.
Fig. 37.19: Trade with US and Canada

In 1953 and 1954 Argentina exports wheat to China, it was limited a trade (non-governmental only). In addition to the absence of political ties, China's trade connections with the nations in Region 5 during the early 1950s were constrained. From 1950 to 1955, China's overall trade with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen amounted to just US$1.7 million, with Chinese imports accounting for over 75 percent of that total.

Egypt The trade with Egypt consisted mainly of cotton import.
Fig. 37.20: trade with Egypt 1950-1954

The periodic market, the peddler, and the urban shop constituted the basis of the traditional commercial structure in China. Farmers paid in-kind the rents to the landowners. Merchant transported them to market towns. Transportation was difficult, caused by mud-clogged roads, poorly maintained waterways and railways and storage facilities were inadequate. However, the merchants had a monopoly on information about market prices and they had the money to overcome difficult periods and wait for better prices. The lack of standardization in weights and measures, the difference in quality of goods and the absence of fixed prices gave the merchants plenty of possibilities to manipulate the market. While the proportion of the private sector in overall economic activity declined between 1949 and 1953, there was a notable rise in the absolute amount of private industrial production and retail trade. Some might attribute much of this increase in private enterprise to post-war recovery efforts. Nonetheless, the decision by the Communists to allow private industrial production to double in value and private retail trade to increase by 40 percent suggests, to some degree, their significant reliance on the private sector during this period. To tackle these problem, starting in 1949, the authorities tried to persuade private businessmen to join “joint public-private enterprises” see Article 33. The new regime deployed a divide and rule tactic by making a distinction between reliable traders and those speculating merchants. The latter are punished and during sanfan and wufan eliminated as a group. The shortage of cadres forced the government to employ private merchants as state trade cadres, especially in the southwest. These cadres used their old network and actions. "..., the behavior they employed included the range of 'corrupt practices -monopolizing, manipulating prices, speculating and hoarding, and tampering with weights and quality-that the still unmodernized economic and technological structure in the countryside permitted."
In April 1950, the Ministry of Trade,implemented a structured system of specialized state trade monopolies nationwide. At the central level, five distinct internal trading companies were established, each focusing on specific commodities such as grain, colored cloths, miscellaneous goods, salt, and coal. These central entities also had direct super-regional subsidiaries. At the provincial level, support was provided by three companies specializing in grain, daily necessities, and indigenous products. In urban areas, state-owned wholesalers and retailers were organized based on regional divisions, although they did not function as specialized trade companies. To ensure financial oversight, all transactions between these trade entities were conducted through the People’s Bank.
Tax paying
The increasing market share of state trading companies in grain, cotton, salt and near state monopoly on mass transportation facilities also squeezed the space for private merchants. Thanks to their national networks, the state trading agencies could acquire commodities wherever they were cheap and sell them where they were dear. By the beginning of 1950, state trading agencies dominated a substantial portion of the national supply chain: over 90 percent of salt, 70 to 80 percent of coal, 40 percent of cotton cloth, 30 percent of cotton yarn and rice, and 20 percent of flour. These figures witnessed rapid expansion in the ensuing months. For instance, within the initial nine months of 1950, the China Cotton-Yarn-Cloth Company procured 75 percent of the entire cotton cloth production.
November 14, 1950, the trade department of the GAC issued Instructions on Banning Speculative Trade: 'All those who practice the types of behavior listed below must be seen as speculators disturbing the market and such behavior must be severely banned:
(1) Engaging in commerce in goods outside the sphere that has been approved by the people's government;
(2) Doing transactions outside designated markets;
(3) Stockpiling and reselling raw materials, refusing to sell goods that concern the people's livelihood or that are daily necessities, seeking 'usurious profits,' or inducing inflation, thereby influencing the people's production or livelihood;
(4) Buying long and selling short and planning for a "usurious profit";
(5) Intentionally raising prices, creating a shopping rush or selling out certain goods and spreading rumors that will stimulate price inflation;
(6) Not respecting local people's governments' regulations on commercial administration methods and disturbing the market;
(7) Using counterfeit, forged, adulterated or illegal commodity specifications or any other kind of fraudulent behavior in seeking illicit profits;
(8) Engaging in any kind of speculative activities.'
