Article 57

• Article 57

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  The People's Republic of China may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on a basis of equality and mutual benefit.

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• Summary
• Introduction
• COCOM
• Control
• Illicit trade
• Customs
• International Trade
• Region 1:
• Soviet Union
• Hong Kong
• India
• Pakistan
• Birma
• North Korea
• Region 2:
• Japan
• Ceylon Singapore
• Region 3:
• Poland
• Czechoslovakia
• GDR
• Region 4:
• UK FRG
• Belgium France Italy
• US Canada
• Region 5:
• Egypt
• Notes

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The Common Program is formulated in such a way that maximum flexibility regarding the development of the economy is possible. Articles 54-56 stipulate that the PRC can develop friendship with non-Soviet and even imperialist nations. These articles contradict the statement of Mao Zedong that China will not take the middle road, but will ‘lean to one side’. However, the economic, ideological and political reality forces the Chinese leaders to take a more pragmatic view. The political leaders of the CCP have to deviate from traditional Marxist theory. Socialism can only be accomplished by a revolution. Mao Zedong stated:

"the proportions of industry and agriculture in the entire national economy of China were, modern industry about 10 per cent, and agriculture and handicrafts about 90 per cent. This was the result of imperialist and feudal oppression; this was the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the society of old China; and this is our basic point of departure for all questions during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after victory. This gives rise to a series of problems regarding our Party's strategy, tactics and policy…The two basic policies of the state in the economic struggle will be regulation of capital at home and control of foreign trade."

In other words, the proletariat class is too small and is not capable of conducting a socialist revolution at this moment. The economic situation compels the new regime to rely on essential materials from Western countries, because the SU cannot supply them.. On February 16, 1949, the CCP issues an instruction on foreign trade policy:

"we should import as much as possible from the Soviet Union and the new democratic countries any goods they can supply. We should only export or import goods to and from capitalist countries that are not needed or cannot be supplied by the Soviet Union and the new democratic countries."

Therefore, Article 57 of the Common Program states: the People's Republic of China may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The new government took concrete steps to stabilize foreign trade. For the time being, private management of import and export trade was permitted, and foreign firms were allowed to establish offices in China. To foster exports, the CC directed local governments to prioritize the production of exportable staple crops and goods, including cotton, soybeans, salt, peanuts, tobacco, silk, fur, handicrafts, and manufactured goods. Loans and other incentives were utilized to encourage increased production of these exportable commodities. The GAC of the CPG promulgated on December 8, 1950 The Interim Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Trade, and the Trade Ministry of the Central People's Government (later renamed the Ministry of Foreign Trade) applied the licensing system to all import and export commodities from May 1951.
Much like the wartime GMD regime, the new government moved to register and regulate import–export activity. Control was exercised through the General Trade Company, which gradually spun off specialized corporations to monopolize strategic commodities such as textiles and minerals. The General Trade Company also established a central office to oversee all foreign trade, requiring private firms—much as under the wartime Import and Export Commission—to apply for approval before moving goods across national borders. These petitions provided the state with detailed knowledge of transnational trading practices and commercial networks. In 1951, for instance, the government founded the Yunnan Import and Export Corporation, creating a direct state competitor to private trading houses. From the outset, then, the Communist state was constructing new corporate institutions designed to rival and ultimately displace major international private firms such as Yongchangxiang.
From the outset, the new government prioritized the importation of industrial equipment and technology, considering them crucial for development. It was decided that traditional agricultural methods, operating within a reformed institutional framework, would suffice to achieve the necessary agricultural growth to support industrial goals. Fundamentally, China aimed to export sufficient quantities of food, textiles, and light industrial products to finance the importation of essential materials, equipment, and technology. Import duties were moderate or nonexisting for industrial equipment, raw materials, and other products essential for the development of heavy industry. Protective tariffs are levied on the imports of consumer goods. Production for exports always presides over production for domestic consumption. However, the government has to import Western grain because the domestic production is too low. Wheat is less expensive and contains higher protein than rice. Therefore, rice is exported and wheat is imported. Mao Zedong wants to become less dependent on these imports and suggests distributing grain rationally and to increase domestic production. The Central government accounts for this grain shortage by blaming black-market sales and hoarding. On December 22, 1949, while Mao Zedong was in Moscow, he sent a telegram to the CC of the CCP, in which he stressed the necessity of trading with other countries (Germany, GB and the US) besides with the SU.

