Article 51 of the Common Program
Text
Article 51 of the Common Program

Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.


Regional autonomy (Chronologic)

1950


01-01-1950 Honghe Hani & Yi
6-5-1950 Tianzhu
29-7-1950 Subei
25-9-1950 Dongxiang
24-11-1950 Garze

1951



12-5-1951 Eshan Yi
19-8-1951 Longsheng
1-10-1951 Oroqen
25-12-1951 Yushu

1952


Hainan Li and Miao
28-5-1952 Dayaoshan
1-8-1952 Tujiazu Miaozu
3-9-1952 Yanbian
1-10-1952 Liangshan Yi
26-11-1952 Rongshui Miao

3-12-1952 Sanjiang Dong

1953


1-1-1953 Aba & Qiang
1-1-1953 Longling
24-1-1953 Xishuangbanna Dai
25-1-1953 Liannan Yao
19-2-1953 Muli
7-4-1953 Lancang Lahu
6-7-1953 Zhangjiachuan Hui
24-7-1953 Dehong Dai & Jingpo
1-10-1953 Gannan
6-12-1953 Hainan

19-12-1953 Menyuan
22-12-1953 Huangnan
31-12-1953 Haibei

1954


1-1-1954 Golog
25-1-1954 Haixi
17-2-1954 Huzhu Tu
20-2-1954 Sunan Yugur
1-3-1954 Xunhua Salar
2-3-1954 Hualong Hui
15-3-1954 Yanqi Hui
25-3-1954 Qapqal Xibe
27-4-1954 Aksay Hazak
7-5-1954 Tongdao Dong
18-5-1954 Jiangcheng Hani & Yi
16-6-1954 Menglian Dai, Lahu & Va
23-6-1954 Bayangol
13-7-1954 Bortala
14-7-1954 Kizilsu Kirgiz
15-7-1954 Changji Hui
17-7-1954 Mulei Hazak
23-8-1954 Nujiang Lisu
10-9-1954 Hoboksar
17-9-1954 Tash Kuaghan Tajik
30-9-1954 Palikun Harak
16-10-1954 Henan
11-11-1954 Weining Yi, Hui & Miao
27-11-1954 Ili Hazak
On February 22, 1952 the Chinese government promulgates 3 decisions regarding autonomy of national minorities and on August 9, 1952 the central administration announces the general program to implement the autonomous regions.
Document: 22-02-1952 Program for the enforcement of nationality regional autonomy. Document: 22-02-1952 Decisions on measures for the establisment of local democratic coalition governments. Document: 22-02-1952 Decisions on the protection of the right of all scattered national minorities. Document: 09-08-1952 General programme of the PRC for the implemention of regional autonomy.
But before the effectuation of this program, the government had to make sure “…to promote the unity of all nationalities. Winning over the trust and loyalty of the people in the minority regions became an important objective,... The first step for the Party to achieve its objectives was to set up government organs in charge of policy making regarding minorities,…"
Ru Dongyan (1999). Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China: A Case Study of the Policy Formulation and Implementation Process. University of Toronto. Page 131
See Article 9
The digression about Article 50 of the Common Program showed that political, strategic, and pragmatic concerns are the main reasons to implement autonomous regions. "In several areas (in particular, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia) the PLA was guided only by general pronouncements from Beijing leaders, who were simultaneously dealing with the massive challenge of reconstruction their victory had brought. The first order of business was simply to establish complete military domination of all regions of China; the second priority was the imposition of Communist Party control over all political and social institutions. 4 The instrument for establishing the party's power was the PLA. Composed primarily of Han Chinese, the PLA was to occupy all areas and eliminate the Guomindang and any other enemies of the people's revolution."
Benson Linda & Svanberg Ingvar (1998) China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. NY. Page 90

‘self-determination’ or autonomy...