Fig. 37.21: Retail trade & Wholesale trade 1950-1953

During the early 1950s, the CCP's state-building approach encompassed not only aggressive mass campaigns but also gradualist tactics aimed at challenging merchants, gaining influence, and ultimately regulating the market through state-owned enterprises. Local authorities established associations for individual grain merchants and itinerant traders to collectively procure rice in bulk from state-owned grain trading enterprises. This enabled merchants to retail rice at lower costs while sustaining their businesses. However, the central government deemed the actions of the local government inaccurate. The Central Party Committee viewed these groups as primarily competing with state-owned trading enterprises and cooperatives, thereby undermining state price policies. Mao Zedong remarked, "These organizations are not illegal... but if they engage in speculation, smuggling, tax evasion, or disrupt state-designed price policies, we will mobilize our economic resources to legally confront and prevail against them." It was evident that Mao saw price manipulation as a means to confront private merchants in December 1951. Within a relatively short period, from mid-1951 to the conclusion of 1952, the CCP significantly expanded its network of state-owned retail outlets, reduced the price disparity between wholesale and retail, initiated the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, and overhauled grain policy administration.
On November 23, 1953, the GAC decided to follow the SU example and abolished the free marketing of major crops (grain, cotton and oil-bearing crops). Agriculture and consumer products were bought and sold at fixed prices. The government was the sole buyer of these crops. Production targets fixed basic quotas for a period of 3 to 5 years. All production above the targets shall also be sold to the government after negotiation, the free market being excluded. See also Article 38
Fig. 37.22: Unified purchase and sale of grain 1953
The authorities started to train and instruct a selected group of cadres in keeping records and began standardization of scales and measures. At the end of 1954 private wholesalers were responsible for only 10.2 percent of the total volume of business on the market. Industries, restaurants and food stands, which relied on grain were also dependent on state supply. They received their supply according to target or production plan.
Age and occupation determined the access to consumer goods, which were rationed on a monthly or annually basis for registered urban citizens. This measure evoked protests: "When informed that some residents would receive more grain than others based on presumed differences in levels of physical exertion required in various occupations, people complained about arbitrary unfairness: workers in large factories with more than one hundred employees would receive nine kilograms of flour per month, while those in smaller factories would get six kilograms. “Since we are all members of the working class,” some party members said, “might two different ration levels affect the unity of the working class?” Others remarked, “After liberation the standard of living went up. Why is it going down now?”25"
Unified purchase includes a second category with a wide range of agricultural products; like sugar, tobacco, pigs, wool, hides and skin. Also, medicinal products belong to this category. Production above the target levels, can be sold to the government after negotiation, and on the free market. The third category with no compulsory quotas for the goods includes vegetables and fruits, and some industrial crops. "However, as long-distance trading was not permitted for producers, government agencies had dominant power in marketing those goods, especially in industrial crops, and hence were able to set price to a large extent." See Article 40 The Chinese industry has to rely on the internal market, because as seen above, the SU is limited in providing goods, and the Cocom restricts the import of essential goods. It is unsurprising that the CCP swiftly transitioned from a prior model of regional self-sufficiency to a strategy of relative national self-sufficiency. In border regions, the CCP advocated the slogan "sell native produce and boycott foreign goods," while in the early 1950s, the party emphasized "taking domestic sales as primary and foreign sales for support." The main policy focus was on developing domestic markets to absorb China's local products. The effective blockade of ports by the GMD exacerbated this shift. Cities like Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou heavily relied on maritime trade, but they were unable to access crucial resources such as coal, cotton, steel, or oil for their industries, nor could they obtain spare parts for machinery due to the blockade. Unable to engage in international trade, they were compelled to redirect all trade from foreign markets to domestic ones within the country.

See for the political role of Overseas Chinese Article 58
In 1950, there are about 11 million overseas Chinese. On the mainland, there are about 30 million qiaojuan (Overseas Chinese dependents and/or relatives). Right from the start, the new government takes control over the flow of funds, the ‘foreign exchange market’ and the circulation of gold, silver, diamonds, and foreign currency. Strict rules are introduced. In order to incentivize citizens to deposit foreign currency into the Bank of China (BOC), the government introduced coupons instead of remittance receipts. These coupons entitled the holder to purchase valuable goods such as bicycles, cooking oil, and other consumer products from state-run stores typically reserved for Party officials and foreign visitors.
