Article 59 of the Common Program

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This article of the Common Program states that protection of foreigners is the basic principle of the policy of the new regime, it is an iteration of article 8 of the Proclamation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army of April 25, 1949. "Protect the lives and property of foreign nationals. It is hoped that all foreign nationals will follow their usual pursuits and observe order. All foreign nationals must abide by the orders and decrees of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government and must not engage in espionage, act against the cause of China's national independence and the people's liberation, or harbour Chinese war criminals, counter-revolutionaries or other lawbreakers. Otherwise, they shall be dealt with according to law by the People's Liberation Army and the People's Government." The decision on diplomatic relations of January 19, 1949, describes the restrictions on activities of foreigners in China.

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In July 1949, about 120 thousand foreigners lived in China, most of them living in Shanghai (65.000, in 1942 151.000) and in the Northeast (54.000). April, 1954 the SU government decided to recall all Soviet immigrants in China. In 1954, 5.842 SU immigrants were repatriated to help the SU economy. In November 1950, merely a total of 11.939 foreigners stayed in Shanghai alone, belonging to around forty different nationalities. The largest group being 1.700 British residents.
During the spring of 1949, the CCP is afraid of an intervention of the US in the civil war. On April 25, Zhou Enlai particularly instructed Deng Xiaoping that the lives and property of the Americans and the British "shall be by all means protected; we should see to it that these foreigners will not be offended or humiliated." In the Northeast, Russian immigrants who came to China after the Civil War in Russia, still believed they had special privileges. "The CCP, however, had come to believe that the only good foreigners were those either being driven out or under control. In due time, such a fate befell on the Russians in the Northeast. ¹⁸"
In practice, foreigners were voluntarily persuaded or forced to leave the country. Living in the Mainland became a burden for foreigners. In the early years of the PRC, the government implemented a series of administrative measures that indirectly encouraged foreigners to leave the country. These measures included the introduction of residence permits, increased taxation, mandatory use of the Chinese language in official interactions, and frequent inspections by authorities. Foreign residents were required to obtain residence permits from local police stations, typically valid for three, six, or twelve months. Authorities conducted regular visits to foreign households, during which they searched personal belongings and inquired about individuals' activities and backgrounds. All official communications were mandated to be in Chinese, necessitating proficiency in the language for effective interaction with government agencies. Additionally, foreigners faced increased financial burdens through higher taxes, rising utility costs, and other expenses. Collectively, these policies created an environment that made it increasingly difficult for foreigners to reside in China, leading many to depart voluntarily. (see Article 5) Some were accused of being a spy (In 1950, a group of 6 foreigners and one Chinese person were arrested for collecting of information for the USA to attack the parade on Tian Anmen square on October 1, 1950) or had abused labor laws.
Western diplomats, who had previously been accredited to the Nationalist government, were now viewed as remnants of imperialist diplomacy and symbols of unequal treaties. The PRC authorities declined to acknowledge the legal status of these foreign representatives, effectively stripping them of diplomatic privileges and treating them as ordinary foreign nationals. This approach led to the gradual removal of the old diplomatic and consular presence from China, as the new regime sought to establish its sovereignty and reshape foreign relations on its own terms. This meant that all diplomatic and consular officials lost their customary privileges and immunities and they were treated as ‘common’ foreigners. They were denied any contact with the Chinese authorities as diplomats and with their home country. They also lost their exemption from local jurisdiction.
In 1950, a new group of diplomatic officials arrived. The main group were representatives of the Eastern Bloc, the second group were negotiating representatives of the UK, Norway, and the Netherlands. The third group were representatives of governments which had not recognized the People's Republic of China and they were treated as ordinary foreign nationals.

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Timeline restrictions on migration 1949-1954 Departing from the country posed numerous hazards for foreigners. It involved public announcements in newspapers, former employees lodging financial claims such as severance pay. Foreigners had to obtain "shop guarantees" from two Chinese businesspersons before exiting the country, meant to address any ongoing liabilities. They underwent investigations to determine if they had committed any crimes in China before departure, making it challenging for many to bring anything beyond their most essential possessions. Secret investigation agents keep an eye on foreigners in places frequently visited and their communities. The Chinese also maintained the belief that foreigners residing in China should never be regarded as having severed ties with their home country. Many of the espionage accusations against foreign nationals may stem from this deeply rooted Chinese suspicion toward unfamiliar individuals within their community.
In 1949 most foreign firms moved their offices from Shanghai to Hong Kong. In particular, large numbers of emigrants settled in North Point, naming the new area in Hong Kong Eastern District as “Little Shanghai.” In 1954, about 600 European and White Russians lived in Shanghai. They were never assigned jobs. Following the treaty of February 1950 only Chinese and SU citizens were allowed to live in the Northeast and Xinjiang. See Additional agreement.

