Article 5 of the Common Program

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Some aspects of this article of the Common Program, like freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and publication will be dealt with in Chapter 5. In this article, the focus lies on religion, elimination of sects, the restrictions on the right of assembly, and the right to move freely throughout the country. Hukou regulations confine this freedom.

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In January 1949, the CCP made it clear that there would be restrictions on the right to assembly. The communist government of Northeast China announced that all secret sects and other popular organizations must dissolve. At that time, secret societies had around 13 million members—far more than the CCP’s 5 million members. Some researchers estimate, the number of followers exceeded 18 million, while others estimate the number up to 30 million. While these numbers should be viewed cautiously, they give an indication of the scale of these organizations. It is also possible that local officials inflated these figures to meet or surpass campaign targets.
Two prominent generals of the PLA, Zhu De and He Long had ties to secret sects. These sects often had military structures and, in many instances, collaborated with the Japanese occupiers.
After the CCP took control of the economically significant port of Tianjin on January 15, 1949, it immediately began eliminating secret organizations, which were particularly active in the economic sector. Many of their members were illiterate laborers. The CCP viewed these sects as remnants of feudal society and as a formidable opposition that needed to be eradicated.
On September 29, 1949, a decree was issued calling for the registration of all social organizations. The CCP aimed to ban "wrong" organizations while reforming "good" ones into reliable partners for the new regime. Article 3 of the decree outlined the types of organizations required to register:
1) The masses’ organizations;
2) Social welfare groups;
3) Literary and art working bodies;
4) Academic and learned associations;
5) Religious groups;
6) Other organizations that accord with the laws of the government. Article 4 states: "The founding of any reactionary organization, which impairs the interests of the state and the people, is prohibited; for those that have already registered but are found reactionary, their registration should be terminated and dismissed."
Six recognized organizations can be disinguished:
1. Mass organizations engaged in general social activities, such as the Trade Union, the Peasants’ Association, the Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Democratic Women’s Federation, the Democratic Youth Federation, the Students’ Federation, etc.
2. Public service organizations, such as the China Welfare Institute and the Red Cross Society of China.
3. Literary and art organizations engaged in literature, art, drama, and music, such as the Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the Drama Workers’ Association, the Art Workers’ Association, the Music Workers’ Association, etc.
4. Academic research organizations, such as the Natural Science Workers’ Association, the Social Science Workers’ Association, the Medical Association, etc.
5. Religious organizations, such as Christian and Buddhist organizations
6. Other social organizations that are recognized by law.
In Shanghai alone, 40,000 organizations registered, including 36,000 labor organizations and 89 religious groups. Some organizations were exempt from registering, according to Article 2 of the regulation. These included democratic parties or groups that had participated in the CPPCC, organizations established under other central government regulations, and groups within administrative, educational, political, and military institutions that had received permission from senior officials.
The most significant mass campaign affecting voluntary organizations was the series of anti-corruption efforts, starting with the Three-Antis Movement in 1952. These campaigns, which increasingly targeted organizations accused of corruption, eventually led to the "reformation" and closure of all private voluntary associations and nonprofits. As a result, only state-sponsored groups, such as the official labor union and the Red Cross, were permitted to continue operating.

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During the war with Japan and the Chinese Civil War, all major opponents, including the Japanese, the GMD, and the CCP, sought to infiltrate secret sects. In 1936, Mao issued an "Appeal from the Central Soviet Government" to the "Brothers of the Elders' Society," praising their anti-Qing tradition and urging them to join the anti-Japanese front. However, the CCP's acceptance of secret societies was purely opportunistic, with the primary goal of assimilating their leaders and rendering them obsolete by fostering grassroots revolutionary associations that could better serve the people's needs. CCP cadres quickly established secret society shrines, which were essentially fronts for Party cells. On January 4, 1949, the People's Government of North China officially banned secret societies.
The CCP distinguished two types of religious groups: those allied with the GMD during the Civil War, inflicting significant losses on the CCP, and those posing a political threat due to their extensive networks and anti-communist ideologies.
The CCP employed multiple strategies to dismantle these sects. One approach involved offering a range of social and economic services, such as job placements, labor insurance, and government loans, gradually eroding the social foundations of many urban organizations. Violence was also used effectively to eliminate these groups. The key challenge was educating villagers to sever ties with secret societies, which often had connections with local bandits. Peasants were warned that GMD spies had infiltrated these organizations, or that the sects had collaborated with Japanese occupiers or bandits, many of whom had ties to the local community. In many cases, formerly independent organizations were absorbed by the state, Party, or mass organizations that functioned as arms of the Party. Others were merged into state-controlled institutions like universities.
Liu Bocheng noted that the continued presence of secret societies in Chengdu six months after the takeover remained a significant problem, as these groups in Southwest China were engaged in illegal activities and providing cover for remnants of bandit forces.
By March 1950, 200,000 rebels were still active in Sichuan province. The Gelaohui, once a powerful anti-Qing resistance group, had by this time evolved into a decentralized network lacking unified leadership. The various branches and lodges in Sichuan operated independently for business and social purposes, with minimal coordination among neighboring lodges. This decentralized approach has left them vulnerable to the Communist threat, as they have failed to unite on a broader scale and reorganize themselves into cohesive underground entities. The CCP systematically neutralized the leaders of these secret societies in each locality. From April 1949 to the end of 1952, the Public Security Bureau reported that the ten largest sects in Henan organized 52 "counterrevolutionary uprisings," while sects in Hubei orchestrated a similar number.
Initially, the PLA targeted the leaders of secret sects, especially those who had collaborated with the Japanese or Nationalists, or who had betrayed Communists. However, this posed challenges, as many followers were impoverished peasants, a group traditionally viewed favorably by the CCP. As a result, many sect members were reclassified into less desirable class statuses during judicial proceedings, with their backgrounds shifting from poor peasant to middle peasant, or even to rich peasant or landlord. Class labels became fluid throughout these judicial processes.
In Shanxi province alone, 734 villages participated in a suppression campaign against Yiguandao in December 1950. Over 82,300 members renounced their affiliation, 1,692 minor leaders registered, and 133 "professional leaders" were detained. In Beijing between 1950 and 1951, 90,000 members renounced Yiguan Dao. Suspicion toward secret societies increased during the Korean War, as many questioned their members' patriotism. Despite this, the sects persisted, supported by large landlords and businessmen who had little to lose. By 1952, some of these sects were involved in armed uprisings. In Shaoxing county, Zhejiang province, Jiugong Dao leaders staged three attacks, damaging government offices and killing over 40 cadres. Armed with swords and imperial banners, they unsuccessfully attempted to seize the county seat and restore the monarchy.
Secret societies also played a significant role in opposing land reform laws. In 1953, some became involved in resisting grain procurement programs. (see Article 27) Recruitment remained relatively easy, as migration control through the hukou system was not yet fully enforced. See below. For example, Yiguandao members spread their message across Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia while working as mule drivers or herbalists, attracting hundreds of new followers by 1954. However, land reform diminished the sects' appeal to poor farmers, as they no longer had much to gain from joining. Many sects, led by dispossessed landlords and rich peasants, shifted their focus to advocating for land reforms that would restore the property of the rural elite, rather than benefit poor peasants. As reactionary organizations, these politically oriented sects faced limitations in recruitment.
In some areas, secret society members infiltrated local government structures. Yiguandao adherents, for instance, gained positions in local militias, rural administrations, and Party organizations, making it difficult to identify them. When suppression measures were implemented, local law enforcement often resisted, with some security forces reluctant to act against sect leaders due to personal or social connections.

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In 1950, Song Qingling played a key role in founding the People’s Welfare League, a national federation that brought together private charities, native place associations, and other organizations offering public services. Like the Nationalists' Social Welfare Federation, the China People’s Welfare League under the PRC was composed of organizations rather than individuals. It also took on much of the government’s supervisory role outlined in the 1950 regulations, including reviewing annual reports, enforcing policy changes, and monitoring its members.
The CCP started to organize people through their factory, school, administration, or army. In 1952 street committees are founded for those who are not organized through their job. These committees have to strengthen the ties between the central, local governments and the neighbourhoods. They are responsible for the daily affairs, like providing marriage certificates, supervision on family planning, the distribution of food vouchers, and propaganda. In 1952, alongside neighborhood committees, security defense groups were also established. These groups aimed to mobilize the masses to support the government in preventing treason, espionage, theft, and arson, eradicating counterrevolutionary activities, and maintaining state and public security. It was specifically mandated that security defense committees be universally established across the country—set up in each city following the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, and in each rural village after land reform was completed. In cities, the units generally consisted of factories, enterprises, schools, and streets, while in rural areas, administrative villages served as the unit. In the discussion of Article 17 of the Common Program will the mediation committee be addressed. In Article 19 the security groups are described.

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See Timeline Hukou Introduction 1948-1954
In the early years of the PRC, the new regime faced a significant influx of refugees due to the civil war and widespread food shortages. During the early to mid-1950s, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued numerous directives urging local governments to prevent peasants from fleeing disaster-hit areas and to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. Social stability was prioritized over the welfare of individual peasants, encouraging them to stay in their villages, restore production, and trust in government relief promises. As a result, peasants in affected regions depended heavily on local and central relief efforts. However, despite these official measures, enforcement was inconsistent. Official statistics reveal that hundreds of thousands of peasants continued to flee during the "spring shortages" almost every year throughout the 1950s (see Table 5.1).

Between July 1949 and March 1950, the Shanghai administration repatriated 350,000 people to their birth provinces. After the army arrived in Beijing, CCP surveyors counted 8,000 beggars and petty thieves. Within three months of Communist control, cadres claimed to have facilitated the return of roughly 3,000 non-native Beijingers to their rural hometowns by offering free train tickets and travel stipends. In response to the large number of beggars in Beijing during 1949-1950, the government organized relief efforts in four phases. The first phase focused on able-bodied beggars without illness or family support, who were placed in labor teams and sent to short-term training camps. Those with families in Beijing were sent to vocational institutions, while the rest were dispatched to labor projects in areas like the Yellow River for dyke repairs or Chahar province for land cultivation. The second phase involved beggars who had fled to Beijing and were sent back to their original homes after training. The third group consisted of those temporarily begging due to illness or special circumstances, who were assisted in regaining their ability to work. The fourth group included the elderly, infirm, and youth without family support, who were placed in relief centers for long-term care, with some performing light labor. In the period between July 1949 and March 1950, the Shanghai administration sends back 350.000 men to their province of birth.
There was also a special group existing of unlicensed street vendors. The Beijing municipal government conducted a series of campaigns to crack down on these unlicensed street vendors. While these initiatives were ostensibly designed to improve traffic flow and enhance the city's aesthetics, they effectively displaced street vendors from urban centres to rural outskirts. This shift underscored a significant transformation in the CCP's approach. Before 1949, the party championed the cause of the impoverished. The Party successfully employed a powerful combination of propaganda, media manipulation, and forceful, campaign-driven law enforcement during its revolutionary period. This approach, while effective against organized opposition, proved less adaptable when applied to the suppression of street vendors. The challenge posed by street vendors came not from inherent malice but from their vulnerability. The CCP, adept at navigating conflict with external adversaries, found itself ill-equipped to handle dissent within its own populace. Instead of developing nuanced strategies, it resorted to familiar, albeit ineffective, tactics borrowed from its revolutionary past. Addressing the economic concerns of street vendors should have been a cornerstone of effective governance. However, the CCP's response remained adversarial, creating a rift in the previously strong bond between the party and the people forged during the revolutionary era. The street vendor issue, a seemingly minor conflict, serves as a microcosm of this broader dynamic, highlighting the challenges the party faced in transitioning from revolutionary movement to governing authority over the very "proletariat" it had once claimed to represent.
The rapid population growth in cities was not only due to refugees but also an influx of laborers drawn to urban industries and construction projects by higher wages. Since the start of the modern era, peasants from areas surrounding Shanghai had a tradition of using their free time from farming to travel to the city and earn extra income. They would take on odd jobs to supplement their earnings and reduce food consumption at home, returning in time for spring plowing and production. This seasonal migration to Shanghai continued after 1949, and after the state grain monopoly was introduced in rural areas in 1953, even more peasants came to the city in search of work. This undoubtedly added strain to Shanghai's grain supply chains. A government policy from June 27, 1952, providing free medical care for government and non-commercial workers, further incentivized migration to cities. See Article 48.
To control this movement, the CCP had introduced a household registration system (Hukou) as early as April 1948 in newly liberated areas in northeastern China. However, in Tianjin, household registration initially played a minimal role in curbing rural-to-urban migration. Instead, efforts were focused on maintaining social order, and authorities tried to persuade refugees to return home or migrate to other parts of the country by offering transportation, food, and accommodation. For example, in October 1949, Public Security vice director Wan Xiaotang instructed his force to connect household registration with efforts against enemy operatives. Hukou police conducted thorough door-to-door inspections, particularly targeting individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. Rather than focusing on the exclusion of individuals from rural areas, the Communist leaders' strategy for Tianjin in the early 1950s prioritized maintaining social order. The Tianjin administration tried to persuade refugees to go back to their home town or to migrate to other parts of China. They provided transportation costs, food and accommodation in the receiving villages. Several people took advantage of this deportation program and entered the city to receive free tickets and stipends. The underlying idea of this policy was to separate the ‘consumers’ from the ‘producers’ and to get rid of the former and to stimulate the latter.
In the 1950s, rural migrants secured factory jobs primarily through family networks or targeted recruitment by urban work units. Between 1951 and 1957, Tianjin alone saw over 780,000 migrants arriving for work or family reunification, alongside 409,000 workers recruited directly from rural villages. Despite state efforts to solidify the rural-urban divide through regulations, a significant number of migrants and urban employers bypassed these rules, relying on familial and regional ties for employment. This period marked the beginning of a gradual shift from agricultural to industrial labor for many.
The Hukou system, which has its roots in the ancient baojia system of population registration and mutual surveillance, was also influenced by social control methods from regions governed by the GMD, Japanese authorities, and Communist revolutionary zones. Additionally, the Soviet passbook system and advice from Soviet advisors significantly shaped the development of China's social control mechanisms, which aimed to support socialist developmental goals. By the end of 1949, the Hukou system had been implemented in major cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai.
The Hukou system was designed with dual objectives: to quickly identify and combat enemies of the state while providing valuable data for policy-making. On July 16, 1951, the Ministry of Public Security introduced the Hukou system nationwide to manage the "blind" influx of rural migrants to urban areas.
The 1949 CCP cadre handbook outlined the dual role of the hukou system. Firstly, it was to quickly identify hidden enemies, support efforts against them, and maintain revolutionary order by monitoring population information. Secondly, it aimed to supply the state agencies with population data essential for policy-making and planning.
Over time, it restricted the mobility of rural residents and created distinct differences between urban and rural populations. The introduction of the system also aims to offer a comprehensive statistical profile of the population, detailing factors such as education, occupation, residency, and social class for administrative and developmental objectives. The updated data collection includes individuals' life narratives, socioeconomic status, social connections, and educational histories. By examining the historical, social, and material circumstances of households, this approach not only imbues the investigation with a "socialist" perspective but also extends beyond the rudimentary and disdained "counting" methods associated with the prior regime.
Between 1949 and 1955, Guangzhou saw its population increase by 534,000, with 70 percent of new residents being unauthorized rural migrants. Shanghai also experienced significant migration, with 1.82 million newcomers between 1949 and 1957, making up 34% of the city’s growth. Beijing and Shanghai alone absorbed around 20% of China’s interprovincial migrants during 1950-1954.

The Hukou system introduced mechanisms to regulate migration, including the requirement to obtain permission from local security offices to relocate. Individuals had to register within three days of moving to a new location, and hotels and guesthouses were required to report on their guests daily. While the system was officially intended to maintain social peace and protect freedom of residence and movement, it effectively restricted these freedoms by placing decisions about residence and mobility in the hands of the state.

The Hukou system significantly hindered social mobility for rural residents. Transfers of Hukou status changed a person’s rights and entitlements as a citizen. Since 1952, the population has been classified into four categories based on residential and occupational status:
a. urban non-agricultural (urban workers);
b. urban agricultural (suburban peasants);
c. rural non-agricultural (workers in state or collective enterprises in rural areas);
d. rural agricultural (rural peasants). Party-state cadres, regardless of their origin, were always classified as holding "urban status." Simply residing in a city before the Communist takeover did not guarantee "urban status" after 1949, as the criteria for urban status under the new regime differed from the previous one.

Before 1949, it was possible to take temporary jobs in the city, move up the social ladder, and eventually settle permanently, with the added benefit of securing education for one’s children. However, after the revolution, a strict divide emerged between urban and rural areas, which disproportionately disadvantaged farmers. Urban citizens also faced challenges. Prior to 1949, professionals and administrators in cities maintained strong ties to rural areas, often relying on rural rents to fund urban careers and investing city earnings into farmland. Many urban men returned to the countryside for marriage, and it was common for children to be sent to rural grandparents. Additionally, the countryside served as a safety net for urban middle-class individuals who faced political or financial setbacks, providing them with a place to recover and survive. After 1949, however, being sent to the countryside became a form of punishment.

In 1950, there are 'eight million' cities, those are Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chonqging – under the direct administration of central government). Three of the four municipalities are located in East China (Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin), two of which are port cities. Only Chongqing lies in the centre of the country. The remaining four ‘million cities’ (of these eight cities) are located in the eastern provinces (3 cities), and one in a central province.

Early enforcement of the Hukou system was weak, as noted in a editorial of the People’s Daily (RMRB). "Rural surplus labour in a considerable number of areas has recently been found moving blindly towards the cities. 'Not only did these (rural) cadres not dissuade the peasants from blindly moving into the cities, but they adopted an irresponsible attitude of "out of sight, out of mind”." Implementation was sluggish, largely due to limited police presence in rural areas. By late 1954, the Ministry of Public Security reported that household registration was only "preliminarily established" in over half of county seats, and large portions of the rural population remained unregistered. For example, by 1956 in Jiangxi, household registration had reached two-thirds of rural townships but not the villages. In Hunan, only 10 percent of the population had been registered by 1954.
Significant migration occurred toward western China during this time, driven by two main factors: national planning and spontaneous movements. The government's focus on developing heavy industries in central and northern China attracted many migrants looking for work in industrial production. Additionally, the establishment of the Production and Construction Corps, composed of former PLA recruits, prompted considerable migration to western and northern border regions. Meanwhile, spontaneous internal migration continued, as cadres and their families relocated, particularly to southern regions. This movement can be partly attributed to the relatively relaxed political control during the early years of the People's Republic, when the government was focused more on economic recovery than on regulating population movements. The "illegal" migration of farmers presented an unexpected benefit for the government. Once in the cities, these farmers, often lacking the welfare benefits given to regular urban workers, provided cheap labor. This arrangement allowed the government to avoid the costs of supporting these migrants while still benefiting from their labor.
Farmers weren’t the only ones contributing to migration issues. On June 29, 1950, the PLA initiated a demobilization campaign, and by the end of that year, around 17% of soldiers had been demobilized. Although the campaign paused during the Korean War, it resumed in 1953. Many of these veterans, primarily from rural areas, struggled to find employment in the countryside and moved to urban centers. Rural officials, eager to be rid of them, often issued unauthorized "letters of introduction" allowing veterans to move to their desired cities. When these letters were unavailable, veterans forged them, often falsifying details such as their hometown, party membership status, or family location. In an effort to curb the influx of both farmers and veterans, the government introduced further measures. One of these was a requirement for an employment contract, but this failed to stop the migration. On March 12, 1954, the Ministries of Home Affairs and Labor issued a decree stating that any additional labor needed for urban construction would be recruited from rural areas in a planned and organized manner, with the expectation that rural recruits would return to the countryside once their employment ended. As the government sought greater control over the economy, they implemented stricter regulations. This included managing human resources not only by industry but also by geographic location, making the Hukou system an essential part of the centrally planned economy. See on job opportunities Article 6 of the Common Program.
After the introduction of the state monopoly on grain purchasing and distribution on October 10, 1953, (see Article 37) villagers had even more reasons to migrate to cities. Urban areas offered better job opportunities, more protection against natural disasters, and significantly higher grain rations than in rural areas. The disparity in treatment between rural and urban workers was influenced by long-standing prejudices that existed before the 1949 revolution. The government also saw urban workers as a greater potential threat due to their ability to organize, while rural workers were considered more compliant. Favoring urban workers, however, only deepened the contradictions in the system, especially regarding rural-to-urban migration. The higher value placed on urban labor over rural labor fueled the movement of workers from rural to urban areas.
The government also promoted migration to border regions, particularly to the Northeast and Northwest, where migration was more systematically planned. See also Article 6 . Stricter emigration regulations were introduced as well. On August 2, 1952, the Ministry of Public Security drafted tighter rules, including restrictions for overseas Chinese returning to their homeland and requiring special permission for those traveling to Hong Kong or Macau. Controls on foreigners wishing to leave China also became more stringent. See Article 59 and Timeline restrictions on migration 1949-1954

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The Constitution of November 7, 1931, drafted during the first National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, laid the foundation for the CCP's stance on religious practice. Article 13 ensured genuine religious freedom for workers, peasants, and the working population. Upholding the principle of complete separation between church and state, the Chinese Soviet state does not favor or provide financial support to any religion. All Soviet citizens have the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda, and no imperialist religious institution may operate unless it complies with Soviet law. The CCP, however, has never precisely defined religion, instead viewing it as a negative social force linked to feudalism or foreign imperialism. The Party distinguishes between two types of religious groups: HuiMen (會門) and DaoMen (道門), HuiMen mainly included secret societies, and DaoMen contained secret religions, folk religions, popular religions. The CCP categorizes the “HuiMen” as secret organizations and they are treated the same way as counterrevolutionary groups. See Article 7 . The CCP did not make distinctions among different sects, believing there was no need to investigate their theologies in detail. All were seen as remnants of China's feudal past and incompatible with progressive values.
Calculations show that, by 1949, China had over 300 redemptive sects, with more than 13 million disciples and 820,000 ritual specialists, making up approximately 2.4% of the population.
In a talk with a Tibetan delegation Mao Zedong explains his attitude towards religion: "The Communist Party has adopted the policy of protecting religion. Whether you believe in religion or not, and whether you believe in this religion or that religion, you all will be respected. The party respects religious belief. This policy, as presently adopted, will continue in the future." A 1950 People’s Daily editorial explains: "So long as a part of mankind is technologically backward and hence continues to be dependent on natural forces and so long as part of mankind has been unable to win its release from capitalist and feudal slavery, it will be impossible to bring about the universal elimination of religious phenomenon from human society. Therefore with regard to the problem of religious belief as such, any idea about taking coercive action is useless and positively harmful. This is the reason why we advocate protecting freedom of religious belief, just as we advocate protecting freedom to reject religious belief."
In January 1951, the government established a Bureau of Religious Affairs, operating at national and local levels. Before 1954, two national conferences on religious work were held, and the bureau's job was to guide religious groups like the Catholic and Protestant churches into participating in the "Three-Self Patriotic Movement" and lead Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic leaders in patriotism classes. The CCP's approach toward the five major religions—Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism, and Taoism—was essentially the same. Confucianism, however, was not regarded as a religion but as a "way of life." It faced complete prohibition due to its association with feudalism, especially after the collapse of the imperial examination system. Redemptive societies trying to revive traditional religion were labeled as reactionary sects, while rural communal cults were dismissed as feudal superstition.
Confucianism likely wasn't classified as a religion because it posed no political threat, and no distinct Confucian population existed. In contrast, other religions were more visible. According to 1950 statistics from the Beijing Bureau of Religious Affairs, China had 0.5 million Han Buddhists, 0.93 million Hinayana Buddhists, 4.43 million Tibetan Buddhists, 8 million Muslims, 2.7 million Catholics, and 0.7 million Protestants. Although no specific number was recorded for Taoists, the combined number of Buddhists and Taoists was believed to be far higher due to the absence of formal rites of initiation. Zhou Enlai estimated that China had 100 million religious believers in the early 1950s.
Like past dynasties, the CCP claimed political and ideological supremacy, and all religions were required to support the new regime. Groups that refused to comply were deemed illegal. The Party sought to weaken religious institutions, partly due to Marxist views that religion conflicted with ideology, and partly because it saw Christianity as 'lackeys of foreign cultural imperialism', Buddhism and Taoism as representatives of feudalism and Islam as a security problem. Beyond institutional control, the state restricted individual religious practice, with local cadres determining who could be considered an enemy of the people, thereby limiting their freedom of religion.
This can be illustrated with an example: local officials' priorities influenced their handling of communal religious activities. When suppressing superstition wasn't a pressing issue, they sometimes made concessions, such as during the rainmaking riots of 1953.
Unlike the Soviet Union, the PRC's religious policy diverged because China’s predominant religious practices among the Han were not exclusively Buddhist, Daoist, or Confucian, but a blend of all three, interwoven with local rituals and beliefs. Popular religion was decentralized, embedded in community networks, cults, festivals, and ancestor worship, lacking the formal structures of modern religions. Consequently, combating religion was not as urgent a priority for the Chinese Communists as it was for their Russian counterparts, who confronted centralized institutions like the Russian Orthodox Church.

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In May 1949, the PLA issued a handbook to educate its soldiers on proper behavior in Muslim areas, which they would soon enter following the conquest of Xi'an. Most Muslims in China lived in border regions and belonged to national minorities. The handbook noted that many Hui Muslims were unfamiliar with the CCP’s nationality policies and distrusted the Party’s representatives to respect their traditions and beliefs. Since the Long March, standing orders required soldiers and cadres in Muslim communities to follow the "three great prohibitions": no billeting soldiers in mosques, no consumption of pork, and no defacing the Quran. The handbook also provided an expanded list of "Hui customs and important taboos," including prohibitions against drinking alcohol or consuming food prepared by non-Muslims, even extending to tea. It further outlined Ramadan fasting practices, Islamic hygiene, and described what it called the "extremely feudal and conservative" gender relations among the Hui.
The handbook emphasized the protection of Islamic institutions, instructing cadres to safeguard mosques and Sufi shrines, and forbade smoking, singing, or hanging signs (likely revolutionary slogans) on their walls.
Despite these guidelines, the CCP frequently accused Muslim leaders of "local national chauvinism," which clashed with the Party's emphasis on "national unity. Additionally, the construction of mosques was often prohibited, and there were instances where the local population was forced to raise pigs. In Gansu and Henan, Muslim communities occasionally rebelled against such policies. For example, uprisings took place in Guyuan, Ningxia, and Zhangjiachuan on April 2 and 4, 1952. One of the most notable figures of Muslim resistance was Osman Batur, who aspired to establish an independent Islamic republic of Turkistan. Throughout his life, he allied with various factions, including Russian Communists, the Americans, and the GMD government. In February 1951, the PLA captured and executed him in Urumqi as a counterrevolutionary.
In comparison to other religions, Islam was treated with relative leniency under the new regime. For instance, a general decree by the GAC exempted Muslims from paying a slaughter tax when slaughtering cattle or sheep for home consumption, with relaxed inspection standards. The PRC also sought good relations with Islamic countries, viewing them as fellow victims of imperialism.
In 1953, the Chinese Islamic Association was established by loyal Muslim leaders to foster better relations between Beijing and the Muslim community. One of these leaders, Wen Xingsan, emphasized the dual responsibilities of Chinese Muslims: to follow the teachings of the Quran and to love and support the motherland by obeying laws and contributing to national construction. Unlike the other national religious associations, the Islamic Association was first categorized as an ethnic organization under the bureau of ethnic minority affairs.
The Chinese Islamic Association also played a role in foreign policy. For example, Ma Jian, a member of the association, published an article in the RMRB declaring that imperialists, particularly the US, were Islam's "arch nemesis." Another instance was the 1952 Hajj mission, organized by the Islamic Association of China’s Preparation Committee, led by prominent Imams, including Imam Da Pusheng and Uyghur leader Imam Imin Mesum. The mission, dispatched just a month after the committee's formation, demonstrated China’s efforts to engage with the Islamic world. Furthermore, the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, held in Beijing in October 1952, saw Muslim leaders play a key role, with speeches from Iranian and Iraqi delegates praising China's struggle for peace and independence as a model for others.(see Article 11 and Article 54) See Meeting. Da Pusheng also represented Chinese Muslims at international events, such as the World Peace Congress in Vienna in 1952.
Meanwhile, some Muslim leaders chose to leave China following the revolution. Among them was Ma Songting who initially fled to Taiwan and later settled in Hong Kong. In 1952, Zhou Enlai successfully persuaded him to return to the mainland. The vast majority of Hui Muslims, however, remained in China, trusting that the CCP would honor its promises of cultural autonomy for the Hui people.

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Buddhism has a long history in China, with monks traditionally living in temple complexes, sustaining themselves through alms and leasing land. The CCP viewed Buddhism as a feudal, exploitative religion, and regarded temples as centers where capitalist and GMD sympathizers might conspire. The 1950 land reform dismantled the economic foundation of Buddhism, creating a vacuum in religious leadership, as well as shortages of space and revenue for religious activities. However, the CCP issued a directive on June 16, 1951, cautioning against occupying temples without the clergy's consent, damaging temples, or destroying historical relics. The directive specified that only ordinary temples without abbots or those voluntarily given up by monks could be confiscated, especially in areas where temples were abundant.
Ju Zan , an influential Buddhist leader, sought to reconcile Buddhism with Communism and adapt to the new political environment. He participated in the CPPCC and launched the magazine “Modern Buddhist Studies” (Xiandai foxue現代佛學). By contrast, three major Buddhist magazines ceased publication in 1953, 1955, and 1958. Even before September 1949, Ju Zan was active, co-authoring a proposal to Mao Zedong advocating for the reform of Buddhism, though Mao never responded. In April 1950, Ju Zan established a burlap factory aimed at "re-educating monks and nuns, transforming them ideologically, encouraging them to embrace socialism, promote patriotic activities among Buddhists, and combat feudalism and capitalism."
In 1953, the Chinese Buddhist Association (CBA) was founded to unify all Buddhists in China. One key motivation behind its establishment was to leverage Buddhism as a tool of foreign policy. For example, during the 1952 Peace Conference of Asia and Pacific Regions (see Article 11 and Article 54 ) was held in Beijing, Chinese monks joined Buddhists from eight countries in signing a call for international peace, which led the CCP to recognize Buddhism's potential in advancing its foreign policy goals.
Mao Zedong acknowledged in 1952 "Though no believer in Buddhism, I am not against forming an association of Buddhists to get them united and enable them to distinguish clearly between the people and the enemy."
The situation in Tibet is more complex. Tibetan Buddhism was central to Tibetan identity, as highlighted by both Tibetan and foreign scholars. Any attempt to alter the traditional role of religion, religious institutions, or religious authorities—through restrictions imposed by Chinese authorities on individual and collective religious practices—was seen as a direct attack on Tibetan identity by both the clergy and the general populace.
The agreement of the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful liberation of Tibet, which is signed on May 23, 1951 stipulates in article 7 "The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities will not affect any change in the income of the monasteries." (See The agreement ) This special status is further illustrated in the treatment of monks in Mongolia and Tibet. By the mid-1950s, the number of monks in Mongolian Buddhist monasteries was reduced by 80%, from 80,000 to 17,000, and they were required to engage in physical labor. However, in Tibetan areas, religious policies were more lenient. For example, the traditional selection and enthronement ceremony of the 6th Jamyang Zhepa, the highest reincarnated lama of Labrang Monastery, was held in February 1952 without interference from Chinese authorities.

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After the 2nd world war, Catholic and Protestant missions were confronted with the task of re-establishing themselves after the large-scale evacuation and imprisonment of the clergy and the damage of their properties by the Japanese invaders. During the civil war period (1945-1949), both religions suffered percussion. The advancing PLA troops killed foreign priests, looted or destroyed over 500 hundred mission stations, and 200 churches. Some 400 churches were confiscated and about 2000 mission schools were closed. From February 1948 onwards, the CCP changed its policy and repeated the statement of religious freedom and the protection of foreign missionaries, as long as they did not support the GMD. Under this constant pressure, several missionaries fled. For the Christian church, withdrawing from China would signify the abandonment of a century-long mission to spread Christianity to a quarter of the world’s population; for many individual missionaries, it would mean acknowledging the failure of a lifetime of work and devotion.
The division between the two religions is accentuated by nationality and language of the missionaries. The catholic clergy are mainly from France, Italy and Spain. The protestants are English speaking from GB, US and the Commonwealth. The catholic presence is all over the country, particularly in rural areas. Their basic aim is converting families or even entire villages. The education efforts were primarily focused on primary and secondary teaching. They ran a limited number of large hospitals but ran instead small dispensaries connected with the mission stations. They have also foundling homes and orphanages. Their financial funding relied mostly on local revenues (rural land and urban real estate).
The protestant missions are concentrated in the urban areas. They gradually become less interested in conversion and more in social reform, education, and health. They ran large hospitals, secondary schools, and universities. Their financial funding is based on voluntary contribution from abroad.

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Like the Buddhist leader Ju Zan, Protestant leader Wu Yaozong was also inclined to collaborate with the CCP and served as a delegate to the CPPCC. Both were appointed by the Communist government rather than their respective religious communities. They not only began to speak within the councils of the government on behalf of the church but soon addressed themselves to the Church on behalf of the government. Whether willingly or unwittingly, they served as effective Communist fifth columns within the Church itself. Wu Yaozong’s cooperation, however, sparked more controversy within the Protestant community than Ju Zan’s did within the Buddhist community, particularly due to his efforts to unify various Protestant denominations into a single church. This initiative met with significant resistance, leading several prominent clerics and theologians to refuse cooperation and flee to Hong Kong, leaving behind a fragmented religious community.
In July 1950, the "Christian Manifesto" was published, expressing loyalty to the People's Republic of China and establishing the "Three-Self Patriotic Movement." This movement aimed to restructure the institutional foundation of Christian churches based on three principles: self-governance, self-support (financial independence from foreign aid), and self-propagation (indigenous missionary work).
Zhou Enlai dismissed allegations of coercion, stating, "Of course, if I had drafted the manifesto and brought it out for them to sign, they would have agreed to it. But what use would there have been in that, for everyone would have said that so-and-so had drafted the statement for them? It is better for them to speak about reform on their own. As long as they are close to our national policy and correct in their general orientation, there is no need to interfere."
The emphasis on social reform by missionaries at the beginning of the 20th century inadvertently aligned them with forces advocating for modernization and transformation in Chinese society. Ironically, this movement toward Westernization and modernization contributed to the rise of Chinese nationalism, which ultimately led to a violent backlash against Western influence by the mid-1920s.

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The CCP’s primary objection to the Roman Catholic Church is its allegiance to the Vatican, which has been a source of tension since the first interactions between Catholic missionaries and Chinese emperors. Chinese Roman Catholics are often viewed as subservient to a foreign capitalist power, and some have been imprisoned and accused of imperialism. After 1949, foreign missionaries were regularly denounced both inside and outside Protestant and Catholic churches. Initially organized by the government, these condemnation sessions were later conducted by the communities themselves. In 1948, there were 5,500 missionaries in China, but by 1952, two-thirds had been expelled. Every priest was required to undergo a "patriotic educational program." The Catholic Church in Shanghai resisted the regime for a considerable time due to its adaptability. Initially operating openly, the church gradually moved underground as state pressure increased, adopting strategies once used by the CCP when it was an underground movement. Former guerrilla fighters of the CCP soon recognized that their own tactics—excluding violence—were being used against them: strict cell group discipline, compartmentalized knowledge, hierarchical organization, mass mobilization, public pressure campaigns, intelligence gathering, and a specially trained militant vanguard. It was not until 1957 that Chinese Catholics established the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, which, like the Buddhist, Islamic, and Protestant associations, aligned with the CCP’s aim to control all mass organizations as part of its United Front strategy.

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Taoism was often perceived as a form of superstition and magic, associated with secret societies. This was largely due to the lack of a unified institutional framework for its rituals, as Daoist ritual masters passed down their liturgical texts and practices to their sons and disciples through distinct, local lines of transmission. However, reducing peasants' religious beliefs to mere "superstitions," as government officials and reformers did, oversimplifies the complex mental and spiritual landscape of rural communities. The government's crackdown on religious publications was, in essence, an attack on the traditions, psychological inclinations, and artistic imagination of the peasantry. See Article 45.
While daily life in rural areas was heavily influenced by Taoist traditions, Confucianism shaped rituals related to kinship and family relations. It wasn't until 1957 that Taoism was officially recognized as a religion, a decision strongly advocated by PLA General Zhu De.

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Chapter 1 of Common Program

• Road to Common Program
• Common Program
• Bibliography
• Documents