The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) chairwoman, He Xiangning seeks the revitalization of huaqiao remittances and tries to persuade them to buy ‘Chinese People’s Victory Bond'. As of 1952, the BOC and the People's Bank of China had the cash flow almost completely under control. The OCAC takes measurement to improve the cashflow of the Overseas Chinese to the homeland. One of these measurements is the establishment of Overseas Chinese investment companies. These companies intensified their oversight of remittances. Additionally, during the 1950s, there was a consistent flow of commercial and industrial delegations from Overseas Chinese visiting China to explore trade and investment prospects. Referred to officially as "sightseeing delegations," they typically comprised representatives from Overseas Chinese commercial and industrial circles. While many hailed from Hong Kong and Macao, their ranks gradually expanded to include individuals from other regions, notably Indonesia, Singapore, Burma, and even the United States and Canada.
Fig. 37.23: Remittance 1950-1954

Foreign countries, with the US and Canadian authorities taking the lead, impose restrictions on financial transactions with China. These actions have major effect on the amount of money Overseas Chinese send to the People's Republic of China.
The members of the family who stay behind on the mainland, are often obliged to hire manpower to be able to exploit the farmland. There are considerable differences in the size of the Overseas Chinese agricultural land, ranging from 34 mu to 2500 mu. During the land reform campaign, their class status is determined as “landlord” and they are often the victim of popular fury. The frequency of violent persecution targeting Overseas Chinese seemed to escalate notably after the arrival of the northern cadres and the subsequent "rectification" of the provincial Party apparatus, which commenced in April 1952. The subsequent month, Hong Kong newspapers disclosed that authorities in Taishan county had issued orders for the execution of approximately thirty landlords, "including numerous Returned Overseas Chinese." Over the ensuing weeks and months, Hong Kong newspapers consistently reported on the execution of landlords who were Overseas Chinese and on suicides among distressed members of the Overseas Chinese community. See for the position of the women left behind Article 6.
Some local authorities tried to protects these families, but in the early months of 1952, Mao Zedong sent Tao Zhu to Guangdong to end this safeguard and to accelerate the Land Reform in South China. More than 6000 cadres are dismissed. Lim (2016) argues in the 1950s, the qiaowu practitioners faced a competition that was not primarily with ideological factions within the leadership of the CCP, but rather with its local membership. During most of the 1950s, the upper echelons of the CCP leadership approved of prioritizing economic considerations in qiaowu, which pertained to overseas Chinese affairs. However, the conflict between qiaowu and the "ideological approach" mainly existed at a lower level due to local cadres and officials who struggled to accept or comprehend policies involving preferential treatment (youdai). Consequently, the competition was not so much between qiaowu and more ideologically inclined factions within the CCP, but rather arose from the CCP's attempt to implement qiaowu and youdai policies that contradicted its own ideological motivations. Thus, it was not a case of the CCP having conflicting approaches to qiaowu, but rather the party-state's qiaowu practices conflicting with its own pursuit of socialist transformation. December 1954, the class status of the Overseas Chinese families is changed to ‘middle farmers’. February 23, 1955, the government decides to validate the remittance and the acceptance of this money has no consequence for the class status of the recipient.
The political and economic significance of the Overseas Chinese has progressively diminished, partially influenced by the Land Reform of 1950-1953. This reform arguably had the most profound impact, as it significantly undermined the cohesion of the community by abolishing the ownership of extensive land holdings, particularly clan-owned land, and seizing land owned by overseas families. As lineages began to break apart, the loyalty of Chinese emigrants to their families and lineages started to erode its fundamental basis. The Zhenfan (see Article 7), the Sanfan (see Article 18), and the Wufan (see chapter 4) also have a great negative impact on the value of the remittances that are sent to the PRC. See Figure 37.23.

