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The exodus of Chinese migrants started in the 19th century. Before that time, emigration was more or less prohibited. This change in policy arose from ‘push’ factors like famine, population pressure, and political instability and from ‘pull’ factors like gold rushes in the US and Australia and employment in Southeast Asia on plantations. From 1870, after the Second Opium War, there was an increase of unskilled labourers (coolies) to the US and the colonies of the UK. In 1893, the emperor decided to lift the prohibition on emigration and emigrants were no longer considered as traitors.
Qing officials tried to get in touch with overseas Chinese to strengthen the ties with China. The GMD government continued this policy and stimulated the establishment of Chinese schools and associations abroad. Especially during the Japanese occupation, the government explicitly made an appeal to the overseas Chinese for financial support.
According to Nationalist government estimates, more than 160,000 Overseas Chinese 'returned' to China between 1945 and 1949. This migration was largely driven by escalating post-war violence and mounting insecurity across Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaya and Indonesia.

In 1949, both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China claimed to be the protector of Overseas Chinese. The PRC inherited the policies established by the previous GMD government regarding the Overseas Chinese.
In the context of Southeast Asia, the issue had three dimensions. Firstly, since the Overseas Chinese fell under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, it became involved in Southeast Asian affairs. Secondly, the nationality law enacted by the GMD Government generated resentment and distrust among Southeast Asian nationalists. Thirdly, the lack of assimilation of the Overseas Chinese made them a target of suspicion. Additionally, the substantial support provided by the CCP to communist movements in Southeast Asian nations, coupled with the fact that leaders and members of the Malaysian communist party were predominantly of Chinese ethnicity, further exacerbated the divide between Beijing and Southeast Asian capitals. It is worth noting that during this period, China often denounced the newly independent governments in the region as "running dogs of imperialism."
Most Overseas Chinese were (descendants) from South China, mainly from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. They were a heterogeneous group with 3 different language groups and different ethnic backgrounds. The lineage was more important than the length of stay abroad, country of birth, or blending with other nationalities. This viewpoint caused many problems in several countries. (see below) Many Overseas Chinese had a double nationality. For example, of the 350,000 living in Burma, over 74% had two nationalities. Besides this number, there were also 140,000 persons with mixed Chinese Burmese roots. 80,000 persons were born in Burma but had Chinese ancestors.
In 1950, the PRC claimed 11 million Overseas Chinese, in 1953, Taiwan claimed 13 million. The difference according to Taiwan were 2 million refugees since 1949. This exodus, partly via Hong Kong (1950-1957), partly via Vietnam (1950-1953, and partly via Laos and Burma (1953), came more or less to a halt in 1951 by China's strict emigration policy. More than 400,000 mainlanders arrived in Taiwan. See table 16. After 1950, the influx of refugees to Hong Kong slowed significantly, dropping from a peak of 100,000 per month to 40,000 per year. In total, over a million refugees fled to the city. Among these refugees were the Shanghainese, many of whom arrived in or shortly after 1949. Unlike most other migrants, these individuals were often highly educated members of Shanghai's former business elite. As a result, their impact on the Hong Kong economy became disproportionately large relative to their numbers. In total, more than 1 million refugees fled to Hong Kong.
The new regime defined "Overseas Chinese" as huaqiao—a term encompassing anyone living temporarily in a foreign country or in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, regardless of whether they held a foreign passport. However, official directives for Guangzhou-based media, such as the South China Daily, mandated the use of the term tongbao (compatriots) instead of huaqiao when referring to residents of Hong Kong and Macao. This linguistic distinction was strategic, intended to "draw" these populations toward Beijing rather than "pushing" them toward the colonial influences of London or Lisbon.
The new government in Beijing took temporary measures in 1951 to better regulate the immigration of Overseas Chinese. These new regulations were specifically made to ease the immigration of Overseas Chinese from countries the PRC had no diplomatic relation with. They could enter the mainland via Hong Kong or Macao and they may leave the country after permission from the authorities.
Both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China tried to win the Overseas Chinese through extensive propaganda and practical interventions. These interventions often caused conflicts with local regimes. See Burma and Overseas Chinese.
On January 6, 1952, the CCP issued instructions on work Concerning Overseas Chinese. The document established a post-1949 overseas Chinese policy framework that combined (1) political loyalty to New China, (2) protection and service to overseas Chinese, (3) encouragement of capital and return flows to China, and (4) strict separation between overseas Chinese work and local revolutionary activities, while avoiding clandestine CCP organization abroad and embedding policy within PRC diplomacy.
In late 1953, the government officially began offering preferential treatment and privileges to overseas Chinese, aiming to encourage their investment and involvement in the broader project of transforming China into a socialist state. For athletes with essential skills needed by the new government, preferential treatment started even earlier. PRC sports leaders hoped these athletes would help achieve two key goals: developing China's elite sports programs and enhancing the international image of China and Chinese sports, particularly within the socialist bloc but also on a global scale.
The loyalty of overseas Chinese was often under discussion. The emerging nation-states in Southeast Asia faced a division between those aligned with Western powers and those inclined towards China and the Soviet bloc. Within this context, Chinese migrants in the region were particularly vulnerable. If they maintained their status as migrants, they were compelled to pick between mainland China and the Republic of China. Opting to settle and attain citizenship in the newly independent states required them to demonstrate a shift in allegiance to the national governments. Yet, even after doing so, they continued to be viewed with political suspicion. After independence, the newly formed governments followed a policy of political and economic nationalism. They tried to minimalize the role of the old colonizers, the Indian and the Chinese traders and bankers.
China and Southeast Asian countries had to address four issues concerning the overseas Chinese after the Second World War, namely, the dominant role of overseas Chinese in the non-agricultural sector of Southeast Asia’s economy; the education of overseas Chinese; the legal identity and dual nationalities of the overseas Chinese; and the political integration of overseas Chinese into the newly independent Southeast Asian countries.
3 groups of overseas Chinese in Malaya can be distinguished, this distinction can be applied to almost all overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese communities in Malaya can be categorized into three distinct groups based on their engagement with local politics (this distinction can be applied to almost all overseas Chinese):
Group A: These individuals largely disregard political developments among Malays and other ethnic groups, perceiving them as irrelevant to their own political lives.
Group B: This group pays attention to the politics of Malays and other communities only when such matters directly affect their interests.
Group C: Members of this group are acutely aware of Malay political power. However, only a minority among them make concerted efforts to understand the dynamics of contemporary nationalism across various Malay social classes. These attitudes indicate a general lack of political alertness within the Chinese community, stemming from inherent limitations in their value system. This has led to miscalculations and errors in political judgment, rather than mere negligence regarding power structures.
The economic role of the Overseas Chinese can be seen in Article 37

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There are two institutes involved in the relationship with the Overseas Chinese. One is United Front Department of the CCP, the other is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee (OCAC)of the government. This is a supra-ministerial organ under Premier Zhou Enlai’s GAC. Like many other committees and ministries the OCAC was dominated by former Nationalists. The head of the commission was Madame He Xiangning .
Both institutes work together in China and abroad. The OCAC coordinates between several departments of the government which are dealing with the issue of the Overseas Chinese. The OCAC is concerned with the 13 million Chinese who live outside China’s borders, and with some 11 million ’domestic Overseas Chinese', dependents and relatives who reside in the People's Republic of China.
The May Day 1948 slogans, which were a call for a broad national united front against the GMD and for the New Democracy (see Part 2) did not only arouse enthusiasm with the Minzhu Dangpai but also with overseas Chinese. This faction, led by Tan Kah Kee, clearly regarded the inclusion of the Overseas Chinese in the 'democratic coalition' as an established reality, as evidenced by their response to the CCP slogans, expressing eagerness for a new Consultative Congress and its future safeguarding of huaqiao interests. Similar sentiments were echoed by the huaqiao in Malaya, Siam, Canada, and even Cuba. CCP Chairman Mao Zedong affirmed their significance in a telegram to Tan on October 1, 1948, assuring that the CCP would prioritize seeking the huaqiao's perspectives on China's future.
The Zhi Gong Dang (ZGD) saw itself as the representative of the Overseas Chinese in the CPPCC. The party sent six delegates to the founding conference of the CPPCC in September 1949. (See Part 6). Yet, the overseas Chinese had 13 delegates. The ZGD was formed in 1925 in San Francisco and moved its headquarters in 1926 to Hong Kong. Later on, the party leaders settled in Guangzhou and finally in 1953 in Beijing.
The influence of the ZGD in national and international policy is marginal. Despite its ties to secret societies, the ZGD persisted in advocating for the interests of Overseas Chinese but remained relatively obscure. In 1952, the CCP ceased recruitment activities, although its members continued to participate in the CPPCC.
The policy towards the Overseas Chinese can be seen as a part of the foreign policy. It is an instrument of the anti-imperialism policy. During the initial two years of its governance, the party seemed to hold the belief that it could effectively utilize the Overseas Chinese community to advance its political goals in Southeast Asia. Similar to the GMD administration in Taiwan, the PRC dispatched educators to Overseas Chinese educational institutions in Southeast Asia to promote the ideologies of the new regime. The policy rhetoric of the CCP often mirrored that of the GMD, emphasizing themes such as protection, financial support, education, cultural preservation, and patriotism, all framed within the discourse of peace, democracy, internationalism, and anti-imperialism. Despite the CCP's assertions of a departure from GMD policies, the resemblance in rhetoric, if not in practice, was evident during these initial years.
The government undertook little initiatives to improve the position of the Overseas Chinese and were mostly interested in the question of family remittances In 1954, the new constitution provided that the Overseas Chinese can sent 30 delegates to the newly formed National People’s Congress.
Mao Zedong acknowledged the role and importance of the Overseas Chinese in financing and planning of the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. In his speech of December 25, 1946, he called up

“Unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.”

He Xiangning, the head of OCAC, reminded the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia of their duties. They have to form a united front with the native people and resist the power of the Europeans and American rulers in their place of residence and

“.. to act as the "outer circle" of the vanguard of international Communism!”

The party established an uncompromising principle that Overseas Chinese policy was subordinate to foreign policy. The emphasis lied on pro-Chinese (communist) propaganda. In practice, this meant the new Chinese government protested loudly against the persecution of Overseas Chinese in (British) Malay and on the other hand, the government established relations with Britain.
In 1954, the foreign policy changed (See Article 54) and the Overseas Chinese were no longer seen as an instrument of the anti-imperialism policy. After 1954, Beijing tried to solve the disputes between Overseas Chinese and their governments through bilateral agreements. The Overseas Chinese were free to choose their nationality. Zhou Enlai summarized the problems that arose for the Overseas Chinese

"The position of the Overseas Chinese in those countries which are unfriendly to China has been extremely difficult,"… "It is worth pointing out that in the past, reactionary Chinese Governments never made any attempt to solve the problem of Overseas Chinese nationality. This not only placed the Overseas Chinese in a difficult position, but was often the cause of discord between China and the countries of residence. In order to improve this situation, we are prepared to solve this problem, beginning with those South-East Asian countries with which we have diplomatic relations."

The Overseas Chinese were often seen as a fifth column, loyal to the homeland and since 1949 as communists (sympathizers). Following the war, the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Republic of China was initially hailed as a victory, elevating Chiang Kai-shek's stature. However, the subsequent prevalence of corruption and inefficiency within his government quickly soured the perception of many Chinese in Thailand. Irrespective of their political leanings, most Chinese favoured the growing influence of the new regime in Beijing, as a stronger Beijing implied enhanced potential for their protection. Some Overseas Chinese were recruited as spies, because they could be targeted as informants and agents and could make visits to China, visit relatives there, and make continuous contact with Chinese communities.
Below, the relations between the Overseas Chinese, the PRC, and Asian states will be described. Between 1949 and 1959, approximately 400,000 Overseas Chinese—primarily from Indonesia and Malaysia—repatriated to the mainland. To accommodate the educational needs of returning students, the PRC government established a comprehensive academic network consisting of primary and middle schools, as well as specialized preparatory colleges and universities. Notable institutions included the Beijing Preparatory School for Overseas Chinese Students, founded in 1950, followed by the Guangzhou Preparatory School in 1953.

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After the power transfer of the Netherlands in 1949, the Indonesian government determined that everyone will be given the Indonesian nationality within 2 years if no protest is recorded. Even though Indonesia officially recognized the PRC in 1950, it intentionally postponed exchanging ambassadors. This delay was a strategic move to prevent direct communication between Beijing and Indonesia's ethnic Chinese population; a group the PRC had declared must receive Beijing's approval to change their nationality. Indonesia's concerns proved to be justified in 1953 when the newly established Chinese embassy in Jakarta was used to rally local Chinese residents to support Beijing's political agenda against Taiwan. The leaders of the PRC were afraid of the GMD influence on Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. They wanted to strengthen their influence and eliminate the GMD organizations. The Chinese ambassador Wang Renshu immediately started negotiations to open several consulates. These talks resulted in the opening of four consulates on Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. The GMD-regime had 7 consulates.
In 1953, nearly 700,000 Overseas Chinese born in Indonesia opted to retain their nationality. One motivating factor for this decision was that students, predominantly from Chinese-language schools, perceived limited opportunities for higher education in an independent Indonesia, believing that the quality of education in science and the professions was superior in China. They viewed training in Shanghai as world-class. Although some expressed intentions to return to Indonesia after completing their training, the majority harbored optimistic sentiments about the mainland's "liberation." They anticipated promising careers as doctors, scientists, teachers, and technocrats. While the resurgence of Chinese cultural influence in Indonesian Chinese-language schools likely influenced their choice, most prioritized education over political considerations, according to several sources.

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In the early 1950’s, there lived about 350.000 Overseas Chinese in Burma (this is about 1,6% of the total Burmese population). About 250.000 had double nationality. The Burmese government had no desire to force the Overseas Chinese to choose between Burmese or Chinese nationality. They were afraid of intervention of the PRC. A second secretary at the Chinese embassy in Rangoon was specifically tasked with managing the Chinese community. However, the PRC did not consider the Chinese minority a significant internal security concern for Burma, as it was preoccupied with other pressing issues. Moreover, Beijing's limited influence among Burma's Chinese population and its reluctance to incite direct conflict with the Burmese government may have also tempered its actions.
December 1954, Mao Zedong had a meeting with the Burmese premier U Nu and he reassured him that China has no intention to export the revolution to Burma or to support an Overseas Chinese communist party. During this visit, no bilateral agreement was signed. In 1956, Zhou Enlai once again assured the Burmese government that also without agreement the problem can be solved. He demanded from the Overseas Chinese who have kept their Chinese nationality to refrain from political activities and

“some overseas Chinese who have stayed for long in Burma, have become Burmese citizens by having acquired Burmese nationality…. As long as they have made the choice on a voluntary basis, and as permitted by the local laws, obtained the nationality of their residing country, they are no longer regarded as Chinese citizens.”

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The Qing Empire and the GMD government had negotiated with the French colonial regime for a special status of the Overseas Chinese in Vietnam. They received the privileges to establish their own schools, freedom of vocation, and protection against tax discrimination. By the time Vietnam achieved independence from the French in 1954, it had become evident that no Vietnamese government could ensure stability without integrating the influential and widespread Chinese population or at least confirming their political allegiance.
Interestingly, despite the uneven distribution of Chinese communities in Vietnam and the ongoing political unrest in Indochina, both Hanoi and Saigon were equally eager to promote the full integration of the Chinese into Vietnamese society. In 1955, the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam agreed, Hanoi will register all Overseas Chinese and treat them as if they are Vietnamese. The Overseas Chinese may voluntarily adopt Vietnamese nationality after a period of ideological training.
In the mid-1950s, the South Vietnamese government implemented aggressive nationality laws to integrate the ethnic Chinese population: In 1955: All children of mixed marriages were declared Vietnamese citizens and in 1956: All Chinese individuals born in Vietnam were legally classified as Vietnamese. While political and economic pushback from the local Chinese community eventually forced Saigon to ease these measures, the regional situation remained complex. In January 1955, the Chinese ambassador to North Vietnam noted that GMD agents maintained a powerful influence over the 40,000 Chinese residents in Haiphong. Overall, the Chinese minority in Vietnam was characterized by its political detachment, having been largely reluctant to participate in the broader anti-colonial resistance movements of the era.

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The connection between Korea and the CCP dates from the late 30’s and early 40’s. (See Article 54 ) Like in other Asian states, the CCP and the GMD were eager to recruit Overseas Chinese (almost 50.000) to their camp. The apprehension that Overseas Chinese, both in Korea and elsewhere, were providing ideological and material support to the GMD heightened and accelerated the efforts of Ding Xuesong and other prominent Chinese Communist cadres in Korea. They were eager to establish a solid foundation of support for the CCP among Overseas Chinese. It's worth noting, however, that the GMD, represented by Ambassador Shao Yulin in Seoul, was equally preoccupied with influencing the political allegiance of the Overseas Chinese in Korea.
In 1946, the CCP and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) started an Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee within the KWP, and in October 1946 the Overseas Chinese Federation (OCF) is founded as a grassroot organization. The OCF penetrated down to village level and tried to form occupational, youth and women’s groups. Elementary schools were opened and in 1949 there were about 50 elementary schools in North Korea.
During the civil war, Overseas Chinese took care of wounded PLA soldiers from Shandong and Southern Manchuria. How successful the OCF was is difficult to measure. The Korean Overseas Chinese community was materially rich but politically and socially neutral allegedly the result of the absence of CCP influence. During the Korea War, the Overseas Chinese were forced to donate money to the CCP. Most Overseas Chinese in fact fled to Northeast China and in 1958 only 15.000 remained.

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In Singapore, the Overseas Chinese dominated the trade in this important trade center. One of the most distinguished traders, Tan Lark Sye (陳六使), openly supported the People's Republic of China because he was of the opinion the GMD government was corrupt and not efficient. During the Korea War he was a proponent of lifting the rubber embargo. Although he was a supporter of the People's Republic of China, he had never the intention to return to the mainland. Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚), an important industrialist, decided to return to Beijing (see Part 3). The rest of his family stayed in Singapore.
The position of the Overseas Chinese in Malaysia is complicated, because of the existence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP is almost entirely composed of Overseas Chinese. In June 1948, the MCP started its armed struggle against the British colonizers. As soon as the CCP had established control, the CCP provided the MCP with literature and propaganda. It was unable to provide material support. The CCP had never explicitly endorsed the MCP or encouraged the Chinese community in Malaya to participate in the insurgency. As of early 1951, it was evident that the party had withdrawn any implicit or ambiguous suggestions of approval for Overseas Chinese engaging in armed resistance against the British. The MCP failed to win the struggle. In 1952, the British government expelled 700 Overseas Chinese. They found work at state farms on the island Hainan.

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The absence of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC hindered the position of the Overseas Chinese in America. In addition, Taiwan was conducting an open struggle to keep and retain the Overseas Chinese in the United States in their camp, backed by the anti-communist winds blowing in the US over the years. This strategy boomeranged, leading to the suspicion of all new immigrants from China as potential spies. The stringent enforcement of immigration laws in the United States provided propaganda fodder for the PRC and put the consistently feeble ROC government in an embarrassing position for its inability to safeguard its citizens.
In 1949, Chinese students studying in the United States faced significant financial challenges. The Guomindang (Nationalist Party) was largely unable to provide assistance, leaving many students in dire financial situations. As the Chinese Civil War progressed and the Communist Party gained control, these students became increasingly isolated from their families back home. This separation led to a cessation of financial support from their families, compelling the students to rely more heavily on the American government for funding to continue their education.
After the start of the Korea War, the position of the Overseas Chinese became even more hazardous, Many Overseas Chinese students left the US for the mainland. The American government tried to stop this exodus of students and scientists. Qian Xuesen, the rocket specialist, was the most famous victim of this policy. After June 1951, the restriction on migration became even more severe and 120 students were not allowed to leave the country for China. September 10, 1955, China and the US agreed that the US abandons the restriction in exchange for the release of American POWs from the Korean War. Qian Xuesan was also allowed to leave. In the years 1945-1955, some 700 Chinese students and scientists returned to the China. Most of them played an important role in the development of science in the PRC.

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