Article 56 of the Common Program
Text
Article 56 of the Common Program

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China may, on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty, negotiate with foreign governments which have severed relations with the Kuomintang reactionary clique and which adopt a friendly attitude towards the People's Republic of China, and may establish diplomatic relations with them.



Timeline Foreign Relations
Region 1
Burma
16-12-1949 Burma recognizes PRC
19-12-1949 Mao sends telegram to Liu and Zhou about Burma
8-6-1950 Diplomatic relation with Burma is established
9-12-1951 Chinese cultural group visits Burma
22-4-1954 Sino-Birmese Three Year Trade Agreement
29-6-1954 Zhou Enlai visits Burma
3-11-1954 Sino-Birmese Protocol on the Exchange of Commodities
1-12-1954 Mao Zedong meets U Nu prime minister of Burma
North Korea
4-10-1949 North Korea recognize PRC
16-11-1953 Zhou Enlai and Kim Il sung sign secret
technological cooperation pact
19-11-1953 Sino-Korean 10-year aid pact Korea Foreign Trade
23-11-1953 Sino-North Korean Economic and
Cultural Cooperation Agreement
4-9-1954 Sino-North Korean Protocol for the Exchange of Goods in 1954
31-12-1954 Protocol on Communist PRC's Aid to Korea
in 1955 Korea Foreign Trade
India
16-11-1949 Nehru publicly claims Chinese 'suzerainty' over Tibet
18-11-1949 Mao "India's Path Is Similar to That of China "
29-12-1949 India recognizes PRC
1-4-1950 Diplomatic relation with India is established
2-1-1951 Sino-Indian trade agreement
25-4-1951 Second Sino-Indian Rice Trade Contract
22-5-1951 Third Sino-Indian Rice Trade Contract
26-5-1952 4th Sino-Indian Rice Trade Contract
13-10-1952 5th Sino-Indian Rice Trade Contract
29-4-1954 China and India sign agreement on Tibet
24-6-1954 Zhou Enlai visits India
21-7-1954 Sino-Indian Trade Agreement on Tobacco
14-10-1954 Sino-Indian Trade Agreement
18-10-1954 Nehru visits PRC
Mongolia
6-10-1949 Mongolia recognizes PRC
16-10-1949 Diplomatic relations with Mongolia established
3-7-1950 Bayaryn Jargalsaihan, Mongolia ambassador visits Mao
4-10-1952 10 year Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic
and Cultural Cooperation
16-1-1953 Postal and telecommunications agreement between
PRC and Mongolia is signed
24-2-1953 Sino-Mongolian Non-Trading Credit Agreement
20-8-1953 Sino-Mongolian Goods Exchange and Payment
Agreement for 1953
7-4-1954 Sino-Mongolian Trade Agreement for 1954
31-7-1954 Zhou Enlai visits Mongolia
16-12-1954 Sino-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Supply
of Goods for 1955
Pakistan
5-1-1950 Pakistan recognizes PRC
21-5-1951 Diplomatic relation with Pakistan is established
14-3-1953 Sino-Pakistani Cotton and Coal Agreement
Vietnam
15-1-1950 DR Vietnam formally recognizes PRC
19-1-1950 PRC recognizes the D.R. Vietnam
19-1-1950 Sino Vietnam trade agreement on military supplies
28-4-1951 DR Vietnam's "representative" or "delegate." is
installed in Beijing
7-7-1954 PRC and the D.R. Vietnam announce an agreement
on aid to D.R. Vietnam
11-8-1954 Luo Guibo becomes ambassador to North Vietnam
24-12-1954 PRC and Vietnam sign agreement on Chinese aid
for economic reconstructions
Nepal
20-9-1950 Agreement on maintaining friendly relations
between Nepal and PRC
Region 2
Japan
28-1-1949 Mao "On ordering GMD Government to re-arrest
Japanese Yasuji Okamura"
12-6-1950 CC statement on the present situation in Japan
10-7-1950 Japanese POW are handed over by SU
May 1952 Japanese delegation visits China
1-6-1952 Sino-Japanese private trade agreement is signed
26-11-1952 Sino-Japanese Barter Contract
31-12-1952 Protocol Extending the Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement
by Half a Year to June 30, 1953
29-10-1953 Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement of 1953
11-10-1954 Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation
of Academic Survey visit PRC
Afghanistan
12-1-1950 Afghanistan recognizes PRC.
Not ready to enter into diplomatic ties.
Ceylon
7-1-1950 Ceylon recognizes PRC
4-10-1952 Sino-Ceylonese General Trade Agreement
18-12-1952 Sino-Ceylonese 5-Year Agreement on Rubber
and Rice Trade
8-10-1954 Sino-Ceylonese Rubber and Rice Contracts
Indonesia
28-3-1950 Decision made to establish diplomatic relation
with Indonesia
13-4-1950 Diplomatic relation with Indonesia is established
22-7-1951 17 members of PRC embassy to Indonesia may not enter
30-11-1953 Sino-Indonesian Trade Agreement
1-9-1954 Sino-Indonesian Trade and Payment Protocol
& payment agreement
Region 3
Albania
20-11-1949 Albania recognizes PRC
11-5-1954 PRC and Albania agree to establish diplomatic relations
13-9-1954 Mao Zedong "The Albanian People Has
a Glorious Revolutionary Tradition"
14-10-1954 Sino-Albanian culteral agreement is signed
3-12-1954 Sino-Albanian Agreement Concerning a
Long-Term Chinese Credit to Albania
GDR
25-10-1949 PRC recognizes GDR
27-10-1949 GDR recognizes PRC
10-10-1950 Sino-GDR Trade Agreement for 1951
8-11-1951 Sino- GDR cultural agreement is signed
30-4-1953 Sino-GDR Goods Exchange and Payment
Agreement for 1953
9-8-1953 Protocol Supplementary to the 1953
Sino-GDR Agreement
30-3-1954 Sino-GDR Goods and Payment Agreement
for 1954
23-7-1954 Zhou Enalai visits GDR
Hungaria
4-10-1949 Hungary recognizes People's Republic of China
5-4-1950 1st official Chinese delegation arrives in Hungary
22-1-1951 Sino-Hungarian Trade Agreement for 1951
12-7-1951 Sino-Hungarian cultural agreement is signed
20-8-1951 Sino-Hungarian accord on the exchange of films
21-7-1952 Protocol Extending and Revising the
1951 Agreement China Hungary
30-3-1953 Sino- Hungary Barter and Payment Agreement for 1953
16-7-1953 Sino- Hungarian agreement on trade in
postal services and telecommunications
3-10-1953 Sino-Hungarian agreement on scientific
and technological cooperation
15-10-1953 Sino-Hungarian agreement on radio cooperation
30-4-1954 Sino-Hungarian Trade and Payment
Agreement for 1954
30-4-1954 Mao Zedong meets Hungarian delegation
28-12-1954 Sino-Hungarian agreement on mutual
cooperation to protect against crop diseases & pests
Bulgaria
3-10-1949 Bulgaria recognizes PRC
21-7-1952 Sino-Bulgarian Trade Agreement for
Exchange of Goods and Payments in 1952
3-12-1952 Sino-Bulgarian Trade Agreement for 1953
25-3-1954 Sino-Bulgarian Goods Exchange and Payment
Agreement for 1954
Rumania
19-1-1953 Sino-Rumanian Goods Exchange
and Payment Agreement for 1953 Rumenia Foreign Trade
3-10-1949 Rumania recognizes PRC
30-7-1952 Sino-Rumania Agreement on Exchange
of Goods and Payments for 1952
19-1-1953 Sino-Rumanian Goods Exchange and
Payment Agreement for 1953
19-4-1954 Sino-Rumanian Trade and Payment Agreement
for 1954
Czechoslovakia
5-10-1949 Czechoslovakia recognizes PRC
14-6-1950 Sino-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement for 1950
21-6-1951 Sino-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement for 1951
6-5-1952 Sino-Czechoslovakian cultural agreement is signed
15-7-1952 Protocol Extending and Revising the
Sino-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement for 1951
7-5-1953 Sino-Czechoslovak Goods Exchange and
Payment Agreement for 1953
27-4-1954 Sino-Czechoslovak Goods Exchange and
Payment Agreement for 1954
Poland
5-10-1949 Poland recognizes PRC
1-3-1950 Sino-Polish Barter Agreement
29-1-1951 Sino-Polish Agreement Concerning Exchange of
Goods and Payments in 1951
4-4-1951 Sino-Polish cultural agreement is signed
15-6-1951 The creation of the China-Polish Joint
Shipping Company
11-7-1952 Sino-Polish Trade Agreement for 1952
25-5-1953 Sino-Polish Goods Exchange and
Payments Agreement for 1953
19-2-1954 Sino-Polish Goods Exchange and
Payment Agreement for 1954
26-7-1954 Zhou Enlai visits Poland
Yugoslavia
5-10-1949 Yugoslavia recognizes PRC
14-12-1954 Zhou contacts Yugoslavia about
diplomatic relations
Region 4
UK
19-4-1949 UK The Amethyst Affair
28-4-1949 UK decides to reinforce Hong Kong
with “a brigade group,” the 27th Infantry Brigade
30-4-1949 UK Mao comments on the April 20 incident
The Amethyst Affair
30-7-1949 UK warship HMS Amethyst escapes down
Yangtze River
6-1-1950 UK recognizes PRC
9-5-1950 UK institutes formal checkpoints and cut direct
rail links between Hong Kong and PRC.
14-4-1952 Sino-British Trade Agreement
6-7-1953 Sino-British Commercial Agreement
17-6-1954 Diplomatic relations are established at
charge d'affaires level with Great Britain
17-7-1954 Zhou Enlai meets Eden
14-8-1954 Attlee arrives in Beijing as head of
British Labour party delegation
12-10-1954 British delegation( 20 members of parliament,
union, scientists, artists) visits PRC
FRG
25-6-1952 Sino-West German Trade Agreement
Denmark
9-1-1950 Denmark recognizes PRC
11-5-1950 Diplomatic relation with Denmark is established
Finland
13-1-1950 Finland recognizes PRC
21-9-1952 Sino-Soviet-Finnish Agreement on Supply of
Commodities in 1952
28-10-1950 Diplomatic relation with Finland is established
5-6-1953 Sino-Finnish Goods Exchange and Payments
Agreement for 1953
21-6-1954 Sino-Finnish Trade Agreement from May 1, 1954
to April 30, 1955
13-12-1954 Sino-Finnish Supplementary Trade Protocol
for 1954
Israël
9-1-1950 Israel recognizes PRC.
Not ready to enter into diplomatic ties
Norway
10-1-1950 Norway recognizes PRC
5-10-1954 Norway establishes diplomatic relations
Sweden
14-1-1950 Sweden recognizes PRC
9-5-1950 Diplomatic relation with Sweden is established
Switzerland
17-1-1950 Switzerland recognizes PRC
14-9-1950 Diplomatic relation with Switzerland and
Lichtenstein are established
The Netherlands
27-3-1950 The Netherlands recognizes PRC
14-4-1952 Sino-Dutch Trade Agreement
19-11-1954 Diplomatic relations established at
charge d'affaires level with Netherlands;
US
12-10-1949 US lists conditions for recognition of the PRC
18-10-1949 US Embassy is moved to Chongqing
24-10-1949 US consulate staff members are arrested
7-12-1949 Zhou sends telegram to Xinjiang
about US representatives
19-12-1949 US Embassy is moved to Taipei
8-12-1950 US Commerce Department announces
a total trade embargo on PRC.
16-12-1950 US freezes Chinese public and private
assets in the United States
28-12-1950 GAC All U.S. property in PRC is expropriated
29-12-1950 GAC "Report on Principles of Dealing
with the Cultural & Educational Organs accepting US funding"
France
14-4-1952 Sino-French Trade Agreement
9-8-1952 Sino-French Contract for Barter Trade
5-6-1953 Sino-French Trade Agreement
1-6-1954 Zhou Enlai meets French minster of
foreign affairs Georges Bidault
17-7-1954 Zhou Enali meets Mendes France in Geneva
Australia
18-6-1954 Zhou Enlai meets Australian Minister
for External Affairs, Richard Casey
Region 5
Algeria
26-10-1949 Mao sends telegram "PRC Supports the
Algerian People's Struggle for Liberation"
Chile
23-10-1952 Sino-Chilean Trade Agreement
Egypt
22-8-1954 Sino-Egyptian trade agreement