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After the thirty-year Sino-Soviet treaty was signed on February 14, 1950, the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group (COCOM) decided in March 1950 to apply the same trade controls on China as on the SU and Eastern Bloc. The US denied also the grant of Marshall Aid to Western countries which might pass banned material to Communist countries. After China participated in the Korea War, the China Committee (CHICOM) was established with the aim to restrict international trade with China, Hong Kong, and Macau. China, like all other communist countries (except Yugoslavia) lost its US most-favored nation status in 1951. American banks ceased to provide credit in US dollars to foreign trading companies which were trading with China. Washington had previously adhered to a "foot-in-the-door" approach in its trade policy with China, anxiously and hopefully watching for signs that the Chinese Communists might demonstrate, through their actions, a readiness to be treated with a relatively normal trade relationship. The CHICOM embargo list was about two times longer than the COCOM list. Neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland, as well India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan and the Arabian League were not members of the embargo club. The Chicom embargo seriously affects HK trade to PCR in volume and percentage. However, in the beginning of 1953 West European countries are increasing their export to the PCR. To circumvent the Western embargo, Chinese leaders employed various strategies, including hidden trade networks, smuggling, and the temporary privatization of foreign trade. The PRC was able to build and maintain a complex trading network in Southeast Asia by mobilizing overseas Chinese merchants, European compradors, and party cadres. East European socialist allies also supported China by forming joint venture companies officially owned by the East European partner to facilitate the transport of strategic goods. For instance, the founding of the Sino-Polish Joint shipping company in Tianjin in 1951 was an attempt to undermine the embargo (See Article 36 ). Similarly, China aided the Soviet Union in acquiring embargoed rubber from Southeast Asia. To complement Soviet aid, the CCP also initiated large-scale rubber plantations in South China, which was seen as “the biggest technological cooperation project between China and the Soviet Union throughout the 1950s.” (See Article 43 ) The PRC’s most effective strategy to broadly counter the Western embargo was substituting Western technological goods with Eastern Bloc production. The US-led embargo profoundly shaped the CCP’s approach to economic statecraft in two critical ways. First, the experience of economic sanctions sharpened the CCP’s awareness of China’s economic vulnerability to Cold War geopolitical disruptions. CCP leaders had not foreseen the US-led trade embargo and were caught off guard by how swiftly it destabilized the Chinese economy.
Initially, the CCP had even hoped that the Korean War might boost China’s economy by opening new export opportunities for strategic goods like tung oil, silk, and animal hides. However, the imposition of sanctions shattered this expectation. The embargo effectively barred US and European firms from shipping goods to China, signing new trade agreements, or securing letters of credit in US dollars. Deprived of fresh foreign currency inflows, the CCP was forced to safeguard its dwindling reserves and turn to barter trade as a stopgap measure.