O'Brien (2004). Page 108 [↩] [Cite]
Mitcham (2005). Page 4 [↩] [Cite]
a.k.a. ‘the Paris Group, created in 1949 with the following countries: Belgium, Canada (1950), Denmark (1950), France, West Germany (1950), Greece (1953), Italy, Japan (1953), Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway (1950), Portugal (1952), Turkey (1953), United Kingdom, and United States. Its purpose is to inhibit the transfer of military or dual use technologies to the SU and Eastern Bloc countries. The counterpart is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or Comecon (January 1949). The members included SU, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania and, East Germany. Although the PRC wanted to become a member, Stalin refused. Libbey (2010) remarks "The explanations for Comecon’s birth are only vaguely related to the notion of a common market. First, and most obviously, the group gave substance and organization to the Soviet Union’s economic war with Yugoslavia. This war had a side benefit of providing the institutional means of excluding Yugoslavia’s disease of independence from Eastern Europe’s economic development." Libbey (2010). Page 141 [↩] [Cite]
"The lists were divided into four categories or classes. Class 1 included all military goods such as guns, ammunition or tanks, or machinery for their manufacture, such as special machine tools and extrusion presses, electronic equipment, vacuum tube machinery, blast furnaces, oil drilling equipment, tractors, trucks, merchant ships, and all strategic chemicals such as benzine, sodium, mercury, all nitrates and nitric acid, tin, zinc, lead and copper. Class 1A included military and semi-military items such as radio equipment, ultra-violet equipment, broad-band communication equipment and large pressure vessels. Class 2 contained products of industrial potential to the East such as road-building equipment, excavators, engines, steel, cast-iron and plate glass. In Class 3 were items regarded as important in maintaining the basic economy such as office machinery, plumbing equipment, needles and matches. Class 4 was the catch-all category embracing all items not elsewhere listed." Cain (1995). Page 34 [↩] [Cite]
Most-favored-nation status guarantees a nondiscriminatory US tariff rate to the foreign exporter. [↩]
A large part of the increased imports consisted of steel and iron products and machinery from France and FRG. Synthetic textile, fibers from Italy. The UK exported more industrial and chemical fertilizers and also wool and textile machinery. November 1949: 86, November 1951: 270, January 1952: 285, March 1954: 265, August 1954: 170 items were on the COCOM list.
Fig. 37.24: Volume of import in 1st part of 1952 compared with 1st part of 1953
Wu (2023). Page 31
"The overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia were at the center of this regional trading network. Dispersed across all of Southeast Asia, the eleven million overseas Chinese bore demographical and economic significance in their countries of residence.6...this group managed to connect the various regions of Southeast Asia via their own trading networks based on clan associations (tong xiang hui) and trade guild halls (tong ye huey guan) and that these communities maintained important connections to China’s economy through overseas remittances.7" Page 35
"Foreign trade departments and banks in various regions took appropriate measures to rescue import and export materials based on specific situation. The export materials on their way to the U.S., which were shipped before the freeze, were required to be transported to Hong Kong, Rangoon, Singapore, Calcutta, Mumbai and Karachi, where the materials can be unloaded, processed, and payment can be made with the guarantee of Bank of China's local branches. The materials on the way to China were required to be unloaded in relatively safe ports in Calcutta, Mumbai, Rangoon, Karachi, Singapore and Hong Kong, where all procedures of delivery, custody and transit shipment would be completed by Bank of China's local branches." [↩] [Cite]
Wang (1973). Pages 196-197 [↩] [Cite]
The China Publication Centre, which is not a corporation, is responsible for the export of books and periodicals. Officially, they are not considered a trading corporation and therefore, not directly under the Ministry of External Trade." Hung (1968). Page 5-10 [↩] [Cite]
Skřivan (2017). Page 167 [↩] [Cite]
In 1952, the China Committee for Promotion of International Trade compiles "New Chinas Economic Achievements 1949-1952." [↩]
Mitcham (2005). Page 6 [↩] [Cite]
Thai (2017). Page 2 [↩] [Cite]
Thai (2017). Pages 2-3 and 6 [↩] [Cite]
"...creating the first truly independent customs office in Chinese history – since its establishment in the nineteenth century it had always been under British control." Carrai (2019). Page 156 [↩] [Cite]