Timeline Cold War 1945-1954


1945
08-02-1945 Yalta conference SU enters WO II stage in East Asia.
One of the conditon is recognition of
Soviet interests in the Manchurianrailways and
Port Arthur (no consultation with GMD government)
26-07-1945 Postdam conference Churchill, Truman, and Xie Jiangshi
(the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan)
issued the Potsdam Declaration which outlined the terms
of surrender for Japan during World War II in Asia
08-08-1945 SU declares war against Japan and invades Manchuria
1946
09-12-1946 France starts war in Indochina against Viet Minh
14-11-1946 UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of
foreign soldiers from Korea

1948
10-05-1948 Syngman Rhee elected as President of the
Republic of Korea
09-09-1948 Kim Il Sung leader of North Korea
20-11-1948 US consulate in Mukden surrounded for a year
by PLA forces
1949
29-08-1949 SU tests its first atomic bomb
01-10-1949 Mao Zedong declares the foundation of the PRC
19-01-1950 China diplomatically recognizes Vietnam
as independent from France
25-06-1950 North Korea invades South Korea.
See for overview course of Korea war article 54
1953
17-06-1953 Uprising in East Germany
1954
07-05-1954 The Viet Minh defeat the French
at Dien Bien Phu.
11-08-1954 The Taiwan Strait Crisis begins
with the PLA shelling of Taiwanese islands
08-09-1954 Foundation of the South East
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
This article of the Common Program describes the relations between governments, not between political parties. In this part only the foreign relations will be presented. The foreign trade and economic relations are described in article 37 .
Basically: “The Chinese Communist leaders adopted very revolutionary criteria when they classified the states in the world during the later part of the PRC’s revolutionary movement. In their eyes, all the states outside the Soviet camp, including all countries in Asia, were either imperialist or under the control of imperialist or reactionary forces. According to the views expressed by Mao Zedong in his work “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” the PRC did not need to urgently establish close relations with these countries, and the Chinese leadership showed more concern for the working people and so-called revolutionary movement, even for the armed struggles against governments in these countries.”
Niu Jun (2012) The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s. Comparative Studies on Regional Powers, Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies. 9 Page 90

The new regime formulates 4 criteria for the diplomatic relations. First of all, the integrity of China should be recognized, in other words Taiwan is an inseparable part of the People's Republic of China. Secondly the old unequal treaties should be revised or abolished. See article 55. Thirdly all contacts with the GMD regime of Taiwan should be severed. Finally, the relations should be friendly and peaceful.
After the recognition of Burma, Mao Zedong states “regarding the issue of Burma’s request to establish diplomatic relations with us, you should ask whether Rangoon is willing to sever relations with Kuomintang, and at the same time ask Rangoon to appoint a delegate, negotiating the establishment of Sino-Burma relations. Then you decide whether two countries’ relations would be established. Such procedure of negotiation on establishing relations is absolutely necessary, and it should be the same with all capitalist countries.”
Document:19-12-1949 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 19 December 1949 (excerpt)

A division in regions characterized by the sort of relations between the People's Republic of China and foreign countries can be made. 1.The first region consists of neighboring countries: SU, India, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Burma, Pakistan and Bhutan.
2.The second region contains countries in the immediate vicinity of China: Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Afghanistan, Ceylon
3.The third region involves the communist regimes in East Europe: GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia and Hungaria
4.The fourth region consists of Western countries: to be divided in non-American-ally countries and American allies. "For those falling in the first category, it positively and actively responded to their proposal for establishing diplomatic relations, with the precondition that negotiations were needed, thereby confirming the new regime’s international status as the sole legal representative of the whole Chinese people."
Chen Xiyu (2003) From Political Alliance in China’s Conception to Comprehensive Partnership in Building: the Relations between China and the European Community/European Union Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen. Page 19

5.The fifth region consists of countries in Africa, Arabia, Latin America and Asia. After 1955 mostly countries from Region 5 prevail in the establishing of relations.
In general, the relations can be qualified “Among the non-Communist countries, three important cross- cutting distinctions must be noted: recognition and non-recognition; friendly popular atmosphere and unfriendly popular atmosphere; and advanced, as against backward and recently colonial countries. China's relations with each category are somewhat different”
Passin Herbert (1963). China's cultural diplomacy, New York. Page 15

Region 1....

