Part 8: Complaints about recruitment

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To address the acute shortage of administrative personnel during the early years of the People’s Republic of China, six distinct groups were mobilized to augment the cadre ranks. These included: (1) incumbent officials, commonly referred to as "old cadres"; (2) younger recruits drawn from high school and university graduates; (3) politically active individuals emerging from mass movements such as land reform, predominantly of worker and peasant origin; (4) unaffiliated intellectuals previously dispersed across various sectors of society; (5) demobilized members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); and (6) selected personnel from the defunct Nationalist (GMD) administration, who were subjected to systematic re-education campaigns.
In Beijing, three institutions were tasked with the ideological transformation of former Nationalist officials. Soviet advisors, assisting in these efforts, frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the perceived leniency of the re-education programs and doubted the sincerity of the ideological conversion exhibited by ex-GMD personnel. Concurrently, the CCP sought to expand its administrative base through the establishment of specialized training centers for student recruits. By the spring and summer of 1949, approximately 50,000 individuals had undergone instruction in preparation for civil service appointments in southern China.
Despite the influx of newly trained personnel, many of these novice cadres lacked both a comprehensive political education and the experiential grounding derived from the revolutionary struggle. Urban administrators anticipated that these recruits, together with "southbound cadres" dispatched from northern regions, would form the core of local governmental structures. The retained GMD staff were expected to comprise less than one-third of administrative personnel. In practice, however, CCP cadres constituted majorities only in the Bureaus of Public Security (80 percent) and Finance (60.2 percent). In other departments—such as Health, Education, Labor, Public Works, Industry and Commerce, and Internal Affairs—the party's representation ranged from merely 19 to 36 percent.
Notable disparities emerged between the composition of party cadres in northern and southern China. Northern cadres tended to be illiterate and of rural origin, reflecting the CCP’s agrarian revolutionary base. In contrast, cadres from southern provinces such as Guangdong often hailed from urban environments and had received formal education. Yet, following the Communist consolidation of power in Guangdong after 1949, a marked shift occurred in the educational profile of local party membership. The grassroots ranks became increasingly populated by illiterate activists, while earlier party members—particularly intellectuals and student activists who had joined during the Japanese occupation—were systematically purged in the early 1950s. Many were replaced by northern cadres perceived to demonstrate firmer allegiance to the central leadership.
At the level of local governance, the CCP encountered substantial difficulties in identifying personnel who combined political reliability with administrative competence. This period witnessed a profound shift in social mobility patterns: individuals from peasant or laboring backgrounds began to ascend into political or economic roles previously inaccessible under the Nationalist regime or imperial administration. However, many such individuals lacked the necessary qualifications for their posts, with their class background often serving as their principal credential.
As the civil war concluded and land reform campaigns tapered off, a significant number of CCP cadres entered a phase of political uncertainty. These officials grappled with new and unfamiliar challenges among the rural population, increasingly resisted party directives, and grew disillusioned with the limited material or personal rewards of continued service. The revolutionary fervor that had once driven participation in the movement diminished. Prospects of reassignment to southern provinces or compulsory military service triggered anxiety and, in some cases, prompted resignations from party membership or episodes of psychological distress. These multifaceted pressures contributed to a broader sense of disillusionment among segments of the cadre corps in the early 1950s.
The method to keep non-communist and ex-GMD party cadres on their jobs was, in the eyes of many CCP members, a big mistake and not justified. Many peasants viewed becoming a state cadre in mutual aid teams or cooperatives (see Article 29 ) as an escape from the hardships of farming. Securing a government job meant joining the state payroll system and leaving behind the difficult life of a peasant. Each month, they would receive a stable salary sufficient to support their families. Faced with such a rare and appealing opportunity, rural Party members, village model laborers, and activists were eager to seize it. To land these positions, some farmers were even willing to inflate production figures to attract the attention of CCP county cadres or higher-level officials.
In 1951, reports from Guangdong highlighted growing resentment among illiterate village cadres, who felt increasingly frustrated that intellectuals from the old society were quickly gaining power solely due to their superior educational backgrounds. They did not necessarily blame the intellectuals themselves but held the Communist Party accountable for neglecting its moral obligation and historical responsibility to the peasants. Recruitment issues also emerged in other areas. For instance, there was a shortage of performers for propaganda teams. Performers were often recruited randomly from the streets, including two teenage girls and an elderly woman who juggled plates in public. Another cadre brought in a former singing girl from a brothel. All of these individuals were classified as formal cadres and received benefits from the supply system. However, this approach to forming a propaganda team proved costly, and the performance of rural ballads was not well-received in the ‘foreign’ port city of Qingdao.
Mao Zedong needed to clarify these tactics to his veteran party members. "Don’t assume you deserve special treatment because of your wartime accomplishments. Remember, one democratic figure can be as valuable as an entire army. By gaining the support of someone like Li Jishen, we potentially saved the lives of twenty to thirty thousand comrades and secured military victory one or two years earlier than anticipated. This is how we will proceed, and it is the only feasible approach, whether you agree with it or not."
Li Jishen ,Fu Zuoyi , Chen Mingren , Wei Lihuang, Cheng Qian ,Tang Shengzhi were some of the former GMD generals who got high positions in the new regime. There were complaints about "…ex-Kuomintang officials, who were trying to be more Communist than the Communist, were very much worse than any of the regular Communist." Not all GMD cadres were lucky. Many of them were imprisoned and sent to Fushun re-education camp in Liaoning or executed in 1950 or 1951. For example, the generals Gan Qingchi, Gong Xianxiang and Gan Fang. Others were put under house arrest and several of them committed suicide, for example Chen Guang. Middle to low-ranking GMD officers, special agents, and foot soldiers were the one suffered the most. CCP considered them untrustworthy. Most of them were executed in the "Zhen Fan" period from 1950 - 1951. In the period of 1950-1954, about 400 GMD generals deceased several of them in a natural way, some of them during battle and a couple of them as communist spies. The rest of them died in the hands of the PLA. See the table below which indicates death rate of GMD generals during the period of 1950-1954.

For example: On December 12, 1950, in Yuanling, a public trial was organized for tens of thousands of people and a meeting was held to execute Wang Yuanhua, Pan Zhuangfei, and Zhou Zhenhuan. They were all 3 GMD regiment commander and had received "life safety guarantee"

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In a letter to his nephew, Chen Yun emphasized, "You must remember that communists have the same rights as ordinary citizens under the laws of the state, and they should set an example by strictly adhering to these laws. The activities of revolutionary party members should solely aim to serve the people, with no expectation of reward." On November 8, 1949, Chen addressed party cadres regarding the tensions between old and new members: "The core issue lies in the relationship between veteran and new cadres. The 'new' cadres fear that the 'old' cadres do not trust them, while the 'old' cadres worry that the newcomers may not be dependable." He further advised, "Veteran comrades should not judge East China based on the experiences of Northeast China from a few years ago, and comrades from East China should avoid clinging to outdated perspectives about the Northeast."
Despite Chen Yun's words, cadres enjoyed numerous advantages, both symbolic and material, distributed according to their rank (twenty-six levels, or even thirty if the lowest state servants are included). For example, the front rows in theaters were always reserved for Communists, access to Beijing Hospital was limited to families in ranks one to seven, elite schools were reserved for the children of high-ranking cadres, and only the children of Party members and Communist Youth League members were permitted to study abroad, among other privileges.
A common complaint echoed in reports was dissatisfaction arising from food shortages, which sharply contrasted with the situation experienced by central leaders. In Beijing, akin to other communist capitals, exclusive stores were designated to serve the leadership. These stores exclusively stocked premium-grade meat, enabling high-ranking cadres and their families to procure unlimited quantities of pork. In fact, two such specialized stores in Beijing alone contributed to 16 percent of the capital's pork consumption. One district in Anshan, called "Taiding," was an exception to the general lack of funding for non-production-related construction. See Article 45. Originally built by the Japanese during the colonial period for high-ranking managers, it became the residential area for top CCP officials and Soviet experts after the founding of the PRC. The district was expanded in the 1950s with new Soviet-style houses and amenities, creating a privileged enclave for the city’s elite. Taiding was heavily guarded, and its residents enjoyed exclusive facilities, reinforcing a continuity between colonial and socialist eras.
Even in the laogai camps, (see Article 2) for anyone with a skill or the required professional know-how got ‘easier tasks’. In 1954, in western Qinghai province, the people holding such jobs were Communists who had “made mistakes” and were treated as first-class prisoners.
The ruling regime of the time provided a remarkable array of privileges to a select group of individuals outside the CCP. This exclusive category consisted of leaders from minor political parties, esteemed intellectuals, and prominent figures who had collaborated with the CCP in toppling the GMD government. These individuals enjoyed various advantages, including direct access to state leaders and influential assemblies, access to confidential policy information and participation in debates, prestigious appointments, government-funded travel and accommodation, and other perks. The extensive deference, honours, and authority bestowed upon these elites, coupled with the knowledge, connections, and resources they gained through their involvement in the united front, often fostered a personal, intellectual, and even emotional affinity towards the regime. However, it is important to note that not all aspects of the united front were viewed favourably by these elites, as they also experienced burdensome or punitive measures such as political re-education and wealth deprivation.

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According to historical analysis, the social background of individuals seeking employment within the party played a significant role in the selection process. Urban members were given preferential treatment compared to those with predominantly rural experiences. The primary source of potential political cadres stemmed from worker and peasant activists who were deemed politically reliable due to their recruitment from the most impoverished sectors, which had benefited greatly from the Communist revolution. However, their lack of formal education posed a challenge. Nevertheless, the regime justified their advancement into cadre positions by highlighting their extensive practical experience and steadfast class perspective, which enabled them to quickly grasp administrative practices once in office. This particular group predominantly filled entry-level positions, often serving in their hometowns or Regions. Their career trajectory typically involved first engaging as activists in mass movements, followed by party membership, and ultimately assuming leadership roles within newly established party-state institutions. In 1949, 13% of the administrators are members of the CCP. The decision made during the CCP Plenary Session in March 1949, which shifted the focus of the revolution from rural areas to urban centers, led to numerous challenges. Rather than embracing its rural revolutionary roots, the party criticized rural characteristics and work methods, favoring individuals with urban expertise over those it deemed purely village-born cadres. This preference persisted throughout the 1950s, as party doctrine continued to assert that cities would lead villages.
After the revolution's triumph in 1949, the millions of peasants who had enlisted in the revolutionary army emerged as the primary pool of cadres for the state bureaucracy. Having inhabited and thrived in urban administrative hubs, they had forged personal connections while upholding social bonds with their rural kin. These connections served as a conduit for rural residents to seek access to opportunities and resources beyond their local spheres. The substantial influx of rural laborers into the urban workforce during the 1950s further solidified the social networks linking urban and rural domains.
The shift from rural to urban leadership resulted in a gradual change of CCP’s focus on the working class and less on the peasantry. The CCP considers itself as the political party of the Chinese working class; the advanced and organized force of the working class. The CCP's management of major State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) required specialized "SOE cadres" with expertise in industrial enterprise management. These cadres differed significantly from "local cadres," who were generalists handling diverse local matters. Prior to 1949, nearly all CCP cadres were generalists. Afterward, a division emerged, creating specialist SOE cadres and generalist local cadres. The dynamic between these two types of cadres was crucial to understanding SOE operations in the early PRC. These two types of bureaucrats embodied contrasting control methods, often termed "reds and experts." The Soviet-inspired vertical command structure was a technocratic, top-down system managed by experts like factory managers. These managers exercised tight control over factory operations through a highly specialized division of labor, assigning positions based on skill. Conversely, the traditional CCP horizontal leadership emphasized bottom-up political mobilization by "local cadres," such as factory CCP committee secretaries. These secretaries mobilized workers through ideology and campaigns to achieve broader goals. While ideally complementary, these two systems frequently conflicted. However even in 1951 the majority of the party members were peasants. North China, which has served as a major communist base during the civil war and where the party therefore has long been entrenched in the countryside, about 1,500,000 of its 1,800,000 members in that Region (as of mid-1951) awee of peasant origin. Peng Zhen said in 1951: "a political party of the working class may overlook the social composition of its membership; that it may neglect to fully utilize all possible conditions to improve its social composition, that is, to increase the proportion of workers among its membership." "It is clear that party leaders will continue to be uncomfortable as long as this disparity between theory end reality continues."

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On Hainan, tensions emerged between communist guerrilla leaders and newly arrived communist cadres. By 1951, a wave of "southbound cadres" came to Hainan to replace local leaders, who were perceived to be too lenient toward the island’s landlords and wealthy capitalists due to their local connections. This led to growing resentment between the veteran revolutionaries of the Hainan Column and the incoming southbound cadres. Many of these new cadres were young urban intellectuals or students dispatched to towns and villages to disrupt the existing local order.
The conflicts that occurred in Hainan possessed a historical backdrop. The Hainan Communists were deeply committed to the cause of national revolution, and their struggle had ingrained them within the very fabric of the island. Throughout much of their arduous journey, the mainland Communists were unable to provide significant support, prompting the Hainan Column to forge an alliance with the indigenous Li population of the island. This alliance proved vital in enabling their survival within the rugged southern interior of Hainan. However, when the mainland Communist leadership issued orders in 1946 for the Hainan Column to abandon the island and relocate their forces to Shandong in the north or Vietnam in the southeast, the Hainan command staunchly rejected these directives, deeming them impossible to execute. With deep respect, they respectfully refused to comply with the orders, citing the unique circumstances and challenges they faced on the island. See also Article 2
In Tianjin, interactions among rural cadres, underground party members, and retained bureaucrats revealed that many rural officials, despite their numerical superiority, initially felt embarrassed and were ultimately sidelined as urban initiatives advanced.
The distribution of seized goods—houses, cars, and other items—caused significant unease due to its unequal nature. City leaders moved into villas by the lakeshore, district leaders received large houses downtown, and privileges like cars, special meals, and personal servants were reserved exclusively for top officials. Meanwhile, most southbound cadres lived in conditions worse than those of the old employees who had been retained. Additionally, formal occasions often required superiors and subordinates to maintain a polite distance. Despite the liberation, the old urban elite continued to lead their lavish lifestyles, which appeared unjustifiably extravagant to the peasant cadres.