Thai (2017). Pages 20 [↩] [Cite]
Thai (2017). Page 25 [↩] [Cite]
Ginsburgs (1976). Page 7 [↩] [Cite]
Scott (1958). Page 157 [↩] [Cite]
Ginsburgs (1976). Pages 26-27 [↩] [Cite]
Hung (1968). Page 3-5 Hung continues "As a matter of fact, Mainland. China does not earn foreign exchange from Hong Kong by merchandise trade only. Part of the foreign exchange which is not shown by the trade statistics is derived from her invisible incomes from Hong Kong … in the forms of oversea remittances and food parcels etc." Page 3-7 see also Article 58 [↩] [Cite]
The conference was held from 3 to 12 April 1952. Despite a boycott by Western governments, it was attended by 471 individuals from 49 states. "As a result of the Conference, Peking entered into $160,000,000 (United States dollars) worth of trade agreements and contracts with England, France, and other European, Latin American, and Asian countries." Hsiao (1968). Page 306.[Cite]
Gao (2015) writes about the French delegation signing an ageement with China: "Les négociations entre les deux délégations aboutirent à la signature d'un accord qui portait la valeur des échanges sino-français à 4 milliards de francs dans chaque sens pour l'année 1952. La Chine importerait des métaux, des machines, des produits pharmaceutiques, etc. et exporterait des soies, du thé, des produits de l'élevage, des huiles, etc. en France.3" Page 79
"Negotiations between the two delegations led to the signing of an agreement which brought the value of Sino-French trade to 4 billion francs each way for the year 1952. China would import metals, machinery, pharmaceutical products , etc. and would export silks, tea, livestock products, oils, etc. to France.3" [↩] [Cite]
Peruzzi (2017). Page 32 [↩] [Cite]
Shao (1991). Page 43 [↩] [Cite]
General chamber of commerce Report for the year 1952 Page 37 [↩] [Cite]
Wang (1973). Page 186 [↩] [Cite]
Gosh (2017). Page 16 [↩] [Cite]
Hussain (2020). Page 153 [↩] [Cite]
Copper (2016). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Copper (2016). Page 97 [↩] [Cite]
Copper (2016). Page 98 [↩] [Cite]
Hsiao (1968). Pages 631-632 "A memorandum attached to the second agreement, October 29, 1953, stated: "The Contracting Parties agreed to exchange trade missions; Japan will establish her permanent trade mission in China when China's permanent trade mission has been established in Japan."83" Page 638 [↩] [Cite]
Skřivan (2012). Page 740 [↩] [Cite]
Jersild (2014). Page 60 [↩] [Cite]
"To do so, the venture would appear simply as a shipping brokerage firm and Chipolbrok ships would officially belong to the Polish Ocean Lines, have Polish names, and operate under the Polish flag." Gnoinska (2019). Page 196 See also Pages 197-198 about the difficulties during the embargo period [↩] [Cite]
Jersild (2014). Page 60
In January 1950, "...the Chinese prepared for the Czechoslovaks a list of goods “required by new China” in the process of reconstruction.18 ...The first trade agreement between the Chinese and the Czechoslovaks was signed on 16 April 1950 " [Cite]
Copper (2016) Volume I Page 116 [↩] [Cite]
Dahlberg (2019). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Ching (2006). Page 185 [↩] [Cite]
Shao (1991). Page 159 [↩] [Cite]
Wang (1973). Page 186 note 12 [↩] [Cite]
Huwaidin (2002). Page 97 [↩] [Cite]
Shue (1976). "A network of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives and state-trading-company purchasing stations and retail outlets was proliferated in rural areas following land reform, growing at an even more rapid rate than the rural finance network. Nevertheless, at the end of 1953 Supply and Marketing Co-ops were still handling the marketing and consumer needs of only a fraction of peasants. Most villagers were still trading in the traditional markets, making deals with private wholesale merchants and middlemen just as before liberation. " Pages 105-106 [↩] [Cite]
Ecklund (1963). Page 242 [↩] [Cite]
Solinger (1979). Page 186 [↩] [Cite]
Huang (2013). Page 12 [Cite]
"Cadres, staff members, and workers in grain organizations at all levels at that time were made up largely of work cadres from finance, grain, and trade departments in old liberated areas, and personnel doing grain work in newly liberated areas. Not only were there too few personnel, but they also lacked experience in managing urban grain work. They were unable to keep up with the rapidly developing situation. As a result of the personnel shortage, some grain control units in north China had to employ some rural warehouse personnel with production responsibilities to look after the grain. Later on, grain units in all jurisdictions stressed taking on demobilized military cadres as work required, and the enrollment of personnel having special skills and educated youths for a gradual strengthening of the ranks of grain cadres, staff members, and workers. By the end of 1952, cadres, staff members, and workers in grain departments nationwide totaled 219,900, 65,900 of whom were in administrative units, and 154,000 of whom were in entreprenural units." Deng (1988). Chapter 2: "Stabilizing the Grain Situation To Accelerate the Rehabilitation of the National Economy (1949-1952)" Page 31 [↩] [Cite]
