The Common Program of the People's Republic of China 1949-1954

Following the collapse of the empire in 1911, numerous intellectuals began exploring alternatives to Confucianism, which had served as the dominant ideology of the empire. With the demise of the Qing dynasty, many intellectuals deemed Confucianism obsolete. The notion that embracing an all-encompassing cultural framework was essential for both elites and the general populace to be considered truly Chinese sparked a significant crisis in self-identification. This crisis initially affected the bureaucratic and scholarly elite, catalyzed by the incursion of Western powers in the nineteenth century. For an increasingly large segment of the population, Chinese culture no longer resonated. Rooted in its own historical context, it struggled to address the unprecedented challenges brought about by Western dominance and the widespread introduction of new technology, institutions, and ideas. A number of individuals, in their staunch adherence to the old system and resistance to change, resorted to extreme measures such as self-inflicted death. One notable figure, Wang Guowei, a highly regarded historian, exemplified this by choosing to follow the ancient ritual of suicide in 1927. Wang's act of ultimate sacrifice showcased his unwavering loyalty to the prevailing order and his unwillingness to compromise in the face of transformation.
Lee (1991) estimates the total number of intellectuals in 1949 very low. "The number of available intellectuals was also very small: China had produced only 210,000 college graduates between 1923 and 1949, and only 10,000 of these had studied abroad." Academics are searching for a new philosophy. Some chose Marxism, other the three principles of Sun Yatsen, or some kind of liberalism. In their pursuit for a new ideology, they look everywhere. In 1936, Mao Zedong told the American Snow in an interview: "At this time (1918) my mind was a curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism, and Utopian Socialism. I had somewhat vague passions about "nineteenth century democracy," Utopianism, and old-fashioned liberalism, and I was definitely anti-militarist and anti-imperialist."

Mao Zedong was not alone in his wandering. While a significant number of left-leaning individuals expressed sympathy for the embattled CCP, with some even joining its ranks, China's modern intelligentsia faced challenges in aligning their literary or critical pursuits with suitable political counterparts. Within this landscape, various segments of intellectuals made distinct choices: some opted to align themselves with the new government, while others sought refuge within the confines of relatively tranquil university campuses, particularly those situated in the former imperial capital of Beijing.
Liberal writers and thinkers found themselves torn between conscious detachment and ambivalent cooperation when engaging with the political center. On one hand, those who subscribed to Enlightenment ideals drawn from Europe, such as reason and liberty, felt naturally uneasy with the authoritarian inclinations of the GMD regime and its intolerance towards intellectual dissent. On the other hand, prominent liberal writers and thinkers often oscillated between non-alignment and reluctant endorsement of the conservative revolution, particularly during pivotal moments under the Nationalist rule.

Some scholars followed the thinking of Sun Yatsen. The fusion of Chinese and non-Chinese elements within Sun Yat-sen's theories can be seen as a natural outcome of his political endeavours, which were characterized by a constant tension between upholding Chinese values and seeking external material support. Initially, Sun sought support from America and Europe, but eventually turned to the Soviet Union when he recognized that the Soviets had shifted their revolutionary aspirations towards China—an objective that had long interested Lenin. Sun's realization that he could potentially receive the backing he had hoped for, but did not anticipate from the West, led him to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union. This ideological and strategic shift underscored Sun's pragmatic approach in balancing his allegiance to Chinese principles with the pursuit of foreign support.
"The only teaching with even limited popular appeal was the Three Principles of the People of Sun Yatsen. But this doctrine was less ethical than political, suffered from numerous inconsistencies, and above all, despite formal promulgation, was ignored by the GMD government. There was thus nothing in Chinese life to serve as a standard of values, and under such circumstances it is hardly conceivable that the intelligentsia could have had the same."

Given the characteristics of Marxism, the failure of the Three Principles and the failures of the GMD government. Considering China's dismal state, the prospects for establishing liberal institutions appeared bleak. Many liberals, some of whom even joined the party, viewed the CCP as the most promising avenue for realizing any semblance of liberal values, despite its undemocratic tendencies. Moreover, in a more abstract sense, Marxism, being a form of scientism, could be interpreted in the pre-1949 era as the most progressive and contemporary manifestation of science and democracy. This notion resonated with intellectuals who implicitly viewed democracy as a form of governance primarily geared towards serving rather than being driven by the people. In 1945, the literati see the attempts of the GMD to alter China as a fiasco and they expect the CCP to succeed.
In 1940, Mao Zedong makes this analysis in his "On new democracy" "In China, it is perfectly clear that whoever can lead the people in overthrowing imperialism and the forces of feudalism can win the people's confidence, because these two, and especially imperialism, are the mortal enemies of the people. Today, whoever can lead the people in driving out Japanese imperialism and introducing democratic government will be the saviours of the people. History has proved that the Chinese bourgeoisie cannot fulfil this responsibility, which inevitably falls upon the shoulders of the proletariat."
Marxism is certainly attractive to the intelligentsia. It's evident that until 1949, intellectuals aligning themselves with Marxism remained a minority within the overall intelligentsia. Throughout the 1940s, discontent with the existing GMD regime led to a notable rise in numbers among intellectuals. However, those who fully embraced the CCP in both political allegiance and ideological alignment were still quite scarce. The decision of Jiang Jieshi in 1947 to ban several Minzhu Dangpai drives most of them to the CCP. During the period from 1946 to 1949, a growing trend emerged among students and young individuals, as they increasingly distanced themselves from the GMD and aligned with Communist or pro-Communist organizations. As Communist-controlled territories expanded steadily, the Communist authorities actively engaged in organizing youth through various groups, attracting an even greater number of young people into their orbit. In response, the GMD attempted to suppress or exert control over the youth through harsh and violent measures, which often resulted in mass exoduses of students and other youth groups fleeing to Communist-held areas.

Soviet Union in Northeast China
As can be seen in Part 4 , many members of the Minzhu Dangpai are also members the CCP or they have a positive attitude towards the CCP. They look at the developments in the Soviet Union with admiration. Once a backward country, it is now trying to develop with communist experiments to a modern state. Chinese intellectuals look at Marxism as an ideology whereby the backwardness of China compared to other countries through targeted political and economic measures can be overtaken or even reversed to a head. There are also negative feelings about the SU. In the past, there have been many wars between China and tsarist Russia, and in the recent past SU troops occupying Manchuria, misbehaved regularly to the Chinese population and plundered the industrial complex of the Northeast.
Not only did the general population share this sentiment, but even ordinary members of the CCP in the Region found it perplexing and disheartening. The presence of Soviet troops, who like themselves were Communists, raised questions as to why they closely monitored, scrutinized, and impeded the Chinese Communists at every juncture. This predicament posed a dual challenge for the CCP. On one hand, they confronted popular ignorance and even hostility towards the Soviet Union. To help the masses comprehend the future socialist China and its achievements in socialist construction, the CCP recognized the need to showcase the Soviet Union as a tangible model. Consequently, the promotion of the Soviet Union and urging the nation to learn from its experiences emerged as top priorities for the CCP following the establishment of the PRC.
Wu Xiuquan writes in his memoirs: "… an exchange between a Soviet Military commander and Peng Zhen, the head of the CCP’s Manchuria bureau, in which the Soviet ordered the CCP to evacuate the city of Shenyang and added “if you do not leave, we will use tanks to drive you out.” Peng Zhen purportedly responded, “the army of one Communist Party using tanks to drive out the army of another Communist Party! Something like this has never happened before. Can this kind of action be acceptable?"

