

**Final Message from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 5 October 1950 (new sections italicized)**

*[Stalin reproduced most of the text of his message to Mao in his cable to Kim Il Sung on 8[7] October 1950, translated by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov and published in CWHIP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 116. The comparison between the documents reveals that only the date, an introductory phrase, and the final two paragraphs were omitted.] see down*

From cde. PHILIPPOV

October 5, 1950

I received your reply [...]

Your reply contains one consideration about the domestic situation in China that is new to me. You insist that, in case of a new war with regard to Korean events there will be many malcontents in the country, that there is strong longing for peace in the country. I understand it in such a way that the bourgeois parties that are part of the Chinese coalition may, in case of war, exploit discontent in the country against the Chinese communist party and its leadership. Of course, you should know the domestic situation in China better than anybody else. Would it be, however, possible to overcome the difficulties of internal situation in China or it would be impossible

- only the Chinese comrades can decide it.

As to the arrival of comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, I would be happy to meet them and to have a conversation with them.

Respectfully,

PHILIPPOV

5 October 1950

[Handwritten] Dispatched to cde. Bulganiin via VCh [high frequency phone] at 23 hours, 5 October.

Draft Message from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 4 October 1950 (italicized passages inserted and

bracketed passages deleted by hand) [DRAFT CIPHERED TELEGRAM] First original version

TO BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR FOR MAO ZEDONG 5 October 1950

I received your response.

I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of [sending to Korea a] *minimum* five-to-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel (and the enemy has already crossed, as is known, the 38th parallel in several places). There could be no doubts that, without such declarations by the Chinese comrades, I would have deemed it impossible to address You with the abovementioned question, *and, incidentally, I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard [platz-d'arme-trans.] for the USA or for a future militarist Japan [against China].*

*While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I was basing myself on the following considerations [in the area] of international [situation] character:*

1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war; 2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable at present of rendering any military assistance to the Americans; 3) *In view of this, the USA will [would] be compelled [in the view of that] to yield in the Korean question, i.e. agree to such conditions of resolving the Korean question that would be advantageous for Korea and that would not give the enemies a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard;* 4) *I believe that the USA would be compelled to return Taiwan to China and, ultimately, [5].* The USA would be compelled to give up *also* on the separate treaty with Japanese reactionaries as well as the conversion of Japan into its satellite. [6] The USA will have to agree to the presence of the representatives of the Central People's government of China at the UN and the Security Council]. *I do not believe that China could obtain these concessions as a result of passive temporizing and patience.* I believe, *on the contrary,* that without serious struggle and without new *imposing* display of its force China will not obtain these and similar concessions, as well as it will not obtain Taiwan, which the Americans keep in their hands in fact not for Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] who has no chance to succeed, *but for themselves* or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

[It is not excluded, although unlikely that sending five six divisions] *One can suppose, that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war, which in turn would drag China into the [big] war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. [But one should not fear this] Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not,* because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states, without Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now, do not present a serious military force.

Such were considerations of a foreign policy nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a *minimum* of five-six divisions from You, while believing that You would find it possible to send these divisions to Korea, because earlier You had declared about your readiness to send Chinese armed forces to Korea.

But Your reply contains a consideration that is new to me, the one on the domestic situation of China which, in my opinion, is of decisive significance. You assert that, in case of a new war with regard to Korean events there will be *very* many malcontents in the country, that there is strong longing for peace in the country. *I understand it in such a way that the bourgeois parties that are part of the Chinese coalition may, in case of war, exploit discontent in the country against the Chinese communist party and its leadership* but this means that China, with regard to its internal situation, is not ready for a new war. [In such a big country as China, the future of the people is decided not by foreign policy factors, but by *the factors* of domestic situation. Of course, You should know the domestic situation in China better than anybody else.] If the internal situation in China does not allow You to risk such steps that might lead to a new war, then one should think *in general* if one should undertake such a risk. Therefore, I fully understand You and [your position] *Your predicament.*

As to the arrival of comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, I would be happy to meet them and to have a conversation with them.

*Respectfully* PHILIPPOV [STALIN]

4 October 1950

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