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In urban areas, the PLA immediately took over town administration. Provincial or city Military Control Committees had significant authority to implement a range of administrative and criminal punishments. For example, the operational mechanism in Beijing, the capital of the PRC, was outlined in the Organic Law of the Military Control Committee of the PLA in Beijing. This law empowered the Military Control Committee to exercise various exceptional emergency measures, including arresting and executing counter-revolutionaries, taking over public or private facilities, collecting weapons and military equipment from GMD party members and other counter-revolutionaries, protecting the lives and private properties of Chinese citizens and foreigners, seizing or controlling resources to facilitate the establishment of economic order in cities and counties, and organizing the masses to help establish CCP political institutions. In important cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, a military control commission was formed well in advance before the actual takeover, to ease the transition of power. In Shanghai and Nanjing, the commanders of the Third and Fourth Army were head of the military control commission as well as mayor of the town. The military control commission was responsible for the local purge of the GMD administration and the takeover of important economic enterprises. In some big cities and especially in Shanghai, Communist underground cadres had infiltrated various administrative authorities beforehand. For instance, the Shanghai police had been infiltrated by Communist Party cadres. Although they constituted a small fraction among the over fourteen thousand members of the police force, these agents played a crucial role in preparing to transfer control of the city's police stations to the PLA's special personnel.

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The most important assignments of this military administration were to maintain order; to restore the daily routine and to make a transition as fast as possible to a civil administration.
The PLA soldiers were expressly instructed to refrain from looting factories, shops, warehouses and other possessions but they have to

"Confiscate bureaucrat-capital. All factories, shops, banks and warehouses, all vessels, wharves and railways, all postal, telegraph, electric light, telephone and water supply services, and all farms, livestock farms and other enterprises operated by the reactionary Kuomintang government and the big bureaucrats shall be taken over by the People's Government."

Moreover, they were required to cooperate with the local civil administration and police. Arrests by military personnel were restricted to direct offenses against the occupying authority; otherwise, arrests fell under the jurisdiction of the local police. Troops were instructed not to disregard the orders of the municipal police without a valid reason.
The PLA had set up garrisons in major cities and strategic locations. These garrison commands not only provided security for the cities but also acted as the main representatives of the PLA within urban areas. Local party committees and governments depended on these commands to coordinate and communicate with PLA units stationed locally. Additionally, garrison commands were responsible for maintaining public order, ensuring regional security, safeguarding key infrastructure, responding to emergencies like riots and uprisings, and carrying out disaster relief and rescue operations.

This arrangement redefined the PLA from a mere field army to a comprehensive defense force, with Military Regions established to align with the nation's strategic requirements. The establishment of four levels corresponded with the party authorities at varying hierarchical levels. From October 1950 to December 1954 there were numerous efforts to regularize the structure of military Regions and several were abolished and others created. (See Fig. 14.1 enlarge)
The period of the military administration was limited in accordance with article 14 of the Common Program. The governments of the major administrative regions served as the superior organs overseeing all provinces and cities within their respective regions, concurrently acting as commissariats of the central government. Secondly, the administrative authority at the provincial level was curtailed by designating provinces as secondary administrative regions. By 1953, there were a total of 53 provincial-level administrative regions. The structure of these major administrative regions mirrored that of the central government. Under a Regional Committee of the People's Government, there were three subsidiary guidance sub-committees and a commission at the same level, including the Committee of Politics and Law, the Committee of Finance and Economy, and the Committee of Culture and Education, as well as the People's Supervisory Commission. Additionally, there were subdivisions of the People's Supreme Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorates. Military control in small cities would last for a period of two weeks to a period of two to three months. In larger cities with more than 100,000 population, the Government decided on the continuance or termination of the military control.

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Article 31 of the organic law of the CPG states

"…In administrative Regions where military action has been concluded, agrarian reform thoroughly carried out, and people of all circles fully organized, popular elections shall be held, and Regional people's congresses called for the formal election of Regional people's government councils. After the establishing of Regional people's government councils, the Military Administrative Committees shall be wound up"

Between 1949 and 1954, the number of provincial units were reduced from 51 to 30 (excluding Taiwan). In August 1952, Wannan and Wanbei were merged into Anhui Province; Chuandong, Chuannan Chuanxi, and Chuanbei were merged into Sichuan Province. In November 1952, two border provinces, Chahar and Pingyuan, were dissolved; Subei and Sunan were merged into Jiangsu Province. In June 1954, Liaodong and Liaoxi were merged to become Liaoning Province; Songjiang was merged into Heilongjiang Province.