During the Qing empire there was no distinction made based on ethnicity, there was only one difference acknowledged, the division between Han and non-Han or in other words between highly civilized Han and less developed civilizations with different stages of advancement but with similar roots. “This distinction, according to Confucianism, does not refer to apparent differences in physical features or language. Rather, it is mainly shown in cultural differences with values and norms of behaviour as the distinguishing characteristics.”
Ma Rong (2007). A new perspective in guiding ethnic Relations in the 21st century: ‘depoliticization’ of ethnicity in China. Discussion Paper 21 China Policy Institute Page 6
Shortly after the fall of the empire the idea of five races (Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Muslim, and Han) introduced by Sun Yatsen, was abandoned. Instead Jiang Jieshi decided: “… our various clans actually belong ... to the same racial stock (tsung-tsu). .. that there are five people designated in China ... is not due to differences of race or blood but to religion and geographical environment"
Cited in Ru (1999). Language Planning. Page 26
So both the rulers of the empire and the GMD saw no reason for self-determination or autonomy for the national minorities. Yet the GMD government was confronted with rebellion in Xinjiang and was not able to exert effective power in Tibet. Even worse was the successful secession of Outer Mongolia. See Article 2

From the start the CCP had a different idea. The first years of the CCP, they followed the Soviet Union model claiming that these minorities groups were ‘nationalities’. They should have the right to ‘self-determination’ and to establish their own nations. The Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-1937
Map
Territories included the Northeastern Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hunan-Western Hubei, Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou, Shaanxi-Gansu, Szechuan-Shensi, Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Honghu and Haifeng-Lufeng Soviets.
adopted in November 7, 1931 a constitution. "As in the constitution of the Soviet Union, national minorities were given the right of self-determination. This meant, in theory, that they could either choose to join with the Chinese Soviet Republic or break away and set up their own state."
Waller Derek J. (1973). The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934. University of California. Page 32 (in the provisional constitution of the GMD of May 12, 1931 there is no mention of minorities at all).The 1931 Resolution on National Minority Questions Within China reaffirms "...the previously established guidelines, these laws allowed national minorities to create autonomous areas. As a general policy, it was also declared that: equal political and legal status should be enjoyed by national minorities and the majority; labour productivity and economic results should be improved in these areas; national languages should remain in use; and minority cadres should trained in autonomous organs." Zhu Guobin, Yu Lingyun (2000). Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal from a Historical Perspective. Page 48
Document: 26-01-1951 labour insurance regulations 1951
In 1938, at the sixth plenary session of the CPC Sixth Central Committee Mao Zedong has changed his opinion and states “under the principle of uniting against the Japanese invasion, the Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao, Yao, Yi, Fan, and all nationalities should be given equal rights as the Han, enjoy the right to manage their own affairs by themselves, and build a unified country with the Han.”28
Cited in Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model of Multinational State-Building in the People’s Republic of China in Thomas P. Bernstein & Li Hua-yu (Eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–present. The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Lexington Books. Page 482
In 1945 a directive regarding the regional autonomy of Inner Mongolia left behind the idea of self-determination and federalism and formulated the development of the theory of regional national autonomy.
During
Mikoyan
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) Minister of Foreign Trade (1938-1949) Politburo member (1935-1966) Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers (1946-1953)
visit on February 4, 1949 he “…conveyed to Mao Zedong that our CC does not advise the Chinese Com[munist] Party to go overboard in the national question by means of providing independence to national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of the Chinese state in connection with the communists’ take-over of power. One should give autonomy and not independence to the national minorities. Mao Zedong was glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever.”
Document: 04--02-1949 Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong
In the Common Program the notion of "self-determination has completely disappeared. "On October 5, 1949, the CCP Central Committee instructed its regional bureaus and field-army CCP committees that the term “self-determination” should no longer be used in its minorities policy, because it might be employed by imperialists and minority reactionaries to sabotage the unification of China.34"
Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model. Page 483
The PLA is stationed in all regions and under direct control of Beijing.
Clarke (2013) states: "Rather, the CCP model was based on the assertion that the various non-Han ethnic groups could only achieve their own social revolutions within a unified Chinese state and under the leadership of the Han dominated CCP.22 While separation from the PRC was therefore denied, the Party nonetheless asserted that it would guarantee China’s ethnic minorities a degree of political and cultural autonomy via the establishment of autonomous organs of government in regions predominantly populated by minority peoples and the protection of ethnic minority religions, languages and cultural practices."
Clarke Michael (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Causes and Contemporary Challenges. European Journal of East Asian Studies, 12,1. Page 117
Howland (2011) notices, that the way the autonomous regions are formed, is according to "...some critics effectively a policy of “divide and conquer”—the creation of a mosaic of autonomous zones in order to prevent any collective action against the PRC- and other critics have debated whether or not the PRC’s work of minzu shibie (ethnic identification) was an act of colonialism in continuity with Qing imperial practices" and he continues with the remark: "This identification, territorialization, and transformation of minority peoples produced lasting ambiguities. On the one hand, longstanding communities discovered ethnic divisions among themselves. Communities of people in southwest China, for example, found themselves identified and territorialized into new communities arranged differently from those to which they had long been accustomed: education and the creation of minority nationality cadres and administrators created new fissures among communities,…"
Howland Douglas (2011). The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy. Modern China 37,2. Page 185
Clarke (2013) concludes
"..., the CCP in fact adopted five guiding principles for its handling of the ethnic minority issue that reflected the imperatives of ‘national regional autonomy’: (1) no region would be permitted to secede from the PRC; (2) both ‘Han chauvinism’ (i.e. assertions of Han cultural superiority) and ‘local nationalism’ (i.e. separatism) would be opposed; (3) autonomous organs of government would be established in regions predominantly populated by minority peoples; (4) equality between nationalities, freedom of religion, and the preservation and development of minority languages and customs would be guaranteed; and (5) the central government pledged to aid in the development of ethnic minority regions…. The ultimate effect of ‘national regional autonomy’, however, was that plurality existed only in a cultural sense while the ‘political unity’ of the People's Republic of China remained resolutely Han-centred."
Clarke (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Page 114