Weber (2021). Page 86 nt14 During this period, domestic cotton supply was insufficient. The cotton planting area was relatively small, averaging 4.94 million hectares annually. However, the planting area increased rapidly in the first few years following the founding of the PRC, enhancing cotton production was listed as one of the main tasks for agricultural production. [↩] [Cite]
Solinger (1979). Page 194 [↩] [Cite]
Li (2021). Page 24 [↩] [Cite]
Li (2021). Pages 242-243 [↩] [Cite]
Skinner (1985) writes "As of 1953 there were approximately 45,000 rural markets serving a rural population of roughly 507 million. By 1965 the number of markets was down to 37,000, while the rural population had grown to 583 million. By 1978 the number of markets had declined further to 33,300, even as the rural population had ballooned to 775 million.24 Thus, each rural market had to service, on average, a population that was more than twice as large in 1978 as in 1953." Page 405 [↩] [Cite]
Brown (2012). Page 35 [↩] [Cite]
Zhong (2004). Page 6 [↩] [Cite]
Keith (1979). Page 281 [↩] [Cite]
Ezpeleta (1972). Page 204 [↩] [Cite]
Ritenour (2005). Page 5 [↩] [Cite]
He Xiangning in a directive to Tan Kah Kee states: (i) To use many methods to spread the news as broadly and as far as possible to the haiwai huaqiao regarding the underlying principle and motive behind this bond issue. (ii) To encourage the huaqiao to subscribe to the issue and not be casual bystanders. (iii) To use the qiaojuan to approach their family and relatives overseas to subscribe because the dividends can be directed towards their family in China, and so too the bond certificates.91. Cited in Lim (2016). Page 64 [↩] [Cite]
February 1951, the South China Enterprise Company is founded to stimulate investments by businessmen from Hong Kong and Macao. Private capital finances for seventy percent this private-state company. The state controls the firm. [↩]
Peterson (2013). Page 96 [↩] [Cite]
Article 24 of the Land reform law deals with the land and houses of the Overseas Chinese. 30-06-1950 The Agrarian Reform law.
30-06-1950 Decisions concerning the differentiation of class status in the countryside.
November 6 1950 special measurements are proclaimed to regulate the land reform for Overseas Chinese “…made it difficult to assign class designations to Overseas Chinese. It is not surprising that the practices of dealing with property of Overseas Chinese underwent such fluctuation during the course of land reform.” Vogel (1969). Page 40. [Cite]
"The CCP view of the Overseas Chinese vacillated, from local capitalists and feudal exploiters" (during the investigation of class status during land reform) to "labouring people" and members of a patriotic united front. Bureaucratic confusion and organizational difficulties paralleled this confusion of image and policymaking: local cadres were unsure of whether to exploit class differences and promote class struggle amongst the domestic Overseas Chinese, or smooth over class divisions in the interests of maintaining the united front. Peterson (1979). Page 167 [↩] [Cite]
"Popular resentment of the privileges enjoyed by transnational families was easily manipulated by village officials who themselves were under considerable pressure from above to make violent class struggle the focal point of Land Reform. Indeed, the experience of transnational families during Land Reform provides one of the earliest examples of how post-1949 Maoist revolutionary culture stigmatised not only private wealth but all forms of social and cultural difference that could be identified as “foreign” [ yang]." Peterson (2007). Page 35.[Cite] See also Ravenholt (1951). [↩] [Cite]
Peterson (2013). Page 51 [↩] [Cite]
Lim (2016). Page 30 [↩] [Cite]
Peterson (1988) Pages 309-335. The families are allowed to use the remittance for traditional marriages and funerals. They are also allowed to buy special consumer goods, which are not generally available. They are a privileged class. This ends in 1957 [↩] [Cite]
Choi (1975). Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia. Pages 57-58 [↩] [Cite]

27-02-1948 Mao Zedong "On the policy concerning industry and commerce"
16-02-1949 Liu Shaoqi "Start foreign trade immediately"
16-02-1949 CC Directive on Foreign Trade Policy
27-02-1948 Mao Zedong "On the policy concerning industry and commerce"
20-04-1949 Liu Shaoqi Speech with officials responsible for domestic and foreign trade
01-01-1950 Chen Yun "Industry and commerce in Shanghai"
15-06-1950 Chen Yun "The current situation and measures for readjusting industry, commerce and taxation"
01-06-1951 Calling upon the peasants to sell cotton to the state
20-07-1951 Chen Yun "Improving the work in the federations of industry and commerce"
25-06-1953 Chen Yun "The system for distributing grain"
02-10-1953 Enlarged PB meeting
10-10-1953 - 12-10-1953 National conference on planned purchasing and marketing of grain
10-10-1953 Chen Yun "Establishing state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of grain"
13-10-1953 Chen Yun "Measures to ensure a sufficient supply of cooking oil"
28-11-1953 Chen Yun "Increasing production and sale of non-staple food"
25-07-1954 Constitution of the SMC
13-07-1954 Chen Yun "Thightening control over the market and transforming private commerce"
23-09-1954 Chen Yun "Some ideas about the system of planned purchase and supply

10-03-1950 GAC Decisions on Procedures Governing the Unification of State-Operated Trade
Notification by the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC regarding the assurance of a reasonable price ratio for cotton, hemp, and foodstuffs. April 11, 1950.
Directive of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC prohibiting the operation of businesses by government organs and the armed forces. April 22, 1950.
Directive of the Ministry of Trade regarding the measures for taking over the businesses operated by government organs and the armed forces. May 29, 1950.
Notification by the Ministry of Trade to the effect that trade administrative organs in all localities should immediately examine the trade companies and guide them in an adjustment of retail prices. June 9, 1950.
Directive of the Ministry of Trade regarding the purchase of wheat by the foodstuff company in 1950. June 13, 1950.
Notification by the GAC to the effect that orders for goods from abroad must first be approved by the Central Finance and Economics Committee and then submitted to the Ministry of Trade for unified handling. August 31, 1950.
12-09-1950 Interim Regulations on Foreign Trade Administration
Joint directive of the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the thorough implementation of the standard price ratio between cotton and foodstuffs, better prices for better cotton, and the determination of a price for cotton bolls. October 14, 1950.
Directive of the Ministry of Trade regarding the joint public- private purchase of cotton and the control of the cotton market. September 2, 1950.
Several directives of the Ministry of Trade on the suppression of speculative businesses. November 14, 1950.
07-12-1950 State monopoly of the purchase of cotton yarn and cloth
08-12-1950 Interim Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Trade
Decision of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC on the unified purchase of cotton yarn. January 4, 1951.
Directive of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC regarding a guaranteed price ratio between cotton and foodstuffs. March, 1951.
Provisions of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC regarding the price ratio between hemp and grain, and also the solution of problems connected with the purchase of hemp and the supply of fertilizers and grain. March 11, 1951.
Directive of the GAC regarding the work entailed in the purchase and storage of cotton. June 11, 1951.
Provisions of the Ministry of Trade regarding the measures for retail price reductions and special sales in department stores during anniversary festivals. July 19, 1951.
Directive of the Ministry of Trade regarding stabilization of commodity prices during the new-calendar and old-calendar New Year seasons. November 29, 1951.
Directive of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC regarding the price ratio between cotton and foodstuffs, and the share taken by cotton fields for the public grain contribution. March 12, 1952.
Directive of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC regarding the 1953 price ratio between cotton and foodstuffs. April 1, 1953.
Directive of the Ministry of Foreign Trade regarding the work involved in post-autumn purchasing. October 6, 1953.
23-11-1953 Decision of the GAC on the Implementation of the Planned Purchase and Planned Supply of Grain
Joint decision of the Ministry of Commerce and the National Federation of Cooperatives of China on the demarcation of the spheres of operation between state commerce and the cooperatives, with regard to industrial goods and handicraft products. December 2, 1953.
Rules governing the inspection and analysis of cotton. December 16, 1953.
Provisional regulations governing the inspection of imported commodities and those to be exported. January 3, 1954.
irective of the Finance and Economics Committee of the GAC regarding the 1954 price ratio between cotton and foodstuffs. March 3, 1954.
Chapter 4 of Common Program