The Minzhu Dangpai have some commonalities as well as differences. Many have studied in the US, western Europe (England, France and Germany), and others in Japan. The western educated believed in constitutionalism, parliamentary government, individual freedoms and loyal political parties; however, they are also adepts of Confucianism. There were politicians who studied in the West, but had different opinions; like communism, socialism and anarchism. For all of them, democracy was not self-evident, not in China and in the rest of the world during the interbellum.
All politicians were members of the educated elite and quite a few were educators (for example Zhang Junmai and Luo Longji). They believed in the power of education in a climate of political reforms. They had all in common a strong nationalism (except the anarchists). They also believed in the power of the written word to influence the public opinion through the publication of newspapers (Xin Lu, Dengda, and Yishi Bao) During the 1930’s, and 1940’s several political leaders try to establish an intermediate position between the CCP and GMD. Two parties, which can be mentioned a third force in China, are the Chinese Youth Party (CYP) and China Democratic Socialist Party (CDSP). The Chinese Youth Party was founded on December 2, 1923, in Paris. They opposed the CCP, but they also opposed the GMD because this party advocated a one-party state.
"Like Sun Yat-sen, Chiang (Kai-shek) took the subordination of the individual even further by identifying the GMD with the state, which meant the individual was inferior to both state and Party. ...In view of this approach, there was obvouisly no room in Chiang's thinking for opposition parties. It was the duty of all citizens, he believed, to join the GMD"
The CYP considered itself a conservative parliamentary democratic party. It was the largest party after GMD and CCP. They cooperated closely with the CDL however, when the CDL became pro-CCP after the war this cooperation ended. After 1949 the leadership and members left the mainland. The same happened to the leaders and members of the CDSP. This party was founded on August 14, 1946 and was formed through the merger of the former Chinese National Socialist Party and the Democratic Constitutionalist Party. Both parties were not invited to join the CPPCC. Like all other minor parties, the fatal weakness of the third forces up to 1949 was the lack of an armed force. See below In October 1948 Luo Longji tries in a last attempt to create a third party and he "...wrote a letter containing a series of proposals to the Communist Party, of which the gist was: 1) At home, they should implement a parliamentary system of government; 2) Abroad, they should adopt a policy of ‘harmonious diplomacy’ (i.e., they should have an equally friendly attitude to the United States and the Soviet Union); 3) The Democratic League should be free to be a legal opposition party; 4) Communist Party members within the League should make known their identity, to avoid overlap between Communists and League members." He did not get any positive response.
Ultimately, these parties and groups existed under the tolerance of both the GMD and the CCP. During World War II, circumstances compelled the former to tolerate the minor parties, while the CCP pursued a united front policy with these parties during its ascent to power. However, after the establishment of the PRC, the CCP cracked down on them during the late 1950s Anti-Rightist movement.
At the end of the Republican period, individuals faced the choice of following the GMD to Taiwan, remaining with the CCP on the mainland, or joining the Chinese diaspora. Those who attempted to maintain a middle ground faced hostility from both sides. This polarization of politics led to the repression not only of those who disagreed with one side but also of those who failed to actively oppose the enemy. Both in Taiwan and the PRC, as was the case before 1949, the minor parties continued to exist at the discretion of the rulers and were financially reliant on them.

The notion of the state as a positive force was widely embraced across the political spectrum in modern Chinese political thought. Statism, in particular, was of significant importance. It was rare to find any intellectual, including those with much liberal inclinations, advocating for a minimal state. The prevailing view was that a minimal state would be ill-suited to China's circumstances, given the absence of a liberal order and a robust bourgeoisie. In contrast, a strong state, characterized by a government with broad powers, a comprehensive plan, a technocratic framework, and an elite leadership, was seen as the remedy for China's political, economic and social challenges. A strong state was believed to be capable of unifying the country, promoting economic development, and protecting against foreign aggression. Not only the intellectuals but also the peasant are only interested in a stable government. "Perhaps the single most important ingredient in the Communist Revolution was the CCP’s ability to provide responsible government in the northern Chinese countryside. What the CCP offered peasants during the war was not, strictly speaking, revolution. Instead of redistributing land, the Communists were forced to build functioning economic systems that provided what many peasants wanted most – security – while they gradually redistributed wealth in ways that seemed reasonable even to many of the rich."
Even the American academics schooled are proponents of planned economy. The sociologist Fei Xiaodong educated in the US has the opinion: "Democracy required balloting, vigorous election campaigns, and a loyal opposition. Since none of these existed in China, Fei did not believe that the Communist party would put democracy into practice. When he discerned elements of dictatorship in the new government after liberation, he doubted that it could be at the same time democratic, since he held democracy and dictatorship to be incompatible." He changes his mind after his participation of the plenum. He thinks the delegates to be representative of the entire population and to be more "…truly representative than any elective body he had observed in either the United States or Britain." He is very optimistic about the future. "The Conference in Peiping is only the starting point of democracy in China" The well-known philosopher Feng Youlan , who is not a delegate, writes Mao Zedong in 1950 that he does not want to be on the margin and he “Unwilling to be a remnant of a bygone age in a time of greatness’ and offering voluntarily to participate in the remolding of his own ideas. Mao Zedong replied immediately welcoming his decision. Subsequently Fung (Feng) went to a village and participated in the land reform work for a period.” During the land reform, many intellectuals go to the rural areas, a place most of them never have been. In her autobiography Frances Wong born in Hong Kong writes about her motives to go back to China: “In 1949, shortly after the Communists took over the reins of mainland China, I went back to Guangzhou… I walked all the way for seven days. Why did I go back to China at a time when millions were fleeing the country? Would I do it again if I could relive my life once more? Those were questions many friends have asked me. I suppose when I was in my twenties, I was naïve, adventurous, romantic, a little patriotic and also primarily, because my husband decided to go and I thought it was my duty to go with him…By this time a conviction had been well established in our minds. The Kuomintang was corrupt and decaying. Only the Communists could save China, and we were ready to work under the Communists and do whatever we could for our country.”

