Article 19 of the Common Program

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To meet the conditions of this article of the Common Program, the central government established in October 19, 1949 the People’s Supervision Commission (PSC a GAC organ). In August 1948, the North China Provisional People's Congress passed the Organizational Outline of the North China People's Government, which clearly stipulated the establishment of the "North China People's Supervision Institute" as the supervisory organ, and made detailed provisions on its nature, tasks, organization, powers and procedures. Her main task was to control the administration. The 1949 PSC operated at both national and local levels, overseeing whether government agencies and civil servants fulfilled their duties. It was tasked with investigating cases of administrative misconduct, including officials who misused state funds, failed to implement decisions and regulations from higher authorities, or deviated from state budgets and economic plans.
The importance of this Commission was reflected in the position in the governmental hierarchy, it was put above the ministries. In October 1949, the third meeting of the CPGC approved the candidates for the PSC. Tan Pingshan , member of the rev GMD headed the commission, Liu Jingfan (CCP), Pan Zhenya and Qian Ying (CCP) were vice directors. There were 14 members (Zhang Xiuyan (CCP), Zhang Muyao, Zhu Yunshan (Rev.GMD), Han Zhao'e (CDL), Dong Lu'an (CCP secretly), Zhang Nanxian (CCP), He Renshi (Rev. GMD), Ning Wu (Rev. GMD), Guo Renzhi, An Ziwen (CCP), Xu Liqun (CCP), Liu Dachao (CCP), Qiu Jin (CCP), Shuai Mengqi (CCP)and, Xiao Ming (CCP)).
Although the commission conducted some regular inspections and investigations in 1950 and 1951, its routine functions were largely overshadowed by the massive mobilization of the Three Anti Campaign. Temporary organizations, like the Austerity Inspection Commission, were established to lead these efforts. Of the roughly 100,000 cases of graft and embezzlement handled during the campaign, only about 9,000 were uncovered by supervisory agencies. The commission could only send inspection teams to government offices on a random and ad hoc basis. Between October 1949 to June 1953, a total of 439 people's supervisory agencies were established across the country, with about 17,000 full-time and part-time supervisory cadres. In September 1954 the Commission was abolished.
In the same period (November 1949) the Political Bureau made the "Decision on the Establishment of Disciplinary Inspection Committees of the Central Committee and the Party at all levels.(Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. CCDI, a CCP organ). See Below The two (CCDI and PSC) were created at the same time, with the same goals and largely overlapping scopes, and an institutionalized connection channel and connection mechanism were established from the very beginning. After the 2nd National Conference on Organizational Work, which is held from September 21 until October 27, 1953, the design of the PSC was altered to fit the requirements of the First Five-year plan. A resolution was submitted to the Central Committee to introduce a "cadre position list" system, modeled after the Soviet nomenklatura system. This system, implemented shortly thereafter, classified all party and state cadres into nine categories and placed them under the supervision of party committees across various sectors and levels, streamlining and institutionalizing their management. Additional systems, like the personal dossier system and the cadre statistics reporting system, were also established following this meeting. The commission requires the status of Ministry of Supervision and Qian Ying became the head. “By the end of 1953, there were 3,586 supervisory agencies nationwide and an 18,000-strong force of full-time and part-time supervisory officials, plus 78,000 more "people's supervision correspondents." The ministry regularly called on the Party to file complaints about administrators at all levels.

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In 1949, the party had appointed some cadres to handle all complaints and suggestions of the people. In August 1949, the CCP started his own department within the Party secretariat. The government followed the example of the party in March 1951 and started a department for dealing with complaints and suggestions from the masses. The influx of opinions and criticism was so considerable that Liu Shaoqi on February 28, 1951, decided “…that all levels of the people’s government should establish “special and capable" organs to cope with people’s requests, to answer people’s letters, and to receive people’s visits.” This was a form of 'democratic centralism,'(see Article 15) serving as a tool for the masses to contribute problems, grievances, solutions, and ideas, which the CPC leadership would incorporate into its policies. The CPC would then present these policies back to the masses for critique, refining them further based on additional feedback—continuing the dialectical process. Democracy involved everyone's input, while centralization referred to the leadership's role in consolidating these ideas into unified policies.
For instance, during the years 1951–1954, complaints and accusations constituted a significant portion of the communications received by central government agencies, accounting for 18 percent of the total. Similarly, they made up 15.5 percent of the letters and visits to the GAC, 26 percent of the postbag in six major cities and provinces, and 20 percent to 25 percent of the visits and mail handled by the CCP General Office. Notably, only about one-third of these accusatory complaints were deemed false. While accusations later shifted focus towards corruption, in the 1950s, citizens were encouraged to report counterrevolutionaries, undesirable elements, and religious followers. Consequently, such signals from citizens held substantial informational value in identifying perceived enemies of the regime. The system proved ineffective for hapless peasants who found themselves subjected to the oppression of such cadres, as they discovered that attempting to complain to higher authorities often yielded little benefit. Firstly, village cadres frequently held the power to retaliate against those who lodged complaints. Additionally, higher-level bureaucrats tended to ignore or sideline letters from the public. In the initial months of 1952, Shandong Party and government offices received approximately 100,000 such letters, some of which contained information exposing village "despots," yet they remained largely unaddressed.

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Mao Zedong decided to intervene and he wanted more staff involved in the handling of the letters and complaints. Shortly afterwards, on June 7, 1951, the central government issued a decree to establish a special unit for complaints, questions, opinions, and accusations at all administrative levels. Luehrmann (2003) concludes that at the local level these bureaus are barely introduced, however Minzner (2006) writes “They also played a key role in the numerous Chinese political campaigns, serving as a channel for authorities to receive citizen tips and complaints on politically suspect activities.”
In 1953, Mao Zedong was still very unsatisfied with the way the cadres handle the letters of the people. “Take the matter of handling letters from the people, for instance. In some provinces the People's Government has piled up more than seventy thousand pieces of mail without handling them. We still don't know how many letters from the people have piled up in the Party and governmental organs at the levels below the province, but it can be imagined that the quantity is not small. Most of these letters from the people contain problems that they hope we will solve, and many of these ought to be handled promptly because they contain accusations against cadres for acts in complete disregard of the laws. ⁴”
And he called for action: “Therefore, in 1953, in coordination with Party rectification, Party building, and work in others areas, beginning with the handling of the letters from the people, please carry out an inspection of the circumstances that give rise to bureaucratism and commandism under which elements who violate law and discipline operate, and launch a resolute struggle against them. Wherever there is a typical case of bureaucratism, commandism, or violation of law and discipline it should be widely exposed in the newspapers.”
All newspapers published letters from readers and they tried to solve the problems. For example, in the Beijing Daily, the section of ‘Letters to the Editor’ became one of the most popular parts in the paper. The newspaper received a total of 2855 letters in 1952 and in 1953, a record high of 29,355 letters were received. The most famous example of the influence of the letters is the “Huang Yifeng Affair" "When Huang Yifeng,..., suppressed criticism and retaliated against a student, People's Daily not only exposed this affair but also followed up with an editorial, "Those that suppress criticism are the party's mortal enemies," forcing the Huang Yifeng case to be treated seriously." See also Part 8 .
Radio Beijingg established a listener letters department in August, 1953. See also Article 49.

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On August 10, 1952, a channel for information was formalized in the establishment of security and defense committees on a local level. On May 10, 1951, In his speech, Mao Zedong described to the 3rd National Congress on Security, how these committees have to function "...there must be widespread organizing of public security and defense committees among the masses. These committees should be organized by popular elections with the xiang as the unit in the countryside, and in the cities, with the [governmental and Party] organs, schools, factories, and neighborhoods as units. There should be at least three and at most eleven members in each committee. [The committees] must absorb the participation of reliable patriotic people from outside the Party and become United Front organizations for public security and defense. These committees will follow the leadership of the basic-level government and public security organs and will bear the responsibility for helping the People's Government liquidate counterrevolutionaries, guard against traitors and spies, protect the country, and for public order and security."
This system established widespread public security presence across all social levels in the country. Starting in 1952, security defense committees were established in various institutions including factories, schools, villages, and production brigades. Typically composed of three to eleven officers, mainly volunteers drawn from the CCP and Communist Youth League, these committees operated under the direction of city or county public security bureaus. They played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses to implement policies, maintain public order, and identify class enemies. It's worth mentioning that the authority of these committees was constrained during the period from 1954 to 1957. They were, for example, used in the anti-drug campaign which relied on local cadres to inform the public, because the campaign was kept silent for foreign countries (see Article 48). These security committees had both repressive and liberating aspects. While they were under the CCP's leadership and often employed surveillance and repression against street residents who opposed the new regime, their functions extended beyond mere suppression. They were responsible for monitoring and “reforming” the “Four Category Elements” landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements. They played a vital role in ensuring the daily security of street residents, garnering positive support from residents for their efforts in crime prevention and resolution at the neighborhood level. Additionally, activities like the Newspaper Reading Team, initially intended for indoctrination, inadvertently provided access to new information for illiterate residents, which was seen as beneficial to the public welfare and elicited high interest from the residents.
The functioning of various local committees remains unclear. For instance, the reporting of offenses has been quite disorganized. Some local supervision commissions reported cases of administrative misconduct to the Central Commission, while others sent them to the administration at the same level, local government personnel offices, or directly to the GAC. In the spring of 1951, Li Weihan highlighted additional challenges. Relations between Party and non-Party cadres were not as strong as they should be. He urged Party cadres to grant their non-Party counterparts more authority and responsibility, respect their views and opinions, and seek their criticism of Party work. The guiding principles for Party and non-Party relations were to be "honesty, mutual respect, mutual learning, and mutual assistance." Party cadres were expected to educate non-Party officials on the provisions of the Common Program, while non-Party cadres were encouraged to improve their political understanding through ideological study and participation in mass movements, particularly land reform. The partial failure of this system was attributed to inefficiency and disorganization in street-level work, characterized by the "mangluan" (忙乱, "working in a rush and getting into a muddle") phenomenon and the "five excesses" (五多): excessive organizations (组织多), excessive leaders (领导多), excessive holding of multiple positions (兼职多), excessive meetings (会议多), and excessive survey tables (表报多).

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On November 9, 1949, the CCP renamed his internal control system from Central Control Commission to Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Zhu De was appointed as the head. On that same day, the Politburo decided to establish Party Core Groups within the hierarchy of the Party. The Discipline Commission had the task to implement this structure. The Party Core Groups (PCGs) operated at both national and local levels, including ministries, with the mission of ensuring and strengthening Party leadership within the government. PCGs typically consisted of three to five Party members who held key positions in government agencies. For example, in a ministry within the GAC, a PCG would include a minister, vice ministers, and one or two bureau chiefs. The PCGs were responsible for ensuring that all decisions made by the CCP Central Committee regarding government work were implemented without violations. (See Part 7 )
In daily life, everyone interacts with numerous representatives of state and Party authority, including their small group leader, security defense committee members, residents' committee members, mediation committee members, cadres from the street business office, police officers, as well as Party members and secretaries. On March 10, 1953, the Politburo decided to abolish the cooperation of Party Core Group secretaries at the central administration level to prevent the risk of government departments becoming disconnected from the leadership of the Party Central Committee. The CCP Politburo aimed to strengthen Party control over government work. From that point forward, major principles, policies, plans, and important matters related to government operations had to be discussed, decided, or approved by the Party Central Committee. Additionally, the work of Party Core Groups in all central government agencies was to be reinforced and placed under the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee. In the period between 1950 and 1954, the directives of the party and of the government were strictly separated. Only the measurement of September 1951 to reform the intellectuals was a joint decree. See also Article 47.

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Chapter 2 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents
• Contact