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The new government starts immediately by monopolizing the external trade, and all private elements are disposed of. However, all the overseas Chinese businesses would be permitted to trade, and all export manufacturers owned by overseas Chinese are granted a temporary permit to export.
Former middlemen between the foreign merchants and the Chinese traders could only keep working if they worked on behalf of the state trading companies. On March 10, 1950, the government established 6 state foreign trade corporations: Bristles Corporation, the Native Produce Export Corporation, the Oils and Fats Corporation, the Import Corporation, the Tea Corporation, and the Minerals Corporation. Soon 5 more corporations were established China Petroleum Corporation, the China Egg Products Corporation, the China Silk Corporation, the China Skin and Fur Corporation, and the China Industrial Material and Equipment Corporation. In 1954 the list expanded with 4 corporations: The China National Foodstuffs Export Corporation, the China National Cereals and Oils Export Corporation, the China Silk Export Corporation, and the China Miscellaneous Articles Export Corporation. All of these corporations have offices in important cities throughout the mainland. They are separate legal entities; each corporation is a separate accounting unit and operate as a separate company. the corporation is not a consuming or producing unit-it is a middleman in the planned economy. The Ministry of Foreign Trade supervises and controls the corporations. See figure 37.1 In 1950, the government controlled 70% of imports and 54% of exports. In 1953, the numbers had increased to 92%. In the early 50’s, the intention and the organization of foreign trade of the government are distinctly socialist. ownership has still a dual character, however, also going in the direction of collective ownership. On March 10, 1950, the GAC promulgated   The Decisions on Procedures Governing the Unification of State-Operated Trade, and it outlines the government's goals of consolidating trade nationwide, directing the domestic market, balancing commodity supply and demand at both national and local levels, and facilitating the swift recovery and expansion of productive enterprises. Therefore, the government perceived economic growth and state oversight as closely interconnected. In other words, trade should leave the path of free trade and to become unified and support the socialist economy. In August 1952, the Ministry of Trade was divided into 2 ministries, one for internal and one for external trade. The foreign trade ministry has several corporations under control, like The China national Animal By-Products Imports and Export Corporation, like The China national Arts and Craft Imports and Export Corporation, and The China National Cereals, Oils Imports and Export Corporation. However, this system also exhibited a notable drawback, notably evident in trade dealings with Western nations and, to a lesser extent, with communist countries. This drawback was the limited direct connections between the buying and selling entities. Essentially, companies from Western nations were effectively prevented from engaging in direct communication with Chinese producers or buyers, leading to significant complications in trade with the PRC. As a result of this system, the exchange of information in trade between the PRC and other communist countries was more convoluted and sluggish.
The Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (PIT) is established in 1952 as an independent organ to establish contacts with foreign firms (of countries with no official ties with the PCR), to organize exhibitions of Chinese products in foreign countries, especially in Hong Kong, and inviting non-governmental trade delegations to China. The PIT is allowed to sign contracts and agreements, it is a non-governmental economic and trade organization composed of representatives and experts from the P.R.C.'s economic and trade circles. (Its board of directors includes officials from the MOFERT, the Bank of China, and other relevant departments.) One of the notable early achievements occurred on June 1, 1952 when a significant private trade agreement was signed with Japan. This agreement stipulated the exchange of £30 million worth of goods by the year's end. However, due to the Japanese government's refusal to sell certain restricted items like special steel, tin, locomotives, cranes, and trucks to China, only a small portion of the agreed-upon amount, approximately 5%, was actually traded. Nevertheless, this trade pact allowed Beijing to acquire essential commodities such as chemical fertilizer in exchange for coal. Consequently, the agreement ignited a heightened interest from Japan in the Chinese market, thereby exerting pressure on Tokyo to reconsider its trade restrictions with China. See also Article 56

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The new government grappled with an ongoing battle against illicit coastal trade, particularly concerning Kong Yuan, director of the China General Customs Administration, who adopted a noticeably cautious stance reflecting his concerns that despite significant achievements in nationwide anti-smuggling efforts by customs, the smuggling situation persisted as a serious challenge. Despite increasingly stringent state regulations, various commodities continued to flow freely along the Chinese coast and penetrate into the interior regions. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of smuggling emerged as a crucial means to satisfy the everyday requirements of numerous individuals and various types of enterprises, including private and joint state-private entities. In the aftermath of the onset of the Korean War, notable figures such as Zhou Enlai and Bo Yibo advocated for the implementation of "organized mass smuggling" (zuzhi qunzhong zousi) in South China. The objective was to evade the United Nations embargo and procure vital resources, including fuel, medicine, and industrial hardware, which were urgently needed at that time. The main smuggling areas are along the coast, with Shanghai, Tianjin, Xiamen, Shantou and Guangzhou, but the primary source of smuggled goods came from the colonial enclaves Hong Kong and Macau.
Despite all administrative efforts and various anti-smuggling campaigns, smuggled consumer products continued to be openly peddled in Shanghai markets well into the 1960s. Similar black markets were active in other cities like Guangzhou and Tianjin, attracting buyers from all walks of life.