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In 1949, there were about 700.000 Koreans living in the Northeast of China, most of them in Yanbian. In the following years, 40.000 soldiers, cadres, and physicians left for Korea. (see Article 54) As the tide changed in the Korea War, many migrants came back to China. In 1950, the number of refugees already surpassed 10.000 people. In 1953, the Northeast Bureau proposed "...those who lived and worked in northeast China prior to October 1949 should be regarded as a minority nationality of China; [however], they should also be allowed to remain as Korean nationals if they prefer. Those who arrived after the Korean War should be treated as Korean nationals.³⁰" In July 1953, China and North Korea signed "Regulations on Chinese and Korean Border Transit.” Residents wishing to cross the border could use travel documents issued by county or municipal public security bureaus. The Public Security Department of Northeast China stipulated that all citizens 18 years old or over could apply for travel documents to go to North Korea to visit relatives and friends, attend schools, see doctors, and attend weddings or funerals."

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SU specialists, who arrived after 1949, received the best accommodations and high salaries. Between 1949-1960, 16.000 SU and East European advisors worked on the mainland. "The Soviet advisers had their own theater, dance hall, library, swimming pool, tennis courts, gym, shops, hairdresser, photographic studio, post office, medical clinic, bar, cafe, six restaurants as well as a special school for their children. Each two advisers had a limousine at their disposal. They were extremely well paid, many earning enough in a two year stay to buy a car, normally beyond the means of most Soviet citizens. They also had access to luxurious foods not available to Chinese citizens.⁶⁶ The Russians seldom mixed with the other foreigners in China at this time." Contact with the Chinese rarely went beyond a small circle of Chinese co-workers, interpreters, and attendants. The Chinese also shouldered financial responsibilities for this aspect of the exchange. They covered the train fare for the specialists and their families traveling to and from China, various expenses incurred in China, the monthly salary for the one-month vacation granted to experts who stayed in China for more than one year, and a monthly payment of 1,500–3,000 rubles to the Soviet government, depending on the qualifications of the specialist. The agreement reached in April 1950 with the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering stipulated that the Chinese would provide the Soviets with paid vacations, satisfactory working conditions at job sites, "heated apartments with furniture," qualified translators, healthcare, and exemptions from Chinese taxes. Additionally, at work sites, the Chinese were responsible for covering transportation costs, any required Chinese labor, and the expenses associated with transporting equipment within China. If the project's duration was extended, the Chinese were also responsible for covering the additional costs incurred due to the extension. After the death of Stalin, the Soviet leadership insisted on complete control over the appointment, placement, and reappointment of the 100 advisers for the new projects. Zhou Enlai agreed on June 8, 1953 that the Soviet embassy should take full charge of such matters. He even offered that the heads and division chiefs of the Soviet advisers would be "automatically invited" to attend the CCP's policy discussions and decision-making meetings at all levels.
In the early 1950s, China faced challenges with some Soviet specialists exhibiting unprofessional behavior, including excessive drinking and condescension towards Chinese counterparts. Incidents involving Russian sailors, such as assaults on Chinese citizens, including cases of rape and murder, exacerbated tensions. A 1951 investigation into 466 air force advisers and specialists led to the immediate return of eighty-two to the Soviet Union due to issues like drunkenness, "immoral behavior," and inappropriate liaisons with foreigners. Aeroflot workers in China were also noted for incompetence. These behaviors reminded the Chinese of the colonial period before 1949. To address these problems, one proposed solution was to have specialists accompanied by their families during their assignments in China, rather than arriving alone.
During the 1950s, Soviet experts in China meticulously documented technological equipment left behind by Western companies, such as powerful water-cooling electric rectifiers. They also sought access to Western technical documents, studies, and magazines that were unavailable in the Soviet Union. This keen interest led Chinese observers to question the comparative level of Soviet technological development. Veteran Chinese technical workers, in particular, began to challenge the presumed superiority of Soviet expertise.

In the 1950s, nearly every sector of China's economy had Soviet specialists involved. They were particularly active in key industries such as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal, power production, and the chemical, oil, machine-building, and electrical engineering sectors—essentially the top-priority areas. The number of specialists fluctuated based on the needs of the Chinese government. "When building new enterprises Soviet specialists helped choose the location for them, prepared basic design materials, took part in designing project, construction, assembly and commissioning. Simultaneously, they trained Chinese personnel – from chief engineer and shop superintendents to skilled workers.¹⁰" Despite the 'socialist' nature of helping China, the Soviet advisers came to China with varying degrees of ideological commitment. Some were deeply committed to the Soviet system and believed strongly in the importance of their mission, while the more hands-on operational staff were focused on technical matters rather than political ideology. For others, their one-year overseas assignment was seen as an exciting adventure."In the extreme case, an appointed adviser, who did not take the assignment in China seriously at all, sent his wife to the post instead"

