Article 51 of the Common Program
Text
Article 51 of the Common Program

Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.



Regional autonomy (Chronologic)
1950

01-01-1950 Honghe Hani & Yi

6-5-1950 Tianzhu

29-7-1950 Subei

25-9-1950 Dongxiang

24-11-1950 Garze


1951



12-5-1951 Eshan Yi

19-8-1951 Longsheng

1-10-1951 Oroqen

25-12-1951 Yushu

1952


Hainan Li and Miao
28-5-1952 Dayaoshan

1-8-1952 Tujiazu Miaozu

3-9-1952 Yanbian

1-10-1952 Liangshan Yi

26-11-1952 Rongshui Miao

3-12-1952 Sanjiang Dong

1953


1-1-1953 Aba & Qiang

1-1-1953 Longling

24-1-1953 Xishuangbanna Dai

25-1-1953 Liannan Yao

19-2-1953 Muli

7-4-1953 Lancang Lahu

6-7-1953 Zhangjiachuan Hui

24-7-1953 Dehong Dai & Jingpo

1-10-1953 Gannan

6-12-1953 Hainan

19-12-1953 Menyuan

22-12-1953 Huangnan

31-12-1953 Haibei

1954


1-1-1954 Golog

25-1-1954 Haixi

17-2-1954 Huzhu Tu

20-2-1954 Sunan Yugur

1-3-1954 Xunhua Salar

2-3-1954 Hualong Hui

15-3-1954 Yanqi Hui

25-3-1954 Qapqal Xibe

27-4-1954 Aksay Hazak

7-5-1954 Tongdao Dong

18-5-1954 Jiangcheng Hani & Yi

16-6-1954 Menglian Dai, Lahu & Va

23-6-1954 Bayangol

13-7-1954 Bortala

14-7-1954 Kizilsu Kirgiz

15-7-1954 Changji Hui

17-7-1954 Mulei Hazak

23-8-1954 Nujiang Lisu

10-9-1954 Hoboksar

17-9-1954 Tash Kuaghan Tajik

30-9-1954 Palikun Harak

16-10-1954 Henan

11-11-1954 Weining Yi, Hui & Miao

27-11-1954 Ili Hazak

On February 22, 1952, the Chinese government promulgates 3 decisions regarding the autonomy of national minorities, and on August 9, 1952, the central administration announces the general program to implement the autonomous regions.
Document: 22-02-1952 Program for the enforcement of nationality regional autonomy. Document: 22-02-1952 Decisions on measures for the establisment of local democratic coalition governments. Document: 22-02-1952 Decisions on the protection of the right of all scattered national minorities. Document: 09-08-1952 General programme of the PRC for the implemention of regional autonomy.
However, before the effectuation of this program, the government had to make sure “…to promote the unity of all nationalities. Winning over the trust and loyalty of the people in the minority regions became an important objective,... The first step for the Party to achieve its objectives was to set up government organs in charge of policy making regarding minorities,…"
Ru Dongyan (1999). Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China: A Case Study of the Policy Formulation and Implementation Process. Page 131
See Article 9
The digression about Article 50 of the Common Program showed that political, strategic, and pragmatic concerns are the main reasons to implement autonomous regions. "In several areas (in particular, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia) the PLA was guided only by general pronouncements from Beijing leaders, who were simultaneously dealing with the massive challenge of reconstruction their victory had brought. The first order of business was simply to establish complete military domination of all regions of China; the second priority was the imposition of Communist Party control over all political and social institutions. 4 The instrument for establishing the party's power was the PLA. Composed primarily of Han Chinese, the PLA was to occupy all areas and eliminate the Guomindang and any other enemies of the people's revolution."
Benson Linda & Svanberg Ingvar (1998) China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. Page 90