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The newly formed General Customs Administration, founded on October 19, 1949, still kept several employees who had worked for the GMD administration, like the former Deputy Inspector Ding Guitang. At the beginning they were valued for their technical and administrative expertise. During the Sanfan, several staff members are fired. On April 18, 1951, the Provisional Customs Law was promulgated. The law stressed the importance of differentiating between major and minor cases of smuggling. Major smuggling was seen as counter revolutionary activities. However, most smugglers were not political motivated but by economics. Throughout Wufan (See Article 30), the public was urged to help fight smuggling and the People’s Courts held public trials and rallies for accused smugglers. The government was less lenient to traffickers who were officials. See also Article 40 Two groups are treated with lenience, Overseas Chinese and minorities. Overseas Chinese were permitted to bring personal goods into China without paying duties. Consequently, numerous travelers and returnees endeavored to capitalize on their politically privileged status and connections to foreign markets for profit or even sustenance. Despite persistent official encouragements, extending into the 1960s, for them to utilize state-run enterprises, many Overseas Chinese persisted in utilizing illicit channels to fulfill their requirements. Minorities are allowed to exchange commodities of daily necessities in small volumes in and out of China tax free.

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The Sino-Soviet alliance, combined with the Western trade embargo, led to a rapid redirection of China's foreign trade. Within just three years, from 1950 to 1952, trade with non-communist countries was nearly halved, while the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe became dominant trading partners. This shift should not be seen as a move toward autarky; China’s foreign trade grew faster than global trade, making it the eleventh or twelfth largest in the world by 1959. After the Korean War ended, trade with non-communist countries gradually increased, and by 1957, it had recovered to pre-1950 levels, though it grew at a slower pace than trade with Eastern Europe.

Source: Yamanouchi (1965). Page 289

Fig. 57.5b Grain exports 1950-1954

Source: Crook (1988). Page 54
*Miscellanous grain excludes wheat and potatoes

Fig. 57.5c Oilseeds, oil & nut exports 1950-1954

Source: Crook (1988). Page 55 * Walnut & Almond Seeds

Fig. 57.5d Several agricultural products export 1950-1954

Source: Crook (1988). Page 58

Fig. 57.5e Live animals exports 1950-1954

Source: Crook (1988). Page 56

Fig. 57.5f Fruit and vegetables export 1950-1954

Source: Crook (1988). Page 57
Canned fruits and vegetables

The nature of trade was shifting from daily necessities to production goods, specifically those required for constructing a socialist economy. The Sino-Soviet agreement of 1950 provided the PRC with a $300 million credit. China was obligated to repay the credits and interest through deliveries of goods, including raw materials, tea, gold, and American dollars. The prices, quantities, and delivery dates for raw materials and tea were to be set by separate agreements, with prices consistently pegged to world market prices. However, a big part of the loan is used for purchase of war material for the Korea War and for expanding and rebuilding of the defense industry. Besides money, the SU also provided technical and technological documentation for the production of military equipment. In the period between 1949-1954 the trade balance of the PCR is negative, the import of production goods exceeds the export, so a part has to be financed by SU loans. On October 12, 1954, the SU and PCR signed a new agreement in which the SU provided China with a credit of 520 million rubles to finance the construction of 15 new industrial enterprises and the expansion of 141 enterprises already under construction. See Summary of 156 projects and Article 26.
"Agricultural produce-ranging from tea, silk and vegetable oils to cereals and hides-continues to dominate Chinese exports, although the proportion of non-ferrous and scarce metals in total exports- antimony, molybdenum, wolfram etc. has increased. Exports of pig iron and coking coal, which formerly went to Japan, are now exported to the USSR and Eastern Europe" Initially, for the first two years, the PRC's exports were limited to agricultural products primarily sourced from the north and northeastern regions. Following the gradual restoration of infrastructure, exports increased significantly. By 1952, nonferrous metals from the south and southwestern areas of China became the top commodity in Soviet imports from the PRC. Concurrently, the list of agricultural products also expanded as resources from China's central and southern provinces were increasingly utilized.

