Article 51 of the Common Program

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On February 22, 1952, the Chinese government promulgated 3 decisions regarding the autonomy of national minorities, and on August 9, 1952, the central administration announced the general program to implement the autonomous Regions. In order to implement this program, the government needed to prioritize promoting unity among all ethnic groups. Gaining the trust and loyalty of people in minority regions became a crucial goal. The initial step for the Party to accomplish its objectives was to establish government bodies responsible for formulating policies concerning minority groups. See Article 9 The digression about Article 50 of the Common Program showed that political, strategic, and pragmatic concerns were the main reasons to implement autonomous Regions. In various regions, notably Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, the PLA operated under broad directives from leaders in Beijing who were grappling with the formidable task of reconstructing the nation following their victory. The primary objective was initially to achieve absolute military dominance across all regions of China, followed by the establishment of CCP authority over all political and social structures. The PLA served as the main tool for consolidating the party's power. Comprised predominantly of Han Chinese, the PLA was tasked with occupying all territories and eradicating the GMD and any other adversaries of the people's revolution.

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During the Qing empire, there was no distinction made based on ethnicity, there was only one difference acknowledged, the division between Han and non-Han, or in other words, between highly civilized Han and less developed civilizations with different stages of advancement but with similar roots. According to Confucianism, this differentiation did not pertain to superficial variances in physical attributes or language. Instead, it primarily manifested in cultural disparities, with values and norms of conduct serving as the defining characteristics. During the Qing period, the southern borderland was characterized by ethnic blending and the continued autonomy of groups like the Miao and Yao peoples, who negotiated advantageous trade terms with various colonial powers. These groups pursued their own interests and refined their guerrilla warfare tactics. They capitalized on their ability to traverse borders for profit, engaging in activities like smuggling opium and trading with French colonists. The rugged mountainous terrain, inadequate infrastructure, self-reliant economies, and absence of centralized religious or political leadership all contributed to their limited dependence on central control. After the fall of the empire, Sun Yatsen introduced the concept of five races (Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Muslim, and Han). It was soon was set aside. Instead, Jiang Jieshi asserted that the diverse clans share the same racial ancestry, suggesting that the classification of five distinct groups in China was not attributed to differences in race or blood, but rather to religious affiliations and geographical surroundings. Therefore, both the rulers of the empire and the GMD saw no reason for self-determination or autonomy for the national minorities. Yet the GMD government was confronted with rebellion in Xinjiang and was not able to exert effective power in Tibet. Even worse was the successful secession of Outer Mongolia. See Article 2