In contrast to the CCP and GMD, the Minzhu Dangpai have no army. They were not pacifists; they supported the war against Japan and often supported one of the parties during the civil war. They allied even with warlords. The lack of funds and fear of repression of the GMD were the main reasons why the Minzhu Dangpai did not have armies. Most of them were intellectuals and had no connections with the military and relied on their pen instead of the gun. Unlike, the CCP and the GMD, the Minzhu Dangpai lacked a tight organization. The political power of the Minzhu Dangpai is very limited, the only way to gain some political influence is to ally with the GMD or CCP. Li Jishen saying to Zhang Dongsun , "… to participate in the negotiations, and offered the following advice: Cut your ties with the Nanjing (GMD) government, go it alone, take a third road. North China should declare independence and establish a coalition government. The new coalition government should take command of the arm."
The GMD can be mainly seen as a party backed by military power and has no substantial backing by particular classes like rural landlords or urban bourgeoisie. Opper (2020) remarks about the period, that the CCP governed the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region between 1937-1949 and the GMD government attempts to destroy the CCP base in the Chinese Civil War from 1946 to 1949. The harshness of the GMD counterinsurgency efforts pushed nearly all civilians to align with the CCP, including groups that were traditionally seen as natural allies of the GMD. Even during the radical phase of land reform, reports indicated that in many regions, even the more privileged segments of rural society continued to support the CCP, despite the efforts of the GMD and its allies to reinstate the pre-Resistance War rural hierarchy.
The CCP's coalition partners remained loyal and did not defect to the GMD. On the contrary, they contributed manpower to the CCP's local armed forces as well as to the PLA. The issue with the GMD's approach to civilian governance lay in the fact that ten years of gradual economic, political, and social reforms by the CCP had established a new status quo that benefited the majority of people in the countryside, including the remaining few landlords and wealthy peasants.
The CCP's attainment of supremacy through military means did not pose significant political damage to them, as it aligned with the established path to political power in China, which the GMD had previously utilized. Moreover, within Chinese tradition, military success itself bestowed a sense of legitimacy and qualified the victorious faction to govern the nation. Conversely, it was argued that the GMD, through their defeat, had demonstrated their own incompetence and thus forfeited their entitlement to the "mandate" to govern the country.

Besides the lack of a private army, the Minzhu Dangpai “..had no access to China's political, military, economic, or social resources, nor did they enjoy any foreign backing.” Their influence is small because of their limited power and small number of followers, but they have some effect. In authoritarian states where opportunities for public discourse on topics relevant to these communities are scarce or absent, corporatist groups can serve as a valuable platform for discussion. The connections among their members can extend far beyond the apparent size of the organization. Additionally, experts, esteemed in their fields if not in the broader community, can play significant roles as spokespersons and mobilizers for these organizations. Their influence on ideological issues is big.
Peng Zhen warns still in 1951 for this impact. "Democratic types demand that everything be made known, even wanting to understand criminal investigation work and to participate in criminal investigation conferences – that is not acceptable. . . All day we are with these democratic types and enlightened types, and we do not believe that they will influence us; but in reality, they have their own style of living, and just as the Political Legal Committee always wants to influence us police, even regarding terminology, this Committee will still want to persist. We are leading and remaking the democratic types, and so we must be constantly vigilant, otherwise we will be influenced by them."
In various publications, leaders of the Minzhu Dangpai emphasized the need for introspection and intellectual self-improvement in order to serve the interests of the people. They condemned opposing forces as reactionary, leaving no room for ambiguity in their stance. These publications also clearly outlined the expectations of the CCP from intellectuals at large, as well as specifically from the members of the Minzhu Dangpai. By publicly expressing their unwavering support in response to the Labor Day Call (See Part 2), the Minzhu Dangpai leaders contributed to a narrative that portrayed the smaller political forces in China willingly and consciously submitting to the leadership of the CCP in the months leading up to the establishment of the People's Republic. Furthermore, these writings by the Minzhu Dangpai leaders pre-emptively undermined any future challenges to the legitimacy of the CCP by categorizing any forces questioning the Communist leadership as revisionist.
Most of the adherents of the Minzhu Dangpai are working in the field of education, press, literature and art. The CCP targets specifically these areas of interest because they are aware of the impact of education, art, and press. Vidal (2008) notices: "The success of the weekly Guancha (Observer), published in Shanghai by Chu Anping between September 1946 and December 1948, a collaboration of more than 200 academics, lawyers, journalists and writers, is the illustration and the symbol of this mobilization pacifist and anti-authoritarian. It goes without saying that the commitment of these intellectuals hardly weighs facing the logic of arms."
Recognizing the importance of gaining the support of intellectuals, the CCP pursued a strategy to bring them into their fold. To showcase how intellectuals could contribute to the country under the Party's guidance, the CCP selected Guo Muruo as an exemplary figure. Guo received significant recognition, being bestowed with prestigious titles and assuming leading positions within both the government and the Party. With his esteemed academic reputation and cooperative attitude, Guo was consistently elevated as a leader within the academic and revolutionary cultural spheres in China. The CCP appointed Guo to various prominent roles, including the presidency of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the directorship of the Department of Social Science and Philosophy, and the directorship of the Institute of History. These appointments aimed to demonstrate to intellectuals the potential opportunities for engagement and influence within the Party, thereby seeking their support and cooperation.
Grad (2001) concludes: "The middle forces, which were comprised of businessmen, intellectuals, students and professionals, wielded a significant amount of power in terms of influencing public opinion and securing the political power of either of the two preeminent political parties. Ultimately, they would be of vital importance to the Communists in terms securing a base of support in the cities, and their response to land reform was significant in that it undercut the authority of the Kuomintang government."
The Minzhu Dangpai leaders see themselves as loyal opposition and not as competitors for power. Stein (1945) interviewed 2 CDL leaders who were in Yan’an in 1944 and they were convinced "…The Communists have no ambition of being the sole leaders of the nation. Of this we are convinced and we know them very well. They are realists and know that the Chinese people will never really support and help a One-party dictatorship." The CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai aim at the same goal: a new and modern China. To achieve this objective, some measures have to be taken. The main targets are the elimination of foreign imperialism, the integration of China’s territories (Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan) by ending the civil war, and the revival of a central authority. The reform of the agriculture, industry, education, and healthcare are also important issues for the Minzhu Dangpai. From an individual perspective, they chose to go along with the CCP because they want to be assured of a job in the new society. They strive for job security because "...Many simply cannot afford to go into exile, and to go to Taiwan is inconceivable to anyone that the authorities harass or seek. Remarkable is however to note that the vast majority of those for whom this choice presents itself refuses to leave the continent, declining government proposals and his emissaries to them like those made abroad."
Vidal (2008) continues: "The non-communist intellectuals align themselves with the program (the Common Program), not with the ideology of the Party. Wil it be the new State, which will appeal to their wishes? Nothing is less sure, but all of them want to believe and are willing to make certain sacrifices, provided it serves the national community."
Amid escalating political pressure, numerous intellectuals opted to align with the Party in order to navigate the turbulent political climate. However, in doing so, they themselves became perpetrators of political persecution, contributing to the mistreatment of others. Moreover, it became increasingly evident after 1949 that achieving success in a political career was essential, particularly in the fields of social sciences and humanities, to be recognized as academically accomplished in the PRC. Regardless of their motivations, whether driven by naiveté, a sense of duty to the nation, or self-interest, these intellectuals also played a role in victimizing others politically. By supporting Mao's revolution, they bore responsibility for the expulsion of their fellow colleagues.
Their influence is also limited by access to information. Like everybody, they had access to the information of the Renmin Ribao, but had limited admission to Reference News (restricted to cadres of a certain minimum rank) and/or Upper-level Reference News which is restricted to higher minimum rank.
A complicated system existed in the distribution of News. Moreover, regarding directives from the Party's Central Committee, certain directives are designated to be sent to military-region headquarters and provincial government departments, while others are intended for divisional military headquarters and district government departments. Similarly, some directives are directed to regimental military headquarters and county government departments, while others are disseminated to ordinary civilians. The distribution of a single directive sometimes follows a sequence wherein it is initially sent to the central government and later distributed to local governments, or it may be first sent to Party members and subsequently to non-Party members.
In several ways, the party leaders of the CCP are trying to convince the Minzhu Dangpai that the collaboration, called the ‘new democracy’, will last at least 20 to 30 years and there will be no big changes in the foreign policy. Zhou Enlai clarifies in a speech for potential candidates of the political consultative conference, the foreign policy with respect to the US: ".. the policy of the CCP is “Don’t cut them off, but don’t be in a rush to establish diplomatic relations. If we are too eager to get recognition, we may fall into the trap of passivity. If imperialism wishes to establish diplomatic relations with us, it must negotiate according to the principle of equality."

Many of the CCP leaders have a mixed feeling about the relation with the US. They condemn the military aid given to the GMD government but are open-minded about diplomatic and economic relations with the US. On the other hand, the Nanking government's increasingly lenient stance regarding the occupation of Japan had significant implications. This approach, interpreted in China as a sign of the GMD's weakness and its reliance on the United States for support, further eroded nationalist sentiment and intensified the perception that Jiang Jieshi depended on foreign assistance to sustain an unpopular civil war. Consequently, many nationalists began to harbour anti-government sentiments and directed their discontent towards the United States due to its association with the disliked GMD regime. As a result, the CCP, despite potential concerns arising from their ideological ties with the Soviet Union, found themselves with an additional avenue for mobilizing nationalist support. They positioned themselves as defenders of China's interests against the backdrop of perceived "American imperialism."
During the Second World War Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai have a regular base contact with the American ‘Dixie Mission’ in Yan'an. Yu (1999) cites Mao Zedong in a talk to these American military observers: “Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together.” There is also a tactical reason not to offend the US too much. The CCP is in constant fear, the US are prepared to intervene directly in the civil war in favour of Jiang Jieshi. There are some incidents. The first one at the consulate in Shenyang on November 14, 1948, and the second at April 25, 1949, at the embassy in Nanjing. There are also moments of rapprochement. In May 1949, there some meetings between US ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua a CCP diplomat. Stuart wants to set up a meeting with Zhou Enlai like in 1945. Zhou Enlai is not willing and the talks are without results. Stalin (1949) in a cable to Mao Zedong remarks in relation to the US: "We think that the democratic government of China must not reject establishing official relations with some of the capitalist countries, including the United States, if these states officially abandon [their] military, trade, and political support of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government… We think that you should not reject foreign loans and trade with the capitalist countries on certain conditions. The main thing is that loans and trade must not impose any conditions. The main thing is that the loans and trade must not impose any economic and financial conditions on China that could be used to limit the national sovereignty of the democratic state and to strangle [its] domestic industry."
It is important to highlight that the CCP's foreign policy process was extremely centralized. Mao emphasized in November 1948 that all matters concerning foreign affairs had to be reported to the Center by local authorities before any actions could proceed.

In addition, the members of the Minzhu Dangpai and many intellectuals have mixed feelings about the US. They also condemn the role of the US in the civil war, but a lot of them consider the US as an example for the development of China and have strong positive feelings for the US. Mao Zedong (1950) warns Liu Shaoqi: "The fact that the United States is pulling out all fits] official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us, but those democratic figures suffering from the fear-of-the-United-States illness may be dissatisfied with the confiscation of the foreign military barracks and other actions. Please pay attention to explaining [the meaning of these actions to them]."
Kovalev, the SU advisor in Beijing reports at the end 1949 to Stalin about those positive feelings: "Among similar sentiments counts also Zhou Enlai's negative attitude toward the dispatch of groups of Soviet specialists to Shanghai and Tianjin because big economic interests of America and England are concentrated at these points. Such sentiments are the result of pressure on the CC on the part of the bourgeois democrats and other capitalist elements inside the country, who wished and wish the soonest recognition by America and England of new China so as to, relying on these imperialist states, the Chinese bourgeoisie could prevent further democratization of China and disallow strengthening and widening of friendship between China and the Soviet Union."
The US government publication on August 5, 1949 of the “white paper on relations with China” affronted many Minzhu Dangpai members. In this report, the suggestion is made that democratic intellectuals are potential allies of the US. In other words, a possible fifth column in China. Lutze (2007) cites the orientalist Biggerstaff who during his stay in Nanjing noticed: ".. Day after day editorials, speeches, resolutions, and reports of roundtable discussion groups and protest meetings were spread across the pages of the Hsin Hua Jihpao, (The New China Daily) challenging American policy and the White Paper from every angle." See also Article 56 for the reaction of Mao Zedong.
Chen Jian (2005) puts forward this argument: "…,from a Chinese perspective, the most profound reason underlying the CCP’s anti-American policy was Mao’s grand plans for transforming China’s state, society, and international outlook. Even though it might have been possible for Washington to change the concrete course of its China policy (which was highly unlikely given the policy’s complicated background), it would have been impossible for the United States to alter the course and goals of the Chinese revolution, let alone the historical cultural environment that gave birth to the event."

China wants to be part of the new world (SU) and not the old one (US).

Besides guarantying a period of 20 to 30 years of new democracy and a positive attitude to western countries, the CCP also wants to satisfy the Minzhu Dangpai in another way. In his “On a coalition government" (1945), Mao Zedong points out his demands and proposals which approach the suggestions of the Minzhu Dangpai:
- Mobilization of all forces to defeat and expel the Japanese.
- Abolition of the GMD's one-party dictatorship.
- Punishment for collaborators.
- Punishment for "reactionaries" creating a danger of civil war.
- "Liquidation" of the GMD's secret police and the abolition of GMD concentration camps.
- Revocation of all "reactionary" laws and decrees aimed at suppressing the people's freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction, and religious belief and freedom of the person and guarantee full civil rights to the people.
- Recognition of the legal status of all democratic parties and groups.
- Release of all patriotic political prisoners.
- Abolition of bureaucratic capital.
- Assistance for private industry.
- Abolition of GMD indoctrination in education and promotion of a national, scientific and mass culture education.
-Guarantees of a livelihood and academic freedom for teachers and other staff members of educational institutions. Mao Zedong asks Stalin for advice on two occasions (November 30, 1947 and March 15, 1948) about dealing with non-Communist parties and about creating a new political order once the CCP had seized power. He is convinced he can lead a one-party rule like the SU and Yugoslavia. Stalin, however, disagrees and states: "We think that the various opposition parties in China that are representing the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them in cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers.

The GMD alienates from the intellectuals it needed to operate the state, party, and military apparatus. From the beginning of the 1940’s, the CCP were "…a staunch champion of political and academic freedom. This stand won over a number of the intellectuals who, since the Kuomintang policy gave considerable latitude in academic and political freedom, were able to exert their influence in support of the Communist cause." American-educated economist Ma Yinchu is an example of a disillusioned intellectual who joined the GMD regime and criticized the CCP in the 1930’s. He became very disappointed in the GMD and disapproved the mismanagement of the economy, the corruption, and the mistreating of the intellectuals. The GMD government no longer permitted him to teach, to publish or to make public appearances. He moves to Hong Kong and in 1949 the CCP invites him to come back to the mainland and become the dean of the Beijing university. Numerous intellectuals such as Ma Yinchu, disillusioned with the Nationalist regime and therefore open to the Party's overtures, discovered that their services were sought after by the CCP. However, their involvement came with strict conditions attached. The Party and the state determined the extent of intellectual participation in society, with a commitment to advancing socialist ideals and ultimately fulfilling the long-postponed aspirations of social revolution, modernization, and national prosperity and strength.
In scientific circles, the CCP policy towards intellectuals is received enthusiastically. Qian Sanqiang , the founder of the Chinese nuclear program puts in these words: "…I felt an overnight change, a total change in everything around me". This change was not only in words but also in cash.
In March 1949, two months after the PLA took over Beijing, Qian received a notice from the CCP government to attend an international conference in Paris. Having studied in Paris, Qian thought attending the conference would provide a good opportunity for him to contact his former professors and buy new books and equipment in France. He requested $200,000 for his purchase. Four days later, he received a call summoning him to the central government office at Zhongnanhai. Li Weihan, minister of the CCP United Front, greeted Qian with the good news that he had received $50,000. Despite all these hopeful outlooks, "In that year (1949), thousands of anti-Communist Chinese intellectuals fled the mainland and went to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. (So called) emigre’s, not exiles, because they were not forced to leave China. They left China because they had made the decision to do so." However, the promised academic freedom soon came under attack. See, for example, (Article 43). The introduction of Lysenkoism is a good example. Li Jingzhun , who opposes the Lysenkoism theory, is removed from his position and is not allowed to teach genetics and biometry. In 1950 he and his family fled to the US.

The peaceful takeover of several cities during the Civil war is another way to reassure the Minzhu Dangpai. The good examples are Beijing and Tianjin. After negotiations, Beijing is fallen in the hands of the PLA. PLA general Ye Jianying explains: "Beijing is an ancient, cultural and international city. Foreign journalists reckon that the Communist Party will establish a people’s capital in Beijing. Consequently, after we enter the city, the implementation of every policy, the views and actions of personnel and the speeches of leading cadres are all closely bound to what people will know about our Party. They take Beijing as a test of whether or not the Communist Party can rule the whole country, and whether or not it can administer cities, industry and commerce. Consequently, the good and bad points of our takeover of Beijing and the influence they produce are not questions isolated to certain cadres or to Beijing itself, but are connected to the impression (they give) to the entire world. It is a question of whether or not the Chinese people can under the leadership of the Communist Party govern themselves.489"
Tianjin is after some fierce fighting in the outskirts of the city under control of the PLA. In December 1948, Song Feiqing and numerous other prominent figures in Tianjin made a collective plea to the local Nationalist authorities. They requested that the ongoing conflict with the Communists either be relocated outside the city or, alternatively, that hostilities be ceased altogether, effectively surrendering. The group was cognizant of the devastating consequences witnessed during the fall of Changchun (see below) to Communist forces and sought to prevent a similar calamity from befalling Tianjin. The infrastructure of this economic important city is more or less intact. Tianjin was north China’s largest port, a finance and transportation hub. The cadres (often small-town students, ex-farmers, and CCP underground operatives), who are sent to the city have recently received crash courses in urban administration. The cadres cannot cope with Tianjin’s urban landscape, which represents a new level of complexity and obscurity. They use their old techniques from the land reform and encourage workers and clerks to purge the owners of factories and shops. "Fifty-three such purges had occurred one month after the seizure of Tianjin, forcing many capitalists to flee to Hong Kong. As a result, no more than 30% of private enterprises were still in business several months later." To restore the economy and to facilitate the regime change in this town, the prominent political leader Liu Shaoqi handles the problems. Liu Shaoqi was present from April 10 till May 7, 1949, and Liu told leaders that they should centralize city government by having the municipal bureaucracy assume tasks that local districts had been handling. Neighborhood organizations were in charge of too many things Liu said, which wasted time and resources and was an example of “village work style.” "The city is concentrated, so work should also be concentrated." He convinces the cadres to stop the purge of capitalists because for this moment the economy relies on them. The actual economic problems Liu Shaoqi solves in a very pragmatic way. In answering Song Feixing director of Dongya, a company in Tianjin, Liu Shaoqi reassures him: "You are now exploiting more than 1,000 men; if you exploit more than 2,000 men that’s even better, we want you to exploit more laborers!" Song states in an interview that his meeting with Liu Shaoqi has convinced him of the possibilities to develop a national industry under communist reign. His conviction does not last long in 1950 he leaves for Hong Kong and later he goes to Argentina. Also, other leaders try to convince industrialists to stay. Liu Hongzheng , an industrialist of Shanghai, moved to Hong Kong just days before the PLA took over the city. "…after Premier Zhou Enlai’s emissaries had reassured him of his safety and had promised business opportunities.23 Upon disembarking in Tianjin, Liu was taken to Beijing to dine with Zhou, who pledged protection of Liu’s property and business and urged him to set an example of cooperation. When Liu arrived in Shanghai the following day, Mayor Chen Yi (陈毅) repeated the welcome with supper at his home."
Stalin backs Liu Shaoqi and other political leaders in a general comment on how to treat the bourgeoisie: "…that we, the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle against the imperialists. Therefore [we] advise to encourage the trading activities of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside, let's say trade with Hong Kong and with other foreign capitalists."
The CCP sought to avoid the complications witnessed in Shijiazhuang on November 12, 1947, where the Communist advance led to armed pickets turning criticism meetings into indiscriminate killing sprees. In response, the party swiftly issued an order prohibiting anyone other than public security officials from conducting arrests, executions, or property confiscations during the liberation process.
During the Sixth All-China Labor Congress convened in Harbin in August 1948, a resolution was passed outlining procedures for liberating cities. Emphasis was placed on maintaining order, safeguarding machinery and equipment in both public and private enterprises, and preventing sabotage and theft. Notably, there was no mention of inciting a proletarian uprising.
On April 8, 1948, Mao Zedong as commander of the PLA has ordered an 8-point instruction to the troops after ransacking of some cities in the Northeast.
"1. be very prudent in the liquidation of the organs of Kuomintang rule.
2. Set a clear line of demarcation in defining bureaucrat-capital and do not confiscate all the industrial and commercial enterprises run by Kuomintang members.
3. Forbid peasant organizations to enter the city to seize landlords and settle scores with them.
4. On entering the city, do not lightly advance slogans of raising wages and reducing working hours.
5. Do not be in a hurry to organize the people of the city to struggle for democratic reforms and improvements in livelihood.
6. In the big cities, food and fuel must be handled in a planned way.
7. Members of Kuomintang and Three People’s Principles Youth League must be screened and registered.
8. It is strictly forbidden to destroy any means of production, whether publicly or privately owned, and to waste consumer goods."
Also other members of the CCP make comments on the behavior of PLA troops. Huang Jing the later mayor of Tianjin, said in a speech on December 1948: "When you enter the city, you absolutely cannot find any old corner and urinate and defecate like you would in the village." Zhu De emphasizes the importance of discipline when the PLA goes south and protect industry and commerce. These peaceful takeovers are also the result of the fear of the residents of the cities. They want to avoid the fate of the inhabitants of Changchun. In October 1948, the PLA conquers the city after a siege of 5 months. During the encirclement between 100.000 and 300.000, citizens die of starvation. The CCP had made special preparations to overtake the metropolis of Shanghai. They distinguished 3 areas of intervention: the economy, which has to be left more or less intact, "Comparatively little damage was done to the city during the battle for Shanghai, partly because of effective action by the People's Peace Preservation Corps (Jen-min pao-an tui), a workers' picket organization that guarded factories and facilities from destruction and sabotage and persuaded Nationalist units to surrender.41 Utilities kept functioning or resumed operations shortly after Liberation ".
The second area education, press and culture have to be gradually reformed, and the third area, the remains of GMD government, army and police have to be completely destroyed. Walder (2015) mentions a not unimportant detail. "Most of the cadres who came south with the army were veterans of northern base areas, were natives of that Region, and were unable to speak or understand southern dialects."
In Shanghai, the CCP enjoys a favorable reputation. By leveraging multi-class patriotism, Party leaders forged cooperative ties with members of the elite, which proved vital in the CCP's resistance efforts against Japan. This relationship often persisted into the post-war era, playing a significant role in facilitating the CCP's smooth takeover of the city in May 1949.

The CCP politicians are aware that the situation they have to deal with in Shanghai is quite different from former tasks. Mao Zedong is worried and tells Kovalev: "…our lack of experience with running such a big city, we do not have specialists, capable of handling the management and usage of the electrical station, water supply, large textile and other enterprises." Mao Zedong knows he has to rely partly on the old GMD bureaucracy. In 1945, the central committee of the GMD was predominantly composed of intellectuals with specialized expertise, constituting 84% of its total members. This meant that real power lay in the hands of these "professionals." Consequently, capturing power without winning over the intellectuals within the GMD to the Communist Party was deemed unfeasible. Mao Zedong acknowledged the necessity of intellectual participation, conceding that victory in the revolution would not be attainable without their involvement. See Part 7.
To avoid complete dependence on GMD specialists, Mao Zedong requested during the same meeting on April 9, 1949, that Kovalev send Soviet experts in managing commercial cities and specialists in counterespionage. Additionally, the CCP had dispatched some of its own specialists to Shanghai. On May 5, 1949 Pan Hannian , Xu Dixin and Xia Yan leave from Hong Kong to Tianjin, where they receive instructions for underground work in Shanghai. One of their main tasks is to control the popular press in the newly liberated areas and to promote the upcoming political consultative conference.

Cohen (1991). Page 125. Cohen continues "For those most immediately involved in these novel circumstances, such as students in the new schools, treaty port merchants and workers, and many others, the cultural crisis was most acute. Many must have felt that they were living in a cultural vacuum, which could only be filled both by the creation of a new cultural design and, of necessity, through the redefinition of being Chinese. " [↩] [Cite]
Jin (2010). Page 131 [↩] [Cite]
Lee (1991). Page 49 [↩] [Cite]
Snow (1972). Page 174. In 1936 Snow slipped through the Nationalists’ blockade and reached the Chinese Communists’ base at Yan an in Shaanxi province, in north-central China. After spending several months in Yan an with Mao Zedong and other leaders, Snow returned to the outside world with the first accurate reporting of the Communist movement in China. Snow depicted Mao Zedong and his followers not as the opportunistic Red bandits described by the Nationalists but rather as dedicated revolutionaries who advocated sweeping domestic reforms and who were eager to resist Japanese aggression in China. Snow’s book-length report on the Chinese Communists, is: Red Star Over China (1937)" [↩] [Cite]
Tsui (2013). Page 170 [↩] [Cite]
Sivieri (2015). Page 9 [↩] [Cite]
Wang (1966). Page X [↩] [Cite]
Moody (1998). Page 12 [↩] [Cite]
Hu (2012). Page 32 [↩] [Cite]
Pringsheim (1962). Page 86.[Cite] "Furthermore, the CCP began to set up elected representative bodies in the areas under their control to showcase their willingness to cooperate across party divisions.17" [↩]
Gao (2012). "The local CCP cadres soon realized that the Soviets were not in support of land reform and other village-based political movements that would disrupt their naval base’s stability. The challenges of making a coastal revolution and building a party apparatus in a contested coastal area reflected competing party agendas and the CCP’s ambivalent attitude toward Soviet influence." Page 7 "...Chen Yun (陈云), then a member of the Northeast Bureau, stated at a meeting in summer 1947, “On the issue of land reform in Dalian, we should not look at the other places and feel compelled to do the same. If the Soviets do not like it, we don’t do it. Just wait.”20" Page 8[↩] [Cite]
Yu (2005). Page 2. [Cite]
"The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that, upon liberating Manchuria, the Soviet Army dismantled arsenals, military and certain other enterprises servicing the Kwantung Army and constituting war trophies. According to the Russians, the Kuomintang military had counted on using these facilities in waging war against the Communist forces and now spread the story of mass dismantlement of local industrial equipment by the Soviet authorities. However, the Chinese "patriots" understood that the measures taken by the Soviet Army prevented the "counterrevolutionaries" from using the "big stick" of Japanese military industry in northeast China against the "democratic forces." Ginsburgs (1976). Page 17 [↩] [Cite]
"It appears to be the custom of Russian commanders to allow full license to their soldiery for, at any rate, the first few days after their entry into a conquered city, whether it be on enemy, or enemy-occupied soil." Jones (1949). Page 225. "But very bitter feelings were soon aroused when it became known that the Soviet Government, in a memorandum to China of 21 January 1946, declared that it regarded as its war booty all Japanese enterprises in Manchuria which had rendered services to the Japanese Army, and that in pursuance of this principle the Soviet occupation authorities in Manchuria were removing large quantities of industrial equipment to the Soviet Union." Jones (1949). Pages 227-228 "The Russians, however, were not responsible for all the looting. As happened elsewhere, for example at Hong Kong in 1941, a great deal of damage was done by the Chinese mob, which seized the opportunity to strip houses and factories for loot and firewood, leaving many of them a gutted shell. In some cases this happened after the Japanese retreated and before the Russian occupation; in others it took place in conjunction with Russian pillaging." Jones (1949). Page 225 [↩] [Cite]
Cited in Murray (1995). Page 3 [Cite]
"...Peng Zhen confided to Soviet ambassador A. S. Paniushkin in January 1953: “A majority of the intelligentsia in China openly refer to the Soviet Union as imperialist,” he said, “asking things like, why until now has the Chinese Changchun Railway been the property of the Soviet Union.”13 Even party members in the immediate wake of the revolution posed the question, “Is the Soviet Union an imperialist power or not?” " Jersild (2014). Page 4 [Cite] [↩]
Jeans (2019). Page 31 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2007). Page 42 [↩] [Cite]
Jeans (2019). No page number [↩] [Cite]
Fung (2010). Pages 258-259 [↩] [Cite]
Zarrow (2008). Page 36 [↩] [Cite]
Dow (1971). Page 13 [↩] [Cite]
The amount of graduates who had studied in the US is much bigger than those graduated in west Europe or SU. Graduates form USA in the period of 1905-1951 are 35.931, In west Europe 10.000 and in the SU less than 100. But most graduates had studied in Japan. Dow (1971). Page 2 [↩] [Cite]
O'Brien (2003). Page 164 [↩] [Cite]
O'Brien (2003). Page 164 [↩] [Cite]
Lee (1963). Page 149 [↩] [Cite]
Wong (2009). Page 1 & 47 [↩] [Cite]
Qing (2007). No page number [↩] [Cite]
Opper (2020). Page 165 [↩] [Cite]
Bernard (1953). Page 17 [↩] [Cite]
Fung (1991). Page 284 [↩] [Cite]fu1991
Groot (2004). Page xxiii [↩]
Cited in Zhong (2015). Page 12 [↩] [Cite]
Rudolph (2021). Page 209 [↩] [Cite]
Vidal (2008). Page 48
Original text: "Le succès de l’hebdomadaire Guancha (L’Observateur), publié à Shanghai par Chu Anping entre septembre 1946 et décembre 1948, auquel collaborent plus de 200 universitaires, avocats, journalistes et écrivains, est l’illustration et le symbole de cette mobilisation pacifiste et anti-autoritaire. Il va sans dire que l’engagement de ces intellectuels ne pèse guère face à la logique des armes. " [↩] [Cite]
Jin (2010). Page 140 [↩] [Cite]
Grad (2001). Page 3 [↩] [Cite]
Stein (1945). Page 374 [↩] [Cite]
Vidal (2008). Page 51
Original text: "...Many simply cannot afford to go into exile, and to go to Taiwan is inconceivable to anyone that the authorities harass or seek. Remarkable is however to note that the vast majority of those for whom this choice presents itself refuses to leave the continent, declining government proposals and his emissaries to them like those made abroad." [↩] [Cite]
Vidal (2008). Page 56
Original text:"C’est à ce programme(le Programme commun) , et non à l’idéologie du Parti, que se rallient les intellectuels non communistes. Le nouvel État sera-t-il celui qu’ils appellent de leurs voeux ? Rien n’est moins sûr, mais tous veulent le croire et sont prêts à faire certains sacrifices pourvu qu’ils servent la collectivité nationale. " [↩] [Cite]
Jin (2010). Page 155 [↩] [Cite]
Hu (2012). Page 75. [Cite]
Groot (1997) states that non-party officials should have access to relevant documents, but many CCP members "…were disinclined to concede the necessity of allies, let alone give them power. Any gains by allies was regarded as a loss for the Party..." Groot(1997). Pages 191-192 [↩] [Cite]
Bernard (1953). Page 14 [↩] [Cite]
Yu (1999). Page 32 [↩] [Cite]
The US has several consulates in China in 1949: Guangzhou, Chongqing, Dalian, Wuhan, Kunming, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao. Chen (2001) states: "In fact, CCP leaders in the Northeast already believed that American diplomats in Shenyang were “actively engaged in” collecting military intelligence information about “the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and China’s liberated zones.” In a summary report to the CCP leadership on 24 November, the CCP Northeast Bureau concluded that a group of special spies existed at the U.S. consulate in Shenyang, who had conducted espionage activities on the GMD’s behalf (telegram, CCP Northeast Bureau to CCP Central Committee, 24 November 1948, CCA)" Chen (2001). Page 297 [↩] [Cite]
Sheng (1998b). Page 184 [↩] [Cite]
Lutze (2007). Page 181.[Cite]
Jeans (2018) concludes "The China White Paper, (…), included a thinly veiled appeal for such (third force) groups. In 1949 and 1950, the United States was open to third force alternatives to the Nationalists on Taiwan. From 1950 to 1953, American policy drifted toward increasing support for the armed anticommunists in Taiwan, thanks to the Korean War, while still secretly supporting promising third force efforts. … in November 1953, (the US) finally acknowledged Taiwan was the only viable noncommunist force. With conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Nationalists and the Americans at the end of 1954 and recognition of the failure of the CIA’s third force project, Americans resumed their former close relationship with the Nationalists, and US aid flowed to them once again." Jeans (2018). Page 237 [↩] [Cite]
Chen (2005). Page 286 [↩] [Cite]
Groot(1997). Page 91 [↩] [Cite]
Houn (1961). Page 4-5. [Cite]
Xu notices: "The economic hardships were so severe that they (CCP) began to shake peasant support as trade was disrupted and the tax burden increased in Communist-administered areas. The leadership thus launched the “great production movement” to ameliorate the condition. Some base areas even began to join in the illicit opium trade to survive. Coupled with this condition was the need to appeal to public opinion and win over upper classes from the KMT. This led to the strategy to tighten internally and soften externally (waikuan neijing). In other words, the Party needed to establish clear boundaries between the internal and external constituencies and enforce strict discipline in its own rank and file while externally projecting a liberal and open-minded image on its leadership. The goal was to exercise control over the politics of interpretation." Xu (1918). Page 10 [↩] [Cite]
Mutter (2010). Page 62 [↩] [Cite]
Li (2007). Page 165 [↩] [Cite]
Li (2007). Page 147 [↩] [Cite]
Yung (2015). Page 165. [Cite] Hu Shi, director of the Beijing University left Beijing and went to Taiwan. "Hu...vertrat die Meinung, dass er unter einem repressiven Rechtsregime zumindest den Luxus des Schweigens genießen dürfe, ohne dazu gezwungen zu sein, sich selbst zu »bessern«. Tausende von Intellektuellen stimmten mit ihren Füssen ab und gingen nach Taiwan"
Original text: Hu...was of the opinion that under a repressive legal regime he could at least enjoy the luxury of silence without being forced to "improve" himself. Thousands of intellectuals voted with their feet and went to Taiwan. Stiffler (2003). Pages 225-226. [Cite]
Hao notices "Chen Yinke (1890–1969), who refused to become an official if it meant he had to study Marxism and Leninism (Lu Jiandong 1995:102), was one of the very few who came close to being a yinshi (unattached intellectual). People like Chen were very rare. But even he remained under the care of the Party and government: he belonged to Zhongshan University in Guangdong Province, which even provided him with writing paper." Hao (2003). Page 403 [↩] [Cite]
Tiffert (2015). Page 105 [↩] [Cite]
Sheehan (2015). Page 178. "In the end, the actual battle for Tianjin was anticlimactic. The Nationalists had lost the will to fight and the Communists took the city in one day." Page 179 [Cite]