Soviet Union , Korea, Bhutan, Laos , Burma , Nepal , India , Pakistan, Vietnam and Mongolia
Soviet Union: This country is the most important neighbour. China has the longest frontier with the SU. Big parts at both sides of the border have been recently and in the past, issues of conflict. These areas are Manchuria, Xinjiang and Mongolia. See article 55.
The choice of “leaning on one side” makes the SU the most important ally of the regime. This relation changes after the death of Stalin in March 1953. " There were other signs of the improved status of the Chinese in the communist world. The Chinese Communist Party, which ranked third after the Polish Party at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, was-raised to second place. Similarly, -in all public references to the Chinese People's Republic was henceforward given priority over all the other People's Democracies. -China was more favourably treated than before, and most probably was no longer regarded, as a satellite.
Zhu Jiaming (1991) A Chinese Exploration of Sino-Soviet Relations since the Death of Stalin, 1953-1989. PhD. University of Glasgow. Pages 28
"Another immediate sign of the Soviet leaders' anxiety to improve relations with China -was their. replacement of the Soviet ambassador In Beijing before the end of March 1953. Until then the Soviet-mission in Beijing had been headed by Alexander Panyushkin, a senior military officer who had much to do with putting Stalin's China policy into practice. He was replaced by V. V. Kuznetosov, a former trade union official who later became one of the Soviet Union's most capable professional diplomats." Zhu Jiaming (1991) A Chinese Exploration. Page 27
Korea: The relationship with this country is described in article 54 .
Bhutan: China and Bhutan do not maintain official diplomatic relations, After Tibet came under direct rulership of Beijing in 1951, Bhutan was afraid to become a victim of the expansionist policy of the People's Republic of China. This fear was not justified, China saw Bhutan never as a part of China. Is was never a suzerainty like Tibet. Although China claimed considerable territory in central and north-western Bhutan. On August 8, 1949 Bhutan and India conclude a treaty in which is stipulated that India is the ‘guide ‘in the foreign policy of Bhutan.
Laos: The relation with Laos is part of the conflict in Indochina. See article 54 The Chinese but mainly the North Vietnamese support the Pathet Lao (founded August 19, 1950), who fight for a real independent Laos. “It is unclear whether the CPR had any direct contact with the Pathet Lao movement up to this time, outside of Souphanouvong's visits to China during 1951 and 1952, apparently for policy consultations. There is little doubt, however, that the triumph of Communist revolution in China and the presence of Chinese troops on the Indochinese frontier encouraged Souphanouvong's movement and that the extensive Chinese military assistance for the Viet Minh operations indirectly aided the Pathet Lao.”
Lee Chae-Jin(1970) Communist China's Policy Toward Laos: A Case Study, 1954-67. International Studies, East Asian Series Research Publication, 6. Page 14
Li Xiaoting claims “In early March 1951, the CCP began to organize and train the communist guerillas of Laos, which was then a self-governing kingdom under French suzerainty. In an internal directive, Liu Shaoqi expressed support for the “Laotian people’s struggles for liberation,” Li Xiaoting (2014) The taming of the red dragon: the militarized worldview and China’s use of force, 1949-2010. PhD., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
In 1954 Laos becomes a constitutional monarchy. Slowly the relationship between the 2 countries improves, “…there were no clear evidences which could support the contention that China's policy toward Laos was inherently "aggressive" and "expansionist." But the general pattern of China's strategies and tactics toward Laos during 1954-67 seemed to be more rational and prudent than irrational and reckless.”
Lee(1970) Communist China's Policy Toward Laos. Page 148
The foundation of the SEATO partly caused this prudent policy. “It was no secret that SEATO was aimed primarily at China. SEATO was a big blow to both the DRV(Vietnam) and China, which were committed to realizing peace in Indochina through compromises.”
Yang Kuisong (2002). Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949-1973. (CWIHP Working Paper 34). Washington, D.C. Page 12
See article 54
Burma: Burma is the first non-communist country which recognizes the People's Republic of China.
The Birmese government asks the Indian government to wait with the recognition of the People's Republic of China after the recognition by Burma. This would make Burma the first non-communist country to recognize the new regiem. Zie Fan, Hongwei, “China–Burma”Fan Hongwei (2008a). Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and equivocations” in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh, China in the world: Contemporary issues and perspectives . Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Page 2 “Two of the top leaders of the BCP (Burmese Communist Party), Ko Aung Gyi and Bo Than Swe, were sent to China to establish regular channels of contact with Peking. They were received in Peking almost as plenipotentiaries from one government to another. Between 1950 and 1953 there were reports of several… missions to Peking and the training of the BCP cadres in China's Yunnan province. Some Burmese Communist leaders had taken up residence in Peking at that time, where they broadcast propaganda in Burmese and developed a deep sympathy for the Chinese Communist system of rule.”Liang Chi-Shad & Scalapino Robert A. (1990). Burma's foreign relations: Neutralism in theory and practice. New York. Page 67 See also See also 23-10-1950 Burmese Foreign Minister’s Statement to Chinese Ambassador during a Large Gathering of Ethnic Chinese, His Perspective, and Our Ideas for a Resolution On September13, 1950 Burma and the US sign an economic and technologic treatment. This blurs the relationship with China.
In 1952 Zhou Enlai describes “...the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with America and Britain." 03-09-1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai The agreement of September 13, 1950 between the US and Burma evokes sharp protests in Beijing . “fully known, U.S. imperialist has strengthened invasion in our country’s peripheries, and attempts to change all our neighboring countries into bases of its invading China……U.S. has signed military and economic agreements with Thailand and Burma in order to strengthen economic plunder in these countries, and on the other hand to change them into its military bases for invasion.” RMRB 13 december 1950 cited in Fan Hongwei (2008a). Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and equivocations” in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh, China in the world: Contemporary issues and perspectives . Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Page 7. See also 23-10-1950 Burmese Foreign Minister’s Statement to Chinese Ambassador during a Large Gathering of Ethnic Chinese, His Perspective, and Our Ideas for a Resolution
The presence of GMD troops in Burma is also an obstacle for intercommunication. In 1951 about 4000 GMD soldiers are near the borders of the Chinese province Yunnan. In 1953 the amount has increased to 16000. The CIA backs these troops of GMD general Li Mi. “The general concept presented was to insert CIA-sponsored Chinese Nationalists into China from Burma, forcing the Communists to pull forces out of Korea to deal with the incursion. If successful, this would cause Mao to redeploy his Red Chinese forces, thereby relieving pressure against American and UN forces.”
Berger D. H. (1995). The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951, Marine Corps Command and Staff College. No pagenumber
Often disguised as PLA soldiers the GMD soldiers are causing unrest in Yunnan and in Burma. “From now on you and your men must make all attempts to attack the weak outpost of the Burmese troops, in the disguise that you are MAO’s Communist bandits and also propagate that MAO’s Communist bandits have invaded Burma.” “Therefore, to make our plans successful we must create trouble between these two governments.”
Kuomintang Aggression against Burma, Ministry of Information, Government of The Union of Burma, 1953, page 159. Cited in Fan Hongwei (2008a). Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and equivocations” in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh, China in the world: Contemporary issues and perspectives . Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Page 8
These undercover actions are not successful.
"five units of the Red China People's Army, a little over 200 men" entered Burmese territory and established camps about 25 miles inside the Northern Wa State.30 These detachments were stationed there presumably to hold off any further attacks against Yunnan staged by the KMT troops located in Burma."Trager Frank (1964). Burma and China. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 5. Page 43
In 1953 the UN solves the problem. The US, Taiwan and Thailand agree to evacuate the majority of these troops.
In a meeting between a delegation of Burma and Zhou Enlai, the latter promises “we are developing economic ties on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. We are not looking for one side’s conditions to outweigh the others. If the Burmese government discontinues its acceptance of American aid by June, it will excite many of the Asian nations.”
Document: 22-05-1953 Remarks of Premier Zhou Enlai receiving the Burmese Government Labor Commission
During his visit in June 1954 Zhou Enlai promises China will not export the revolution to Burma and "to settle this question (incomplete delimitation of the boundary line) in a friendly spirit at an appropriate time through normal diplomatic channels."
There are some border issues between Burma and China: The first includes all territory north of latitude 25° 35' along a line from above Myitkyina. The second territorial claim, located in the Shan States is the Namwan Tract, a tract of land wedged in south and east of Bhamo to the Shweli River. The third disputed area is a portion of the Wa State, east of Lashio, and east of the Salween River which at this point runs well inside the Burmese border. Trager Frank (1964). Burma and China. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 5 Pages 42-43
Mao Zedong assures the Birmese premier in December 1954 that China will not interfere in the internal affairs of Burma. Both countries are more or less sentenced to one another “Beijing not only established Burma as an important buffer state between China and the West and the later the Soviet Union, but also partly broke out of U.S. encirclement by means of Burmese geographic location. With the encirclement of China by the West, Burma was the only friendly non-Communist territory through which the Chinese Communists physically could go abroad.”
Fan Hongwei (2012) China–Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs,31,1 Page 17 See also 28-06-1956 Deng Xiaoping Submits a Written Report to the Central Committee on the China-Burma Border Issue
Nepal: Like Bhutan, Nepal is afraid to lose its sovereignty and like Bhutan seeks protection from India. Both countries conclude an economic and military treaty. Nepal-India relation is largely directed by 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which Nepalese side considers as unequal. Intern opposition against the growing influence of India affects the relation with China in a positive way. August 1, 1955 Nepal recognizes its neighboring country.
Both China's attempt to smoothly pull the negotiations with Nepal and Burma is connected with the domestic situation, namely the Tibetan uprising. On January 28, 1960 Burma and China sign a preliminary agreement.
India: India established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 1 January 1950, the second non-communist nation after Burma. The China-India Friendship Association (CIFA; Zhongyin Youhao Xiehui 中印友好协会) is founded in Beijing on May 16, 1952. The first Chinese cultural delegation went to India in late 1951.
See chronology contacts China India https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/chinaindia1950/timeline/index.html
The Chinese leaders regard Head of Government Nehru as a lackey of Imperialism. Nehru visits Washington in October 1949 and maintains a close relationship with London via the Commonwealth. The relationship with China is very tense after the crushing of a communist uprising in South India and gets even more tense after the takeover of Tibet.
On April 29, 1954 both parties sign agreement on trade and relation with Tibet.
Document:29-04-1954 Agreement between the republic of india and the people’s republic of China on Trade and intercourse between Tibet region of China and India
There are disputes about the border regions.
On October 26 1950 the Indian government officially protested against the use of military force in Tibet. 4 days later the Chinese Foreign Ministry replied, that Tibet is an internal affair. In June 1951 Nehru recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In October 1954 the two countries sign a treaty to which the five principles serve as a starting point of the foreign policy of both countries. Trade and communication between Tibet and India is also regulated.
After the Geneva conference Zhou Enlai visits India. Both countries agree to take the 5 principles as basic principle for their relation. See article 54 . India tries to stay neutral in the conflict between the US and the SU.
Pakistan: Although both countries recognize each other in 1950, the contacts remain at a very low level. “Nevertheless, through successful bilateralism policy, Pakistan befriended with the US and China while earning USSR’s animosity. At these critical junctures, Pakistan preferred to stay neutral on China’s internal affairs i.e. Tibet. …. At that time politically, there was no diverging point between Karachi and Peking. Even the undefined Pakistan-China border remained in peace and Chinese position was not clear over Kashmir dispute at least at the time of China-India warm relations as India and China were enjoying very good relations during this phase. Economically, Pakistan-China trade extended under the barter agreement of 1952, under which Pakistan exported Rs. 97.2 million worth of cotton to China and in exchange of coal and jute.”
Javaid Umbreen & Jahangir Asifa (2015) Pakistan-China Strategic Relationship: A Glorious Journey of 55 Years. JRSP, 52, 1, 157-183. Page 162
China is concerned about the negotiations between the US and Pakistan and the participation in the SEATO.
"In December 1953, the PRC had sent a memorandum to the Pakistani government, expressing grave concern with the ongoing military alliance negotiations between Pakistan and the United States. This issue, the memorandum warned, might affect stability in Asia as well as China’s security. On February 13, 1954, Pakistan replied to Beijing that it needed assistance from all countries, including the United States, to preserve its independence and sovereignty; but Pakistan had absolutely no hostile intent toward China"Li Xiaoting (2014). The taming of the red dragon: the militarized worldview and China’s use of force, 1949-2010. PhD., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Page 212
Vietnam: In examining article 54 of the Common Program the relationship between North Vietnam and the People's Republic of China is described. The relationship between South Vietnam and China is non-existent. South Vietnam is a full ally of the US and survives by the military and economic aid of the US.
Mongolia: As seen in Article 55 the leaders in Beijing are reluctant to accept the independence of Mongolia. Only under pressure of the SU the People's Republic of China accepts the independence of Mongolia. The former GMD government had accepted the independence in January 1946. From 1952 onwards the People's Republic of China and Mongolia sign agreements on economic aid in the form of monetary aid and manpower. Thousands of Chinese workers helped construction projects in the capital Ulaanbaatar. The 1952 deal was the first bilateral agreement, which was concluded by Mongolia with a country other than the Soviet Union. It challenged Soviet predominance in Mongolia.

Region 2....

Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Afghanistan , Ceylon and Cambodia
Indonesia: Between Indonesia and China never existed a close relation like those with Korea and Vietnam. This absence of interest can be explained by the dominance of Hinduism, Islam and western influences in Indonesia.
Mozingo(2007) states “Indonesia,…, emerges as the successor to a Western colonial entity-…-and her leaders were pledged, not to radicalism or basic reform, but to dependence on the leading capitalist democracies and the adoption of some of their institutions. Because the motivations of the two countries were fundamentally different… the resulting opposed nationalistic interests would clash sharply and soon.” Page 44
The position of the numerous Chinese complicates the relation. See article 58. In April 1950, after the closing of the Taiwanese consulates the Chinese ambassador presents his credentials to president Sukarno. In July 1951, a diplomatic row over some Chinese embassy personnel arose, which was only solved after some months.
See for details on the incident Feith (1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Page 192
At the end of 1953 trade agreements are signed and after the Bandung conference of 1955, the relationship improves. Partly because the new Indonesian government has to rely on the communist party (PKI) to realize a majority in the Parliament
Japan: The relationship between China and Japan has been extremely bad after the end of world war II and Japan is still seen as a potentil threat. The treaty of February 1950 between the SU and the People's Republic of China stipulates mutual aid in case Japan will violate Chinese or Russian territory. "The problem of the settlement with Japan was one of the treatment of defeated Japan. The aims of China and The Soviet Union were the same to a great degree: China desired to resume the sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores islands, the Soviet Union wanted to deliver the southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union de jure. Both countries opposed America's occupying and managing Japan alone. They rejected American intentions of changing Japan into an American ally and for residence of American troops in Japanese territory. They took precautions against the revival of Japanese militarism. Such highly consistent aims formed the foundation of consultation, coordination and cooperation between the two nations. As promised in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, both countries must "together reach the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan through the consent each other."
Zhang Shengfa (2002). The Soviet-Sino Boycott of the American-Led Peace Settlement With Japan in the Early 1950s. Russian History, 29, 2. Page 403
During the Korea war the military bases in Japan are an important part of the US strategy. In 1951, the US and Japan sign a security treaty and Japan recognizes Taiwan.
"The apparently close relationship between the United States and Japan, and easily constructed parallels between the American presence in East Asia and that of Imperial Japan, presented the CCP with a sitting target for propaganda campaigns, especially campaigns whose roots lay in the Japanese invasion and occupation of China." Cathcart (2009). To Serve Revenge. Page 1063
Document: 06-05-1951 Stalin cables to Mao or Zhou
Document: 08-09-1951 Treaty of mutual cooperation and security between Japan and the united states of America
On September 8, 1951 when 48 countries set their signature to the peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union, along with Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to sign it.
"...from October 1950 when China intervened in the Korean War to September 1951 when peace treaty in San Francisco was signed, the Soviet Union and China mutually consulted and cooperated in boycotting the Japanese peace settlement led by America."Zhang(2002). The Soviet-Sino Boycott. Page 404. Neither the government of PRC nor ROC was invited to the peace conference due to a difference of opinion between the British government which wanted to recognize the PRC and the American government which favored continued recognition of the ROC.
12-08-1951 Telegram, Soviet Foreign Ministry to N. V. Roshchin (Soviet Ambassador in Beijing)
The relation between the two countries is under constant pressure, “Issues relating to trade, fishing rights, prisoners of war, and war criminals have been deliberately manipulated by Peking for political purposes, and questions relating to disarmament and rearmament, atomic weapons, American bases in Japan, and the status of Okinawa have been exploited for propaganda aims.”
Barnett A. Doak (1960). Communist China and Asia challenge to American policy. Harper & Brothers. Pages 257-258
"Because of interest regarding Japan among the constituent parts of the new PRC government, issues normally placed strictly in the sphere of foreign relations ballooned into much more massive operations. Analysing and publicizing the legacy of Japanese war crimes became a task that engaged the participation of virtually every ministry in the government." Cathcart Adam & Nash Patricia (2009). “To Serve Revenge for the Dead”: Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949–1956. Page 1056
The PRC seized 154 Japanese fishing boats and 1,909 Japanese crew members between 1950 and 1954.
In Northern China, there were still thousands of Japanese, even in the army. (See Article 22) “…the CCP was willing to tolerate those Japanese deemed useful and controllable. These were steel and mining engineers, airplane pilots, and anybody with a skill for which the CCP had a use. Service and contribution by the Japanese, however, did not buy them Chinese trust. In the fall of 1952, representatives from countries around the world attending an Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Beijing received permission to visit the Northeast. Lacking confidence in what the Japanese might relate to the outsiders, CCP authorities decided that it was better to arrange the foreigners’ visit in a way that they would not have a chance to meet local Japanese."
Wang Xiaodong (2002). China Learning to Stand Up: Nationalism in the Formative Years of the People’s Republic of China. Page 82
Through non-official channels the two countries try to have contact. In April 1952, several delegations are invited to Moscow to attend the International Economic Conference. This conference aims to circumvent the embargo imposed by the UN during the Korea war. Japanese businessmen attend this conference and in June 1952 a trade agreement is made with Japanese private companies.
“From the 1950s, Beijing practiced People’s Diplomacy toward Japan, a semiofficial diplomatic campaign aimed at changing Tokyo’s policy of nonrecognition of Beijing and undercutting its security alliance with Washington.”
He Yinan also states: “Chinese official war history refrained from demonizing the entire Japanese nation, drawing a clear line between “the small handful of Japanese militarists” and ordinary Japanese people, who were treated as the Chinese people’s fellow victims of the militarists.”He Yinan (2007).The search for reconciliation : Sino-Japanese and German-Polish relations since world war II. Cambridge University Press. Pages 134-135
Zhou Enlai explains to a Japanese delegation the essence of “People’s Diplomacy”. The Chinese people can distinguish between the militarist elites and the common people. He also puts in the spotlight the generous attitude of China towards the Japanese war criminals and the willingness to solve these matter in a fast way.
Zhou Enlai’s Remarks on ‘The Foundation of Japanese-Chinese Friendship’ in the Meeting with Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation of Academic Survey, October 11, 1954.” Cited in He Yinan (2007).The search for reconciliation : Sino-Japanese and German-Polish relations since world war II. Page 135-136. In 1954 there are still more then 1000 war criminals in China. There are no death penalties or life sentences pronounced. See also Cathcart Adam & Nash Patricia (2009). “To Serve Revenge for the Dead”: Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949–1956. See document October 12, 1954 Joint declaration of the PRC and SU on realtions with Japan
In 1955 32000 pows are repatriated and in 1956 war criminals are sent back.
From the 1930's onwards many Japanese immegrants live in the Northeast of China. After the founding of the People's Republic of China the policy towards them can be characterized as “With regard to Japanese with revolutionary zeal, they should be sent back to their country before or after March of this year to become soldiers of struggle in the Japanese revolution. . . . They can also stimulate Japan’s revolutionary movement, improve . . . China’s position in the Far East and stimulate the two nation’s revolutions. . . . This means that prior to [their] going back, we must continue the satisfying education work so that like those who came back from the Soviet Union, the Japanese who return from China can in their language and actions increase greatly the power of democracy.” Cathcart Adam & Nash Patricia (2000) War criminals and the road to Sino-Japanese normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang trials, 1954 – 1956. Twentieth-Century China,34, 2. Page 91
Philippines: Between Beijing and Manilla is no diplomatic relation. The Filipino government is anti-communist and the country sends troops for the UN army in Korea. The country is a member of SEATO.
Thailand: Even though China has attempted to establish diplomatic relations with Thailand, it is only in 1975 the latter recognizes China.
In December 1955 Mao Zedong assures a Thai delegation the Chinese regime has no intention in aiding the Thai communist in overthrowing the Thai government. According to Mao Zedong Thailand should be neutral just like India.
Yang (2002). Changes. Page 14
Thailand choses to join the SEATO. On June 21 1956 Zhou Enlai signs a secret treaty with Thai politicians to lift the UN embargo on non-strategic articles.
Afghanistan: Although in January 1950 Afghanistan recognizes the new regime in Beijing, the diplomatic exchange starts in January 1955.
Ceylon: This island recognizes the People's Republic of China in 1950, real diplomatic relations start in September 1956. Already in December 1952 both countries sign a trade agreement on rubber and rice. In exchange of rice, China imports rubber from Ceylon. In the subsequent years, more of these contracts are signed.
Cambodia: It is in July 1958 Cambodia and China establish diplomatic relations.

Region 3....

German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Hungary
The diplomatic relations between China and the European socialist countries went completely according to international conventions. After recognition followed the exchange of ambassadors. All East Bloc countries have recognized the People's Republic of China at the end of 1949.
In January 1949 the SU, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary form the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Albania becomes a member in February 1949, GDR in 1950.
China is excluded from this organization.
“The Sino-Soviet deal cutting out a “division of labor” between the nations, as introduced by Stalin to Liu Shaoqi during the latter’s trip to Moscow in the summer of 1949, represented one of the informal restrictions that the Chinese side was forced to abide by during the Stalin period.48 This ‘division’ marked a clear boundary to the Chinese sphere of influence, which ended in Asia; Stalin was here mindful of the potential parallels between potential Chinese influence on the Eastern European states and that, historically, of Yugoslavia on the more orthodox Balkan nations.49 As a result, the PRC’s relationship with the Eastern bloc states during the Stalin era found itself limited to trade, cultural exchanges and formal diplomatic connections. No significant (party-party) political relations existed affiliating the Communist Parties of China and Eastern Europe.”
Zhu Dandan (2009). The Double Crisis: China and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. PhD. London School of Economics. Page 37. "Eastern Europe in itself played a secondary role in Chinese foreign policy. The importance of the Eastern European region stems from the fact that it became part of the Sovietdominated socialist world after 1948–49. In other words, Chinese foreign policy considered relations with individual states and with the whole region as a derivative of Sino-Soviet relations." Zofka Jan, Vámos Péter & Urbansky Sören(2018). Beyond the Kremlin’s reach? Eastern Europe and China in the Cold War era. Cold War History, 18. Page 3
After the death of Stalin this relationship alters and in 1954 there are direct talks between the People's Republic of China and Hungary and Poland during the fifth anniversary of the republic. On a regular basis, there are mutual visits by political, cultural and economic delegations. Eastern European countries also send experts to China. “Just as domestic five-year plans were subject to periodic (usually annual) adjustment, so too the multi-year co-operative agreements between China and its Eastern bloc partners were in fact renegotiated on an annual basis to bring them more in line with the realities of production in a given year.”
Kirby W.C. (2006). China’s internationalization in the early People’s Republic: Dreams of a socialist world economy. The China Quarterly, 886. Page 886
Yugoslavia:
In 1948 Tito (the political leader of Yugoslavia) decides to set its own course and to be more independent of the SU. This course complicates the relations with China. On July 10 1948, the CCP accepts a resolution in which the party supports the SU condemnation of the independent course of Yugoslavia. Mao Zedong tells the Russian ambassador: “… that the Chinese government would not reply to Yugoslavia and would ignore all attempts by the Yugoslavs to entrap [zaviazat’] China into relations.”
Document:16-10-1949 Roshchin Memorandum of conversation with Mao Zedong
After the death of Stalin both countries try to establish normal relations. In January 1955, this results in diplomatic relations. Mao Zedong in a conversation with the Yugoslavian ambassador states: “You recognized us long ago. Since the establishment of our country, you have supported us and this position has never altered. Our reason for delaying the establishment of relations with you is that we hoped to mend relations with you together with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has now mended its relations to you and so have we. This was a better way, so establishment of relations was delayed for a few years.”
Document: 0-06-1955 Conversation of Mao Zedong and the Yugoslav Ambassador V. Popovic. In 1956 for example the Yugoslavian Film Week was organized in part to confirm and enhance the diplomatic ties between China and Yugoslavia that were newly established in 1955
German Democratic Republic:
In June 1953, there was a popular uprising against the regime. After the military intervention of SU troops the revolt was beaten down. Soon afterwards the Chinese government supports the regime with economic aid. As Zhou Enlai put it: "In consideration of the friendship between the Chinese and German peoples and in order to overcome the current difficulties into which the American imperialists and the West German bandits have brought the German people, we see our assistance to the German people as our duty and as an honour."
Kirby (2006) China’s internationalization. Page 887

The position of China regarding the revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956 is no subject of this study.

Region 4....

United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Liechtenstein , United States , Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Israel, France and US
United Kingdom: Hong Kong airport. “On the whole, the CCP's policy toward Britain in the late 1940s was characterized by common sense and pragmatism. Despite occasional anti-imperialist rhetoric against the British, which was more often directed at a domestic audience, the party adopted a flexible and realistic policy in its dealings with Britain as demonstrated in the cases of Hong Kong and trade. The difference between the CCP's attitudes toward the United States and Britain is illuminating because it shows that although ideology and historical memory helped shape the CCP's foreign policy, geopolitical and military-security calculations were of overriding significance. Although the party viewed both Washington and London as reactionary and deplored their extraction of imperialist rights from China and their intervention in the Russian Revolution, it considered America more dangerous than Britain in the late 1940s simply because the United States actively supported the Nationalists, whereas the United Kingdom remained neutral in the Chinese civil conflict.”
Zhai Qiang (1994). The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chines-British-American relations, 1949-1958. Kent State University Press. Page 15

The UK is willing to recognize the People's Republic of China mainly for its economic benefits. The British investments in China run up to more than 200 million pounds. Political and economic interests in the Far East and Hong Kong play significant roles in the attitude of the British Government and London seeks for rapprochement with Beijing.
Three issues are important to Beijing. One, the voting of the UK regarding Chinese representation in the United Nations. In January, Britain had abstained from voting on a Soviet resolution to expel the GMD representative from the UN.
The other matter is the presence of GMD organizations in Hong Kong and the third issue China’s state properties in Hong Kong. Particularly the ownership of 71 airplanes grounded on
“Although, in February 1950, the Hong Kong court ruled that the aeroplanes belonged to the PRC, London was under pressure from Washington to prevent them from falling into Communist hands. Not satisfied with the British ambivalent attitude towards the GMD, Beijing thus refused to reciprocate London’s diplomatic recognition. Sino-British negotiation ended abruptly when the Korean War broke out in the summer of 1950.”
Mark Chi-kwan (2012). China and the World since 1945. An International History. Routledge. Page 22
Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Liechtenstein: In the first 3 months of 1950 several European countries recognize the People's Republic of China. The Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Lichtenstein on ambassador level. The Netherlands on D’affaires level. The contacts between these countries and China are on a very low frequency. Sporadic trade agreement and after the start of the Korea war almost non-existent. The exception is the above mentioned Economic Conference in Moscow. (See above)
France: There are two big obstacles for a normal relationship between France and the People's Republic of China. One is the war in Indochina. (See article 54 ) . The other is the membership of SEATO (see above) During the conference in Geneva there some talks between delegations of both countries but these don’t lead up to recognition. (See article 11 This recognition took place in 1964.)
BDR, Belgium, Italy and Spain:
In the 1970’s these countries recognize the People's Republic of China. Italy in 1970
In the 1950s, Italian governments repeatedly tried to initiate diplomatic relations with the PRC, but the US veto and the PRC’s inflexibility regarding the terms of recognition limited their margins of action. Italy did not have any special interests in Asia like the UK or France and was more dependent on Washington and its containment policies against China than either of those European powers. Fardella Enrico (2016). A significant periphery of the Cold War: Italy-China bilateral relations, 1949–1989, Cold War History, Page 6.
, Belgium 1971, Germany in 1972 and Spain in 1973.
Israel: Despite protest of the US and UK Israel recognizes the People's Republic of China in January 1950. Both countries don’t exchange ambassadors and the relation is at a very low level. “In December 1953, Chinese ambassador Yao Zhongming met with Israeli ambassador David Ha-Cohen in Burma and soon a message was delivered to the Chinese foreign ministry: the Israeli government ordered Ha-Cohen to keep the sincerest and friendliest relation with China and check the possibility to develop business and trade with our country. And soon after that the Israeli embassy in Finland also asked about the possibility of an Israeli business delegation to visit China, which was approved by Premier Zhou Enlai in August 1954.”
Liang Pingan & Liang Zheng (2013) The bilateral relations between Israel and modern China (1948-2010). Page 153
This delegation visited China in 1955.
China is very reluctant to openly support Israel because the regime does not want to upset its Muslim minorities and Arab countries.
United States: The relationship between the People's Republic of China and the US deteriorate rapidly. Partly caused by the fact the US supports the GMD regime, which fled to Taiwan and partly caused by the Cold War, which put both countries ‘automatically' opposed to each other. Historically the bond between the CCP and the US has been very fragile. Washington sparingly supports the communist army against the Japanese. At the other hand the CCP seeks support from the SU in 1920’s,1930’s and 1940’. This choice is above all ideologically motivated. The GMD choses the side of the US and on November 4, 1946 both countries sign a five years’ friendship treaty. This treaty evokes protest from pro GMD students and from pro CCP students. The anti-American sentiment grows after the news of the rape of a Chinese girl by 2 American soldiers. At the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947 there are in cities like Shanghai and Beijing several demonstrations against American presence in China.
In 1949, the CCP is puzzled by the reactions of the US on the developments during the civil war. On the other hand, the US government is also puzzled about the policy of the CCP. Both countries don’t trust each other.
Sheng states: "...the friendly overtures were disinformation designed to confuse the Americans in order to reduce or delay the possibility of U.S. military intervention on behalf of the GMD.” Sheng Michael M.(1998a). Battling western imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States. Princeton. Page 182
Document:08-01-1949 Mao Zedong We should include a direct U.S. military intervention in our battle plan
Mao Zedong is convinced “the Truman administration sought to salvage American interests in China. Facing defeat "sending its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organizing so-called oppositionists." He even imagined that Washington might grant diplomatic recognition as a way of securing its influence in China the better to push this strategy of "'destruction from within.”
Hunt Michael H.(1996). The genesis of Chinese communist foreign policy. New York. Page 196
In June and July there are some attempts to start diplomatic relations but they all fail.
March 1949 Chen Mingshu (member of the Rev. GMD) tries to act as a mediator between the CCP and the US. His atempts fail. See Chen Jian (1997). The Myth of America’s “Lost Chance” in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence. Diplomatic History, 21, (1) 77-86.
“The friendly overtures were disinformation designed to confuse the Americans in order to reduce or delay the possibility of U.S. military intervention on behalf of the GMD.”
Sheng Michael M.(1998a). Battling western imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States. Princeton. Page 182
SU Ambassador Kovalev sends a cable to Stalin about the negotiations between US and China. He noticed "With regard to the conversation with ( American ambassador) Stuart, Mao Zedong said that the statements of Stuart contradict the actions of [American General Douglas] MacArthur, who recently landed two companies of American soldiers in Qingdao, and is also strengthening the Navy in Shanghai. Either Stuart is lying or the military (MacArthur) does not care about what the State Department says about anything”. 23-05-1949 Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, Report on the 22 May 1949 CCP CC Politburo Discussion
In August the US government publicizes the “white papers”. The papers conclude that the introduction of communism is a victory of the Russian expansionist tendencies and an implementation of an alien system in China. (See also Part 4)
Mao Zedong reacts on these accusations and warns: “The slogan, "Prepare for struggle", is addressed to those who still cherish certain illusions about the relations between China and the imperialist countries, especially between China and the United States. With regard to this question, they are still passive, their minds are still not made up, they are still not determined to wage a long struggle against U.S. (and British) imperialism because they still have illusions about the United States. There is still a very wide, or fairly wide, gap between these people and ourselves on this question.”
Document: 14-8-1949 Mao Zedong "Cast away illusions, prepare for struggle."
See also Document:18-8-1949 Mao Zedong Farewell, Leighton Stuart
See also Document: 28-8-1949 Mao Zedong Why it is necessary to discuss the white paper
On January 5, 1950 president Truman announces the US shall not intervene in the civil war of China and will not give military support to Taiwan. This decision is soon withdrawn as the People's Republic of China enters the war in Korea. February 1951 the US and Taiwan sign a military treaty.
Document: 09-02-1951 Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Taipei
Two months earlier in December of 1950 President Truman froze all Chinese assets in the United States in retaliation of China's military intervention in Korea. In response, the Chinese government expropriated all property belonging to United States nationals in China and froze all US deposits in the territory under its control.
"The United States estimated that the value of seized property and assets belonging to U.S. nationals totalled approximately $197 million; the assets belonging, to Chinese nationals in the United States amounted to roughly $80.5 million." Sit Elaine (1996). Broken Promises: The Status of Expropriated Property in the People's Republic of China, 3 Asian American Law Journal 3, Page 127
In 1954 during the Conference of Geneva Chinese and American diplomats meet and they decide to hold talks in Warsaw. They start in 1955. The repatriation of nationals was the primary issue of these talks.
Document: 19-05-1954 Minutes of the Talk between Huan Xiang and Humphrey Trevelyan on the Return of Chinese and US Nationals to Their Respective Countries (Excerpt)
Document: 03-06-1954 Telegram From Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, on the Issue of the US Asking China to Release Convicted US Nationals in China

Region 5....


The main characterization of this region is that relations only started after the Bandung Conference (meeting of Asian and African states) of april 1955. During the period between 1949 and 1955 a political outreach to Africa/Latin America and Arabia is not a CCP priority. Instead, to secure its external legitimacy the CCP works hard to win as many diplomatic partners as possible away from Taiwan. "On 5 October 1954, the CCP magazine World Culture published an article entitled ‘Foreign Relations of New China During the Past Five Years’ calling for the party to adopt a more active global approach. It argued that the independence struggles of Asian, African, and Latin American states ‘share a common interest in the wiping out of colonialism, and there are no basic conflicts of interest among them.’ 15 This clarion call for unified ‘oppo- sition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war’ marked the beginning of proactive CCP outreach to African independence groups – creating political networks later used to channel material support"
Eisenman Joshua (2018). Comrades-in-arms: the Chinese Communist Party’s relations with African political organisations in the Mao era, 1949–76, Page 4
The Arabic region “…the Chinese always associated the region [of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region] with the capitalist camp rather than the socialist camp. They described the governments of the region as 'puppets' in the hands of the West.”
Huwaidin Mohamed Bin (2002). China's relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 1949-1999. London. Page 96
This attitude changes, a change that is not only specific to the Gulf states but for whole region 5. “By the end of the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet alliance began to deteriorate. The Chinese started to regard the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region as an arena of Chinese-Soviet rivalry as well as a stage to wage a campaign against Western imperialism.”
Huwaidin, Arabia and the Gulf. Page 100

In 1956 Radio Beijing starts broadcasting in English for the African continent. Latin America is mostly a virgin territory for China. The governments of these countries are considered pro US.
Egypt: Starting from 1954 both countries have a trade relation. President Nasser explains why he is hesitant to recognize the People's Republic of China. “…the Americans and the British were exerting pressure on the Egyptian government not to have any relations with China. Egypt could not ignore the Anglo-American position for fear that they [the Anglo-Americans] might stop the evacuation of the British forces from the Canal Zone. That was the reason why Egypt abstained during the vote in the UN over the inclusion of China, yet in his [Nasser’s] heart of hearts he was for recognizing China.”
Document: 21-05-1955 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and the Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser
One year later May 1956 Egypt recognizes the People's Republic of China. This is a very important decision for Beijing. Egypt is the first Islamic country recognizing the new regime.
Burhan Shahidi (chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government) makes the first contacts. “February 1956, …(he) led the second delegation of hajji in which he followed the usual China-encouraged practice of combining pilgrimage with politics: While in the Middle East he met with King Sa’ud of Saui Arabia, King Husayn of Jordan, and Nasser of Egypt, as well as the premiers of Lebanob, Syria, and possibly North Yemen. As a direct result of his meeting with Nasser, Egypt became the first Middle Eastern Muslim country to diplomatically recognise the PRC.” Gladney Dru C. (1992). Constructing a contemporary Uighur national identity: Transnationalism, Islamicization, and state representation. Cahiers d’etudes sur la Mediterranee Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien 13, 165-184. Page 8
South Africa: May 28, 1954 Mao Zedong cables the congress of Indians in South Africa in which he supports the struggle against racial discrimination and racial oppression.
Document:28-05-1954 Mao Zedong Telegram to the congress of Indians in South Africa

Literature Notes Documents...

1. Niu Jun (2012) The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s. Comparative Studies on Regional Powers, Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies. 9 Page 90 Back
3. Chen Xiyu (2003) From Political Alliance in China’s Conception to Comprehensive Partnership in Building: the Relations between China and the European Community/European Union Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen. Page 19 Back
4. Passin Herbert (1963). China's cultural diplomacy, New York. Page 15 Back
5. Zhu Jiaming (1991) A Chinese Exploration of Sino-Soviet Relations since the Death of Stalin, 1953-1989. PhD. University of Glasgow. Pages 28 Back
6. "Another immediate sign of the Soviet leaders' anxiety to improve relations with China -was their. replacement of the Soviet ambassador In Beijing before the end of March 1953. Until then the Soviet-mission in Beijing had been headed by Alexander Panyushkin, a senior military officer who had much to do with putting Stalin's China policy into practice. He was replaced by V. V. Kuznetosov, a former trade union official who later became one of the Soviet Union's most capable professional diplomats." Zhu Jiaming (1991) A Chinese Exploration. Page 27 Back
7. Lee Chae-Jin(1970) Communist China's Policy Toward Laos: A Case Study, 1954-67. International Studies, East Asian Series Research Publication, 6. Page 14 Back
8. Li Xiaoting claims “In early March 1951, the CCP began to organize and train the communist guerillas of Laos, which was then a self-governing kingdom under French suzerainty. In an internal directive, Liu Shaoqi expressed support for the “Laotian people’s struggles for liberation,” Li Xiaoting (2014) The taming of the red dragon: the militarized worldview and China’s use of force, 1949-2010. PhD., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Page 61 Back
9. Lee(1970) Communist China's Policy Toward Laos. Page 148 Back
10. Yang Kuisong (2002). Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949-1973. (CWIHP Working Paper 34). Washington, D.C. Page 12 Back
11. The Birmese government asks the Indian government to wait with the recognition of the People's Republic of China after the recognition by Burma. This would make Burma the first non-communist country to recognize the new regiem. Zie Fan, Hongwei, “China–Burma”Fan Hongwei (2008a). Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and equivocations” in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh, China in the world: Contemporary issues and perspectives . Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Page 2 “Two of the top leaders of the BCP (Burmese Communist Party), Ko Aung Gyi and Bo Than Swe, were sent to China to establish regular channels of contact with Peking. They were received in Peking almost as plenipotentiaries from one government to another. Between 1950 and 1953 there were reports of several… missions to Peking and the training of the BCP cadres in China's Yunnan province. Some Burmese Communist leaders had taken up residence in Peking at that time, where they broadcast propaganda in Burmese and developed a deep sympathy for the Chinese Communist system of rule.”Liang Chi-Shad & Scalapino Robert A. (1990). Burma's foreign relations: Neutralism in theory and practice. New York. Page 67 See also 23-10-1950 Burmese Foreign Minister’s Statement to Chinese Ambassador during a Large Gathering of Ethnic Chinese, His Perspective, and Our Ideas for a Resolution Back
12. In 1952 Zhou Enlai describes “...the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with America and Britain." (Doc 2) The agreement of September 13, 1950 between the US and Burma evokes sharp protests in Beijing . “fully known, U.S. imperialist has strengthened invasion in our country’s peripheries, and attempts to change all our neighboring countries into bases of its invading China……U.S. has signed military and economic agreements with Thailand and Burma in order to strengthen economic plunder in these countries, and on the other hand to change them into its military bases for invasion.” RMRB 13 december 1950 cited in Fan Hongwei (2008a). Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and equivocations” in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh, China in the world: Contemporary issues and perspectives . Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Page 7. See also 23-10-1950 Burmese Foreign Minister’s Statement to Chinese Ambassador during a Large Gathering of Ethnic Chinese, His Perspective, and Our Ideas for a Resolution Back
13. Berger D. H. (1995). The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951, Marine Corps Command and Staff College. No pagenumber Back
14.Kuomintang Aggression against Burma, Ministry of Information, Government of The Union of Burma, 1953, page 159. Cited in Fan Hongwei (2008a). Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and equivocations” in Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh, China in the world: Contemporary issues and perspectives . Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. Page 8 Back
15."five units of the Red China People's Army, a little over 200 men" entered Burmese territory and established camps about 25 miles inside the Northern Wa State.30 These detachments were stationed there presumably to hold off any further attacks against Yunnan staged by the KMT troops located in Burma."Trager Frank (1964). Burma and China. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 5. Page 43 Back
17. There are some border issues between Burma and China: The first includes all territory north of latitude 25° 35' along a line from above Myitkyina. The second territorial claim, located in the Shan States is the Namwan Tract, a tract of land wedged in south and east of Bhamo to the Shweli River. The third disputed area is a portion of the Wa State, east of Lashio, and east of the Salween River which at this point runs well inside the Burmese border. Trager Frank (1964). Burma and China. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 5 Pages 42-43 Back
18. Fan Hongwei (2012) China–Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs,31,1 Page 17 See also 28-06-1956 Deng Xiaoping Submits a Written Report to the Central Committee on the China-Burma Border Issue Back
19. Both China's attempt to smoothly pull the negotiations with Nepal and Burma is connected with the domestic situation, namely the Tibetan uprising. On January 28, 1960 Burma and China sign a preliminary agreement. Back
20.See chronology contacts China India https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/chinaindia1950/timeline/index.html Back
22. On October 26 1950 the Indian government officially protested against the use of military force in Tibet. 4 days later the Chinese Foreign Ministry replied, that Tibet is an internal affair. In June 1951 Nehru recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In October 1954 the two countries sign a treaty to which the five principles serve as a starting point of the foreign policy of both countries. Trade and communication between Tibet and India is also regulated. Back
23. Javaid Umbreen & Jahangir Asifa (2015) Pakistan-China Strategic Relationship: A Glorious Journey of 55 Years. JRSP, 52, 1, 157-183. Page 162 Back
24. "In December 1953, the PRC had sent a memorandum to the Pakistani government, expressing grave concern with the ongoing military alliance negotiations between Pakistan and the United States. This issue, the memorandum warned, might affect stability in Asia as well as China’s security. On February 13, 1954, Pakistan replied to Beijing that it needed assistance from all countries, including the United States, to preserve its independence and sovereignty; but Pakistan had absolutely no hostile intent toward China"Li Xiaoting (2014). The taming of the red dragon: the militarized worldview and China’s use of force, 1949-2010. PhD., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Page 212 Back
25.Mozingo(2007) states “Indonesia,…, emerges as the successor to a Western colonial entity-…-and her leaders were pledged, not to radicalism or basic reform, but to dependence on the leading capitalist democracies and the adoption of some of their institutions. Because the motivations of the two countries were fundamentally different… the resulting opposed nationalistic interests would clash sharply and soon.” Page 44 Back
26.See for details on the incident Feith (1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Page 192 Back
27. Zhang Shengfa (2002). The Soviet-Sino Boycott of the American-Led Peace Settlement With Japan in the Early 1950s. Russian History, 29, 2. Page 403 Back
28. "The apparently close relationship between the United States and Japan, and easily constructed parallels between the American presence in East Asia and that of Imperial Japan, presented the CCP with a sitting target for propaganda campaigns, especially campaigns whose roots lay in the Japanese invasion and occupation of China." Cathcart (2009). To Serve Revenge. Page 1063 Back
31. "...from October 1950 when China intervened in the Korean War to September 1951 when peace treaty in San Francisco was signed, the Soviet Union and China mutually consulted and cooperated in boycotting the Japanese peace settlement led by America."Zhang(2002). The Soviet-Sino Boycott. Page 404. Neither the government of PRC nor ROC was invited to the peace conference due to a difference of opinion between the British government which wanted to recognize the PRC and the American government which favored continued recognition of the ROC. Back
33. Barnett A. Doak (1960). Communist China and Asia challenge to American policy. Harper & Brothers. Pages 257-258 Back
34. "Because of interest regarding Japan among the constituent parts of the new PRC government, issues normally placed strictly in the sphere of foreign relations ballooned into much more massive operations. Analysing and publicizing the legacy of Japanese war crimes became a task that engaged the participation of virtually every ministry in the government." Cathcart Adam & Nash Patricia (2009). “To Serve Revenge for the Dead”: Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949–1956. Page 1056 Back
35. Wang Xiaodong (2002). China Learning to Stand Up: Nationalism in the Formative Years of the People’s Republic of China. Page 82 Back
36. He Yinan also states: “Chinese official war history refrained from demonizing the entire Japanese nation, drawing a clear line between “the small handful of Japanese militarists” and ordinary Japanese people, who were treated as the Chinese people’s fellow victims of the militarists.”He Yinan (2007).The search for reconciliation : Sino-Japanese and German-Polish relations since world war II. Cambridge University Press. Pages 134-135 Back
37. Zhou Enlai’s Remarks on ‘The Foundation of Japanese-Chinese Friendship’ in the Meeting with Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation of Academic Survey, October 11, 1954.” Cited in He Yinan (2007).The search for reconciliation : Sino-Japanese and German-Polish relations since world war II. Page 135-136. In 1954 there are still more then 1000 war criminals in China. There are no death penalties or life sentences pronounced. See also Cathcart Adam & Nash Patricia (2009). “To Serve Revenge for the Dead”: Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949–1956. See Document: October 12, 1954 Joint declaration of the PRC and SU on realtions with Japan Back
38. From the 1930's onwards many Japanese immegrants live in the Northeast of China. After the founding of the People's Republic of China the policy towards them can be characterized as “With regard to Japanese with revolutionary zeal, they should be sent back to their country before or after March of this year to become soldiers of struggle in the Japanese revolution. . . . They can also stimulate Japan’s revolutionary movement, improve . . . China’s position in the Far East and stimulate the two nation’s revolutions. . . . This means that prior to [their] going back, we must continue the satisfying education work so that like those who came back from the Soviet Union, the Japanese who return from China can in their language and actions increase greatly the power of democracy.” Cathcart Adam & Nash Patricia (2000) War criminals and the road to Sino-Japanese normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang trials, 1954 – 1956. Twentieth-Century China,34, 2. Page 91 Back
39. Yang (2002). Changes. Page 14 Back
40. Albania becomes a member in February 1949, GDR in 1950. Back
41. Zhu Dandan (2009). The Double Crisis: China and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. PhD. London School of Economics. Page 37. "Eastern Europe in itself played a secondary role in Chinese foreign policy. The importance of the Eastern European region stems from the fact that it became part of the Sovietdominated socialist world after 1948–49. In other words, Chinese foreign policy considered relations with individual states and with the whole region as a derivative of Sino-Soviet relations." Zofka Jan, Vámos Péter & Urbansky Sören(2018). Beyond the Kremlin’s reach? Eastern Europe and China in the Cold War era. Cold War History, 18. Page 3 Back
43. Kirby W.C. (2006). China’s internationalization in the early People’s Republic: Dreams of a socialist world economy. The China Quarterly, 886. Page 886 Back
46. Kirby (2006) China’s internationalization. Page 887 Back
47. Zhai Qiang (1994). The dragon, the lion & the eagle: Chines-British-American relations, 1949-1958. Kent State University Press. Page 15 Back
48. Mark Chi-kwan (2012). China and the World since 1945. An International History. Routledge. Page 22 Back
49."In the 1950s, Italian governments repeatedly tried to initiate diplomatic relations with the PRC, but the US veto and the PRC’s inflexibility regarding the terms of recognition limited their margins of action. Italy did not have any special interests in Asia like the UK or France and was more dependent on Washington and its containment policies against China than either of those European powers." Fardella Enrico (2016). A significant periphery of the Cold War: Italy-China bilateral relations, 1949–1989, Cold War History, Page 6 Back
50. Liang Pingan & Liang Zheng (2013) The bilateral relations between Israel and modern China (1948-2010). Page 153 Back
51. Sheng states: "...the friendly overtures were disinformation designed to confuse the Americans in order to reduce or delay the possibility of U.S. military intervention on behalf of the GMD.” Sheng Michael M.(1998a). Battling western imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States. Princeton. Page 182 Back
53. Hunt Michael H.(1996). The genesis of Chinese communist foreign policy. New York. Page 196 Back
54. March 1949 Chen Mingshu (member of the Rev. GMD) tries to act as a mediator between the CCP and the US. His atempts fail. See Chen Jian (1997). The Myth of America’s “Lost Chance” in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence. Diplomatic History, 21, (1) 77-86.
“The friendly overtures were disinformation designed to confuse the Americans in order to reduce or delay the possibility of U.S. military intervention on behalf of the GMD.” .
Sheng Michael M.(1998a). Battling western imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States. Princeton. Page 182
SU Ambassador Kovalev sends a cable to Stalin about the negotiations between US and China. He noticed "With regard to the conversation with ( American ambassador) Stuart, Mao Zedong said that the statements of Stuart contradict the actions of [American General Douglas] MacArthur, who recently landed two companies of American soldiers in Qingdao, and is also strengthening the Navy in Shanghai. Either Stuart is lying or the military (MacArthur) does not care about what the State Department says about anything”. 23-05-1949 Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, Report on the 22 May 1949 CCP CC Politburo Discussion Back
59. "The United States estimated that the value of seized property and assets belonging to U.S. nationals totalled approximately $197 million; the assets belonging, to Chinese nationals in the United States amounted to roughly $80.5 million." Sit Elaine (1996). Broken Promises: The Status of Expropriated Property in the People's Republic of China, 3 Asian American Law Journal 3, Page 127 Back
62. Eisenman Joshua (2018). Comrades-in-arms: the Chinese Communist Party’s relations with African political organisations in the Mao era, 1949–76, Page 4 Back
63.Huwaidin Mohamed Bin (2002). China's relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 1949-1999. London. Page 96 Back
64.Huwaidin, Arabia and the Gulf. Page 100 Back
65. 21-05-1955 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D.S. Solod and the Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser Back
66. Burhan Shahidi (chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government) makes the first contacts. “February 1956, …(he) led the second delegation of hajji in which he followed the usual China-encouraged practice of combining pilgrimage with politics: While in the Middle East he met with King Sa’ud of Saui Arabia, King Husayn of Jordan, and Nasser of Egypt, as well as the premiers of Lebanob, Syria, and possibly North Yemen. As a direct result of his meeting with Nasser, Egypt became the first Middle Eastern Muslim country to diplomatically recognise the PRC.” Gladney Dru C. (1992). Constructing a contemporary Uighur national identity: Transnationalism, Islamicization, and state representation. Cahiers d’etudes sur la Mediterranee Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien 13, 165-184. Page 8 Back
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