From the start, the CCP had a different idea. The first years of the CCP, they followed the Soviet Union model claiming that these minorities groups were ‘nationalities’. They should have the right to ‘self-determination’ and to establish their own nations. The Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-1937) adopted on November 7, 1931 a constitution. "As in the constitution of the Soviet Union, national minorities were given the right of self-determination. This meant, in theory, that they could either choose to join with the Chinese Soviet Republic or break away and set up their own state." In 1938, at the sixth plenary session of the CPC Sixth Central Committee, Mao Zedong changed his opinion and stated "under the principle of uniting against the Japanese invasion, the Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao, Yao, Yi, Fan, and all nationalities should be given equal rights as the Han, enjoy the right to manage their own affairs by themselves, and build a unified country with the Han.²⁸"
In 1945, a directive regarding the Regional autonomy of Inner Mongolia left behind the idea of self-determination and federalism and formulated the development of the theory of Regional national autonomy. In 1947, Mongols and the CCP succeeded in seizing power in Inner Mongolia. Chinese warlords colonized Inner Mongolia in the early twentieth century, however the majority of the Chinese population consisted of poor peasants leasing Mongol Land. In 1947, the Mongols were granted limited autonomy by adopting Leninist colonial liberation ideology, which framed the Mongols as a collective entity colonized by the Chinese. However, the socialist ideology, grounded in class analysis during the land reform, identified many Mongols as class enemies, legitimizing the redistribution of Mongol land among the Chinese majority in Inner Mongolia. Consequently, ethnic violence erupted, compelling Inner Mongolia's Mongol leaders—serving as both agents of the CCP and representatives of the Mongolian nationality—to formulate and advocate for a clear nationality policy aimed at safeguarding the ethnic rights of Mongols and, by extension, the autonomy of Inner Mongolia. On May 1, 1947 the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government (IMAR) was established, with Ulanhu as the chairman. “In fact, the CCP used the ethnic Mongols’ participation in the founding of the PRC as a crucial model in its effort to demonstrate its legitimacy in the eyes of other ethnic minority groups”
During Mikoyan's visit on February 4, 1949, he “…conveyed to Mao Zedong that our CC does not advise the Chinese Com[munist] Party to go overboard in the national question by means of providing independence to national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of the Chinese state in connection with the communists’ take-over of power. One should give autonomy and not independence to the national minorities. Mao Zedong was glad to hear this advice but you could tell by his face that he had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever.” In the Common Program the notion of "self-determination has completely disappeared. On September 20, 1949, the CCP Central Committee instructed its Regional bureaus and field-army CCP committees that the term “self-determination” should no longer be used in its minorities policy, because it might be employed by imperialists and minority reactionaries to sabotage the unification of China. The PLA was stationed in all Regions and under direct control of Beijing. Instead, the CCP model posited that the diverse non-Han ethnic groups could realize their own social revolutions only within a unified Chinese state and under the leadership of the Han-dominated CCP. While the possibility of separation from the PRC was rejected, the Party maintained its commitment to ensuring a level of political and cultural autonomy for China's ethnic minorities. This commitment was demonstrated through the establishment of autonomous government bodies in regions predominantly inhabited by minority groups and the safeguarding of ethnic minority religions, languages, and cultural traditions. Some critics argue that the formation of autonomous regions effectively resembles a "divide and conquer" strategy, aiming to create a patchwork of autonomous zones to prevent collective action against the PRC. Others have debated whether the PRC's ethnic identification efforts constitute a form of colonialism, aligning with Qing imperial practices. This process of identification, territorialization, and transformation of minority groups has resulted in enduring ambiguities. For instance, longstanding communities have discovered ethnic divisions within themselves. Communities in southwest China, for example, found themselves identified and territorialized into new groups, diverging from their traditional arrangements. Initiatives such as education and the establishment of minority nationality cadres and administrators have further deepened divisions within communities. In fact, the CCP adopted five guiding principles to address the ethnic minority issue, reflecting the imperatives of 'national Regional autonomy': 1) No Region would be allowed to secede from the PRC. 2) Both 'Han chauvinism' (assertions of Han cultural superiority) and 'local nationalism' (separatism) would be opposed. 3) Autonomous government bodies would be established in Regions predominantly inhabited by minority peoples. 4) Equality among nationalities, freedom of religion, and the preservation and development of minority languages and customs would be ensured. 5) The central government committed to aiding in the development of ethnic minority Regions. However, the ultimate impact of 'national Regional autonomy' was that diversity existed primarily on a cultural level, while the 'political unity' of the People's Republic of China remained firmly Han-centred.

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Mao Zedong wrote to Peng Dehuai on November 14, 1949, that "the government organs at all levels should, in accordance with the size and ratio of [minority] nationality populations, allocate quotas and absorb in large numbers those members of the Hui nationality and other minority nationalities who are capable of cooperating with us into taking part in government work. In the present period they should organize, across the board, coalition governments, i.e., united front governments. Within [the framework of] such a cooperation, minority nationality cadres will be nurtured in large numbers. Furthermore, the provincial [Party] committees of Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Shaanxi, and the [special] district [Party] committees of all places where there are minority nationalities ought to form training classes for minority nationality cadres, or cadre training schools. Please give this a good deal of attention. It is impossible to thoroughly resolve the problem of the minority nationalities and to totally isolate the nationalistic reactionaries without a large number of Communist cadres who are from minority nationality backgrounds." The Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN) in Beijing to train cadres for the government and party apparatus was established in 1951. A few months later, it was decided to establish such institutes in three other locations: the northwest, the southwest, and the central south. By 1952, seven such Minority Institutes had been established in other parts of the country. "Three tasks were specified for these institutes: first, to train high- and mid-level cadres for minority work, including language workers; second, to conduct research on minorities, including their language, culture, history, and socioeconomic situations; and third, to supervise and organize translation and editing work" Not all minorities were interested in the training. Most responsive were those affected by Japanese aggression before 1949. Especially the Koreans, Mongolians and Manchus. In the province of Qinghai, there was little response. The Islamic Hui and the Tibetan opposed the new regime and throughout the 1950’s there were periodic armed revolts. (See Article 2) By 1957, there were about 700,000 CCP members among the minorities, that is, about 5.5 per cent of the total of 12.72 million. The number of ethnic minority cadres at all levels of leadership was about 10,000 in 1950, 50,000 in 1951, and 100,000 in 1952 There was also opposition from CCP members who contended that it was premature to train minority cadres. Among the minority citizens who had undergone training and became cadres, only a few had ascended to the ranks of party officials. Such attitudes conveyed a distinct message to Tibetans residing in these regions, one that contradicted Mao's assurances: although you are part of the new China where equality prevails, your non-Han ethnicity is viewed as a barrier to full participation in the governance of the new China. In the south of China, language is an obstacle for the mobility of minority cadres. Most of the minorities do not speak Mandarin. From 1950 on, officials are required to learn Mandarin within a few years. Only the well-educated are in the position to acquire posts in the Regional administration and/or party. The CCP is confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, the party wants to create a united front with the local elite, to show that the CCP is unlike the earlier Han rulers who did not pay attention to the interests of the minorities. On the other hand, the CCP has to convince the minority peasants that in the long run the support for the CCP is in their interest. In remote areas all over the country, there are no minority CCP members who can hold office. Cadres faced numerous challenges beyond linguistic and cultural barriers, including difficulties with transportation, communication, housing, supplies, security, and staffing. Despite these obstacles, Han officials in local government and Party administration, though a small minority of the population, held elite political status. This allowed them to exert significant influence on the economic, political, and cultural transformations in these regions since the 1950s. While the Party would place great attention on the cultivation of minority cadres, in these early years what the state needed more than bureaucrats was the charismatic authority associated with indigenous tribal and religious positions. Thus, despite doling out government positions to indigenous leaders, essentially the Party expected and needed post-Liberation indigenous elites to continue to act as pre-Liberation elites, albeit somewhat repackaged and certainly remessaged. These local leaders were important to resolve intra- and inter-tribal conflicts, because the CCP primary goal was to restore social order, developing national unity, and increasing production.