Cadres...

Mao Zedong writes to Peng Dehuai on November 14, 1949, that "the government organs at all levels should, in accordance with the size and ratio of [minority] nationality populations, allocate quotas and absorb in large numbers those members of the Hui nationality and other minority nationalities who are capable of cooperating with us into taking part in government work. In the present period they should organize, across the board, coalition governments, i.e., united front governments. Within [the framework of] such a cooperation, minority nationality cadres will be nurtured in large numbers. Furthermore, the provincial [Party] committees of Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Shaanxi, and the [special] district [Party] committees of all places where there are minority nationalities ought to form training classes for minority nationality cadres, or cadre training schools. Please give this a good deal of attention. It is impossible to thoroughly resolve the problem of the minority nationalities and to totally isolate the nationalistic reactionaries without a large number of Communist cadres who are from minority nationality backgrounds."
Document: 14-11-1949 Letter to Peng Dehuai and the Northwest Bureau
The Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN) in Beijing to train cadres for the government and party apparatus is established in 1951. A few months later, is decided to establish such institutes in three other locations: the northwest, the southwest, and the central south. By 1952, seven such Minority Institutes had been established in other parts of the country.
"Three tasks were specified for these institutes: first, to train high- and mid-level cadres for minority work, including language workers; second, to conduct research on minorities, including their language, culture, history, and socioeconomic situations; and third, to supervise and organize translation and editing work"
Ru (1999). Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China. Pages 132-133
Not all minorities were interested in the training. Most responsive were those affected by Japanese aggression before 1949. Especially the Koreans, Mongolians and Manchus. In the province of Qinghai there was little response. The Islamic Hui and the Tibetan opposed the new regime and throughout the 1950’s there were periodic armed revolts. (See Article 2) By 1957 there were about 700,000 CCP members among the minorities, that being about 5.5 per cent of the total of 12.72 million. The number of ethnic minority cadres at all levels of leadership was about 10,000 in 1950.
Mackerras Colin (2003). China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation. Routledge Curzon New York. Page 21.
There were 3121 CCP members in Qinghai in 1954 Goodman David S G (2004) Qinghai and the Emergence of the West: Nationalities, Communal Interaction and National Integration. China Quarterly, 178. Page 386
"Though still making no specific recommendations for Zhuang autonomy, the party emphasized the necessity of training minority personnel to carry the Communist message to the minority masses. The vast majority of party members and officials in the area were Han, from both inside and outside the province. Very few cadres were minority nationals, and those who were rarely emphasized their nationality affiliation. In August 1951, 219 minority cadres were sent to the Southern Minority Nationalities Institute for a one-year training course. In March 1952 the party established the Guangxi Nationalities Institute in Nanning and recruited the first class of 150 students" Palmer Kaup Katherina (2000). Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China. Boulder, CO. Page 84
There is also resistance from CCP members, they argued "…it was too early to train minority cadres. Of the minority citizens who had completed training and become cadres, not many had advanced to the status of party officials.67 There was in such attitudes a clear message to Tibetans living in these areas, one which went contrary to all that Mao had promised: you are part of new China where all are equal, but by virtue of being non-Han, you are considered ethnically incapable of participating fully in new China's governance."
Khan Sulmaan Wasif (2015) Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands. UNC Press Books. Page 31
In the south of China language is an obstacle for the mobility of minority cadres. Most of the minorities don't speak Mandarin. From 1950 on, officials are required to learn Mandarin within a few years. Only the well-educated are in the position to acquire posts in the regional administration and/or party. The CCP is confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand the party wants to create a united front with the local elite, to show that the CCP is unlike the earlier Han rulers who did not pay attention to the interests of the minorities. On the other hand, the CCP has to convince the minority peasants that in the long run the support for the CCP is in their interest.
In remote areas all over the country there are no CCP members who can hold office. Cadres are not only confronted with linguistic and cultural obstacles but also with transport, communications
For example: In February 1952 the PLA in Tibet started its first language class, to learn Tibetan.
, housing, supply, security and staffing difficulties.

