Article 19 of the Common Program
Text
Article 19 of the Common Program

People's supervisory organs shall be set up in the People's Governments of county and municipal level and above, to supervise the performance of duties by the state organs of various levels and by public functionaries of all types, and to propose that disciplinary action be taken against state organs and public functionaries who violate the law or are negligent in the performance of their duties.
The people or people's organisations shall have the right to file charges with the people's supervisory organs or people's judicial organs against any state organs or any public functionaries that violate the law or are negligent in the performance of their duties.


To meet the conditions of this article of the Common Program, the central government establishes in October 1949 the People’s Supervision Commission. Her main task is to control the administration at national and local levels. "...(it) was responsible for investigating cases of administrative malfeasance involving officials who made improper use of state funds, who failed to carry out the decisions and regulations of higher levels, or who departed from state budgets and economic plans."
Harding Harry (1981). Organizing China: The problem of bureaucracy, 1949-1976. Stanford University Press. Page 79
The importance of this Commission is reflected in the position in the governmental hierarchy, it is put above the ministries.
Tan Pingshan
Tan Pingshan (1886-1956) Director of the People's Supervision Commission of the Government Administration Council (1949-1954)
, member of the rev GMD heads the commission and
Qian Ying
Qian Ying (1903-1973) Vice Director of the People's Supervision Commission of the Government Administration Council (1949-1954)
(CCP)is vice director. But “Although it was involved in some regular inspections and investigations in 1950 and 1951, the massive mobilization of the Three Anti Campaign overshadowed the commission's routine functions. Ad hoc organizations were set up to lead campaigns such as the Austerity Inspection Commission. Among the 100,000 or so cases of graft/embezzlement that were handled during the Three Anti Campaign, only about 9,000 were discovered by supervisory agencies."
Lü Xiaobo (2000). Cadres and corruption: The organizational involution of the Chinese communist party. Stanford University Press. Page 140
The commission was “.. only able to send inspection teams into government offices on a random and ad hoc basis.”
Harding (1981). Organizing China. Page 80
After the 2nd national conference on organizational work, which is held form September 21 till October 27, 1953 the design of the People’s Supervision Commission is altered, to fit the requirements of the First Five year plan. “A resolution was proposed to the Central Committee to implement a "cadre position list" system, a copy of the Soviet nomenklatura system. Under this system, implemented soon afterward, all party/state cadres were classified into nine categories and put under the supervision of party committees of various sectors and levels) and their management was rationalized and institutionalized. Other complementary systems, such as the personal dossier system and the cadre statistics report system, were also put into place after this meeting.”
Lü Xiaobo (2000). Cadres and corruption. Pages 144-145
The commission requires the status of Ministry of Supervision and Qian Ying becomes the head. “By the end of 1953, there were 3,586 supervisory agencies nationwide and an 18,000-strong force of full-time and part-time supervisory officials, plus 78,000 more "people's supervision correspondents."
Lü (2000). Cadres and corruption. Page 142
The ministry regularly calls on the party to file complaints about administrators at all levels.

Handling of complaints...

Already in 1949 the party has appointed some cadres to handle all complaints and suggestions of the people. In August 1949 the CCP starts his own department within the Party secretariat. The government follows the example of the party in March 1951 and starts a department for dealing with complaints and suggestions from the masses. The influx of opinions and criticism is so huge that Liu Shaoqi on February 28, 1951 decides “…that all levels of the people’s government should establish “special and capable" organs to cope with people’s requests, to answer people’s letters, and to receive people’s visits.”
Document: 28-2-1951 Liu Shaoqi On the System of People's Representatives Conferences and the Transition to Elected People's Congresses
The system fails "Hapless peasants exposed to the tyranny of such cadres found that it didn't pay to try to complain to higher levels of authority. For one thing, the village cadres were frequently in a position to retaliate against the complainers.60 For their part, higher level bureaucrats tended to pigeonhole letters from the public. In the first half of 1952, 100,000 such letters, some of which contained information exposing village "despots," accumulated in Shantung Party and government offices."
Bernstein Thomas P. (1968). Problems of village leadership after land reform. The China Quarterly, 36. Page 19

Intervention of Mao Zedong...

Mao Zedong decides to intervene and he wants more staff involved in the handling of the letters and complaints.
Document: 16-5-1951 Mao Zedong Comment on the "Report of the Secretary's Office on the Handling of Letters from the Masses"
Shortly afterwards on June 7, 1951,the central government issues a decree to establish a special unit for complaints, questions, opinions and accusations at all administrative levels.
Luehrmann
Luehrmann Laura M. (2003). Facing citizen complaints in China, 1951-1996. Asian Survey, 43, (5). Page 851
concludes that at local level these bureaus are barely introduced but Minzner
Minzner Carl F. (2006). Xinfang: An alternative to formal Chinese legal institutions. Stan. J. Int'l L. 42. Page 115
writes “They also played a key role in the numerous Chinese political campaigns, serving as a channel for authorities to receive citizen tips and complaints on politically suspect activities.”
In 1953 Mao Zedong is still very unsatisfied in the way the cadres handle letters of the people. “Take the matter of handling letters from the people, for instance. In some provinces the People's Government has piled up more than seventy thousand pieces of mail without handling them. We still don't know how many letters from the people have piled up in the Party and governmental organs at the levels below the province, but it can be imagined that the quantity is not small. Most of these letters from the people contain problems that they hope we will solve, and many of these ought to be handled promptly because they contain accusations against cadres for acts in complete disregard of the laws. 4”
Document:15-05-1951 Mao Zedong Instructions on resolutions of the Third National Conference on Public Security
And he calls for action: “Therefore, in 1953, in coordination with Party rectification, Party building, and work in others areas, beginning with the handling of the letters from the people, please carry out an inspection of the circumstances that give rise to bureaucratism and commandism under which elements who violate law and discipline operate, and launch a resolute struggle against them. Wherever there is a typical case of bureaucratism, commandism, or violation of law and discipline it should be widely exposed in the newspapers.”
05-01-1953 Mao Zedong Intra-Party Directive on Rectification
All newspapers publishes letters from readers and they try to solve the problems. For example in the Beijing Daily the section of ‘Letters to the Editor’ became one of the most popular parts in the paper. The newspaper received a total of 2855 letters in 1952 and in 1953, a record high of 29,355 letters were received.
Hung Chang-tai (2014). Inside a Chinese Communist Municipal Newspaper: Purges at the Beijing Daily. Page 357
The most famous example of the influence of the letters is the “
Huang Yifeng
Huang Yifeng (1906-1988)
Affair" "When Huang Yifeng, director of the Transportation Department of the East China Military and Political Committee as well as president of the East China Transportation Training School, suppressed criticism and retaliated against a student, People's Daily not only exposed this affair but also followed up with an editorial, "Those that suppress criticism are the party's mortal enemies," forcing the Huang Yifeng case to be treated seriously."
Wang Renlong(2006). How could the media report on corruption in the early days of New China?
See also Teiwes Frederick C. 1993 “Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965” pp.96-98
See also Article 49.

Security and defense committees on local level..

