Part 4: Creating a consultative conference

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Throughout the 1940s, Mao Zedong repeatedly sought to meet Stalin in person in Moscow. In April 1948, Mao was on the verge of traveling to the Soviet Union for this purpose, but at the last moment, Stalin declined the meeting. Despite this setback, Mao continued to make several attempts in 1948 and early 1949 to persuade Stalin to meet him, all of which were unsuccessful. The primary reason for these refusals was Stalin's reluctance to offend the government of Jiang Jieshi, with whom Moscow had diplomatic relations. These relations were not solely diplomatic; the Soviet Union also engaged in the sale of weaponry to the GMD government. Mikoyan, the special envoy of Stalin, gave an additional explanation: "Should the trip become public knowledge, Mikoyan said, Mao could have been "named a Moscow agent. This would have been detrimental to the prestige of the CCP and would have been exploited by the imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique against the Chinese communists."

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Mao Zedong wanted to consult Stalin on several topics. One of them was the matter of organizing a political consultative conference. Instead of personal contact, Mao Zedong, and Stalin corresponded to each other about this theme. Mao Zedong was afraid the Americans intend to "…organize and send their lackeys so that they infiltrate the political consultative meeting and the democratic coalition government and could create an opposition bloc there and undermine from within the people’s revolutionary front in order that the revolution could not be consistently implemented." Stalin agreed with Mao and proposed to him to organize immediately a political consultative conference after the takeover of Beijing, then the GMD would be incapable of creating their own political consultative conference. Mao Zedong answered Stalin that the moment had not yet arrived to establish a political consultative conference. He wants to wait until Nanjing, Wuhan, or Shanghai is firmly in the hands of the PLA. Mao is not afraid the Minzhu Dangpai will join an initiative of the GMD. "At the present time the majority of the democratic politicians are in our areas, they themselves want to be there, and [come] to us. Whereas before we invited many but they did not go, now after the victories of our armies, it is enough to give them the smallest hint, and they immediately come."
This opinion of Mao Zedong appears to be right. On January 22, 1949, some 53 members of the CDL and other political persons publicly declared to support the CCP and condemned the foreign policy of the US. Mao Zedong also stated that several GMD generals, like Bai Chongxi, Tan Enbo, and Liu Ruming openly or secretly contacted the PLA in order to surrender. (However, all 3 of them eventually fled to Taiwan.)
As an alternative of receiving Mao Zedong in Moscow, Stalin sent his special envoy Mikoyan on a secret mission to the headquarters of the CCP in Xibaipo. He arrived on January 30, 1949 and had a number of talks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and other Politburo members. On January 30 and February 4, 1949, they had extensive talks about the establishment of a coalition government and about the formation of a preparatory committee for the founding of a political consultative conference. Mao Zedong showed Mikoyan, a list of 22 political and social organizations that were eligible for an invitation. Changes in the available invitation lists can provide significant insights into the power struggles between the Minzhu Dangpai and the CCP, as well as among the Minzhu Dangpai factions competing for influence within the new regime. An invitation list attached to a draft by the CCP leadership from October 1948 included 39 entities: 9 DPGs (Minzhu Dangpai), 6 factions representing local interests, 6 factions representing the military, and representatives from 17 civic associations. However, just one week later, the number of DPGs had decreased to seven, excluding the Zhigong Party and the Democratic National Construction Association.
On July 4, 1949, Liu Shaoqi assured Stalin, during his meeting with him in Moscow, that in the new consultative conference, the CCP will have the control. There are about 100 political groups active in the period between 1945 and 1949. Stalin constantly urged the CCP to form a coalition government as soon as possible, however, he also wrote "Before creating a government, one should comprehensively clear the liberated territory from hostile elements, internal and foreign, strengthen one’s cadres, bring forces and military supplies to the frontlines of the People’s Liberation Army. This will require time. How much time this will require is something that the Chinese comrades must determine for themselves." Mao Zedong replied on another occasion: "Now we decided to form a government in the months of August-September of this year. All the preparatory work must be completed before the middle of the month of August. In the middle or in the second half of the month of August one can call the political consultative meeting and form the government."
In the same cable, Mao Zedong told Stalin, he is convinced the Minzhu Dangpai will eventually support the CCP although a lot of persuasion is needed, and he told Stalin the total number of delegates can be expanded to 500.

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The CCP has invited 135 congress participants to come to Beijing to hold a preparatory meeting. On June 11, 1949, the CCP and various democratic parties and democrats without party affiliation hold a preparatory meeting for the preparatory meeting of the new political consultative conference in Beijing. Candidates for the Standing Committee were chosen. The purpose of this gathering (15-06-1949 - 19-06-1949) is to work on a Common Program. On the first day of the Preparatory meeting of the CPPCC, June 15, 1949, Mao Zedong called them to take on the necessary preparations for convening a political consultative conference. He is convinced this meeting will be a success, because all the delegates want to make an end to the domination of imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism, and they all want to eliminate the GMD government. Mao Zedong said "This battle can be won because equal minded people can beat those enemies and make it possible to strive for a China that is independent, which has peace, unity, power and prosperity. He also claims there are 2 important tasks for the new coalition government. The first one is to eliminate all reactionaries, the second is economic recovery."
The 135 delegates to the conference represented 23 organizations. They were from different areas of China and had different political, social, and economic background. About 50 delegates were members of the CCP, although during the meeting they should represent their Minzhu Dangpai. See for an explanation of Dual membership.
There were only 18 female delegates. Different backgrounds can be seen in a few examples.Chen Mingshu was a military educated person, who was prime minister in the GMD government. Dissatisfied with Jiang Jieshi’s policy, he left the GMD. He was very impressed by the military strength and discipline of the PLA and in 1949 he was a middleman during the negotiations between the CCP and US ambassador Stuart. He is a delegate at this conference for the Revolutionary GMD (Rev.GMD).
Chen Jiageng better known as Tan Kah Kee was a prominent businessman, who in his youth immigrated to Singapore. He rapidly became a successful entrepreneur. In 1940, after a meeting with Mao Zedong he supported the communists and he tried to persuade Overseas Chinese to stop their funding to the GMD regime. In 1946, he even asked American President Truman to stop the aid for Jiang Jieshi. In January 1949, he accepted the invitation for the preparatory meeting of the CPPCC, but he insisted that his visit to China was for touring to see for himself the situation in the liberated areas. He was a delegate at this meeting for the Overseas Chinese. In February 1950 he returned to Singapore and in May 1950, he left for China definitely. His decision to stay in China after May 1950, became a significant patriotic symbol for the overseas Chinese, and an inspiration for thousands of Chinese youths in Southeast Asia to go to China in the 1950's.
Many delegates had studied on universities and had been abroad for their study or/and for their work. Most of them were in Japan. In West Europe: France and Germany are favourite destinations. In East Europe the SU is favourite. America is also a very popular destination.

A number of prominent people received a personal invitation of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. They were not affiliated with any political party or organization. For Chinese liberals, political engagement did not always involve formal membership in existing political parties or the establishment of new ones. Prominent Chinese academics and intellectuals believed that even by maintaining a certain distance from day-to-day politics, they could wield significant political influence surpassing that of their European or American counterparts. This perception may have stemmed from the enduring impact of the traditional literati class, which endowed them with a unique ability to shape political discourse and exert influence despite their relative detachment from routine political activities. Their role did not cease after the regime change in October 1949. Some prominent old intellectuals received honorary positions because they had been targets of the CCP's united front policy, while others were appointed to specialized roles where they could apply their expertise. Although old intellectuals could not claim virtue or seniority, they held valuable knowledge that the regime required, enabling them to survive in functional positions.

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Several members of the CCP were also (secretly) followers of one or more Minzhu Dangpai. During the civil war, the existence of dual membership had been denied and GMD’s evidence denounced as false. "An appearance of independence was maintained for the foreign and domestic public but MPG (Minzhu Dangpai) members were well aware CCP members in their midst." Chu Tunan , a historian born in Hunan, was a party member since 1926 but he was also a member of the CDL. This dual membership was quite common, with some members being directly sent to influence the Minzhu Dangpai from within. This policy became official after 1949. It is important to note that while the CPC was open to encouraging the minor parties to expand, there were suggestions as early as May 1951 for Communist Party members to comprise up to ten or twenty percent of the total membership in these minor parties to assist with organizational matters.
It is very difficult to tell how many double memberships exist. The work of the United Front department is secret. Only 2 years before his death in 1980, it became publicly known that Sha Qianli, a member of the CNDCA, also was a member of the CCP. Sometimes a person wants to become a member of the CCP but is refused on tactical grounds. The CDL leader Wu Han applied for membership in 1948, but Zhou Enlai convinced him his role in the United Front was too important. In 1957, Wu Han became secretly a CCP member. The CCP seeks for support of the intellectuals but does not want a large number of them within the party. The opposite is also possible. "Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) asked Hu (Yuzhi), “Are you an open CCP member or still an underground member?” Hu replied that his membership remained a secret. Zhou’s instruction was, “As an underground member, it is better for you to continue to work inside the democratic parties.” ⁴⁵ Hu Yuzhi was careful not to appear “communistic,” particularly in the early 1950s, when Mao was courting members of democratic parties to build a broader base of support for the new Communist regime."
There is also a group who lost contact during the civil war with the CCP and they looked for political shelter in the Minzhu Dangpai. The third group are persons who are members of the Minzhu Dangpai, and later on become CCP members or were member of the CCP and left the party. Qian Jiaju who was member of the CCP and was a member of the CDL, wrote in his memoires: "Political parties in capitalist countries are exclusive. No one can join two political parties at the same time. But it is different in China. There are many overlapping members and people are used to them. Even a leader of one party can be a member of another party… This is why it is unrealistic and impossible to change democratic parties into opposition parties, as suggested by many young friends. These Chinese-style democratic parties can only be little parties under the leadership of the CPC."
The vast majority of Minzhu Dangpai members can be described as dissidents from the GMD; they are individuals who once belonged to the GMD but left due to political differences, persecution, or personal rivalries. The intricate pasts of many of these individuals are so intertwined that a complete account would read like the plot of a complex historical novel.

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Not only Minzhu Dangpai members were invited but also members of mass organizations. These are, for example, the All-China Federation of Labour (ACFL). An organization founded in 1925. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of this trade union. The All-China Federation of Democratic Women (ACFDW) founded just before this meeting on March 1949. The Honorary President was Soong Ching Ling, the wife of Sun Yat sen. The All-China Federation of Students (ACFS) also founded in March 1949. These organizations are specially founded for this meeting in June. After this political consultative conference, other mass organizations are founded to be able to send delegates to the political consultative conference of September 1949. See Table Mass organizations. These mass organizations, although inherently political, do not strictly fall within the bureaucratic structures of state power. However, they are intricately linked to the party, the army, and later, the government in numerous ways. They constitute a vital component of the organizational framework underpinning Chinese Communist governance, serving as the intermediary link between the bureaucratic ruling bodies and the general populace.
The majority of the organizations convened shortly before this political consultative conference their own congress to choose their delegates for this preparatory conference.
Most of the participants at this conference were enthusiast. Wu Yaozhong a delegate for the Christian religious people told during the meeting: "It is time now that Christians should free themselves from capitalist and imperialist traditions." Additionally, the Buddhists were very positive. In a letter to Mao Zedong, and leaders of the Minzhu Dangpai Ju Zan wrote: "All Buddhists have expressed their admiration and appreciative joy over the dawn of the new era.
2. Buddhists would like to give ten thousand thanks to the Chinese Communist Party for eliminating feudalism and superstition, which have long defiled the sangha, and Buddhists are looking forward to a new life.
3. Buddhism, unlike other religions, is atheism, and it advocates the realization of the doctrines of non-self and serving others. Therefore, it is comparable to the spirit of the time (Marxism). The appearance of a new form of Buddhism in China would facilitate the liberation of Tibet and Taiwan, where Buddhism is much revered. New Buddhism will also help promote diplomatic friendship with neighboring Buddhist countries, thus contributing to world revolution.
4. A movement of "shifting to production" and "shifting to scholarship" should be carried out among the sangha so that the feudal system and superstitious beliefs could be destroyed, and backward Buddhists could be transformed.”
In addition, other delegates were excited, Huang Yanpei an economist talked about a building with 5 entries: "Independence, democracy, peace, unity, and prosperity with power. The flag atop the building was the banner of New Democracy."

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It is difficult to assess how sincere and 'voluntary' the delegates' enthusiasm truly is, as for example, no Church organization was given the chance to elect these or any other delegates. The 'delegates' were chosen by the Communist authorities, who appointed them as the 'representatives of the Churches.'
The party imposed three conditions on all conference delegates: first, the recognition of CCP's leadership; second, the commitment to pursue the revolution to its completion; and third, the establishment of a people's democratic dictatorship that excluded counterrevolutionary elements and precluded the possibility of an alternative path. The future participants of the CPPCC are extensively vetted for their sympathies. Their feelings range from anti-Japanese, anti-Jiang Jieshi, anti-feudalism, and anti-American to pro-Soviet Union and pro-unitary state. According to the regulations of the Preparatory Committee, the first group of representatives was approved at the 8th meeting of the Standing Committee of the New CPPCC Preparatory Committee after more than three months of consultation. On September 20, the list of representatives participating in the new CPPCC was finally settled.

The significant inclusion of traditional doctors as members in the CPPCC was often regarded as evidence of their elevated status within the Communist regime. Notably, there was no explicit campaign to criticize any lingering "feudal" elements in their perspectives. It is possible that traditional Chinese doctors swiftly and readily discarded the conservative aspects that earlier twentieth-century modernists found objectionable. However, the divergent treatment by the Communist government implies that they considered the traditional conservatism represented by these doctors to be less threatening than the bourgeois ideas and assertions of autonomy put forth by the modern medical profession. (see Article 48) Even those who chose not to participate in the CPPCC saw themselves as Liang Shuming puts it as ‘loyal opposition” “a wish shared by those who chose to stay on the mainland after 1949.”
In 1949, the CCP had over 5 million members. The Minzhu Dangpai had 20.000 members in total. It is difficult to determine the total number of Minzhu Dangpai members because in 1947 the GMD regime prohibited some parties. According to rough estimates, the CDL had 15.000 members in 1947.

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This preparatory meeting ended with the election of a permanent committee of 21 members. Mao Zedong and Zhu De are on behave of the CCP chairmen. Li Jishen (Rev. GMD) is also elected chairman and Lin Boqu (CCP) is general secretary. The committee choses members for 6 workgroups. Their job is the composition of the list of participants for the next political consultative conference, to prepare a Common Program and organic laws. One law for the new political consultative conference and one for the coalition government. The workgroups have also to decide on the new national emblem, a national flag, and a national hymn.
Zhou Enlai coordinated the 6 groups and Mao Zedong supervised the work on the Common Program. Zhou Enlai temporarily put aside many affairs at hand, and concentrated a period of time to complete the drafting of the "Common Program". On June 30, the first draft was successfully completed. The draft of the "Common Program" had five revisions (August 22nd, September 5th, September 6th, September 11th and September 13th). Mao Zedong made some structural adjustments and some paragraphs were revised. On September 13, there was the final discussion and amendments. See Meeting and see also Part 6.
The 29-year-old Wu Jian had been asked to end the congress in a celebratory way. He used the popular Yangge. This is a combination of dance and song. Its origin lays in rural dance performances and is used by the CCP cultural department for propaganda aims. To reach rural audiences, propagandists utilized yangge, a well-known folk art, as a tool. New yangge—a reformed rural dance infused with political themes celebrating the accomplishments of communist rule—along with its accompanying short plays, which gained popularity during the Yan'an era, became a political instrument for conveying anti-sect messages to the villagers. The Huairen hall of Zhongnanhai in Beijing is filled with the delegates on the evening of June 19, 1949, to enjoy the theatre performance. One of the acts performed is ‘The big Yangge of the celebration of Liberation’ in which the liberation of Beijing and the successes in the war against the GMD are the main topics. The audience is very impressed. See also Article 45

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On June 21, 1949, two days after the end of the preparatory political consultative conference, Liu Shaoqi went on a secret mission to Moscow to visit Stalin. The purpose of this trip was to ensure financial, and technical aid from the SU. During the first meeting, Stalin clarified the terms of the US$ 300 million credit, all of it to be used for the purchase of Soviet goods and equipment at 1 percent interest, which was to be repaid within ten years and the SU was ready to send its first group of experts to China. Stalin also granted the CCP extensive military assistance. Liu Shaoqi reported on the preparatory conference. Another part of his mission was to learn about the construction and structure of government, economic and cultural commissions and mass organizations. He and his delegation visited several factories and collective farms. Stalin met with Liu Shaoqi 6 times, an unprecedented event. Stalin agreesdwith Liu Shaoqi about the CPPC's coalition policy: "The point of view that considers cooperation between you and the Chinese national bourgeoisie as the way of drawing them into the government is correct." Stalin proposed a kind of "division of labor" to the CCP leadership. He downplayed China's status by compelling it to accept that it had not yet reached socialism and needed to go through a phase of "new democracy" as preparation. At the same time, he elevated China by assigning it the role of leading revolutionary movements in East Asia. This approach acknowledged the PRC significant size and influence within the international communist movement, as well as the global admiration sparked by the success of the Chinese revolution. However, it also served as a strategic way to limit China's ambitions as a major player within the socialist bloc.
When Liu Shaoqi left Moscow on August 14, 1949, he took with him 220 advisors. They were specialists in the field of civics, economy, defense, and propaganda. In 1949 the total number of SU specialists in China is more than 600. Most of them are active in the Northeast. civilian and military assistance.

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On the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the CCP, Mao Zedong writes the essay "On the people’s democratic dictatorship" in which he clarified the margins within which the Minzhu Dangpai may collaborate with the CCP. The most important one is: "We are the opposite of the political parties of the bourgeoisie. They are afraid to speak of the extinction of classes, state power and parties. We, on the contrary, declare openly that we are striving hard to create the very conditions which will bring about their extinction. The leadership of the Communist Party and the state power of the people's dictatorship are such conditions."
He also wrote that the new republic will be different: "There are bourgeois republics in foreign lands, but China cannot have a bourgeois republic because she is a country suffering under imperialist oppression. The only way is through a people's republic led by the working class. All other ways have been tried and failed." The people govern the new republic and Mao Zedong defines who are part of the people and what will happen to those who are not part of the people: "They are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism -- the landlord class and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of those classes, the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices -- suppress them, allow them only to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act in an unruly way, they will be promptly stopped and punished." Mao Zedong deviates from the traditional Marxist-Leninist definition, in which the middle and national bourgeoisies are not a part of the people. Several Asiatic communist parties in Burma, Indonesia and Malaysia follow his definition. "The CCP defined the bourgeoisie so as to include: capitalists in industry and commerce and many small businessmen and shop-owners; various celebrities as well many relatively wealthy university professors and professionals; the representatives of their interests and claims in various political parties and groups: and even some senior officers and officials who had defected from the Guomindang."

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According to "On the people’s democratic dictatorship" the role of the Minzhu Dangpai will be limited in the future because "The people's democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants, because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 per cent of China's population. These two classes are the main force in overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. The transition from New Democracy to socialism also depends mainly upon their alliance." Mao Zedong attests that the Minzhu Dangpai for this moment has to play an important role: "To counter imperialist oppression and to raise her backward economy to a higher level, China must utilize all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood; and we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle. Our present policy is to regulate capitalism, not to destroy it. But the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor should it have the chief role in state power." Already in 1939 Mao Zedong wrote in "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" "Except for the Communist Party, no political party (bourgeois or petty-bourgeois) is equal to the task of leading China's two great revolutions, the democratic and the socialist revolutions, to complete fulfilment."

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Until the start of the September plenum, the 6 workgroups meet regularly and the Common Program is thoroughly examined and 5 times amended, Liu Shaoqi calls the end result "…the Communist Party's 'minimum program'."
In the months after the preparatory political consultative conference, the Minzhu Dangpai and mass organizations hold meetings to elect the delegates for the plenum of the CPPCC. The plenum is scheduled for September 21, 1949. Table 3 shows the distribution of the number of participants per Minzhu Dangpai. The first list includes 510 delegates "Its 510 delegates will be drawn from 45 "representative units," to include: 14 political parties (142 delegates), most important of which will be the Communist party, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and the Democratic League (16 delegates each); 9 nonpolitical Regional groups (102 delegates), to be drawn from all parts of China; 6 army units (60 delegates), all of which, of course, are Communist; 16 people's organizations and groupings (206 delegates). This last group will comprise labor, peasant, women, youth, and student divisions, industrial and commercial circles, literary, scientific, educational, social science, and journalist groups, minority nationalities, "democratic overseas Chinese," and "democratic religious circles." Later the number of delegates has risen from 510 to 662.

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Road to Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
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