Special treatments...

In his talk with Tibetan delegates Mao Zedong tells about the the problem of land redistribution “In the regions inhabited by the Han people land has already been redistributed, and in these areas religions are still protected. Whether or not land should be redistributed in regions inhabited by minority nationalities will be decided by the minority nationalities themselves. At the moment, land redistribution is out of the question in Tibet. Whether or not there should be redistribution in the future will be decided by you yourselves; moreover, you yourselves should carry out the redistribution. We will not redistribute the land for you.”
Document: 08-10-1952 Talk With Tibetan Delegates (Excerpts). Howland (2011) notes: "In 1945, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movements Association endorsed Mao’s project of new democracy and proceeded to target landlords, rich peasants, and Nationalist reactionaries in Inner Mongolia as a first step toward land reform and class struggle. To the Party’s stated regret, the wanton destruction of livestock and Lama Buddhist temples and the denigration of the Mongol language and culture produced charges of “extreme leftist mistakes” against CCP leadership of the revolution in Inner Mongolia. Nonetheless, the region was integrated into the new state system that the CCP was trying to create " Howland Douglas (2011) The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy. Modern China 37,2. Page 183.
The program carried out in the minority areas was called Democratic Reforms instead of Land Reforms. "There were several reasons for such a delay. One is the idea that many minority groups were still not at the stage of “landlord economy” yet, so land reforms were not appropriate. Another reason was the CCP’s need to appease local leaders in minority areas to incorporate them into the ruling elites. Thus, the local leaders were able to hold out their previous land tenures for much longer than their Han counterparts. Also, the Democratic Reforms carried out in ethnic minority areas were not as violent as the Land Reforms in most Han areas, where landlords were violently struggled and persecuted."
Han Enze & Mylonas Harris (2011). Nation-building policies in communist China, 1949-1965 ISA Annual Convention. Page 16.
"The Agrarian Reform Law of The People's Republic of China, promulgated on June 30th 1950, specifically protects the rights of Muslims to mosque land, but also states that Ahungs (and other religious leaders) should be given land to work, unless they have other means of making a living . (38) Communist troops destined for Muslim areas were given specific instructions to respect mosques, refrain from eating pork, and to show respect to Muslim women . Special hospitals serving halal food were established in Peking and Tientsin. " Forbes Andrew D.W. (1976). Survey article The Muslim National Minorities of China. Religion, 6, 1. Page 79

Article 27 of the Marriage law permitted the national minorities to modify the Marriage Law in conformity with the actual conditions prevailing in these areas. See Article 6

The CCP allows minority groups some degree of religious freedom. In Xinjiang and Tibet religious leaders are included in governmental organs. Islamic and Buddhist education can be continued for a while. New prayer halls are erected and some religious festivals are still performed.
The purpose of these special arrangements is to win the favor of minority groups through the promise of protected legal status. This set of minority rights would be territorially based, allow for political and economic self-determination, and place minority leaders into local offices. But the CCP used refined methods to maintain control: “the use of the Party’s unique position in the structure of the Chinese government to undermine minority autonomy; the organization of the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minorities; and the subversion of traditional leadership in minority communities. While promising minorities protected legal status and autonomy within the system, the CCP often used the structure of the Party itself to sabotage minority autonomy. Within China’s political system, the state government and the CCP exist as separate entities, but each state organization has a corresponding Party equivalent, with the Party component exercising ultimate authority.70 This arrangement allowed the CCP to appoint local minority leaders to state posts, but because these offices were subservient to their Party counterparts, they possessed no real power.”
Betz Jeffrey D. (2008). An institutional assessment of ethnic conflict in China. Monterey, California. Page 27.
Betz (2008) remarks: "...means by which the CCP was able to undermine minority autonomy was to organize the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minority groups. The purpose of this was to dilute Uyghur predominance within Xinjiang’s leadership by creating a system in which the Uyghurs had to compete directly with other minority groups for political office. As a result, despite being a local majority within Xinjiang, the Uyghurs came to possess a disproportionately low number of local offices, only 40 percent of a potential 80 percent of such offices in 1951.73 So while the Uyghurs accepted CCP rule because minority leaders could hold office within Xinjiang, the system that the Party created locked them in competition with other groups. This aided the CCP in its efforts to control Xinjiang by providing the appearance of autonomy, but simultaneously allowing the Party to remain dominant as minority groups struggled amongst themselves.74" Page 28. He continues "Again, in the same way that administrative units were designed in Xinjiang to dilute Uyghur influence and force Uyghur leaders to compete with Kazaks and Hui for office, so to was Zhuang power diluted in Guangxi as Zhuang leaders competed with Yi and Dai for local control." "In order to limit the ability of Tibetans to exercise autonomy within central Tibet, ..., the Party fostered competition among the political factions of the Dalai Lama’s government." Page 29
Svanberg (1998) notices: "At the highest government levels, however, there was no proportionate national minority representation, leaving the promises of the Common Program unfulfilled. In Xinjiang, each national minority was given at least one representative on the government council; Uyghurs, who constituted 75 percent of the population, held only 29 percent of council seats. When the council was subsequently enlarged to seventy-one members, Uyghurs held twenty-four seats, or 34 percent. Han Chinese, who were then about 6 percent of the region's population, held fifteen seats, or 21 percent. The remaining positions were held by representatives of the remaining nationalities."
Svanberg Ingvar (1998). China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. Armonk, NY. Page 99




Literature Notes Documents...

2.Ru Dongyan (1999). Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China: A Case Study of the Policy Formulation and Implementation Process. University of Toronto. Page 131 Back
3.Benson Linda & Svanberg Ingvar (1998) China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. NY. Page 90 Back
4.Ma Rong (2007). A new perspective in guiding ethnic Relations in the 21st century: ‘depoliticization’ of ethnicity in China. Discussion Paper 21 China Policy Institute. Page 6 Back
5.Cited in Ru (1999). Language Planning. Page 26 Back
6.Waller Derek J. (1973). The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934. University of California. Page 32 (in the provisional constitution of the GMD of May 12, 1931 there is no mention of minorities at all). The 1931 Resolution on National Minority Questions Within China reaffirms "...the previously established guidelines, these laws allowed national minorities to create autonomous areas. As a general policy, it was also declared that: equal political and legal status should be enjoyed by national minorities and the majority; labour productivity and economic results should be improved in these areas; national languages should remain in use; and minority cadres should trained in autonomous organs." Zhu Guobin, Yu Lingyun (2000). Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal from a Historical Perspective. Page 48 Back
7.Cited in Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model of Multinational State-Building in the People’s Republic of China in Thomas P. Bernstein & Li Hua-yu (Eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–present. The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Lexington Books. Page 482 Back
9.Zhou Minglang (2010). The Fate of the Soviet Model. Page 483 Back
10.Clarke Michael (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Causes and Contemporary Challenges. European Journal of East Asian Studies, 12,1. Page 117 Back
11. Howland Douglas (2011). The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in Mao Zedong’s New Democracy. Modern China 37,2. Page 185 Back
12.Clarke (2013). Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of China History, Page 114 Back
14.Ru (1999). Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China. Pages 132-133 Back
15.Mackerras Colin (2003). China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation. Routledge Curzon New York. Page 21.
There were 3121 CCP members in Qinghai in 1954 Goodman David S G (2004) Qinghai and the Emergence of the West: Nationalities, Communal Interaction and National Integration. China Quarterly, 178. Page 386
"Though still making no specific recommendations for Zhuang autonomy, the party emphasized the necessity of training minority personnel to carry the Communist message to the minority masses. The vast majority of party members and officials in the area were Han, from both inside and outside the province. Very few cadres were minority nationals, and those who were rarely emphasized their nationality affiliation. In August 1951, 219 minority cadres were sent to the Southern Minority Nationalities Institute for a one-year training course. In March 1952 the party established the Guangxi Nationalities Institute in Nanning and recruited the first class of 150 students" Palmer Kaup Katherina (2000). Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China. Boulder, CO. Page 84 Back
16.Khan Sulmaan Wasif (2015) Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands. UNC Press Books. Page 31 Back
17.For example: In February 1952 the PLA in Tibet started its first language class, to learn Tibetan. Back
19.Han Enze & Mylonas Harris (2011). Nation-building policies in communist China, 1949-1965. ISA Annual Convention. Page 16.
"The Agrarian Reform Law of The People's Republic of China, promulgated on June 30th 1950, specifically protects the rights of Muslims to mosque land, but also states that Ahungs (and other religious leaders) should be given land to work, unless they have other means of making a living . (38) Communist troops destined for Muslim areas were given specific instructions to respect mosques, refrain from eating pork, and to show respect to Muslim women . Special hospitals serving halal food were established in Peking and Tientsin. " Forbes Andrew D.W. (1976). Survey article The Muslim National Minorities of China. Religion, 6, 1. Page 79 Back
20.Betz Jeffrey D. (2008). An institutional assessment of ethnic conflict in China. Monterey, California. Page 27.
Betz (2008) remarks: "...means by which the CCP was able to undermine minority autonomy was to organize the country’s administrative units in ways disadvantageous to minority groups. The purpose of this was to dilute Uyghur predominance within Xinjiang’s leadership by creating a system in which the Uyghurs had to compete directly with other minority groups for political office. As a result, despite being a local majority within Xinjiang, the Uyghurs came to possess a disproportionately low number of local offices, only 40 percent of a potential 80 percent of such offices in 1951.73 So while the Uyghurs accepted CCP rule because minority leaders could hold office within Xinjiang, the system that the Party created locked them in competition with other groups. This aided the CCP in its efforts to control Xinjiang by providing the appearance of autonomy, but simultaneously allowing the Party to remain dominant as minority groups struggled amongst themselves.74" Page 28. He continues "Again, in the same way that administrative units were designed in Xinjiang to dilute Uyghur influence and force Uyghur leaders to compete with Kazaks and Hui for office, so to was Zhuang power diluted in Guangxi as Zhuang leaders competed with Yi and Dai for local control." "In order to limit the ability of Tibetans to exercise autonomy within central Tibet, ..., the Party fostered competition among the political factions of the Dalai Lama’s government." Page 29 Back
21.Svanberg Ingvar (1998). China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks. Armonk, NY. Page 99 Back
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