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So called ‘friends of the People's Republic of China’ were allowed to stay. They worked as translators, language teachers, radio broadcasters, doctors and technicians. Most of them were known and trusted already before 1949 or they were sent by communist parties of their home country. They came from Australia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, and Japan. In handling Western residents, the new Chinese government adopted a strategy resembling 'privileged isolation', aimed at segregating and shielding them from the harsh realities of daily life that contradicted the promoted ideals of 'new China'. These privileges encompassed access to exclusive stores offering higher-quality products that were often unavailable in regular shops. Government-employed Westerners received higher salaries compared to their Chinese counterparts, along with superior accommodation, dining, and other amenities.
In the Northeast, the Japanese engineers, pilots, and anybody with technical or other professional skills were allowed to stay to aid in the economic development of the new nation. "There was a tension between the Chinese Communist Party’s desire to wipe the slate clean and build a modern, industrial utopia, and the realization that it could not do so without first drawing on Japanese technology and expertise."
In October 1948, one year before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP created a Committee for the Management of Japanese in Northeast China. The embargo on China in December 1950 increased the use of Japanese technicians because they had the knowhow to repair existing machinery and equipment. "Beginning in 1950, the Committee for the Management of Japanese in Northeast China organized propaganda and education efforts to condemn the ‘imperialistic’ United States and Japanese governments, but portrayed the Japanese people as common victims in this struggle." The additional agreement of February 14, 1950, stipulated that no foreigners should be allowed to stay in Xinjiang and Northeast China. "…the Chinese side delayed implementation of the additional agreement by taking the first steps only after three years and also only with respect to Manchuria. In February 1953, negotiations with Japan began for the repatriation of the approximately 30,000 Japanese living in Manchuria." Starting from late 1951, the demand for Japanese skilled labor decreased as Soviet technicians started arriving. When the first 'Five Year Plan' was introduced in 1953, many Japanese technicians in the Dalian area, including those from the former Central Research Laboratories (CRL), were relocated to different parts of China. The CRL personnel were reassigned to projects in eight different locations throughout the country. Between 1953 and 1955, these technicians and their families were voluntarily repatriated from these locations. The Peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan signed in April 1952, was as well a reason for starting repatriation. The CCP had to look for ‘unofficial ties’ with Japan. The return could be considered as an act of goodwill. In February 1953, negotiations started between China and Japan about the repatriation of 30 000 Japanese. "In that month (November 1952), the Chinese central government released a ‘Resolution Dealing with Overseas Japanese in China’ (...). The Resolution decreed that ‘apart from a few war criminals, anti-revolutionary forces, and those who had important top-secret information about China’, all Japanese who wished to go home would be allowed to do so ¹¹⁰."

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January 1950, the Czechoslovak and Polish governments submitted a request for exchanging students. Later Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and other East European countries proposed to exchange students. These requests were granted. The students were to learn the Chinese language, politics, history, and culture. Most of the foreign students spoke either English or Russian. In 1952, the number of foreign students had increased from 33 students to 77. Even Japanese students were permitted to study in PRC.

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Tourists were often treated as state guests, and enjoyed audiences with Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai. The purpose of this hospitality was that travelers in their homeland will give a positive image of the People's Republic of China. Tourist numbers were low, they were mostly part of a delegation and were not free to roam the country. In the 1950s, China implemented a policy of "people's diplomacy," aiming to manage interactions between its citizens and foreign visitors. Tourist numbers were low, with most visitors being part of delegations and not free to explore the country independently. The government educated ordinary Chinese citizens on how to interact with foreigners, emphasizing common sense and an awareness of the hyperpolitical status of such interactions. This approach guided most people in their treatment of foreign visitors. Robert Loh, a Shanghai factory manager, provided an insider's perspective on this system. His role involved portraying a reformed capitalist to foreign visitors in Shanghai during the 1950s. Loh's task was to reassure these visitors of the Communist government's humanity and moderation, suggesting that even bourgeois industrialists had embraced Chinese socialism. This orchestrated presentation aimed to influence foreign perceptions of China's political landscape, showcasing a harmonious society under Communist rule. However, such managed interactions often limited genuine cultural exchange and provided a curated view of the country to outsiders. Without a doubt, leaders like Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Mao Zedong considered hosting foreign visitors as a top-secret political endeavor. In 1950, while Communist forces were still suppressing opposition in the south and the country faced hyperinflation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took charge of all interactions between Chinese institutions and foreign visitors. A directive stated, "Henceforth, any institution receiving foreign guests must first inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is mandatory." A report from 1954 emphasized that hosting foreign guests was a highly significant political task crucial for improving the international situation. It noted, If we don't invite them, they will continue to criticize us. But if we do, they will find it difficult to do so.
Modern tourism in China sprang up in the early 1950s. China Travel Service (CTS) was established in 1949, China International Travel Service (CITS) in 1954, with 14 branches in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing and other major cities. Between 1954 and 1978, The CITS hosted only 125.000 foreigners. "Tours focused on the material achievements of communism such as factories, communes and revolutionary peasant, and worker communities. Heritage was not promoted."

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Chapter 7 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents