



## **January 02, 1950**

# **Cable, Mao Zedong to the Central Committee of the CCP**

### **Citation:**

“Cable, Mao Zedong to the Central Committee of the CCP,” January 02, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China), vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), 211-212; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), 131-132.  
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110390>

### **Summary:**

Mao Zedong informs the Central Committee of "an important breakthrough" in his talks with Stalin, and asks that Zhou Enlai immediately come to Moscow to conclude a new Sino-Soviet treaty.

### **Original Language:**

Chinese

### **Contents:**

- English Translation
- Scan of Original Document

To the Central Committee [of the Chinese Communist Party]:

(1) Our work here has achieved an important breakthrough in the past two days. Comrade Stalin has finally agreed to invite Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and other agreements on credit, trade, and civil aviation. Yesterday, on 1 January, a decision was made to publish my interview with the Tass correspondent, and it is in the newspapers today (2 January), which you might have already received. At 8:00 p.m. today, Comrade Molotov and Comrade Mikoyan came to my quarters to have a talk, asking about my opinions on the Sino-Soviet treaty and other matters. I immediately gave them a detailed description of three options:

(a) To sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. By taking this action, we will gain enormous advantages. Sino-Soviet relations will be solidified on the basis of the new treaty; in China, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the left wing of the national bourgeoisie will be greatly inspired, while the right wing of the national bourgeoisie will be isolated; and internationally, we may acquire more political capital to deal with the imperialist countries and to examine all the treaties signed between China and each of the imperialist countries in the past.

(b) To publish through the news agencies of the two countries a brief communique stating that the authorities of the two countries have exchanged opinions on the old Sino-Soviet treaty and other issues, and have achieved a consensus, without mentioning any of the details. In fact, by doing so we mean to put off the solution of the problem to the future, until a few years later. Accordingly, China's foreign minister Zhou Enlai does not need to come here.

(c) To sign a statement, not a treaty, that will summarize the key points in the two countries' relations. If this is the option, Zhou Enlai will not have to come either. After I have analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of these three options, Comrade Molotov said promptly that option (a) was good and that Zhou should come. I then asked: "Do you mean that the old treaty will be replaced by a new one?" Comrade Molotov replied: "Yes." After that we calculated how long it would take for Zhou to come here and to sign the treaty. I said that my telegram would reach Beijing on 3 January, and that [Zhou] Enlai would need five days for preparations and could depart from Beijing on 9 January. It would take him eleven days by train [to travel to Moscow], so he could arrive in Moscow on 19 January. The negotiation and the signing of the treaty would need about ten days, from 20 January to the end of the month. Zhou and I would return home in early February. Meanwhile we also discussed the plans for my sightseeing outside [my quarters and Moscow], and we decided that I would visit Lenin's tomb, travel to Leningrad, Gorky, and other places, and make tours of such places as an ordnance factory, the subway (Molotov and Mikoyan recommended these two items) and a collective farm. We also discussed the problem of my meeting with various Soviet leaders (so far I have not left my quarters to pay an individual visit to any of them).

(2) Please finish all the preparations [for Zhou's departure] in five days after you receive this telegram. I hope that [Zhou] Enlai, together with the minister of trade<sup>2</sup> and other necessary aides, and with the necessary documents and materials, will depart from Beijing for Moscow by train (not by air) on 9 January. Comrade Dong Biwu will assume the post of acting premier of the Government Administration Council. The news should not be publicized until Zhou has arrived in Moscow.

(3) Are the above-stated arrangements feasible? Will five days be enough for you to finish the preparations? Does [Zhou] need one or two more days for preparation? Is it necessary for Comrade Li Fuchun or other comrades to come to offer assistance? Please consider them and report to me in a return telegram.

Mao Zedong

11:00 p.m., 2 January [1950]

# 关于周恩来去苏联参加谈判问题 给中央的电报

(一九五〇年一月二日、三日)

中央：

(一)最近两日这里的工作有一个重要发展。斯大林同志已同意周恩来同志来莫斯科，并签订新的中苏友好同盟条约及贷款、通商、民航等项协定。昨一月一日决定发表我和塔斯社记者谈话，已见今日(二日)各报，你们谅已收到。今日下午八时，莫洛托夫米高扬<sup>(1)</sup>二同志到我处谈话，问我对中苏条约等事的意见。我即详述三种办法：(甲)签订新的中苏友好同盟条约。这样做有极大利益。中苏关系在新的条约上固定下来，中国工人、农民、知识分子及民族资产阶级左翼都将感觉兴奋，可以孤立民族资产阶级右翼；在国际上我们可以有更大的政治资本去对付帝国主义国家，去审查过去中国和各帝国主义国家所订的条约。(乙)由两国通讯社发一简单公报，仅说到两国当局对于旧中苏友好同盟条约及其他问题交换了意见，取得了在重要问题上的

同一致意见，而不涉及详细内容，实际上把这个问题拖几年再说。这样做，中国外长周恩来当然不要来。（丙）签订一个声明，内容说到两国关系的要点，但不是条约。这样做，周恩来也可以不来。当我详细分析上述三项办法的利害之后，莫洛托夫同志即说，（甲）项办法好，周可以来。我仍问，是否以新条约代替旧条约？莫洛托夫同志说，是的。随即计算周来及签订条约的时间。我说，我的电报一月三日到北京，恩来准备五天，一月九日从北京动身，坐火车十一天，一月十九日到莫斯科，一月二十日至月底约十天时间谈判及签订各项条约，二月初我和周一道回国。同时又谈到我出外游览的问题，商定晋谒列宁墓，去列宁格勒、高尔基城等处看一看，并看一看兵工厂、地下电车（这二项是莫米二同志提的）、集体农场等处。又谈到和苏联各负责同志谈话的问题（到现在我还没有出门去单独看过他们任何一人）。（二）你们收到此电后，请于五天内准备完毕。希望恩来偕同贸易部长及其他必要助手和必要文件材料，于一月九日从北京动身，坐火车（不是坐飞机）来莫斯科，由董必武〔2〕同志代理政务院总理。对外不要发表，待周到莫后才发表。（三）以上是否可行，五天准备时间是否足够，是否还需多一、二天准备时间，有无叫李富春〔3〕或其他同志同来协助之必要，均请考虑电复。

毛泽东

一月二日下午十一时