June 1950, the GAC recruited a group of researchers and government cadres to form 4 Central Research Teams. Between 1950 and 1952, they visited different non-Han areas throughout the country. The delegations travelled to the Southwest (Xikang, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou) , the Northwest (Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai), the Central South (Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan) and the Northeast (Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Rehe, and Jilin). Besides research, the teams organized meetings with Han cadres and local non-Han (informal) leaders to discuss the possibility of becoming and autonomous area. Before an autonomous area could be created, a preparatory committee had to be established. The committee had two primary tasks. First to hold local elections to select candidates for the founding meeting. The composition had to correspond to each ethnic share in the total local population, and they had to represent the class structure. The second task of the committee was to propagandize the ethnic local autonomy. The establishment of the propaganda team and the central government's focus on its activities indicated that numerous local non-Han leaders either lacked clarity about or were unaware of the specifics of ethnic local autonomy. Consequently, the establishment of autonomous prefectures frequently occurred without genuine grassroots interest beforehand. At the founding meeting the delegates elected the leading cadres for the local People's Government and the local People's Congress. The provision of ethnic local autonomy did not follow a straightforward top-down or bottom-up approach. Rather, the establishment of ethnic autonomous regions seemed to occur as a bottom-up process, initiated only after the central government mobilized local non-Han communities. Prior to a region being officially designated as an ethnic autonomous prefecture, the central government intervened when the provincial government appears to obstruct the designation process.