During the Qing empire, there was no distinction made based on ethnicity, there was only one difference acknowledged, the division between Han and non-Han, or in other words, between highly civilized Han and less developed civilizations with different stages of advancement but with similar roots. “This distinction, according to Confucianism, does not refer to apparent differences in physical features or language. Rather, it is mainly shown in cultural differences with values and norms of behaviour as the distinguishing characteristics.”
Ma Rong (2007). A new perspective in guiding ethnic Relations in the 21st century: ‘depoliticization’ of ethnicity in China. Page 6
In the Qing period "The (southern) borderland space was one in which ethnic mixing prevailed and in which still independent Zhuang, Miao and Yao people  negotiated favorable terms of trade with competing colonial regimes. These people went their own way and honed their skills in guerrilla  warfare. They used their ability to crisscross the border for profit, such as smuggling the opium production in China and trading with  French colonials.3 The isolating mountainous terrain, poor infrastructure, self-sufficient economies, and lack of a  unified religious  or  political leadership all contribute to the  imited independence from central control."
 Chaisingkananont Somrak (no year). Notion of Ethnicity as Cultural Politics: State, Ethnology, and the Zhuang. Page 23
Shortly after the fall of the empire, the idea of five races (Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Muslim, and Han) introduced by Sun Yatsen, was abandoned. Instead Jiang Jieshi decided: “… our various clans actually belong ... to the same racial stock (tsung-tsu). .. that there are five people designated in China ... is not due to differences of race or blood but to religion and geographical environment"
Cited in Ru (1999). Language Planning. Page 26
Therefore, both the rulers of the empire and the GMD saw no reason for self-determination or autonomy for the national minorities. Yet the GMD government was confronted with rebellion in Xinjiang and was not able to exert effective power in Tibet. Even worse was the successful secession of Outer Mongolia. See Article 2

From the start, the CCP had a different idea. The first years of the CCP, they followed the Soviet Union model claiming that these minorities groups were ‘nationalities’. They should have the right to ‘self-determination’ and to establish their own nations. The Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-1937)
Map
Territories included the Northeastern Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hunan-Western Hubei, Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou, Shaanxi-Gansu, Szechuan-Shensi, Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Honghu and Haifeng-Lufeng Soviets.
adopted on November 7, 1931 a constitution. "As in the constitution of the Soviet Union, national minorities were given the right of self-determination. This meant, in theory, that they could either choose to join with the Chinese Soviet Republic or break away and set up their own state."
Waller Derek J. (1973). The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934. Page 32 (in the provisional constitution of the GMD of May 12, 1931 there is no mention of minorities at all).The 1931 Resolution on National Minority Questions Within China reaffirms "...the previously established guidelines, these laws allowed national minorities to create autonomous areas. As a general policy, it was also declared that: equal political and legal status should be enjoyed by national minorities and the majority; labour productivity and economic results should be improved in these areas; national languages should remain in use; and minority cadres should trained in autonomous organs." Zhu Guobin, Yu Lingyun (2000). Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal from a Historical Perspective. Page 48
In 1938, at the sixth plenary session of the CPC Sixth Central Committee, Mao Zedong has changed his opinion and states "under the principle of uniting against the Japanese invasion, the Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao, Yao, Yi, Fan, and all nationalities should be given equal rights as the Han, enjoy the right to manage their own affairs by themselves, and build a unified country with the Han.28"
Cited in Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model of Multinational State-Building in the People’s Republic of China in Thomas P. Bernstein & Li Hua-yu (Eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–present. Page 482
In 1945, a directive regarding the regional autonomy of Inner Mongolia left behind the idea of self-determination and federalism and formulated the development of the theory of regional national autonomy. In 1947, Mongols and the CCP succeeded in seizing power in Inner Mongolia. On May 1, 1947 the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government (IMAR) was established, with Ulanhu as the chairman. “In fact, the CCP used the ethnic Mongols’ participation in the founding of the PRC as a crucial model in its effort to demonstrate its legitimacy in the eyes of other ethnic minority groups”
Han Enze & Mylonas Harris (2014). Interstate Relations, Perceptions, and Power Balance: Explaining China’s Policies Toward Ethnic Groups, 1949–1965. Page 172
During
Mikoyan
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
visit on February 4, 1949, he “…conveyed to Mao Zedong that our CC does not advise the Chinese Com[munist] Party to go overboard in the national question by means of providing independence to national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of the Chinese state in connection with the communists’ take-over of power. One should give autonomy and not independence to the national minorities. Mao Zedong was glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever.”
Document: 04--02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong. Walder (2015) remarks the idea of self-determination is "...replaced by a plan to create a socialist state that embodied the “unity of five nationalities”—Tibetans, Xinjiang’s Uighurs, and Mongolians, along with Han Chinese and Hui (ethnic Han Muslims). This was the long- standing Nationalist position that the CCP had denounced as a reactionary cover for national oppression. Mao declared this new stance in discussions with Stalin’s envoy in January 1949. The new claim was that the socialist state would liberate minority peoples from feudal oppression." Walder Andrew G. (2015). China under Mao. A revolution derailed. Page 37
In the Common Program the notion of "self-determination has completely disappeared. "On October 5, 1949, the CCP Central Committee instructed its regional bureaus and field-army CCP committees that the term “self-determination” should no longer be used in its minorities policy, because it might be employed by imperialists and minority reactionaries to sabotage the unification of China.34"
Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model. Page 483
The PLA is stationed in all regions and under direct control of Beijing.
Clarke (2013) states: "Rather, the CCP model was based on the assertion that the various non-Han ethnic groups could only achieve their own social revolutions within a unified Chinese state and under the leadership of the Han dominated CCP.22 While separation from the PRC was therefore denied, the Party nonetheless asserted that it would guarantee China’s ethnic minorities a degree of political and cultural autonomy via the establishment of autonomous organs of government in regions predominantly populated by minority peoples and the protection of ethnic minority religions, languages and cultural practices."
Clarke Michael (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Causes and Contemporary Challenges. Page 117
Howland (2011) notices, that the way the autonomous regions are formed, is according to "...some critics effectively a policy of “divide and conquer”—the creation of a mosaic of autonomous zones in order to prevent any collective action against the PRC- and other critics have debated whether or not the PRC’s work of minzu shibie (ethnic identification) was an act of colonialism in continuity with Qing imperial practices" and he continues with the remark: "This identification, territorialization, and transformation of minority peoples produced lasting ambiguities. On the one hand, longstanding communities discovered ethnic divisions among themselves. Communities of people in southwest China, for example, found themselves identified and territorialized into new communities arranged differently from those to which they had long been accustomed: education and the creation of minority nationality cadres and administrators created new fissures among communities,…"
Howland Douglas (2011). The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy. Page 185
Clarke (2013) concludes
"..., the CCP in fact adopted five guiding principles for its handling of the ethnic minority issue that reflected the imperatives of ‘national regional autonomy’: (1) no region would be permitted to secede from the PRC; (2) both ‘Han chauvinism’ (i.e. assertions of Han cultural superiority) and ‘local nationalism’ (i.e. separatism) would be opposed; (3) autonomous organs of government would be established in regions predominantly populated by minority peoples; (4) equality between nationalities, freedom of religion, and the preservation and development of minority languages and customs would be guaranteed; and (5) the central government pledged to aid in the development of ethnic minority regions…. The ultimate effect of ‘national regional autonomy’, however, was that plurality existed only in a cultural sense while the ‘political unity’ of the People's Republic of China remained resolutely Han-centred."
Clarke (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Page 114



Mao Zedong writes to Peng Dehuai on November 14, 1949, that "the government organs at all levels should, in accordance with the size and ratio of [minority] nationality populations, allocate quotas and absorb in large numbers those members of the Hui nationality and other minority nationalities who are capable of cooperating with us into taking part in government work. In the present period they should organize, across the board, coalition governments, i.e., united front governments. Within [the framework of] such a cooperation, minority nationality cadres will be nurtured in large numbers. Furthermore, the provincial [Party] committees of Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Shaanxi, and the [special] district [Party] committees of all places where there are minority nationalities ought to form training classes for minority nationality cadres, or cadre training schools. Please give this a good deal of attention. It is impossible to thoroughly resolve the problem of the minority nationalities and to totally isolate the nationalistic reactionaries without a large number of Communist cadres who are from minority nationality backgrounds."
Document: 14-11-1949 Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau
The Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN) in Beijing to train cadres for the government and party apparatus is established in 1951. A few months later, is decided to establish such institutes in three other locations: the northwest, the southwest, and the central south. By 1952, seven such Minority Institutes had been established in other parts of the country. "Three tasks were specified for these institutes: first, to train high- and mid-level cadres for minority work, including language workers; second, to conduct research on minorities, including their language, culture, history, and socioeconomic situations; and third, to supervise and organize translation and editing work"
Ru (1999). Pages 132-133
Not all minorities were interested in the training. Most responsive were those affected by Japanese aggression before 1949. Especially the Koreans, Mongolians and Manchus. In the province of Qinghai, there was little response. The Islamic Hui and the Tibetan opposed the new regime and throughout the 1950’s there were periodic armed revolts. (See Article 2) By 1957, there were about 700,000 CCP members among the minorities, that is, about 5.5 per cent of the total of 12.72 million. The number of ethnic minority cadres at all levels of leadership was about 10,000 in 1950, 50,000 in 1951, and 100,000 in 1952
Mackerras Colin (2003). China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation. Page 21.
There were 3121 CCP members in Qinghai in 1954. Goodman David S G (2004) Qinghai and the Emergence of the West: Nationalities, Communal Interaction and National Integration. Page 386 and Conner Walker (1984). The national question in Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy. Page 290
"Though still making no specific recommendations for Zhuang autonomy, the party emphasized the necessity of training minority personnel to carry the Communist message to the minority masses. The vast majority of party members and officials in the area were Han, from both inside and outside the province. Very few cadres were minority nationals, and those who were rarely emphasized their nationality affiliation. In August 1951, 219 minority cadres were sent to the Southern Minority Nationalities Institute for a one-year training course. In March 1952 the party established the Guangxi Nationalities Institute in Nanning and recruited the first class of 150 students" Palmer Kaup Katherina (2000). Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China. Page 84
There is also resistance from CCP members, they argued "…it was too early to train minority cadres. Of the minority citizens who had completed training and become cadres, not many had advanced to the status of party officials.67 There was in such attitudes a clear message to Tibetans living in these areas, one which went contrary to all that Mao had promised: you are part of new China where all are equal, but by virtue of being non-Han, you are considered ethnically incapable of participating fully in new China's governance."
Khan Sulmaan Wasif (2015) Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands. UNC Press Books. Page 31
In the south of China, language is an obstacle for the mobility of minority cadres. Most of the minorities do not speak Mandarin. From 1950 on, officials are required to learn Mandarin within a few years. Only the well-educated are in the position to acquire posts in the regional administration and/or party. The CCP is confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, the party wants to create a united front with the local elite, to show that the CCP is unlike the earlier Han rulers who did not pay attention to the interests of the minorities. On the other hand, the CCP has to convince the minority peasants that in the long run the support for the CCP is in their interest.
In remote areas all over the country, there are no minority CCP members who can hold office. Cadres are not only confronted with linguistic and cultural obstacles but also with transport, communications
For example: In February 1952 the PLA in Tibet started its first language class, to learn Tibetan.
, housing, supply, security, and staffing difficulties. Although confronted with these complications. "Han people working in local government and Party administration only constituted a small minority of the whole population, but owing to their political elite status they have obviously had a considerable influence on the economic, political and cultural changes in those areas since the 1950s."
Hansen Mette Halskov (2004). Frontier People Han Settlers in Minority Areas of China. Page 48



In his talk with Tibetan delegates, Mao Zedong tells about the the problem of land redistribution “In the regions inhabited by the Han people land has already been redistributed, and in these areas religions are still protected. Whether or not land should be redistributed in regions inhabited by minority nationalities will be decided by the minority nationalities themselves. At the moment, land redistribution is out of the question in Tibet. Whether or not there should be redistribution in the future will be decided by you yourselves; moreover, you yourselves should carry out the redistribution. We will not redistribute the land for you.”
Document: 08-10-1952 Talk With Tibetan Delegates (Excerpts). Howland (2011) notes: "In 1945, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movements Association endorsed Mao’s project of new democracy and proceeded to target landlords, rich peasants, and Nationalist reactionaries in Inner Mongolia as a first step toward land reform and class struggle. To the Party’s stated regret, the wanton destruction of livestock and Lama Buddhist temples and the denigration of the Mongol language and culture produced charges of “extreme leftist mistakes” against CCP leadership of the revolution in Inner Mongolia. Nonetheless, the region was integrated into the new state system that the CCP was trying to create " Howland Douglas (2011) The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy. Page 183.
The program carried out in the minority areas was called Democratic Reforms instead of Land Reforms. "There were several reasons for such a delay. One is the idea that many minority groups were still not at the stage of “landlord economy” yet, so land reforms were not appropriate. Another reason was the CCP’s need to appease local leaders in minority areas to incorporate them into the ruling elites. Thus, the local leaders were able to hold out their previous land tenures for much longer than their Han counterparts. Also, the Democratic Reforms carried out in ethnic minority areas were not as violent as the Land Reforms in most Han areas, where landlords were violently struggled and persecuted."
Han Enze & Mylonas Harris (2011). Nation-building policies in communist China, 1949-1965. Page 16.
"The Agrarian Reform Law of The People's Republic of China, promulgated on June 30th 1950, specifically protects the rights of Muslims to mosque land, but also states that Ahungs (and other religious leaders) should be given land to work, unless they have other means of making a living . (38) Communist troops destined for Muslim areas were given specific instructions to respect mosques, refrain from eating pork, and to show respect to Muslim women . Special hospitals serving halal food were established in Peking and Tientsin. " Forbes Andrew D.W. (1976). Survey article The Muslim National Minorities of China. Page 79

Article 27 of the Marriage law permitted the national minorities to modify the Marriage Law in conformity with the actual conditions prevailing in these areas. See Article 6
The CCP allows minority groups some degree of religious freedom. In Xinjiang and Tibet, religious leaders are included in governmental organs. Islamic and Buddhist education can be continued for a while. New prayer halls are erected and some religious festivals are still performed. "Other affirmative measures toward ethnic minorities included: to lower standards for admission to colleges and universities (1951); the granting of scholarships to students from an ethnic minority (1952); a specific program to improve the public health of ethnicities (1951) as well various measures to preserve the various ethnic cultures."
Lahtinen Anja (2010). Governance matters China’s developing western region with a focus on Qinghai province. Page 71
The purpose of these special arrangements is to win the favor of minority groups through the promise of protected legal status. This set of minority rights would be territorially based, allow for political and economic self-determination, and place minority leaders into local offices. However, the CCP used refined methods to maintain control: “the use of the Party’s unique position in the structure of the Chinese government to undermine minority autonomy; the organization of the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minorities; and the subversion of traditional leadership in minority communities. While promising minorities protected legal status and autonomy within the system, the CCP often used the structure of the Party itself to sabotage minority autonomy. Within China’s political system, the state government and the CCP exist as separate entities, but each state organization has a corresponding Party equivalent, with the Party component exercising ultimate authority.70 This arrangement allowed the CCP to appoint local minority leaders to state posts, but because these offices were subservient to their Party counterparts, they possessed no real power.”
Betz Jeffrey D. (2008). An institutional assessment of ethnic conflict in China. Page 27.
Betz (2008) remarks: "...means by which the CCP was able to undermine minority autonomy was to organize the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minority groups. The purpose of this was to dilute Uyghur predominance within Xinjiang’s leadership by creating a system in which the Uyghurs had to compete directly with other minority groups for political office. As a result, despite being a local majority within Xinjiang, the Uyghurs came to possess a disproportionately low number of local offices, only 40 percent of a potential 80 percent of such offices in 1951.73 So while the Uyghurs accepted CCP rule because minority leaders could hold office within Xinjiang, the system that the Party created locked them in competition with other groups. This aided the CCP in its efforts to control Xinjiang by providing the appearance of autonomy, but simultaneously allowing the Party to remain dominant as minority groups struggled amongst themselves.74" Page 28. He continues "Again, in the same way that administrative units were designed in Xinjiang to dilute Uyghur influence and force Uyghur leaders to compete with Kazaks and Hui for office, so to was Zhuang power diluted in Guangxi as Zhuang leaders competed with Yi and Dai for local control." "In order to limit the ability of Tibetans to exercise autonomy within central Tibet, ..., the Party fostered competition among the political factions of the Dalai Lama’s government." Page 29
Svanberg (1998) notices: "At the highest government levels, however, there was no proportionate national minority representation, leaving the promises of the Common Program unfulfilled. In Xinjiang, each national minority was given at least one representative on the government council; Uyghurs, who constituted 75 percent of the population, held only 29 percent of council seats. When the council was subsequently enlarged to seventy-one members, Uyghurs held twenty-four seats, or 34 percent. Han Chinese, who were then about 6 percent of the region's population, held fifteen seats, or 21 percent. The remaining positions were held by representatives of the remaining nationalities."
Svanberg Ingvar (1998). China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. Page 99


Ru Dongyan (1999). Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China: A Case Study of the Policy Formulation and Implementation Process. Page 131 Back
Benson Linda & Svanberg Ingvar (1998) China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. Page 90 Back
Ma Rong (2007). A new perspective in guiding ethnic Relations in the 21st century: ‘depoliticization’ of ethnicity in China. Page 6 Back
Chaisingkananont Somrak (no year). Notion of Ethnicity as Cultural Politics: State, Ethnology, and the Zhuang. Page 23 Back
Cited in Ru (1999). Language Planning. Page 26 Back
Waller Derek J. (1973). The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934. Page 32 (in the provisional constitution of the GMD of May 12, 1931 there is no mention of minorities at all). The 1931 Resolution on National Minority Questions Within China reaffirms "...the previously established guidelines, these laws allowed national minorities to create autonomous areas. As a general policy, it was also declared that: equal political and legal status should be enjoyed by national minorities and the majority; labour productivity and economic results should be improved in these areas; national languages should remain in use; and minority cadres should trained in autonomous organs." Zhu Guobin, Yu Lingyun (2000). Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal from a Historical Perspective. Page 48 Back
Cited in Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model of Multinational State-Building in the People’s Republic of China in Thomas P. Bernstein & Li Hua-yu (Eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–present. Page 482 Back
Han Enze & Mylonas Harris (2014). Interstate Relations, Perceptions, and Power Balance: Explaining China’s Policies Toward Ethnic Groups, 1949–1965. Page 172 Back
Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model. Page 483 Back
Clarke Michael (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Causes and Contemporary Challenges. Page 117 Back
Howland Douglas (2011). The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy. Page 185 Back
Clarke (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Page 114 Back
Ru (1999). Pages 132-133 Back
Mackerras Colin (2003). China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation. Page 21.
There were 3121 CCP members in Qinghai in 1954 Goodman David S G (2004) Qinghai and the Emergence of the West: Nationalities, Communal Interaction and National Integration. Page 386. Conner Walker (1984). The national question in Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy. Page 290
"Though still making no specific recommendations for Zhuang autonomy, the party emphasized the necessity of training minority personnel to carry the Communist message to the minority masses. The vast majority of party members and officials in the area were Han, from both inside and outside the province. Very few cadres were minority nationals, and those who were rarely emphasized their nationality affiliation. In August 1951, 219 minority cadres were sent to the Southern Minority Nationalities Institute for a one-year training course. In March 1952 the party established the Guangxi Nationalities Institute in Nanning and recruited the first class of 150 students" Palmer Kaup Katherina (2000). Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China. Page 84 Back
Khan Sulmaan Wasif (2015) Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands. Page 31 Back
For example: In February 1952 the PLA in Tibet started its first language class, to learn Tibetan. Back
Hansen Mette Halskov (2004). Frontier People Han Settlers in Minority Areas of China. Page 48 Back
Han Enze & Mylonas Harris (2011). Nation-building policies in communist China, 1949-1965. Page 16.
"The Agrarian Reform Law of The People's Republic of China, promulgated on June 30th 1950, specifically protects the rights of Muslims to mosque land, but also states that Ahungs (and other religious leaders) should be given land to work, unless they have other means of making a living . (38) Communist troops destined for Muslim areas were given specific instructions to respect mosques, refrain from eating pork, and to show respect to Muslim women . Special hospitals serving halal food were established in Peking and Tientsin. " Forbes Andrew D.W. (1976). Survey article The Muslim National Minorities of China. Page 79 Back
Lahtinen Anja (2010). Governance matters China’s developing western region with a focus on Qinghai province. Page 71 Back
Betz Jeffrey D. (2008). An institutional assessment of ethnic conflict in China. Page 27.
Betz (2008) remarks: "...means by which the CCP was able to undermine minority autonomy was to organize the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minority groups. The purpose of this was to dilute Uyghur predominance within Xinjiang’s leadership by creating a system in which the Uyghurs had to compete directly with other minority groups for political office. As a result, despite being a local majority within Xinjiang, the Uyghurs came to possess a disproportionately low number of local offices, only 40 percent of a potential 80 percent of such offices in 1951.73 So while the Uyghurs accepted CCP rule because minority leaders could hold office within Xinjiang, the system that the Party created locked them in competition with other groups. This aided the CCP in its efforts to control Xinjiang by providing the appearance of autonomy, but simultaneously allowing the Party to remain dominant as minority groups struggled amongst themselves.74" Page 28. He continues "Again, in the same way that administrative units were designed in Xinjiang to dilute Uyghur influence and force Uyghur leaders to compete with Kazaks and Hui for office, so to was Zhuang power diluted in Guangxi as Zhuang leaders competed with Yi and Dai for local control." "In order to limit the ability of Tibetans to exercise autonomy within central Tibet, ..., the Party fostered competition among the political factions of the Dalai Lama’s government." Page 29 Back
Svanberg Ingvar (1998). China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. Page 99 Back