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On April 19, 1950, the first trade agreement between the SU and the PCR is signed, to emphasize the importance of the deal a ceremony was staged in Beijing on September 30, 1950. One of conditions is that prices for goods featured in Soviet-Chinese trade will be set in rubles on the basis of the prices existing on the world market. The preceding year served as an index for fixing prices. See article 4 of the agreement. In September 1949, the first commercial transactions between the SU and China were concluded. The North China Foreign Trade Company and Soviet foreign trade organizations came to an agreement to mutual deliver goods worth 31 million rubles. Since 1946, the Soviets offered economic and technical assistance to local CCP governments in Northeast and Northern China. Trade between Northeast China and the Soviet Union increased significantly, rising from 413 million to 916 million roubles between 1947 and 1949, with most of the trade occurring in communist-controlled areas. In 1948, the Soviet government dispatched specialists to support railway construction in Northeast China, addressing critical transport challenges. This effort later facilitated the mobilization of communist troops via railway transport, contributing to the CCP’s victory in the region.
Given the poor transport situation in 1950, the bulk of the export to the SU were agricultural products from the north and northeast of China, later on, from 1952 onwards when the new regime had full control over the mainland, nonferrous metals from the south and southwest became the main export products. In addition, agricultural products from central and southern China became available for export.
Particularly in a province like Xinjiang, which is close to the border with the SU and rich in minerals, the change in trade volumes which took place, is abundantly clear. China’s trade with the Soviet bloc faced significant logistical challenges due to its geographical distance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Most exports and imports had to travel overland via the Trans-Siberian Railway, which substantially increased both the cost and time required for transport. Some estimates indicate that this geographical separation added as much as 30 percent to the cost of China’s imports from the Soviet Union compared to what Eastern European countries paid. Additionally, Soviet and Eastern European goods and industrial expertise were frequently considered less well-suited to China’s specific needs than those provided by other long-standing economic partners, such as Japan. Already in February 1949, a group of Chinese merchants in Singapore set up a barter deal with China. Shipments of rubber from Malaya were shipped to Hong Kong in exchange for soya beans from Northeast China. "After 1951, Mainland China reaps an enormous amount of export surplus in her trade with Hong Kong and this surplus forms an important portion of foreign exchange for her to cover her trade deficits elsewhere end to repair her external debts." On December 3, 1950, the US administration introduced a complete embargo for PRC, Hong Kong and Macau. The US asked her allies to do the same. The UK government tried a different approach for Hong Kong. In the aftermath of the International Economic Conference in Moscow not only the PCR established the PIT (see above ) but also a Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade was founded. The members of both councils had close ties with Chinese-British trade companies before 1949. The UK refused to implement shipping controls. Indeed, British business maintained its connections with mainland China through Hong Kong. Shipping companies registered in Hong Kong, as well as in Singapore, Liberia, and Panama, facilitated the alteration of British or Chinese goods, making it challenging to ascertain their true origins and enabling trade through Hong Kong to persist. While many of these shipping companies displayed the British flag, approximately 50 percent of the shipping services utilized for Socialist China's trade were provided by vessels flying the Greek flag. According to Shao's analysis in 1991, it became evident during the latter half of 1950 that the Chinese government's trading activities had a significant presence in Hong Kong. This presence encompassed various entities involved in trade, banking, and other sectors, which were inherited from the previous regime, along with their assets and personnel. Additionally, new enterprises affiliated with Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were established, functioning as branches of these respective organizations. Some of these enterprises were established as Hong Kong-based companies, with or without explicit official affiliations. It became apparent that these newly formed organizations had effectively established their reputation, prompting many European firms to prefer engaging with them rather than maintaining previous business connections. However, there was a decline which can be attributed to three primary factors: 1. The "Three Antis" and "Five Antis" Movements on the mainland essentially halted business activities during the first half of the year. 2. Direct shipments of edible oil from the mainland to Eastern European buyers reduced Hong Kong's entrepot trade correspondingly. 3. Western European countries decreased their import quotas for edible oils to reduce their foreign exchange expenditure.