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In his talk with Tibetan delegates, Mao Zedong talked about the problem of land redistribution “In the Regions inhabited by the Han people land has already been redistributed, and in these areas religions are still protected. Whether or not land should be redistributed in Regions inhabited by minority nationalities will be decided by the minority nationalities themselves. At the moment, land redistribution is out of the question in Tibet. Whether or not there should be redistribution in the future will be decided by you yourselves; moreover, you yourselves should carry out the redistribution. We will not redistribute the land for you.” The program carried out in the minority areas was called Democratic Reforms instead of Land Reforms. There were several factors contributing to this delay. Firstly, it was believed that many minority groups had not yet reached the stage of a "landlord economy," making land reforms unsuitable. Additionally, the CCP sought to placate local leaders in minority regions to integrate them into the ruling elite, allowing these leaders to retain their land tenures for longer periods than their Han counterparts. Furthermore, the Democratic Reforms implemented in ethnic minority areas were less violent compared to the Land Reforms in most Han regions, where landlords were subjected to intense struggles and persecution.
The CCP had learned from the land reform in Inner Mongolia, which had turned into a fiasco. On June 23, 1949, a document from the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, responsible for overseeing land reform in Inner Mongolia, acknowledged the severe repercussions of failing to differentiate between Mongols and Chinese. This led to the mechanical application of Chinese practices in Mongol areas within Chahar, Rehe, and the northeastern provinces.
As class labelling was implemented based on the number of animals one owned, wealthy Mongols took steps to avoid being categorized as herd lords, which were associated with feudal elements. They distributed animals among relatives and subordinates and carried out mass slaughtering of their livestock. Being labelled a herd lord not only risked property confiscation but also threatened physical elimination. In contrast, impoverished Mongols, who had received distributed animals, consumed as many as possible out of fear that their allocation might place them in the herd lord category. This rapid and intense response resulted not only in the demise of numerous among the Mongol elite but also led to a catastrophic loss of animals. Some individuals vehemently resisted, and a few even rebelled, only to be suppressed by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government army. An open rebellion erupted in Ulanmod Township in Hinggan League in February 1948, where over 200 rebels killed land reform officials and attempted to escape to the Mongolian People’s Republic with many followers and horses. The rebellion was brutally quelled.
The extent of violence in Inner Mongolia was so significant that even the leadership of the Mongolian People's Republic expressed concern. The central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party also feared that the ongoing ethnic violence could destabilize Inner Mongolia. In this context, it wasn't merely the inter-ethnic violence in the ethnically mixed regions that drew the attention of Chinese leaders. Rather, it was the intra-Mongol violence with the potential to escalate into international conflict that alarmed the Chinese leadership, prompting them to issue an order to cease these activities. The document stated "In the future, the central problem in the Mongolian area is to educate the cadres to understand nationality policy (minzu zhengce), to train new Mongolian cadres, to understand different policies that distinguish different regions (agricultural, semi-agricultural-semi-pastoral, pure pastoral), and to understand that in the Mongolian area a more cautious and steady principle has to be adopted, and only a gradual democratic policy be implemented."
In the latter part of 1950, peasants in some regions of Xinjiang initiated what was labelled as a "universal struggle against criminal landlord elements." However, this movement was likely largely impulsive and premature, instigated by some peasants interpreting the initial propaganda disseminated by the Party authorities, before practical measures for its organization and execution were fully developed. Partly, it could have been provoked by pressures imposed by authorities demanding increased grain tax from the peasantry. Whatever the instigating factors, this led to incidents of violence and extremes, some of which took the shape of ethnic and religious conflicts among different local groups, particularly between non-Han and Han nationals. Consequently, steps were taken to regulate the movement, including deploying PLA work teams to the grassroots levels. By the end of 1951, provincial authorities had established the groundwork for a more unified land reform campaign across Xinjiang. In an earlier experimental initiative involving rent reduction and anti-landlord efforts across 146 villages, the Party rectified and reinforced peasant associations, nurtured local minority leaders and activists, intensified educational programs on national unity, and promulgated Party policies at the foundational levels. The Party embraced a policy of "no struggle, no division, no classification of classes, and mutual benefit to both herdsmen and herd-owners" among the fiercely independent pastoral population. The phase of pacification and democratic reform in the pastoral regions was planned to extend until well into 1955. Military work teams, army production and construction units, and active PLA units were tasked with gradually consolidating the Party's authority among the herdsmen. The Party's gradual and moderate policies were partly motivated by concerns about disrupting the basis of Xinjiang-Soviet trade, which heavily relied on livestock products at the time.

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Article 27 of the Marriage law permitted the national minorities to modify the Marriage Law in conformity with the actual conditions prevailing in these areas. See Article 6
The CCP allowed minority groups some degree of religious freedom. In Xinjiang and Tibet, religious leaders were included in governmental organs. Islamic and Buddhist education continued for a while. New prayer halls were erected and some religious festivals were still performed. "Other affirmative measures toward ethnic minorities included: to lower standards for admission to colleges and universities (1951); the granting of scholarships to students from an ethnic minority (1952); a specific program to improve the public health of ethnicities (1951) as well various measures to preserve the various ethnic cultures." The purpose of these special arrangements was to win the favor of minority groups through the promise of protected legal status. This set of minority rights would be territorially based, allow for political and economic self-determination, and place minority leaders into local offices. However, the CCP employed sophisticated tactics to retain control, including leveraging the Party's distinctive position within the Chinese government structure to undermine minority autonomy, organizing administrative units in ways that disadvantaged minorities, and subverting traditional leadership in minority communities. While offering minorities protected legal status and autonomy within the system, the CCP frequently exploited the Party's framework to undermine minority autonomy. Within China's political system, the state government and the CCP operated as separate entities, yet each state organization had a corresponding Party counterpart, with the Party component wielding ultimate authority. This setup enabled the CCP to appoint local minority leaders to state positions, but as these positions were subordinate to their Party equivalents, they held little actual power. It is worth noting that at the highest levels of government, there was not an equitable representation of national minorities, thus failing to fulfil the promises of the Common Program. In Xinjiang, each national minority was allocated at least one representative on the government council; however, despite constituting 75 percent of the population, Uyghurs held only 29 percent of council seats. Subsequently, when the council was expanded to seventy-one members, Uyghurs held twenty-four seats, accounting for 34 percent. In contrast, Han Chinese, who comprised approximately 6 percent of the Region's population, occupied fifteen seats, representing 21 percent. The remaining positions were filled by representatives of other nationalities.

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Chapter 6 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents