Article 5 of the Common Program
Text
Article 5 of the Common Program

The people of the People's Republic of China shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, change of domicile, religious belief and the freedom of holding processions and demonstrations.



Some aspects of this article, like freedom of thought, freedom of speech and publication will be dealt with in Article 49.


Freedom of association and assembly....

Already in January 1949 the CCP makes it clear that there will be restrictions on the right of assembly. The communist government of Northeast China announces all secret sects and other popular organisations have to dissolve. In 1949 the total number of members of secret societies is about 13 million, much more than the 5 million CCP members. “Por otra parte, Lin Rongze estimó que el numero de seguidores ascendió a más de 18 millones, mientras que Lu Zhongwei en 30 millones. Si bien estas cifras deben tomarse con cautela, ofrecen una idea de la magnitud del fenómeno. Además, las cifras podrian estar infladas por los funcionarios locales en un intento de satisfacer o superar las metas de las campañas.”
Martinez Esquivel Ricardo (2016) La campaña de erradicación de las huidaomen por parte del partido comunista Chino (1949- 1953) La Albolafia: Revista de humanidades y cultura. 7. Page 81
"Translation: Moreover, Lin Rongze estimated that the number of followers reached more than 18 million, while Lu Zhongwei comes up to 30 million. While these figures should be treated with caution, they give an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon. Moreover, the figures could be inflated by local officials in an attempt to meet or exceed the goals of the campaigns"
Two important generals of the PLA,
Zhu De
Zhu De (1886-1976)
and
He Long
He Long (1896-1969)
were members of a secret sect. These sects often have a military structure and in many occasions collaborated with the Japanese occupiers. When on January 15, 1949 the economic important port Tianjin is taken over, the CCP instantly starts to eliminate the secret organisations which are basically active in the economic sector. Most members are illiterate labourers. The CCP considers the sects as remains of the feudal society and as a powerful opponent, which have to be eradicated.
On September 29, 1949 a decree is made public in which all social organizations are called to register. The CCP wants to forbid the ‘wrong” organizations and to reform the “good” ones in reliable partners of the new regime.
Article 3 of the decree defines the organisations which are obliged to register:
1) The masses’ organizations;
2) Social welfare groups;
3) Literary and art working bodies;
4) Academic and learned associations;
5) Religious groups;
6) Other organizations that accord with the laws of the government.
Article 4 states: “The founding of any reactionary organization, which impairs the interests of the state and the people, is prohibited; for those that have already registered but are found reactionary, their registration should be terminated and dismissed.”
Document: 29-09-1950 Provisional regulations for registration of social organizations
In Shanghai 40.000 organisations are registered. 36.000 are labour organizations and 89 are religious groups.
Brooks Jessup J. (2011). Flipping the script: Buddhist youth in communist Shanghai, 1949-1956. Presentation at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, San Francisco.
Some organisations are not obliged to register according to article 2 of the regulation. These are the democratic parties or the people’s groups that have participated in the Chinese People’s Political and Consultative Conference; organizations that have been formulated by other regulations of the Central Government; organizations within administrative agencies, educational institutions, political entities, and military troops, which have obtained permission for their establishment from leading cadres.

Elimination of the Sects....

The CCP uses several methods to eliminate the secret sects. One is based on delivering “…various kinds of social and economic services, from job placement, to labour insurance, to extensive government loan and credit facilities, it increasingly undermined the basis for the plethora of social organizations ... in the cities.”
Lieberthal Kenneth (1973). The suppression of secret societies in post-liberation Tientsin. The China Quarterly, 54. Page 266

The use of violence is also an efficient method to eliminate the sects. Gao (2004) notices various difficulties. The crucial task was to educate the villagers to make a clear break with popular secret societies in the villages that had numerous connections with bandits. The secret societies are not immediately banned but peasants are warned that gmd spies have penetrated these organizations or that they had close relations with Japanese occupiers and bandits were often local people who had relatives or friends in the villages.
Gao James Zheng (2004). The communist takeover of Hangzhou: The transformation of city and cadre, 1949-1954. page 108-109
“In addition, many former independent organizations were simply absorbed by the state, the party, or mass organizations that effectively functioned as arms of the party. Others were merged into state-controlled institutions, such as universities.”
Simon Karla W.(2013). Civil society in China: The legal framework from ancient times to the new reform era. Oxford University press. Page 154

Liu Bocheng
Liu Bocheng (1892-1986)
(PLA commander in the Southwest) poses the opinion that the existence of secret societies in Chengdu half a year after the takeover, is still a big problem “secret societies have been rampant in the Southwest provinces and have been carrying on illegal activities inimical to society, and as the remnant bandits have since liberation taken cover under these organizations to engage in sabotage activities”.
Cited in Skinner, G. William (1951) Aftermath of communist liberation in the Chengtu Plain. Pacific Affairs, 24, (1). Page 68
According to Skinner (1951) there are in March 1950 still 200.000 rebels active in the province of Sichuan. Smith (2015) observes "According to the Public Security Bureau (PSB), between April 1949 and the end of 1952, the ten biggest sects in Henan organized fifty two “counter revolutionary uprisings,” an average of one a month, and their counterparts in Hubei organized the same number. "
Smith S.A. (2015). Redemptive religious Societies and the Communist State, 1949 to the 1980s. Page 344.
The PLA firstly arrested the leaders of the secret sects (especially those who had collaborated with the Japanese and Nationalists or who had betrayed Communists to the secret police) and later on their followers. “In the single province of Shanxi, for example, some 734 villages carried out a suppression campaign against the Yiguan Dao (the biggest ‘secret’ society) in December 1950. Over 82,300 members withdrew from the sect, 1,692 minor leaders registered and 133 "professional leaders" were put under detention.”
Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Rural violence in socialist China. The China Quarterly, 103. Page 417. Smith (2015) concludes "the societies had been cross- class organizations with members ranging from the political and economic elites down to the most marginal and impoverished strata. The destruction of the old ruling classes, however, meant that the societies lost the merchants, gentry, and offcials who had once been their wealthy patrons." Smith (2015). Redemptive religious Societies. Page 354
In Beijing between 1950 and 1951 90,000 members renounced
Yiguan Dao
1950 Yiguang Dao leaders arrested in Beijing
.
Martinez Esquivel Ricardo (2016). Page 86
The suspicion against the sects rises during the Korean War. Many people doubt as to the patriotism of the members. Still the secret societies keep existing. The big landlords and businessmen have the feeling they have nothing to lose.
"By 1952 these revived sects were already reported to have instigated armed uprisings. In Shaoxing county, Zhejiang, leaders of the Jiugong Dao launched three attacks which damaged district government offices and resulted in the death of more than 40 cadres. Brandishing swords and imperial banners, the rebels attempted unsuccessfully to seize the county seat and stage a monarchical restoration."
Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Page 418

The sects also play an important role as opponents against the Land reform law and in 1953, a few societies become involved in resistance to the new program of grain procurement. (see Article 27) Recruiting of members is still easy to achieve because the control on migration is limited. The hukou system is not yet strictly implemented. See below.
“For example, members of an Yiguan Dao branch spread their message across Hebei, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia by working as mule carters or travelling herbalists. In this way, by 1954 the group had managed to attract hundreds of believers.”
Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Page 419
The Land reform law makes the attraction for the poor farmers less relevant. They have not much to gain by joining a sect. "Frequently led by dispossessed landlords and rich peasants, many of the sects developed …But now, of course, the plea was for a land reform that would restore the property of the divested rural elite, rather than service the interests of the poor peasantry. As reactionary organizations, the overtly political sects were limited in their recruitment potential.
Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Page 425
At some places sect member succeed in infiltrating local governments.

New associations....

Most Chinese people are organised through their factory, school, administration or army. In 1952 street committees are founded for those who are not organised through their job. These committees have to strengthen the ties between the central, local governments and the neighbourhoods.
They are responsible for the daily affairs, like providing mariage certificates, supervision on family planning, the distribution of food vouchers and propaganda. In 1952 beside these neighbourhood committees also security defense groups are founded. The purpose of these committees in “…organs, factories, enterprises, schools, and streets shall generally be taken as units n cities, while in rural villages the administrative village shall be the unit….” (article 3) and “In order to rouse the masses and to assist the people’s government in preventing treason, espionage, theft, and arson, in liquidating counterrevolutionary activity, and in defending state and public security, it is specially prescribed that security defense committees be universally established throughout the country, in every city after development of the movement for the suppression of counterrevolution and in every rural village after completion of the land reform." (article 1 of the Provisional act of the People’s Republic of China for the organization of security defense committees)
Document: 27-06-1952 Provisional act of the PRC for the organization of security defense committees
In the discussion of Article 17 of the Common Program will the mediation committee be addressed.

Place of residence / Hukou....

See Timeline

In the first years of the People's Republic of China the regime is confronted with a great number of refugees as a result of the civil war. In the period between July 1949 and March 1950 the Shanghai administration sends back 350.000 man to their province of birth.
"Just after the army arrived in Beijing, CCP surveyors tallied 8,000 beggars and petty thieves in the capital city. Within the first three months of Communist control, cadres claimed that by offering free train tickets and travel stipends, they mobilized roughly 3,000 nonnative Beijingers (and other willing migrants) to return or relocate to the countryside.”
Smith Aminda M.(2012). Thought reform and China's dangerous classes: Reeducation, resistance, and the people. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Page 59. "The millions of refugees still loitering in the cities also demanded immediate attention. Within two weeks of Tianjin’s surrender in mid-January 1949, the CCP sent 20,000 people back to their villages throughout north China and in Manchuria.5 In Beijing, the next major urban center to fall on January 31, the authorities also began a rapid repatriation campaign, offering free passage to those willing to leave. About 5,000 people remained in the former Nationalist refugee shelters, the most obvious candidates for immediate removal in the effort dubbed “reducing the parasitic population” (jianshao jisheng renkou). But when cadres identified an additional 160,000 people and prepared for large-scale dispersal, protests forced them to abandon those plans.6 Instead, the new government concentrated its efforts on demobilized GMD soldiers lurking about the city. Public notices announced that former enemy combatants and their dependents who registered and turned in their weapons by the February 25 deadline would be rewarded for their cooperation; those who failed to do so would be treated as “illegal” belligerents.7 ...For the new PRC regime, confronting unknown numbers of possibly armed and hostile enemy soldiers was a key issue on the security agenda." Chen Janet Y. (2012) Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900-1953. Page 214
The population increase in the cities is not only caused by the refugees but also by the influx of labourers for the industry and construction work. These newcomers arrive from the rural areas attracted by the higher earnings. The government measure of June 27, 1952 to provide free medical care for everyone working at the government and non-commercial organizations is an extra stimulus to migrate to the city. See Article 48.

  • Table
  • To control the migration the CCP introduces already in April 1948 a household register system (Hukou) in the newly liberated areas in the northeast of China.
    "The origins of the hukou system lie embedded in the baojia system of population registration and mutual surveillance perfected over millennia. But its antecedents also lie in 20th-century techniques of social control that were perfected in areas under Kuomintang and Japanese rule, and in the Communist-led revolutionary base areas. Equally important is the direct influence of the Soviet passbook system and the role of Soviet advisers in creating a social order that could be mobilized in the service of socialist developmental priorities.”
    Cheng Tiejun & Selden Mark (1994). The origins and social consequences of China's hukou system, The China Quarterly, 139. Page 645. "To a great extent, the CCP directly copied and inherited much of the ROC hukou laws and policies on hukou registration and verification procedures. The early version of the CCP's hukou regulations (before the mid-1950s) also similarly provided for the citizen's right of free internal migration. Before the establishment of the PRC, the CCP established its own hukou-like mass mobilization and organization system as early as the 1930s, in its guerrilla bases in Jiangxi Province and later in northern Shangxi Province. 52" Wang Fei-Ling (2005). Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System. Page 43
    At the end of 1949 the Hukou system is introduced in cities like Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. The system is also introduced “----to provide a general statistical overview of the composition of subjects … based on education, profession, residence, and class for administrative and developmental purposes. “ “…the new information to be collected included people's life stories, classes, economic conditions, social relations, and educational backgrounds. Researching the historical, social and, material conditions of a household, this approach made the investigation both “socialist” and more extensive than the simple and despised “counting” methods attributed to the previous regime.”
    Graminius Carin (2017) Building a New China. Hukou Investigation Practices in Beijing and Tianjin, 1949–1950. The PRC History Review, 2, (1). Pages 2-3. "…for security, employment, and rationing reasons. They issued “resident’s cards”. These were not given to each person but to each head-of-household. The document had to be shown when any member of the household applied for a regular job or made purchases at a state grain shop. In later years, when ration tickets were required to buy certain goods, the card was used to verify the identity of the buyer. The head of each household could obtain tickets only at a special office.2" White III Lynn T.(1978). Careers in Shanghai: The Social Guidance of Personal Energies in a Developing Chinese City, 1949–1966. Page 149
    The handbook for CCP cadres describes the double function that involves the system. "On the one hand, [we] need to find out [hidden] enemies quickly, assist struggles against the enemy, and maintain the revolutionary order through the hukou management that controls the information on the population. On the other hand, [we] can provide data to the agencies of the state for their making policies and plans through hukou management that controls the population.”
    Wang Fei-Ling (2005). Organizing through division and exclusion china’s hukou system. Stanford, California. Page 61
    In July 16, 1951 the ministry of public security introduces the Hukou system throughout the country, in order to contain the ‘blind’ influx of persons from rural regions to the urban areas.
    Document:16-07-1951 Temporary Regulations Governing the Urban Population. Schoenhals (2012) remarks: "In the early 1950s, when the situation in many parts of China still remained chaotic and the new authorities struggled to maintain basic law and order, some establishments did a brisk trade in the fabrication of false official seals and bogus identity papers.45" Schoenhals Michael (2012). Spying for the People Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949–1967. Page 61

    ‘Blind’ influx means not controlled. Between 1949 and 1955 in Guangzhou the total number of citizens has grown with 534,000 people of whom 70 percent are ‘blind’ farmer migrants. “Between 1949 and 1957, it is reckoned the city (Shanghai) offloaded more than a million people, but 1,820,000 migrants came to the city in the same period, so that immigration accounted for about 34% of the city’s growth.”
    Smith S.A. (2008). Revolution and the people in Russia and China: A comparative history. New York. Page 222
    "7.47% of all interprovincial migrants moved to Beijing during 1950-1954. During the same period, Shanghai received about 8.24% of China's interprovincial migrants. Together the three municipalities received almost 20% of China's interprovincial migrants in that period."
    Liang Zai & White Michael J.(1996). lnternal Migration in China, 1950-1988. Demography, 33 (3). Page 377

    The Hukou system includes a number of mechanisms to manage the migration flow smoothly. The main provision involves obtaining permission from the local security office of the place where one wants to leave. Everybody has to register himself within 3 days at the local security office where one wants to live. Hotels and other guesthouses have to report about their guests at the local security office on a daily basis.
    "The present regulations,' it began, 'were formulated with a view to maintaining social peace and order,safeguarding the people's security and protecting their freedom of residence and of movement.' This document may in fact be said to have formally initiated the process that, in the course of a decade, effectively denied the Chinese people freedom of residence and movement, placing decisions in this realm in the hands of the state.”
    Cheng Tiejun & Selden Mark (1997). The Construction of spatial hierarchies: China's hukou and danwei systems. In T. Cheek & T. Saich, New perspectives on state socialism of China. New York. Pages 28-29
    The system complicates the upward mobility for residents of rural areas strongly. What was implicit but not stated in the hukou transfer pamphlets was that transfers of hukou changed residents’ rights and entitlements as citizens. Since 1952, the hukou registrar has recorded China’s population according to their residential (rural or urban) and occupational (agricultural or non-agricultural) status, creating four categories of citizenship:
    a. urban non-agricultural (urban workers);
    b. urban agricultural (suburban peasants);
    c. rural non-agricultural (workers in state or collective enterprises in rural areas);
    d. rural agricultural (rural peasants).
    Chuang Julia (2014). China's rural land politics Bureaucratic absorption and the muting of rightful resistance. The China Quarterly, 219. Page 656

    Before 1949 it was possible to stay through temporary jobs in the city and to climb the social ladder and eventually permanently residing in the city and the opportunity to get an education for your children. A stringent and clear distinction between town and rural area occurs to the detriment of farmers.There are also some setbacks for citizens
    “Before 1949, urban professionals and administrators had multiple ties to the countryside. Rural rents funded urban careers, and profits from the city could be invested in rural land. Men living in the city returned to the countryside to marry,and children were sent to stay with rural grandparents. Country residence also provided an escape where politically or financially ruined members of the urban middle class could recuperate,regroup,or simply survive.”
    Davis Deborah S. (2000). Social class transformation in urban China: Training, hiring, and promoting urban professionals and managers after 1949. Modern China, 26, (3). Page 268
    After 1949 people are sent to the countryside as a punishment. The control is in the beginning certainly not waterproof and the editorial of the People’s Daily (RMRB) complains. “Rural surplus labour in a considerable number of areas has recently been found moving blindly towards the cities.” 'Not only did these (rural) cadres not dissuade the peasants from blindly moving into the cities, but they adopted an irresponsible attitude of "out of sight, out of mind”.
    Gluckstein Ygael (1957). Mao’s China economic and political survey. London. Page 123
    This illegal influx of migrants has also a positive side for the administration. "Once in town, farmers labored as outsiders, generally without most of the basic welfare rights enjoyed by average urban-citizens workers.51 …. For the simple fact that it is a way to provide cheap labor not have to deal with the concerns and expenses of providing welfare to the average peasant; a type of moneysaving technique."
    Seeger Lucas H.F.(2012). China's internal migration, public policies, and economic growth. MA thesis, Monterey California. Page 23

    Not only the farmers create a migrant problem, on June 29, 1950 the PLA starts a demobilization campaign. At the end of that year about 17% of the soldiers are demobilized. The campaign is stopped during the Korean War but after 1953 the demobilization campaign starts all over. Most of these veterans cannot find a job in he countryside (from where most of them were recruited) and migrate to the towns.
    "Rural officials were only too glad to be rid of them, so they “casually” issued them unauthorized “letters of introduction” to whatever urban destination they desired. If such letters could not be procured, veterans forged them (..)making sure to falsify their native place, party member status, or location of family members."
    Diamant Neil J. (2006). The Stubborn Myth of `Rising Patriotism' in Modern China. (Working paper 2), East Asia Institute. Seoul. Page 27
    In a new attempt to constrain the influx of farmers and veterans the government takes some more measures. One of these is the requirement the possession of an employment contract, but this requirement does not halt the influx and on March 12, 1954 the Ministry of Home Affairs and the ministry of labour announces a new decree: "If in the future additional workers are needed for urban construction, the district and township government will be officially directed to recruit rural labour in a planned and organized manner."That is, rural recruits would presumably return to the countryside at the conclusion of their employment”
    Cheng Tiejun & Selden Mark (1994). Page 654
    As the government wants to gain more and more control over the economy, they also have a greater need to make more stringent rules “…the ability to allocate human resources not only at the enterprise and sectorial levels but also across geographic locations. Therefore, the Hukou system was considered to be a necessary component of the centrally planned economy”
    Wang Mengmeng (2007). Analysing the employment discrimination phenomena in China from an international human rights perspective—Focusing on Hepatitis B-based discrimination. MA thesis, Lund University. Page 20
    See also on job opportunities Article 6 of the Common Program.
    The government stimulates the migration to border areas. Especially the migration to the Northeast and Northwest is a planned operation. See also Article 6
    On August 2, 1952 the Ministry of Public Security drafts stricter rules for emigration, even for overseas Chinese who want to go back to their homeland. Also persons who want to go to Hong Kong or Macau have to ask permission. The control on foreigners who want to leave the country is also getting stricter.

    Religious affiliation....

    The CCP has never made a precise definition of religion, the party considers religion as a negative social power clearly related to feudal and/or foreign imperialism. She differentiate “…into HuiMen (會門) and DaoMen (道門), HuiMen mainly included secret societies, and DaoMen contained secret religions, folk religions, popular religions etc.”
    Lee Yu-Jung (Hope) (2004). Politics and religion in the People’s Republic of China. The cases of Buddhism, Protestant Christianity and Falun Gong. (SEAS Electronic Working Papers 2, (4)). Page 4
    The CCP categorizes the “Huimen” as secret organizations and they are treated the same way as counterrevolutionary groups. See Article 7 . “By 1949, well over 300 redemptive sects existed in China with a total of 820,000 ritual specialists and more than 13 million disciples, roughly 2.4% of the population.57”
    Smith S.A (2015). On not learning from the Soviet Union: Religious Policy in China, 1949-65 Modern China Studies, 22, (1). Page 90-91
    In a talk with a Tibetan delegation Mao Zedong explains his attitude towards religion: "The Communist Party has adopted the policy of protecting religion. Whether you believe in religion or not, and whether you believe in this religion or that religion, you all will be respected. The party respects religious belief. This policy, as presently adopted, will continue in the future."
    Cited in Luo Zhufeng (ed), (1991). Religion under socialism in China. New York. Page 143. This statement contradicts the constitution of Chinese Soviet of 1939. This Constitution in its 13th article guarantees “true religious freedom to the workers, peasants, and the toiling population. Adhering to the principle of the complete separation of church and state, the [Chinese] Soviet state neither favors nor grants any financial assistance to any religion whatsoever. All Soviet citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda. No religious institution of the imperialists shall be allowed to exist unless it shall comply with Soviet law”
    In January 1951 the government institutes a special bureau for religious affairs which works on national and local level. Before 1954 two national conferences on religious work are held. The staff of the bureau of religious affairs receive a job description. “Lead the Catholic Church and Protestant churches in participating in the 'Three-Self Patriotic Movement;' and lead the Buddliist,Daoist,and Islamic leaders in conducting regular study classes on 'patriotism'."
    Leung Beatrice (2005). China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity. The China Quarterly, 184. Page 13
    Basically the position of the administration towards the 5 big religions is the same. These 5 big religions are the Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism and Taoism.
    Confucianism is not considered as a religion but as a ‘way of life’. “Confucianism, disorganised since the collapse of the imperial examination system and mandarinate, was completely banned as the very essence of 'feudalism'; the thousands of redemptive societies, (6) which aimed to reformulate and revive traditional religion, were ruthlessly persecuted as 'reactionary sects and secret societies'; the millions of communal cults, deeply rooted in traditional rural society, were stigmatised as 'feudal superstition'; (7)”
    Palmer David A. (2009) China’s Religious Danwei Institutionalising Religion in the People’s Republic China China perpectives 4. Page 18
    "According to statistics from the Beijing Bureau of Religious Affairs, there were 0.5 million Han-Buddhists (excluding those who practised at home), 0.93 million Hinayana Buddhists, 4.43 million Tibetan Buddhists, 8 million Muslims, 2.7 million Catholics,17 and 0.7 million Protestants in China in 1950.18 The total number was 17.26 million excluding Taoists…Although there is no precise number recorded for Taoists, it is believed that the number of Buddhist and Taoist believers was far greater than in any other religions due to the fact that these religions have no particular formality of baptism. Former Chinese premier Zhou En-Lai (周恩來) even estimated that there were 100 million religious believers in China in the early 1950s.”
    Lee Yu-Jung (Hope) (2004). Page 6
    The power base of the different religions must be broken. Partly because the Marxist ideology and religion are incompatible, and partly because the party considers the Christian faiths as "lackeys of foreign cultural imperialism ', Buddhism and Taoism as representatives of feudalism and Islam as a security problem. In addition to these institutional approach to religion, the state limits the believers personally in the exercise of their faith. The government leaves this control to the local cadres who are responsible for "religious work". They can determine if a person is enemy of the ‘people’ and deprive or constrain his right of freedom of religion. Wang (2015) gives an example "The handling of communal religious activities therefore often depended on the needs of local offcials. When the issue of suppressing superstition was low on their list of priorities, they could choose to make a concession, as they did during the rainmaking riots of the summer of 1953."
    Wang Xiaoxuan (2015). The Dilemma of Implementation The State and Religion in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1990. Page 264. "Villagers openly criticized the Communist Party for “destroying the statues of gods” (daofo), ascribing the drought to the conversion of temples and the demolition of sacred statues of divinities.28 Rainmaking ceremonies quickly turned into an attack on cadres and the village and town government. To deal with the surge of rainmaking ceremonies, in addition to sending cadres to help irrigate land and pump water, the county government ordered first to “educate” (jiaoyu) villagers and, if persuasion turned out to be futile, then to let people do the ritual." Page 264
    In this the politics of the People's Republic of China differs from the SU, because "The religion of the overwhelming majority of Han Chinese was neither Buddhist, Daoist nor Confucian, but drew selectively on all three traditions and combined these with elements of local ritual and belief. Popular religion was par excellence local, rooted in networks of cults, festivals and ancestor worship based on the household, territorial communities, guilds and other associations. Diffuse in character, it lacked many of the features associated with the modern conception of religion, such as institutionalised structures, trained personnel and a coherent belief system. Partly for this reason, the struggle against religion in the PRC –in the absence of centralised institutions that characterised Russian Orthodoxy - was never as important a priority for the Chinese Communists as it was for their Russian comrades..."
    Smith S.A (2015). Page 75. He describes a typical village temple "A village temple might house bodhi- sattvas,a statue of Guandi,the god of war,one of Guanyin,goddess of mercy, and gods of flood-control or earth gods.The village cult,however,centred on a god—sometimes a historic personage who had been deified—who was the special protector of the locality." Smith S.A. (2015). Contentious Heritage: The Preservation of Churches and Temples in Communist and Post-Communist Russia and China. Page 192

    Islam....

    Most Muslims live in the border areas and they belong to national minorities. Frequently Beijing accuses them of ‘local national chauvinism’ (difang minzu zhuyi) which is in conflict with the ‘national unity’ (minzu tuanjie)
    Leung Beatrice (2005). Page 901. Betz (2008)"Having undermined the power of many Sunni and Shiite clerics through land reform, .., many Muslims in Xinjiang turned towards Sufism. Different from Sunni and Shia Islam, Sufism deemphasizes the importance of Mosques and land and instead focuses on the importance of Muslim fellowship.94 As such, under Sufism Muslims can meet practically anywhere to discuss their faith and listen to religious teachings. Therefore, by practicing Sufism the Uyghurs were able to maintain their Islamic faith despite attempts by the Chinese state to undermine it." Betz, Jeffrey D. (2008). An institutional assessment of ethnic conflict in China. Monterey, California. Page 34.
    The government prohibits the construction of mosques and sometimes forces the local population to raise pigs. In Gansu and Henan the Muslim inhabitants frequently revolt. The most famous rebel is
    Osman Batur
    >Osman Batur (Ospan Batyr 1899-1951))executed in Urumqi on April 29, 1951
    , who dreams of an independent Islamic republic Turkistan. To achieve his goal, he works at different times together with Russian Communists, the Americans and the GMD government. In February 1951 the PLA captures him and he is sentenced as a counterrevolutionary person and hanged in Urumqi. The new regime is relatively mild to the Islam as compared to the other religions. For example the general decree of the Government Administration exempts people of the Islamic faith from paying the slaughter tax when their cattle and sheep are slaughtered for home consumption, and also relaxes the inspection standard.
    Document: 19-12-1950 Provisional regulations on Slaughter Tax of the People’s Republic of China
    The People's Republic of China also wants to keep good relations with Islamic countries throughout the world. Most of these countries are underdeveloped countries and the CCP considers them as victims of imperialism. In 1953 loyal Islamic leaders establish the Chinese Islamic Association to improve the relation between Beijing and the Muslim community.

    Buddhism....

    Buddhism has a long history in China. The monks live in temple complexes and they provide for their livelihood by begging and leasing of land. The CCP considers Buddhism as an exploiting feudal religion. The temples are considered as places where capitalist and GMD sympathizers conspire. The land reform of 1950 destroys the foundation for the economic structure of Buddhism and created an apparent vacuum in religious leadership and a shortage of physical space and revenue for religious practice. Yet the CCP issued a directive on 16 June 1951 which "warned that temples should not be occupied without the agreement of resident clergy; that no damage should be done to temples; and that historic relics should be preserved. If temples were confiscated, they should be ordinary temples without abbots (zhuchi)—these were the vast majority in fact—or be given up voluntarily by monks, or be in places where temples were numerous."
    Smith (2015). Contentious Heritage. Page 197
    Ju Zan
    Ju Zan (1908-1984) also known as Pan Chutong
    , an influential Buddhist attempts to unify Buddhism and Communism. He participates at the CPPCC and starts a magazine
    “Modern Buddhist Studies” (Xiandai foxue現代佛學).
    Published from 1950 to 1964
    Even before September 1949 he is very active and he writes with several other progressive Buddhists a proposal to Mao Zedong to reform Buddhism. Mao Zedong never answers. In April 1950 he sets up a factory to make burlap. His ultimate goal “…was to re-educate monks and nuns so that they would transform themselves ideologically, embrace socialism willingly, promote patriotic activities among local Buddhists enthusiastically, and fight feudalism and capitalism resolutely.”
    Xue Yu (2009b). Buddhist Contribution to the Socialist Transformation of Buddhism in China: Activities of Ven. Juzan during 1949–1953. Journal of Global Buddhism, 10. Page 243
    In 1953 the Chinese Buddhist Association is founded to unite all Buddhists in China. Mao Zedong writes in 1952 “Though no believer in Buddhism, I am not against forming an association of Buddhists to get them united and enable them to distinguish clearly between the people and the enemy.”
    Document: 04-08-1952 Let us unite and clearly distinguish between ourselves and the enemy

    Protestantism....

    Like the Buddhist Ju Zan, the protestant leader
    Wu Yaozong
    September 1949 Wu Yaozong (1893-1979) also known as Y.T. Wu speeches at the CPPCC
    is also inclined to cooperate with the CCP. He is also a delegate to the CPPCC. Both of them are appointed by the communist and not by their own religious community “…not only began to speak within the councils of the government (…) on behalf of the church, but soon addressed themselves to the Church on behalf of the government. Whether willingly or unwittingly, they have served as an effective Communist fifth column within the Church itself.”
    Outerbridge L. M. (no date). The lost churches of China. Philadelphia. Page 177
    His collaboration raises within the Protestant community more discord than within the Buddhist. Especially his attempt to unify the different protestant movements in one church raises much resistance. Several important clerics and theologians refuse to cooperate and flee to Hong Kong, leaving behind them a divided religious community. In July 1950 the ‘Christian Manifest’ is publicized. It states loyalty to the People's Republic of China and the foundation of the ‘Three Self Patriotic Movement’. This movement aims to change the institutional base of the Christian churches. The three principles are self-governance, self-support (i.e., financial independence from foreigners), and self-propagation (i.e., indigenous missionary work).
    Zhou Enlai denies the accusations of coercion "Of course, if I had drafted the manifesto and brought it out for them to sign, they would have agreed to it. But what use would there have been in that, for everyone would have said that so-and-so had drafted the statement for them? It is better for them to speak about reform on their own. As long as they are close to our national policy and correct in their general orientation, there is no need to interfere."
    Cited in Seibel Caleb (2011). Origins of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement: John Livingston Nevius. Kansas State University. Page 20

    Roman Catholicism....

    The main objection the CCP has against the Roman Catholic Church is the influence of the Vatican. This loyalty conflict already occurs from the first contacts between the Roman Catholic missionaries and the Chinese emperors.
    The Chinese Roman Catholics are seen as
    lackeys
    Anti-Catholic newspaper cartoon from the Jiefang ribao [Liberation Daily], October 13, 1951
    of a foreign capitalist country.
    "Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) and Pope Pius XI (1922-1939),in 1919 and 1926, respectively, called for foreign missionaries to cede their posts to Chinese priests. Their efforts yielded few results; the foreign missionaries seemed reluctant to relinquish their positions of leadership. The normalization of Sino-Vatican relations in 1939 did not improve the situation. Only in 1946 did the Chinese Catholic Church officially become a national church; even by then, foreigners still dominated its ecclesiastic leadership." Zhang Boyao (2015) Crosses, hammers, and sickles sino-vatican relations between 1949 and 1989. Columbia university journal of politics & society. Page 40 "On August 19, 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a document that identified Chinese Catholic and Protestant Churches as potential loci of imperialist spying operations."
    After 1949 the foreign missionaries are on regular bases publicly not only outside but also inside the protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches denounced. The government initiates these gatherings, later on the own community organizes these condemnation. In 1948, there were 5500 missionaries in China. Two-thirds had been
    expelled
    Archbishop Riberi (1897-1967) is already expelled May 24, 1951
    in 1952. Every priest has to undergo a “patriotic educational program.”
    Mariani (2011) claims the Catholic church in Shanghai was able to withstand the regime for a long time because "The church proved adaptable. At first it operated in the open, but as state pressure mounted it became ever more clandestine, even to the point of mirroring strategies once used by the previously underground CCP. It was not long before the former guerrilla fi ghters of the CCP recognized that the tactics and techniques they had perfected—barring violence—were now being used against themselves: cell groups with strict discipline and group cohesion, compartmentalized knowledge, a hierarchical organization, mass mobilization, multifaceted public pressure campaigns, intelligence gathering, and a specially trained vanguard of militants."
    Mariani Paul (2011). Church militant : Bishop Kung and Catholic resistance in Communist Shanghai. Page 6. By 1955, the Roman Catholic Church in Shanghai had been effectively dismantled.
    It is only in 1957 the Chinese Catholics constitute a Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. This association, like the Buddhist, Islamic and Protestant associations fits in the pursuit of the CCP to take control over all mass organizations. They are a part of the United Front work.

    Taoism ....

    Taoism received the image of superstition and magic and as protagonist of secret organizations. Hung (2000) remarks "But to lump together peasants' religious beliefs as mere "superstitions," as government officials and reformers did, is a gross simplification of the peasants' enormously complicated men- tal and spiritual universe. The government attack against religious prints was essentially an assault against the peasants' traditions, as well as against their psychological bent and artistic imagination."
    Hung Chang-Tai (2000). Repainting China: New Year Prints (Nianhua) and Peasant Resistance in the Early Years of the People's Republic. Page 797
    Only in 1957 Taoism is considered a religion. PLA General Zhu De was the great promoter for this decision.

    Conclusion....

    It is for the first time in Chinese history Buddhists, Daoists, Protestants or Muslims are been united in a China-wide organisation. The firm grip the CCP gets over the 5 religions causes great difficulties within the religious communities. Some of them want to hold on to the situation pre 1949 and others want to cooperate.
    In 1949 in Beijing there are more than 60 churches and organizations with a religious background. In 1959 all organizations with a foreign background have disappeared and only 4 ‘official’ churches remain. In Shanghai the situation is even more severe. In 1949 there are 2000 churches in 1959 only 15 remain.
    Leung Philip Yuen-Sang (1999). Conversion, commitment and culture: Christian experience in china, 1949-1999. Page 4
    "The communist takeover in 1949, however, started a new era of cultural homogenization. The government denounced Confucianism and banned religious activities. Local cultural forms (music, opera, handicraft products, etc.) were turned into means to promote the universal messages of communism (Chen 1989). Any sign of behavior deviating from centrally defined economic and cultural policies was not tolerated"
    Eng Irene and Lin Yi-Min (2002). Religious Festivities, Communal Rivalry, and Restructuring of Authority Relations in Rural Chaozhou, Southeast China. The Journal of Asian Studies,61,4, Page 1268
    The sects are seen as counterrevolutionary organizations and are much more persecuted than the adherents of religion.
    "In general, however, the united front policy in the 1950s stressed the desirability of materialists (weiwu lunzhe) and idealists (weixin lunzhe) working together to build socialist China, rather than the incompatibility of religion and socialism.21"
    Chen Jinlong cited in Smith S.A (2015). Pages 80-81

    The Hukou system limits the mobility of almost everyone in the rural areas and also the urban dwellers are limited in their migration possibilities.


    Literature Notes Documents...

    1.Martinez Esquivel Ricardo (2016) La campaña de erradicación de las huidaomen por parte del partido comunista Chino (1949- 1953) La Albolafia: Revista de humanidades y cultura. 7. Page 81 Back
    2.Translation "Moreover, Lin Rongze estimated that the number of followers reached more than 18 million, while Lu Zhongwei comes up to 30 million. While these figures should be treated with caution, they give an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon. Moreover, the figures could be inflated by local officials in an attempt to meet or exceed the goals of the campaigns" Back
    4.Brooks Jessup J. (2011). Flipping the script: Buddhist youth in communist Shanghai, 1949-1956. Presentation at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, San Francisco. Back
    5.Lieberthal Kenneth (1973). The suppression of secret societies in post-liberation Tientsin. The China Quarterly, 54. Page 266 Back
    6. Gao James Zheng (2004). The communist takeover of Hangzhou: The transformation of city and cadre, 1949-1954. page 108-109 Back
    7.Simon Karla W.(2013). Civil society in China: The legal framework from ancient times to the new reform era. Oxford University press. Page 154 Back
    8. Cited in Skinner, G. William (1951) Aftermath of communist liberation in the Chengtu Plain. Pacific Affairs, 24, (1). Page 68 Back
    9.Smith S.A. (2015). Redemptive religious Societies and the Communist State, 1949 to the 1980s. Page 344 Back
    10. Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Rural violence in socialist China. The China Quarterly, 103. Page 417. Smith (2015) concludes "the societies had been cross- class organizations with members ranging from the political and economic elites down to the most marginal and impoverished strata. The destruction of the old ruling classes, however, meant that the societies lost the merchants, gentry, and offcials who had once been their wealthy patrons." Smith (2015). Redemptive religious Societies. Page 354 Back
    11.Martinez Esquivel Ricardo (2016). Page 86 Back
    12. Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Page 418 Back
    13. Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Page 419 Back
    14. Perry Elizabeth J. (1985). Page 425 Back
    16.Smith Aminda M.(2012). Thought reform and China's dangerous classes: Reeducation, resistance, and the people. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Page 59. "The millions of refugees still loitering in the cities also demanded immediate attention. Within two weeks of Tianjin’s surrender in mid-January 1949, the CCP sent 20,000 people back to their villages throughout north China and in Manchuria.5 In Beijing, the next major urban center to fall on January 31, the authorities also began a rapid repatriation campaign, offering free passage to those willing to leave. About 5,000 people remained in the former Nationalist refugee shelters, the most obvious candidates for immediate removal in the effort dubbed “reducing the parasitic population” (jianshao jisheng renkou). But when cadres identified an additional 160,000 people and prepared for large-scale dispersal, protests forced them to abandon those plans.6 Instead, the new government concentrated its efforts on demobilized GMD soldiers lurking about the city. Public notices announced that former enemy combatants and their dependents who registered and turned in their weapons by the February 25 deadline would be rewarded for their cooperation; those who failed to do so would be treated as “illegal” belligerents.7 ...For the new PRC regime, confronting unknown numbers of possibly armed and hostile enemy soldiers was a key issue on the security agenda." Chen Janet Y. (2012) Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900-1953. Page 214 Back
    17.Cheng Tiejun & Selden Mark (1994). The origins and social consequences of China's hukou system, The China Quarterly, 139. Page 645. "To a great extent, the CCP directly copied and inherited much of the ROC hukou laws and policies on hukou registration and verification procedures. The early version of the CCP's hukou regulations (before the mid-1950s) also similarly provided for the citizen's right of free internal migration. Before the establishment of the PRC, the CCP established its own hukou-like mass mobilization and organization system as early as the 1930s, in its guerrilla bases in Jiangxi Province and later in northern Shangxi Province. 52" Wang Fei-Ling (2005). Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System. Page 43 Back
    18. Graminius Carin (2017) Building a New China. Hukou Investigation Practices in Beijing and Tianjin, 1949–1950. The PRC History Review, 2, (1). Pages 2-3. "…for security, employment, and rationing reasons. They issued “resident’s cards”. These were not given to each person but to each head-of-household. The document had to be shown when any member of the household applied for a regular job or made purchases at a state grain shop. In later years, when ration tickets were required to buy certain goods, the card was used to verify the identity of the buyer. The head of each household could obtain tickets only at a special office.2" White III Lynn T.(1978). Careers in Shanghai: The Social Guidance of Personal Energies in a Developing Chinese City, 1949–1966. University of California Press Page 149 Back
    19.Wang Fei-Ling (2005). Organizing through division and exclusion china’s hukou system. Stanford, California. Page 61 Back
    21.Smith S.A. (2008). Revolution and the people in Russia and China: A comparative history. New York. Page 222 Back
    22.Liang Zai & White Michael J.(1996). lnternal Migration in China, 1950-1988. Demography, 33 (3). Page 377 Back
    23.Cheng Tiejun & Selden Mark (1997). The Construction of spatial hierarchies: China's hukou and danwei systems. In T. Cheek & T. Saich, New perspectives on state socialism of China. New York. Pages 28-29 Back
    24.Chuang Julia (2014). China's rural land politics Bureaucratic absorption and the muting of rightful resistance. The China Quarterly, 219. Page 656 Back
    25.Davis Deborah S. (2000). Social class transformation in urban China: Training, hiring, and promoting urban professionals and managers after 1949. Modern China, 26, (3). Page 268 Back
    26. Gluckstein Ygael (1957). Mao’s China economic and political survey. London. Page 123 Back
    27.Seeger Lucas H.F.(2012). China's internal migration, public policies, and economic growth. MA thesis, Monterey California. Page 23 Back
    28.Diamant Neil J. (2006). The Stubborn Myth of `Rising Patriotism' in Modern China. (Working paper 2), East Asia Institute. Seoul. Page 27 Back
    29.Cheng Tiejun & Selden Mark (1994). Page 654 Back
    30. Wang Mengmeng (2007). Analysing the employment discrimination phenomena in China from an international human rights perspective—Focusing on Hepatitis B-based discrimination. MA thesis, Lund University. Page 20 Back
    31.Lee Yu-Jung (Hope) (2004). Politics and religion in the People’s Republic of China. The cases of Buddhism, Protestant Christianity and Falun Gong. (SEAS Electronic Working Papers 2, (4)). Page 4 Back
    32.Smith S.A (2015). On not learning from the Soviet Union: Religious Policy in China, 1949-65 Modern China Studies, 22, (1). Page 90-91 Back
    33. Cited in Luo Zhufeng (ed), (1991). Religion under socialism in China. New York. Page 143. This statement contradicts the constitution of Chinese Soviet of 1939. This Constitution in its 13th article guarantees “true religious freedom to the workers, peasants, and the toiling population. Adhering to the principle of the complete separation of church and state, the [Chinese] Soviet state neither favors nor grants any financial assistance to any religion whatsoever. All Soviet citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda. No religious institution of the imperialists shall be allowed to exist unless it shall comply with Soviet law” Back
    34.Leung Beatrice (2005). China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity. The China Quarterly, 184. Page 13 Back
    35.Palmer David A. (2009) China’s Religious Danwei Institutionalising Religion in the People’s Republic China China perpectives 4. Page 18 Back
    36.Lee Yu-Jung (Hope) (2004). Page 6 Back
    37.Wang Xiaoxuan (2015). The Dilemma of Implementation The State and Religion in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1990. Page 264. "Villagers openly criticized the Communist Party for “destroying the statues of gods” (daofo), ascribing the drought to the conversion of temples and the demolition of sacred statues of divinities.28 Rainmaking ceremonies quickly turned into an attack on cadres and the village and town government. To deal with the surge of rainmaking ceremonies, in addition to sending cadres to help irrigate land and pump water, the county government ordered first to “educate” (jiaoyu) villagers and, if persuasion turned out to be futile, then to let people do the ritual." Page 264 Back
    38.Smith S.A (2015). Page 75. He describes a typical village temple "A village temple might house bodhisattvas,a statue of Guandi,the god of war,one of Guanyin,goddess of mercy, and gods of flood-control or earth gods.The village cult,however,centred on a god—sometimes a historic personage who had been deified—who was the special protector of the locality." Smith S.A. (2015). Contentious Heritage: The Preservation of Churches and Temples in Communist and Post-Communist Russia and China. Page 192 Back
    39.Leung Beatrice (2005). Page 901. Betz (2008)"Having undermined the power of many Sunni and Shiite clerics through land reform, .., many Muslims in Xinjiang turned towards Sufism. Different from Sunni and Shia Islam, Sufism deemphasizes the importance of Mosques and land and instead focuses on the importance of Muslim fellowship.94 As such, under Sufism Muslims can meet practically anywhere to discuss their faith and listen to religious teachings. Therefore, by practicing Sufism the Uyghurs were able to maintain their Islamic faith despite attempts by the Chinese state to undermine it." Betz, Jeffrey D. (2008). An institutional assessment of ethnic conflict in China. Monterey, California. Page 34. Back
    41. Smith (2015). Contentious Heritage. Page 197 Back
    42.Xue Yu (2009b). Buddhist Contribution to the Socialist Transformation of Buddhism in China: Activities of Ven. Juzan during 1949–1953. Journal of Global Buddhism, 10. Page 243 Back
    44.Outerbridge L. M. (no date). The lost churches of China. Philadelphia. Page 177 Back
    45. Cited in Seibel Caleb (2011). Origins of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement: John Livingston Nevius. Kansas State University. Page 20 Back
    46. "Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) and Pope Pius XI (1922-1939),in 1919 and 1926, respectively, called for foreign missionaries to cede their posts to Chinese priests. Their efforts yielded few results; the foreign missionaries seemed reluctant to relinquish their positions of leadership. The normalization of Sino-Vatican relations in 1939 did not improve the situation. Only in 1946 did the Chinese Catholic Church officially become a national church; even by then, foreigners still dominated its ecclesiastic leadership." Zhang Boyao (2015) Crosses, hammers, and sickles sino-vatican relations between 1949 and 1989. Columbia university journal of politics & society. Page 40 "On August 19, 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a document that identified Chinese Catholic and Protestant Churches as potential loci of imperialist spying operations." Page 42 Back
    47. Mariani Paul (2011). Church militant : Bishop Kung and Catholic resistance in Communist Shanghai. Page 6. By 1955, the Roman Catholic Church in Shanghai had been effectively dismantled.Back
    48. Hung Chang-Tai (2000). Repainting China: New Year Prints (Nianhua) and Peasant Resistance in the Early Years of the People's Republic. Back
    49. Leung Philip Yuen-Sang (1999). Conversion, commitment and culture: Christian experience in china, 1949-1999. Page 4 Back
    50. Eng Irene and Lin Yi-Min (2002). Religious Festivities, Communal Rivalry, and Restructuring of Authority Relations in Rural Chaozhou, Southeast China. The Journal of Asian Studies,61,4, Page 1268 Back
    51. Chen Jinlong cited in Smith S.A (2015). Pages 80-81 Back
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