Article 22 of the Common Program
Text
Article 22 of the Common Program

The People's Republic of China shall strengthen its modernized army and shall establish an air force and a navy in order to consolidate national defence.


On February 3, 1949 the PLA holds a big military parade in Beijing. The parade is meticulously orchestrated in order to show that: “…the red army was forcefully stating that it intended to demolish two evils of China’s past: feudalism and imperialism. The communist army,…, would now ‘liberate’ China.”
Hung Chang-tai (2007). Mao’s parades: State spectacles in China in the 1950s. The China Quarterly, 190. Page 412
An observer noticed “(it was) the most extensive public display of US military hardware in over a decade."
Cited in Gill Bates & Kim Taeho. (1995). China’s arms acquisitions from abroad. A quest for ‘superb and secret Weapons’. SIPRI Research Report 11. Oxford University Press. Page 17
“During the period 1946–50, the PLA captured, mainly from the retreating Nationalists, some 3 160 000 rifles, 320 000 machine-guns, 55 000 artillery pieces, 622 tanks, 389 armoured vehicles, 189 military aircraft and 200 small warships.17” Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, “China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ “,SIPRI Research Report No. 11 Oxford University Press 1995, page 17 . In December 1948, the US Military Attaché in Nanjing reported that 80 percent of the weapons and 75 percent of the ammunition that the United States had supplied the Guomindang had been captured. (Andrew, 2008, 163)
“ This parade of American and Japanese weaponry is also to disguise the military aid of the SU."
Andrew Martin Kenneth (2008). Tuo Mao: the operational history of the People's Liberation Army. PhD, ePublications@bond, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Page 156

In 1949 the People's Republic of China is not capable to produce its own ships, tanks, airplanes and modern weapons. The navy has captured several GMD ships, of which about 100 are seaworthy. The majority of men (4000) are ex GMD sailors.

The air force has less than 200 airplanes. They are from USA, UK and Japan. But not only the weaponry is foreign even the soldiers are foreign. In 1949 during the battle around Tianjin Japanese soldiers man the captured Japanese artillery.
Diamant Neil J. (2010). Embattled glory: Veterans, military families, and the politics of patriotism in China, 1949–2007. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Page 11
The PLA soldiers were not used to modern weaponry so they had to learn this from ex GMD and Japanese officers and soldiers. “They did this by creating schools to integrate the equipment and become an army capable of using artillery and tanks in a coordinated manner. Ex-Guomindang officers and soldiers as well as Japanese prisoners of war were employed to this end.”
Andrew Martin Kenneth (2008). Tuo Mao. Page 156
"Not only had the PLA used Japanese soldiers. Yan Xishan (1883-1960) a warlord in Shanxi persuaded 15,000 Japanese soldiers to join his army and this assistance was vital in Yan’s ability to hold out until 1949."
enesch Oleg (2014) Chinese Examinations of the Japanese Martial Spirit. Extrême-orient, Extrême-occident 38. Page 148
In her pursuit of achieving more unity within the PLA, the PLA mainly looks at the structure of the SU army. "We must learn every bit of the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union in order to change our armed forces from their condition of backwardness and construct our armed forces into a most superior modernized military force [in the world], so as to be able to assure ourselves of the ability to defeat, in the future, the invasion of the imperialists' armies."
Document:01-01-1950 Mao Zedong Comment on a summary of the relationship between the various departments of the military and the soviet advisors
The PLA implements most of the regulations of the Russian army.
A list of these regulations to be found at You Ji, “The Soviet Model and the Breakdown of the Military Alliance.” in Hua-Yu Li. “China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present.”
In 1955 the PLA also introduces the conscription, the grading structure and salary. This copying of the SU model runs anything but smooth. "The PLA had not thought through what role its own model of army building should play, one that was based on decades of war, when it hurried into learning and absorbing a vastly different model. The PLA’s own model can be defined as follows: a high level of egalitarianism between officers and soldiers; intensive ideological indoctrination with an emphasis on spiritual commitment; integration with the masses, which was a requirement for waging people’s war; and (shuangzhangzhi) or the parallel authority of commanders and commissars in combat units, that is, the principle of collective leadership. In contrast, the Soviet model highlighted professionalism, the importance of hardware, the superior position of commanders over commissars and reliance on formal institutions. Fundamentally, the clash centered on whether politics should continue to be in command.”
Ji You (2010). The Soviet Model and the Breakdown of the Military Alliance. In Thomas P. Bernstein & Hua-Yu Li (Eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–present. The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Lexington Books. Page 134-135
The PLA is in constant need of SU equipment during the Korean War, Mao Zedong begs on a regular base for new military specialists, guns, anti-aircraft guns, vehicles and bicycles.
Document:05-10-1951 Mao Zedong asks Stalin for more military aid05-10-1951 Mao Zedong asks Stalin for more military aid
On June 4, 1953 the SU and the People's Republic of China close several important deals in which the SU will assist in the construction of China’s defense industry. This includes the production of modern weaponry for land forces, air forces and navy, the modernisation of shipyards and the construction of factories to build airplanes. China in return will deliver raw materials such as tungsten, copper, and rubber to the SU.
In December 1953 the PLA convenes a meeting on the experience of the Korean War. Peng Dehuai remarks “the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea was an important challenge to our army . . . its importance lies in the fact that we must raise the military art of our armed forces to a new level”
Cited in Zhang Shu Guang (1999). Between ‘paper’and ‘real tigers’: Mao’s view on nuclear weapons. in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May & Jonathan Rosenberg (Eds.), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945. Oxford University Press. Page 199
Deng Hua
Chinese People's Volunteers , Chen Hao , Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua 1954
(PLA general) concludes “that although nature of war and the army's political quality will still play a decisive role in modern warfare, [our army's] sources of military materiel and technological conditions will be indispensable factors.”
Also cited in Zhang Shu Guang (1999). Between ‘paper’and ‘real tigers’. Page 199
In 1949 the PLA starts with the construction of its own air force (PLAAF) and navy (PLAN). The base for both of these organizations is the legacy of the PLA. "The PLAAF must oppose two erroneous tendencies. The first tendency is to believe the PLAAF is a new service that can disregard the legacy of the Army. The second tendency is to be complacent with just some of the Army’s experience. Both of these tendencies are wrong and will impede development.”… “the Air Force will be developed on the basis of the Army."
Commander Liu Yalou in 1951 cited in Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history: the Chinese people’s liberation army at 75. Strategic Studies Institute. Page 106

PLA Air Force (PLAAF)....

March 17, 1949
Chang Qiankun
Chang Qiankun(1904-1973)
becomes the commander and Wang Bi the political commissar of the newly formed PLAAF. Their mission is to expand the air force with as much GMD airplanes as possible and to persuade GMD personnel to work for the PLA.
"In the period 1946–49, the number of Communist Chinese military aircraft fluctuated widely owing to war losses, captures and defections by Guomindang pilots. By the end of the war there were fewer than 200 aircraft left. According to official Chinese accounts, the new regime in Beijing in late 1949 could lay claim to approximately 159 foreign aircraft—US, British, and Japanese—including P-47 and P-51 fighters, Japanese ‘Oscar’ fighters, B-24 and B-25 bombers, as well as transports and trainer aircraft, although many of these aircraft were not operational.42 In addition, the PLA was able to capture from the retreating Guomindang some 1278 aircraft engines and more than 40 000 tonnes of aviation equipment and supplies, nearly all of which was of foreign origin.43"
Gill Bates & Kim Taeho. (1995). China’s arms acquisitions from abroad. Page 25
Almost at the same time, during August to October 1949, 6 aviation institutes are founded, where 878 Russian experts teach.
Zhao Yanghui (2011). The establishment of Chinese military academies & the Soviet aids in 1920s-1950's. Sociology of science and technology, 2, (4). Page 19-20
Document:13-04-1950 Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Bulganin
Document:06-05-1950 Telegram from Zhou Enlai to ambassador Wang Jiaxiang
On July 10, 1949 Mao Zedong plans to send between 300 to 400 officers to the SU to be trained as pilot or engineer and to purchase at least 100 airplanes. “Together with the air force we have now, they will form an offensive unit to support the cross-strait campaign and prepare to seize Taiwan next summer.”
Cited in Zhang Xiaoming (2002). Red wings over the Yalu. China, the Soviet Union, and the air war in Korea. Texas A&M University Press.

On November 11, 1949 after all this preliminary work the PLAAF is founded. The staff of the PLAAF are all officers of the land forces. The main task of the PLAAF is ‘to be battle ready’ as soon as possible to conquer Hainan and Taiwan. One way to achieve this goal is cooperation with the GMD servicemen who are defected or who will defect.
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai states in December 1950: "Construction of China’s aviation industry should be carried out according to the Chinese practical situation . . . We could not just rely on buying foreign aircraft and only carrying out repair by ourselves. The construction road, therefore, of China’s aviation industry should be conducting repair first, manufacture afterwards and then the design . . . certain consideration should be given to the planning and arrangement of turning [repair facilities] into a manufacture factory in the future. Meanwhile, negotiations should be carried out with the Soviets about their assistance for the construction of our aviation industry."
Cited in Duan Zijun (1989). China today: Aviation industry. China Aviation Industry Press. Page 16

During the Korean War the PLAAF grows rapidly. In January 1950 the PRC buys 586 airplanes, the following year the total number of airplanes has risen to 1500 and in 1954 the PLAAF possesses 3000 airplanes. From December 1953 onwards China receives the production rights to produce its own MiG-15bis and starts to design airplanes based on Russian planes. China’s first indigenously produced military aircraft, the CJ–5 trainer manufactured at the Nanchang Aircraft Factory, made its first successful test flight on July 11, 1954.

PLA Navy (PLAN)....

On May 2, 1949, the PLA lays the foundation for its own navy.
Zhang Aiping
Zhang Aiping (1910 - 2003)
is commissioned to build a fleet that makes it possible to transport military troops and support an attack on Taiwan. March 25, 1949 Mao Zedong and
Zhu De
Zhu De (1886-1976) Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army (1946-1954)
stresses the importance of defection after the mutiny of the troops of the Chonqing cruiser. "Your rebellion shows that the KMT reactionaries and their American imperialist bosses are on their last legs. They can damage such a ship as the Chongqing by bombing, but they cannot prevent even more vessels from joining it, and even more vessels, aircraft, and army units will rebel to join the People's Liberation Army. The Chinese people are certain to establish their own powerful national defense, and in addition to an army, we must also build our own air force and navy. You, then, are among the vanguard that will build the Chinese People's Navy."
China Today: The People's Navy, China Social Services Publishing House, Beijing, October 1987. In JPRS-CAR-90-014 23 February 1990. Page 34
One month later, 25 warships fall in the hands of the PLA after GMD admiral Deng Zhaoxiang defects to the CCP.
November 1949 a navy academy starts in Shenyang with 84 SU specialists. Later on 711 Russian naval experts in three batches are also dispatched. Along the coastline rudimentary maintenance and logistic infrastructure are constructed. Zhang Aiping goes to the SU looking for aid and he buys old submarines, patrol boats and other vessels.
On 25 October 1949 with the amphibious landing on Quemoy the PLAN has its baptism of fire. The supremacy of the GMD at sea and in the air makes this landing a total disaster.
Liu Hsiang-Wang (2016) Last struggle of the Chinese civil war: the battles on Quemoy and Dengbu, 1949 Virginia Review of Asian Studies. Page 2
The invasion of Dengbu two weeks later turns also out in disaster. The importance of having a capable navy has already become clear during the campaign around Tainjin, The surroundings of Tainjin
“… that the campaign to capture Tianjin had to deal with the fact that the city is surrounded by water and crossed by canals and waterways, as it is the gate to the sea for the North China plain. Nationalist forces had flooded much of the area by the first week of January 1949, “slowing movement and forcing the Communist forces to gather boats to conduct their attack.”
Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 186 note 10
In May 1950, when the PLAN is officially founded, the complete fleet of the People's Republic of China exists of “… a motley armada of 5,000 vessels . . . freighters, motorized junks, and sampans” to use for the invasion of Taiwan; this force was to be manned by “30,000 fishermen and other sailors.”
Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 187 note 24
General Su Yu responsable for the upcoming attack on Taiwan “... estimated that 760,000 tons of shipping, plus 2,000 small boats, were needed to execute this campaign plan, but these forces were not available. The general knew even more troops would be required, since the KMT forces on Taiwan were becoming more capable with the passage of time, but more troops required more transports and supporting vessels.”
Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 167