DeMare (2019) "Rumors of rural violence spread widely. In Beijing, citizens heard tales of landlords being “swept” out of their houses. They also heard stories of activists “lighting sky lamps” (dian tiandeng), turning the heads of victims into torches.83...With violence threatening the Civil War effort, Communist Party leaders eventually realized that their hurricane had to be postponed: land reform in newly won territories would have to wait.85" Page 17
The CCP issued on January 15, a directive to ensure not to disrupt the original organizational structure of the enterprises in Tianjin.   15-01-1949 Central Directive on Taking Over Bureaucratic Capitalist Enterprises" and   30-05-1949 Directive on Seriously Overcoming the "Left" Deviation [↩] [Cite]
Yang (2007). Page 17.[Cite]
Pepper (1999) "Although the cities of China did not surrender to the Communists as a result of any uprising from within, underground Communist cadres were able to organize support for the take-over, particularly among workers and students. The immediate objective was to protect industry, communications, public utilities, and academic institutions from any disorder during the take-over period." Page 309 [↩] [Cite]
Brown(2012). Page 21 [↩] [Cite]
See also Kenneth (1971). pp. 494-520 [↩] [Cite]
Dittmer (1998). Page 203 [↩] [Cite]
U (2012). Page 40. [Cite]
"Liu Hongsheng was deeply disturbed by the failure of the gold yuan reform and Chiang Ching-kuo’s treatment of Chinese capitalists (October 1948), and he was not alone. According to Lloyd Eastman, “Most people thereafter abandoned all hope for economic recovery; the failure of the reform seemed to demonstrate that the National Government was totally without resources to control the inflation.” 13 Liu Hongsheng shared this view, and he ceased to envision any role for himself and his family members in Taiwan. Under the Nationalist government, he soberly told his children at a family meeting, “Taiwan would not be a safe place.”14 Cochran (2007). Page 363. [↩] [Cite]
Perry (2006). Page 135 [↩] [Cite]
Guo (2015) delineates a procedure in Mianchi (Henan). "After many former KMT personnel and sectarian members had registered with the local communist cadres, a follow-up policy seemed to be in order. The KMT-associated Personnel Training Class (匪伪人员训练班) was created in 1949 in Mianchi for the purpose to reform and stabilize those who just registered. It was not a voluntary training class at all, but a reformation camp with great amount of psychological and physical compulsion. CCP policies and contemporary national/local affairs were taught in the class. The classmates were required to confess publically and privately on their past wrongdoings, denounced each other and supposedly learned the wickedness of Old Society(旧社会) and KMT, and eventually became refreshed men." Page 89 [↩] [Cite]
Brown (2012). Page 16 [Cite]
Tiffert (2015) remarks " prepare them for Beijing and its urban social and cultural novelties, the Party issued handbooks with titles such as “Survey of Beijing,” “Investigation of Beijing,” and “Survey of Beijing’s Districts” containing information compiled from Beijing natives and underground Party members operating inside the city. The instruction also covered mundane topics like how to use electric light switches and modern toilets, and observe traffic rules.507" Tiffert (2015). Page 105 [↩] [Cite]
Byrne (2006). Page 61 [↩] [Cite]
Westad (2003). He remarks: "Saving the city was also the main aim of the city’s bourgeoisie. With Li Zongren’s blessing, a number of “peace delegations” left Shanghai for Beijing in February and March 1949, in most cases speaking quite openly with CCP leaders about the prospects for a Communist takeover of the city. The leader of the most prominent of the mafia-style gangs in Shanghai, Du Yuesheng—who as leader of the Green Gang had helped Jiang Jieshi massacre thousands of Communists in 1927-28 —got in touch with the Communist underground to explain that his motives had always been “sincere” and that he would do whatever was needed to make it "unnecessary" for the PLA to take the city by force." Page 247. [↩][Cite]
Walder (2015). Page 63 [↩] [Cite]
Stranahan (1992). Page 26. [Cite]
The book "The Lius of Shanghai" shows how a rich family deals with the evolving situation in Shanghai. "On December 17, 1949, Father wrote to him that Shanghai was the place where all of the Lius should be. “Since liberation (in 1949), everything in our country has returned to normal. The corruption and decadence of the old days have been wiped out entirely. The army’s discipline is especially impressive. It is the first we’ve seen in the republican period [since 1911]. Although life is still hard at the moment, people from all walks of life are working diligently to overcome difficulties. It is generally believed that great hope lies ahead. I share this view. At home, everything is fine.” Cochran (2013). Page 337 [↩] [Cite]
13-04-1949 Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin]. Mao Zedong remarks: "We know our weaknesses; we feel it too. It is not just our leaders who have no experience of managing the economy, but the whole party too. We are like a girl who is about to be married. While she knows that she will eventually bear children, she has no idea how it will happen, except that this is bound to happen after marriage. We are exactly like that. We know the general direction, and we know how to develop the national economy. We strive towards this direction, but we cannot say how it will turn out, because we are uncertain ourselves. We must quickly build up our economic capabilities. 60" Cited in Lim (2016). Page 55 [↩] [Cite]
Kam (1985). Pages 57-58 [↩] [Cite]
Pan Hannian and other undercover agents were accused of being contra revolutionairies in 1955. Other had more luck "For example, Pao Junnan, an important intelligence source for the Teke during the 1920s, was imprisoned in early 1950 because of his background working for the GMD and the Wang Jingwei puppet government. Xu Qiang and Li Yun, two CCP top agents in the 1930s in Shanghai, were put under investigation during the Yan’an rectification of the 1940s; they did not receive a verdict for their cases until the early 1950s. Their names were cleared only when Li Kenong personally intervened." Guo (2012). Page 345 [↩] [Cite]
Johnson (2008). Page 340 [↩] [Cite]

10-10-1947 Mao Zedong "On the reissue of the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention — instruction of the general headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army"

Road to Common Program