Article 35 of the Common Program

---

Fig. 35.1: Power production 1949-1957

Fig. 35.2:

---

Garver (2016) states "A second characteristic of CCP eradication of the Western presence was avoidance of claims for compensation under international law by not seizing or nationalizing foreign property outright. CCP foreign policy specialists (many of whom had studied in the West) had done their homework and knew that if foreigners could be persuaded, one way or another, but via lawful means, to simply abandon their property or hand it over to a Chinese entity, China would not be liable to foreign claims to compensation for that property. Thus foreigners found themselves and their operations confronted with increasing diffculties until, finally, they simply left." Besides Western companies, there were also Russian businesses. The strategy of the CCP was to buy them out. The Quilin Company, a trading entity boasting numerous department stores and warehouses in the Northeast, occupied prime locations in major northeastern cities, evoking memories of the Russian imperialist era and emerging as one of the largest foreign enterprises in the region. Adding complexity to the matter of CCP control, the Soviet government held partial ownership of the company and deployed cadres to assume management roles. Concurrently, CCP authorities assigned cadres to apprentice with Soviet managers at each Qiulin department store. The formal takeover commenced with the acquisition of relatively small-scale supply bases in remote counties and culminated in 1952 with the complete transfer of ownership from Soviet to Chinese hands. Industralization

---

Chapter 4 of Common Program