The main part of the personnel of the navy are retrained army personnel with little or no marine skills The early Soviet assistance programme included the creation of the Soviet Naval Advisory Mission in Beijing and the dispatch of 500 naval advisers and maintenance personnel in 1950. Already in October 1949 84 Soviet experts arrive in Shenyang to help China found the Naval Academy
In July 1950, the Soviet Union began to deliver naval weapons, equipment and spare parts for the nascent PLAN. The first Soviet transfers of finished naval craft consisted of about 50 World War II-vintage torpedo boats,which took place in 1951.
Gill Bates & Kim Taeho. (1995). China’s arms acquisitions from abroad. Page 24
A treaty between the PLAN and the SU is signed on June 4, 1953. The PLAN buys 5 type of ships, including the right to produce these ships (i.e. minesweepers and submarines) During a politbureau meeting in December 1953 Mao Zedong explains the duties of the PLAN “we must build a strong navy”: (1) to get rid of disturbances by ocean pirates and protect the security of ocean channel shipping; (2) to prepare the strength to recover Taiwan at an appropriate opportunity and eventually unify our entire country; and, (3) to ready our forces to resist an invasion of imperialism from the sea. He qualified these goals, however, by noting that the navy had to be built “in a planned, progressive way in accordance with the situations regarding industrial development and finance.”
Cited in Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 170. In 1950, Xiao Jingguang, the commander of Chinese naval forces insisted that "..the navy should be a light type navy, capable of inshore defence. Its key mission is to accompany the ground forces in war actions. The basic characteristic of this navy is fast deployment, based on its lightness." Cited in You Ji & You Xu (1991). In search of blue water power: The PLA navy's maritime strategy in the 1990s. The Pacific Review, 4, 2. Page 139. "In step with this doctrine, the navy established the 'three-point pillars' of its forces; namely, the torpedo boats, land-based naval aircraft and submarines. Of these, the submarine fleet enjoyed priority in development." "Mao's military thinking, centred on the 'people's war', was the fundamental guideline for the formulation of naval plans." Page 139

Nuclear weapons....

Mao Zedong is convinced nuclear weapons will not make the difference in a war situation. How dire the weapon, eventually the people will determine the outcome of the war. In a speech on September 5, 1950, he thus expresses “We will not allow you [the Americans] to use the atomic bomb [against us]. But if you won't give it up, you may just use it. You can follow the way you choose to go, and we will do whatever is to our [best] advantages [in encountering you]. You may bomb [us] with the atomic bomb, but we will respond with our hand-grenades. We then will catch your weakness to tie you up and finally defeat you.”
Cited in Gaddis John Lewis, Gordon Philip H., May Ernest R. & Rosenberg Jonathan (1999). Cold war statesmen confront the bomb. Nuclear diplomacy since 1945. Oxford University Press. Page 196
Despite this rhetoric the political leaders of the CCP are already interested in nuclear weapons from the moment they are negotiating with SU leaders. “During June through August 1949, … Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gan visited the Soviet Union to lay the groundwork for a fateful meeting between Stalin and Mao Zedong.4 Unexpectedly for the Soviets, Liu Shaoqi, who never acted impulsively, asked for a tour of Soviet nuclear installations. Stalin, however, rejected the request; he did not intend to share his potential nuclear achievements with foreigners, whoever they might be.”
Gobarev Viktor M. (1999): Soviet policy toward China: Developing nuclear weapons 1949–1969, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12:4. Page 3. "...the CCP engaged in a 'systematic programme of collecting Information' on atornic issues.12 Second, China began preparations to survive a nuclcar war via the adoption of civil defence measures, notably the construction of air raid shelters and tunnelling Systems.13" Horsburgh Nicola (2015). China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement. Oxford University Press. Page 41
Gobarev also states that during the negotiations between Mao Zedong and Stalin in January and February 1950, the issue of military assistance in case of a war should be extended 'with all means at its disposal' in other words “nuclear assurances to China.”
Gobarev Viktor M. (1999): Soviet policy toward China. Page 4
Soviet efforts resulted in the substitution of the words 'state of war' for 'military engagement' in the final version of the treaty.9 Therefore, under the new wording, in the event the Chinese became engaged in military actions with no declaration of war, the Soviet Union was under no formal obligation to provide its support, to say nothing about the activation of the nuclear guarantees. Gobarov, 1990. Pages 4-5
After the death of Stalin Mao Zedong again approaches the SU leaders to provide China with an atomic bomb. The SU leaders reject this demand but are inclined to give more military assistance. “Khrushchev (during his visit 1954) first repeated Stalin's and his own old argument that there was no need for China to possess the atomic bomb since China, as well as the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, was already under the Soviet nuclear umbrella.”
Gobarev Viktor M. (1999): Soviet policy toward China. Page 20. See also Shen Zhihua & Xia Yafeng(2012). Between Aid and Restriction: The Soviet Union's Changing Policies on China's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1954-1960. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project Working Paper,2
From the year 1955 on Mao Zedong is determent to make China a superpower and a way to achieve this is by developing a Chinese atomic bomb. In order to attain this goal a nuclear development program is initiated under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and with the help of the SU. The Chinese leaders realize they have to rely on the aid of the SU to develop their own nuclear program and that they cannot rely on the nuclear protection of the SU. A lesson they learned during the Korean War.

Conclusion....

The PLA, PLAAF and PLAN rely heavily on SU support in training of personnel as well on receiving and buying SU equipment. It is only after 1954 they become less dependent on the SU.


Literature Notes Documents...