On August 10, 1952 a channel for information is formalized in the establishment of security and defense committees on local level.
Article 1. For the purpose of mobilizing the masses to help the people’s government in anti-treason, anti-espionage, anti-bandit and anti-arson activities, and in stamping out counterrevolutionary activities--thereby protecting the state and public order--security committees shall be set up in all cities after the campaign for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries begins and in all rural districts following the completion of agrarian reform. Ministry of Public Security, Provisional Regulations Governing the Organizational Security Committees, August 10, 1952 NCNA, Peking, August 10, 1952
On May 10, 1951 Mao Zedong describes in his speech to the 3rd national congress on security, how these committees have to function "...there must be widespread organizing of public security and defense committees among the masses. These committees should be organized by popular elections with the xiang as the unit in the countryside, and in the cities, with the [governmental and Party] organs, schools, factories, and neighborhoods as units. There should be at least three and at most eleven members in each committee. [The committees] must absorb the participation of reliable patriotic people from outside the Party and become United Front organizations for public security and defense. These committees will follow the leadership of the basic-level government and public security organs and will bear the responsibility for helping the People's Government liquidate counterrevolutionaries, guard against traitors and spies, protect the country, and for public order and security."
15-05-1951 Mao Zedong Instructions on resolutions of the Third National Conference on Public Security
It resulted in a system where "The public security system penetrated deep into the smallest social units in the country. Since 1952 security defense committees have been set up in factories, enterprises, schools, streets, villages, communes and production brigades. The committee consists of three to eleven officers and is subject to the direction of the city or county public security bureau. These committees have been the instrument through which the regime mobilizes the masses for executing policies, preserving public order and eliminating class enemies. However, it is important to note that the power of these committees was limited during 1954-1957.”
Tao Lung-Sheng (1974). Politics and law enforcement in China: 1949-1970. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 22, (4). Page 727
“In the case of a city, units are set up, i.e. one unit for factories, one for business, one for schools, one for each block, etc. This public security committee while it is the smallest yet the most fundamental and effective unit of the Chinese Communist police system. It constitutes the most important link in the chain to control the Chinese people, for the section of personnel is unusually strict and the powers entrusted are enormous.” Yee Frank S. H. 1957 "Chinese Communist Police and Courts", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 48 Issue 1 p.85
Park (2015) does not only show the repressive side of these security committes but also emancipating side. "..., it is clear that the Public Security Committee, under the leadership of the RCs, could be characterized by its repressive and surveillant nature vis-à-vis the street residents who were not willing to accept the legitimacy of the new regime.51 However, this organization did not limit its function to the suppression of dissidents. The Committee played crucial roles for daily life security (治安) of the street residents, thereby receiving residents’ positive support in its activities for prevention and addressing of crimes at the neighborhood level.52 ...the Newspaper Reading Team was conceived for indoctrination which had the effect of “brainwashing” on residents, the practices of newspaper reading led by the RCs also served as one of the means for illiterate residents to access new information, which was closely related to “public welfare,” thereby triggering the residents’ high interest"
Park Sang-Soo (2015). Neighborhood Space in 1950s Beijing: Urban Governance in the Early PRC. Page 15
The functioning of the various committees at the local level is not clear, for example, the reporting of offenses has been very messy. “...when reporting cases of administrative misconduct, some local supervision commissions sent them to the Central Commission, others to the administration of the same level, or to the personnel offices of local government, or directly to the State Council.”
Lü (2000). Cadres and corruption. Page 141
In the spring of 1951 Li Weihan already points at other difficulties "...relations between Party and non-Party cadres were not as good as they should be. He called on Party cadres to give their non-Party counterparts greater authority and responsibility, to respect their views and opinions, and to seek their criticism of the Party's work. The principles guiding relations between Party and non- Party officials were to be "honesty, mutual respect, mutual study, and mutual assistance." … Party cadres were duty-bound to educate non-Party officials in the provisions of the Common Program, and non-Party cadres were asked to improve their political understanding through ideological study and by participating in the ongoing mass movements of the period, particularly land reform."
Harding (1981). Organizing China. Page 41
Park (2015) mentions "The ineffectiveness and disorder in performing the street works (because they) were characterized by “mangluan” (忙乱“working in rush and getting into a muddle”) phenomena with “five excesses”(五多): excessive organizations (组织多), excessive leaders (领导多), excessive holding of multiple positions (兼职多), excessive meetings (会议多), and excessive survey tables (表报多).31"
Park (2015). Neighborhood Space in 1950s Beijing. Page 9-10
as main reasons for the partly failure of this system.

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection..

On November 9, 1949 the CCP renames his internal control system from Central Control Commission to Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and
Zhu De
Zhu De(1886-1976) Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (1949-1955)
becomes the head. On that same day the Politburo decides to establish Party Core Groups within the hierarchy of the Party. The Discipline Commission has the task to implement this structure. The Party Core Groups will be active on national level; the ministries and on local level "Their mission was to "ensure as well as strengthen the Party leadership of the government." The PCGs usually consisted of three to five Party members who assumed leading roles in the government agencies. In a ministry in the State Council, for instance, a PCG would include a minister, vice ministers, and one or two bureau chiefs. “en "Party core groups must see to it that all the decisions by the CCP Central Committee concerning the government work are carried out and that no violations occur."
Zheng Shiping (1997). Party vs.state in post-1949 China: The institutional dilemma. Cambridge University Press. Page 84
In his or her daily life everybody has to deal with “…many representatives of state and Party power -their small group leader, security defense committee members, residents committee members, mediation committee members, cadres from the street business office, policemen, and Party members and secretaries.”
Lubman Stanley (1967). Mao and mediation: Politics and dispute resolution in communist China. Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. Pages 1312-1313
On March 10, 1953 the Politburo decides to abolish the cooperation of the secretaries of the Party Core Groups on the central administration level in order "…to avoid the danger of various departments of the government becoming divorced from the leadership of the Party Central Committee," the CCP Politburo decided "to strengthen the Party leadership over the government work… From now on, major and important principles, policies, plans and matters in government work must be discussed, decided or approved by the Party Central Committee. . . . [T]he work of Party core groups in all the agencies of the central government must be strengthened and be under the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee.”
Zheng Shiping (1997). Party Pages 85
In the period between 1950 and 1954 the directives of the party and of the government are strictly separated. Only the measurement of September 1951 to reform the intellectuals is a joint decree.
Zheng (1997). Party Pages 89-90
See also Article 47.

Conclusion...

Despite the development of various organs at national and local level where one can complain about the administration and party, the implementation and results remain weak.

Literature Notes Documents...

1. Harding Harry (1981). Organizing China: The problem of bureaucracy, 1949-1976. Stanford University Press. Page 79 Back
2. Lü Xiaobo (2000). Cadres and corruption: The organizational involution of the Chinese communist party. Stanford University Press. Page 140 Back
3. Harding (1981). Organizing China. Page 80 Back
4. Lü Xiaobo (2000). Cadres and corruption. Pages 144-145 Back
5. Lü (2000). Cadres and corruption. Page 142 Back
7. Bernstein Thomas P. (1968). Problems of village leadership after land reform. The China Quarterly, 36. Page 19 Back
9. Luehrmann Laura M. (2003). Facing citizen complaints in China, 1951-1996. Asian Survey, 43, (5). Page 851 Back
10. Minzner Carl F. (2006). Xinfang: An alternative to formal Chinese legal institutions. Stan. J. Int'l L. 42. Page 115 Back
12.05-01-1953 Mao Zedong Intra-Party Directive on Rectification
13.Hung Chang-tai (2014). Inside a Chinese Communist Municipal Newspaper: Purges at the Beijing Daily. Page 357 Back
14. Wang Renlong(2006). How could the media report on corruption in the early days of New China? Back
15.See also Teiwes Frederick C. 1993 “Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965” pp.96-98 Back
16.Article 1. For the purpose of mobilizing the masses to help the people’s government in anti-treason, anti-espionage, anti-bandit and anti-arson activities, and in stamping out counterrevolutionary activities--thereby protecting the state and public order--security committees shall be set up in all cities after the campaign for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries begins and in all rural districts following the completion of agrarian reform. Ministry of Public Security, Provisional Regulations Governing the Organizational Security Committees, August 10, 1952 NCNA, Peking, August 10, 1952 Back
18. Tao Lung-Sheng (1974). Politics and law enforcement in China: 1949-1970. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 22, (4). Page 727 Back
19.“In the case of a city, units are set up, i.e. one unit for factories, one for business, one for schools, one for each block, etc. This public security committee while it is the smallest yet the most fundamental and effective unit of the Chinese Communist police system. It constitutes the most important link in the chain to control the Chinese people, for the section of personnel is unusually strict and the powers entrusted are enormous.” Yee Frank S. H. 1957 "Chinese Communist Police and Courts", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 48 Issue 1 p.85 Back
20."..., it is clear that the Public Security Committee, under the leadership of the RCs, could be characterized by its repressive and surveillant nature vis-à-vis the street residents who were not willing to accept the legitimacy of the new regime.51 However, this organization did not limit its function to the suppression of dissidents. The Committee played crucial roles for daily life security (治安) of the street residents, thereby receiving residents’ positive support in its activities for prevention and addressing of crimes at the neighborhood level.52 ...the Newspaper Reading Team was conceived for indoctrination which had the effect of “brainwashing” on residents, the practices of newspaper reading led by the RCs also served as one of the means for illiterate residents to access new information, which was closely related to “public welfare,” thereby triggering the residents’ high interest" Park Sang-Soo (2015). Neighborhood Space in 1950s Beijing: Urban Governance in the Early PRC. Page 15 Back
21. Lü (2000). Cadres and corruption. Page 141 Back
22. Harding (1981). Organizing China. Page 41 Back
23. Park (2015). Neighborhood Space in 1950s Beijing. Page 9-10 Back
24. Zheng Shiping (1997). Party vs.state in post-1949 China: The institutional dilemma. Cambridge University Press. Page 84 Back
25. Lubman Stanley (1967). Mao and mediation: Politics and dispute resolution in communist China. Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. Pages 1312-1313 Back
26. Zheng Shiping (1997). Party Pages 85 Back
27. Zheng (1997). Party Pages 89-90 Back

Meetings....

  • 10-05-1951 - 16-05-1951 3rd national conference on public security works
  • 21-09-1953 - 27-10-1953 2nd national organization work conference
  • Continue to Chapter 3