Within each Chinese province, administration was organized into four tiers, ranging from municipalities directly governed by the central or provincial authorities to districts, counties, and townships. Below the county level, cadres were generally not paid by the state but instead received salaries from local government funds. For officials operating “within the system” above this level, the allocation of resources was determined by a hierarchy of sub-ranks, which also reflected spatial inequalities. To account for regional differences in living costs, the country was divided into eleven urban wage zones, with Shanghai occupying the highest tier. In June 1954, the number of centrally administered cities was reduced to three (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai). In 1952, the first changes occurred in provincial government leadership in China, parallel with the changes in those of provincial party leadership. A second peak came in 1955.

Once a town's situation stabilized to some extent, the civil authorities' duties expanded. In practice, military representatives were dispatched to nearly every enterprise and government agency, assuming leadership positions within those entities. Subsequently, as the political climate stabilized, many military representatives were officially appointed as Party secretaries or directors within their respective units. Until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, former military representatives continued to serve as the predominant cadre in numerous units.
Liu Shaoqi stated military control and people’s democracy are not contradicting

“These two phases of work have always complemented and strengthened each other. This has been made possible by the fact that our military control is the military control of the people, and that the PLA is the armed force of the people. To our enemies and the reactionaries, military control as exercised by the PLA is merciless and open military dictatorship, but to the people it presages the people's democracy. Far from restraining the people or causing them inconvenience, this sort of military control only protects the people, helps to free the people from the oppression and bondage of old influences, gives the people all kinds of facilities and encourages them to be their own masters by taking their own destiny in their hands and taking care of their own affairs together with the affairs of the nation.”

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On December 2, 1949, the central government decided to form 6 Regional military and administrative Regions. On December 16, 1949 the organic law for Organizing the Regional People Government Committees were issued. See also Article 16 Introduction . This was an administrative level between the central government in Beijing and the provinces, mainly created to customize the administration slightly to Regional differences and as a transitional measure to move from military rule to civilian rule.
Several factors contributed to the establishment of these bureaus. Distrust of provincial authorities, disparities among different regions, a shortage of administrative personnel, and considerations related to military deployment influenced the decision. Additionally, the unexpectedly rapid takeover and a divide-and-rule strategy played a role in partitioning the country for administrative convenience.
A key strategy for a regime leader is to co-opt local-echelon leaders by offering them central government roles while allowing them to keep their local seats. This can foster central-local cooperation and provide a means to monitor these incorporated elites. In the early communist period, military leaders significantly shaped the CCP's regional and provincial structures, acting as local leaders. However, co-opted elites also strengthen their position as brokers between the central and local levels, utilizing their existing networks and building their own support bases. This can potentially undermine the regime leader's authority, particularly when political elites experience internal divisions. Another tactic for an authoritarian leader aiming to centralize power is to reshuffle elites through bureaucratic reorganization and changes in working relationships. However, implementing such reshuffles requires the central leader to secure the support of at least some of the co-opted elites.
In the Organic Law of these new Regional administrations, the division of labour is clarified. The relationship between higher and lower levels of government is outlined as follows: Regional committees must report important work within their jurisdiction to the Government Administration Council and seek approval for work with national implications.
The North China Region, established in 1948, acted de facto as the central government until October 1949. Many of its staff members contributed to the organization of the Central People’s Government. The North China People’s Government had a coalition character, following the united front policy (See Part 1 ) of the CCP. All Regional bureaus were staffed with CCP members and minzhu dangpai. One can argue that the formation of Regional bureaus was a deliberate political design to ensure no Region had sufficient economic potential to challenge the central government. The Regions had no integrated economy, no equal physiographic features and cultures. However, one can also argue that the development and the integration of the Northeast economy was taken as an example for the national economic development. The formation of the Regions mainly came about through the course of the civil war. It is observable that the CCP leadership aimed to incorporate as much of the "old liberated regions" as geographically feasible within the territories of the four Military Administrative Committees (NE, NW, EC, and CC), to provide the vast "newly liberated regions" with reference points.
The CCP constitution of 1945 already took into account the formation of Regional bureaus. Article 27: To facilitate the guidance of the work of the local Party, the Central Committee may, as circumstances require, establish Central Bureaus and Central Branches in several provinces or border areas. Central Bureaus and Central Branches are representative organs of the Central Committee, appointed by the Central Committee and accountable to the Central Committee. Such Central Representative Organs may be abolished or merged when circumstances do not require them.

All heads of these 6 Regional bureaus had a military background and were also members of the Central People’s Government Council. There is a concentration of power of about 20 men. (See fig. 14.5 see also List of senior officials ) See also Leaders Regional Bureaus . They enjoy authority on central, Regional, civil, and military administration matters. The six regions held no real autonomy and served only as intermediaries between the central government and the provinces. However, due to the military-driven nature of their initial formation, each region was generally designated as the territory of one of the PLA's five Field Armies. In the Chinese Civil War, the PLA strategically deployed its Field Armies to conquer different parts of mainland China. After the 2nd and 3rd Field Armies seized Nanjing, the 2nd moved into the southwestern provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou, while the 3rd expanded southward along the coast from Jiangsu to Fujian. Simultaneously, the 4th Field Army, the PLA's largest, was redeployed from Manchuria to campaigns in Central China, and the 1st Field Army operated in the northwestern provinces. This military takeover by the Field Armies was paralleled by the expansion of regional Party Bureaus across China, with military leaders appointed as their Party secretaries. Consequently, many of the leaders at this level were revolutionary generals accustomed to independent command. During the period of economic recovery, the Regional Bureaus had numerous responsibilities, but military, diplomatic, and public security matters were managed by the CPG. The Regional Bureaus played a key role in the land reform campaign, focusing on interpretation, adaptation, planning, and implementation. However, despite repeated calls in 1949 for a flexible administrative approach that encouraged local creativity, initiative, and decentralization, the economic and fiscal crisis of early 1950 was met with a significant degree of centralization.

On March 29, 1951, the CPG reconsidered this decision and

"… properly transfer certain power and responsibility to local governments under unified leadership, thereby to realize local expediency, would, rather than causing any harm, further consolidate the central leadership through the manifestation of local initiative. … Obviously, this decision is fully in line with the principle of "not only conducive to national reunification, but also conducive to local conditions" as stipulated in Article 16 of the Common Program and the principle of "dividing the fiscal scope between the central and local governments" stipulated in Article 40. The spirit of "adjusting measures to local conditions" is an important feature of this decision."

All 6 regional bureaus are researched; in total 758 persons are identified. 576 are members of the CCP. 262 members have been (once) active either as military personnel or as political commissar in the PLA. 126 are members of Minzhu Dangpai. 311 have studied at universities or military academies (Whampao 17, Baoding 15); 116 have studied in mainland China, 60 have studied in Japan; 42 in the SU; 12 in the UK; 19 in the US, 12 in France, and 12 in Germany. The average age of the members is 45 years, the youngest is 21 Zhu Rongji 朱镕基, the oldest Sa Zhenbing 薩鎮冰 is 90 years old. Only 19 members are female. See Regional bureau members .

60 members of the North Regional Bureau are investigated: 15 members have a PLA background. One member is independent. 24 members have studied on universities of whom 13 abroad. 45% of the members have their origin in the North Region and 86% are CCP members.

128 individuals of the North East Regional Bureau are reviewed: 35 have a PLA background, 8 are members of the Minzhu Dangpai. 23 persons have studied abroad. 45% of the members have their origin in the North East Region and 90% are CCP members.

106 persons of the North West Regional Bureau are researched: 31 have a PLA background, there are 18 members of the Minzhu Dangpai. 15 persons have studied abroad. 57% of the members have their origin in the North West Region, 43% are from Shaanxi and 52% are CCP members.

151 members of the East Regional Bureau are explored: 43 have a PLA background. 37 are members of the Minzhu Dangpai. 44 have a PLA background. 32 persons have studied abroad. 58% of the members have their origin in the East Region and 72% are CCP members.

175 members of the Central South Regional bureau are researched: 75 have a PLA background. 22 members have studied at Whampao or Baoding military academy. 32 are members of the Minzhu Dangpai. 33 persons have studied abroad, of whom 17 in Japan. 48% of the members have their origin in the Central South Region and 54% are CCP members.

140 members of the South West regional Bureau are researched: 48 persons have a PLA background, 27 are member of Minzhu Dangpai. 22 have studied abroad. 44% of the members have their origin in the South West Region and 69% are CCP members. Only 13% are born in the North China Region and 4% in the North West Region.
Looking at all six Regions, one can conclude that almost 50% of the members were from the Region where they were stationed. There was an overwhelming number of CCP members in all Regions, ranging from 45% in North China to 90% in the North East. Those CCP members occupied the main positions in the region's administration.

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On November 15, 1952, the 6 bureaus lost their military function and only their administrative power remained. So, from being both local power organs and central agents, they were now merely central agents. However, the new central cadres could exert influence over their old co-working relations in their locality.
This reduction of power is part of the 5 year-plan.

"To meet the new situation and tasks of planned large-scale national economic and cultural construction, shortly to be started in 1953, the CPG should further unify and centralize its leadership over the different phases of work, and the organs of the CPG should be further strengthened. At the same time, the organizations of provincial and municipal people's governments should also be • strengthened in order to increase the responsibility of leadership at the provincial and municipal levels. Consequently, the structure and tasks of people's governments (or MAC's) in administrative Regions should also be changed accordingly."

Furthermore, in 1953, most of the important political and/or military leaders were transferred to Beijing. (1) The actual heads of the major administrative regions were transferred to Beijing. On the one hand, this was to prepare for the abolition of the major administrative regions, and on the other hand, it was to rearrange the power structure of the top level. The specific arrangements for the actual leaders of the major administrative regions were as follows: Deng Xiaoping, the first to arrive in Beijing in July 1952, immediately served as Vice Premier of the GAC and Vice Chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission, and later concurrently served as Minister of Finance.
Xi Zhongxun, who arrived in Beijing later, was appointed Minister of the Central Propaganda Department and Vice Chairman of the GAC’s Culture and Education Commission in September. Deng Zihui was appointed Minister of the Central Rural Work Department and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission in January 1953. Subsequently, Rao Shushi was appointed Minister of the Central Organization Department, and Gao Gang was transferred to become Director of the Planning Commission. Bo Yibo, the first secretary of the North China Bureau, was appointed Deputy Director of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Political Affairs Council and Minister of Finance in October 1949. The North China Bureau was stationed in Beijing, so there was no question of "going to Beijing."
(2) Strengthening the direct leadership of the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee over state power and government affairs. In the first half of 1953, Mao Zedong made major adjustments to the leadership structure and personnel arrangements of the Party and state organs by launching a campaign against "decentralization" and criticizing the "erroneous tendency of right-leaning opportunism" that deviated from the general line. The Party Organization Cadre Committee of the Central People's Government, of which Zhou Enlai was the secretary, was abolished, and the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee began to directly lead the various party groups and branch party organization cadres.
The Central People's Government no longer exercised its leadership over its subordinate economic departments through the Central Finance Commission within the GAC, but rather through five newly established government departments, known at the time as the "Five Ports Trade" policy.
On March 10, 1953, the redistribution of power went even further and the Politburo decided:

“From now on, all major and important directives, policies, plans, and events in the government work must be reported to the Center for instruction beforehand; only with the Center’s discussion or decision or approval can they be implemented.”

In fact, this is a repetition of the decision of February 2, 1941 which stipulated that all circular telegrams, declarations and inner-Party directives bearing on the country as a whole must have the prior approval of The role of the CCP increases and Mao Zedong is much more playing the leading role.

“From now on, all documents and telegrams sent out in the name of the Central Committee can be dispatched only after I have gone over them, otherwise they are invalid. Please take note."

On June 19, 1954 the CPG decided to abolish the Regional bureaus.

"They have been responsible for implementing central policies, implementing people’s democratic governance, conducting various social reform campaigns, restoring the national economy, and Economic construction, cultural construction, and other aspects of work all play a very important role, and they have successfully completed their tasks."

The decision continued

"Now, the country has entered a period of planned economic construction. The construction of the state-planned economy requires further strengthening of the centralized and unified leadership of the central government. In order for the central government to directly lead the provinces and cities to better understand the following situations, reduce organizational levels, increase work efficiency, and overcome bureaucracy; in order to save cadres, strengthen the needs of the central government and supply factories and mining enterprises, and appropriately strengthen the leadership of the provinces and cities. It is absolutely necessary and timely to abolish administrative agencies at the Regional level."

In his "On the ten major relationships" Mao Zedong commented on the abolishment:

"Take our own experience; the system of the greater administrative area instituted in the early days of our People’s Republic was a necessity at that time, and yet it had shortcomings which were later exploited to a certain extent by the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih It was subsequently decided to abolish the greater administrative areas and put the various provinces directly under the central authorities; that was a correct decision. But neither was the outcome so satisfactory when matters went to the length of depriving the localities of their necessary independence."

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