1. Hung Chang-tai (2007). Mao’s parades: State spectacles in China in the 1950s. The China Quarterly, 190. Page 412 Back
2. Cited in Gill Bates & Kim Taeho. (1995). China’s arms acquisitions from abroad. A quest for ‘superb and secret Weapons’. SIPRI Research Report 11. Oxford University Press. Page 17 Back
3. “During the period 1946–50, the PLA captured, mainly from the retreating Nationalists, some 3 160 000 rifles, 320 000 machine-guns, 55 000 artillery pieces, 622 tanks, 389 armoured vehicles, 189 military aircraft and 200 small warships.17” Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, “China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ “,SIPRI Research Report No. 11 Oxford University Press 1995, page 17 . In December 1948, the US Military Attaché in Nanjing reported that 80 percent of the weapons and 75 percent of the ammunition that the United States had supplied the Guomindang had been captured. (Andrew, 2008, 163) Back
4. Andrew Martin Kenneth (2008). Tuo Mao: the operational history of the People's Liberation Army. PhD, ePublications@bond, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Page 156 Back
5. Diamant Neil J. (2010). Embattled glory: Veterans, military families, and the politics of patriotism in China, 1949–2007. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Page 11 Back
6. Andrew Martin Kenneth (2008). Tuo Mao. Page 156 Back
7. Benesch Oleg (2014) Chinese Examinations of the Japanese Martial Spirit. Extrême-orient, Extrême-occident 38. Page 148 Back
9. A list of these regulations to be found at You Ji, “The Soviet Model and the Breakdown of the Military Alliance.” in Hua-Yu Li. “China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present.” Page 133 Back
10. Ji You (2010). The Soviet Model and the Breakdown of the Military Alliance. In Thomas P. Bernstein & Hua-Yu Li (Eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–present. The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Lexington Books. Page 134-135 Back
12. Cited in Zhang Shu Guang (1999). Between ‘paper’and ‘real tigers’: Mao’s view on nuclear weapons. in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May & Jonathan Rosenberg (Eds.), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945. Oxford University Press. Page 199 Back
13. Cited in Zhang Shu Guang (1999). Between ‘paper’and ‘real tigers’. Page 199 Back
14. Cited in Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history: the Chinese people’s liberation army at 75. Strategic Studies Institute. Page 106 Back
15. Gill Bates & Kim Taeho. (1995). China’s arms acquisitions from abroad. Page 25 Back
16. Zhao Yanghui (2011). The establishment of Chinese military academies & the Soviet aids in 1920s-1950's. Sociology of science and technology, 2, (4). Page 19-20 Back
19. Cited in Zhang Xiaoming (2002). Red wings over the Yalu. China, the Soviet Union, and the air war in Korea. Texas A&M University Press. Back
20. Cited in Duan Zijun (1989). China today: Aviation industry. China Aviation Industry Press. Page 16 Back
21. China Today: The People's Navy, China Social Services Publishing House, Beijing, October 1987. In JPRS-CAR-90-014 23 February 1990. Page 34 Back
22. Liu Hsiang-Wang (2016) Last struggle of the Chinese civil war: the battles on Quemoy and Dengbu, 1949 Virginia Review of Asian Studies. Page 2 Back
23. Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 186 note 10 Back
24. Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 187 note 24 Back
25. Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 167 Back
26. Gill Bates & Kim Taeho. (1995). China’s arms acquisitions from abroad. Page 24 Back
27. Cited in Burkitt Laurie, Scobell Andrew & Wortzel Larry M. (2003). The lessons of history Page 170. In 1950, Xiao Jingguang, the commander of Chinese naval forces insisted that "..the navy should be a light type navy, capable of inshore defence. Its key mission is to accompany the ground forces in war actions. The basic characteristic of this navy is fast deployment, based on its lightness." Cited in You Ji & You Xu (1991). In search of blue water power: The PLA navy's maritime strategy in the 1990s. The Pacific Review, 4, 2. Page 139. "In step with this doctrine, the navy established the 'three-point pillars' of its forces; namely, the torpedo boats, land-based naval aircraft and submarines. Of these, the submarine fleet enjoyed priority in development." "Mao's military thinking, centred on the 'people's war', was the fundamental guideline for the formulation of naval plans." Page 139 Back
28. Cited in Gaddis John Lewis, Gordon Philip H., May Ernest R. & Rosenberg Jonathan (1999). Cold war statesmen confront the bomb. Nuclear diplomacy since 1945. Oxford University Press. Page 196 Back
29. Gobarev Viktor M. (1999): Soviet policy toward China: Developing nuclear weapons 1949–1969, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12:4. Page 3. "...the CCP engaged in a 'systematic programme of collecting Information' on atornic issues.12 Second, China began preparations to survive a nuclcar war via the adoption of civil defence measures, notably the construction of air raid shelters and tunnelling Systems.13" Horsburgh Nicola (2015). China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement. Oxford University Press. Page 41 Back
30. Gobarev Viktor M. (1999): Soviet policy toward China. Page 4 Back
31. Soviet efforts resulted in the substitution of the words 'state of war' for 'military engagement' in the final version of the treaty.9 Therefore, under the new wording, in the event the Chinese became engaged in military actions with no declaration of war, the Soviet Union was under no formal obligation to provide its support, to say nothing about the activation of the nuclear guarantees. Gobarov, 1990. Pages 4-5 Back
32. Gobarev Viktor M. (1999): Soviet policy toward China. Page 20. See also Shen Zhihua & Xia Yafeng(2012). Between Aid and Restriction: The Soviet Union's Changing Policies on China's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1954-1960. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project Working Paper,2 Back
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