The primary product India exported to China was jute products. Trade with India also carried a strong political motive. In 1951, when India faced a severe famine, China provided significant relief through a barter arrangement. This included agreements signed in the fall of 1951 for China to supply 66,000 tons of rice and 442,000 tons of sorghum. Further agreements followed in 1952 for an additional 150,000 tons of rice (100,000 tons on May 26 and 50,000 tons on October 13). Following these political gestures, the volume of trade between the PRC and India increased rapidly until stabilizing around 1956. This growing economic relationship likely had a considerable influence on India's position in the international arena regarding matters affecting the PRC.
On October 14, 1954, India and China signed a two-year trade agreement, outlining a comprehensive list of goods that each country would export to the other. Chinese exports encompassed cereals, machinery, minerals, silk, animal products, paper and stationery, chemicals, and oils, while Indian exports comprised grams, rice, pulses, unmanufactured tobacco, minerals and ores, wood and timber, fibers, textiles, skins, chemicals, and machinery. The immediate impact of the treaty was notable: trade during 1954–55 saw a seven-fold increase compared to the previous year, although it represented a relatively small portion of India's global trade, amounting to only 1.2 percent. The trade with Pakistan consists largely of the export of raw cotton and jute and the import of cotton twist and yarn. "...,in 1952, Pakistan had exported $ 84 million worth of commodities to China and only $2.2 million value of imports from China. Both sides trade volume reached $86 million. However, the export volume was decreased in next year’s and the bilateral trade volume in 1953 $7.2 million, in 1954" As seen in (Article 56) Burma is the first noncommunist country which recognizes the People's Republic of China, however the realtionship is tense. As a gesture of goodwill, in December 1954, the PRC procured 150,000 tons of Burmese rice at a price higher than the prevailing world market rate, as stipulated in a trade pact between the two nations. Concurrently, the United States provided food aid, including rice, to countries in the region, thereby driving down the market price of rice, a key export commodity for Burma. This economic development adversely affected Burma's economy. Additionally, tensions arose because Burma's government was in conflict with the Taiwan government and the United States due to their failure to address the presence of Nationalist Chinese soldiers who had fled China in 1949 and were still stationed in Burma, exerting significant influence over certain regions of the country. Despite Beijing's inclination towards secrecy, China has disclosed some relevant information regarding its military and economic assistance to North Korea. In October 1951, General Chen Yi of the PLA stated that the Chinese government had supplied 897 planes, 33 artillery pieces, 17 anti-aircraft guns, and two tanks to support the "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign. However, quantifying the monetary value of this aid proved challenging due to the absence of published prices for Chinese weapons. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that China offered significantly more military and economic assistance during that time than the aforementioned list suggests, and certainly continued to provide even greater support later on. Furthermore, Copper notes that China's aid to North Korea underwent a shift towards a more formal and less classified framework in late 1953, following the signing of an armistice that brought an end to the hostilities. During this period, China announced the cancellation of a debt totalling $56.9 million and offered new assistance in the form of a nonrepayable grant amounting to $338 million, designated for the purpose of repairing war-related damages. Additionally, China allocated funds to cover the expenses of its troops remaining in North Korea.

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In the 1950s, the US government dictated the foreign policy of Japan. From 1949 until June 1950, the US administration was encouraging Japanese trade with the PRC The US-Japan Security Treaty signed on September 8, 1951, gave the Japanese few possibilities to make official contacts with the PCR. However, on November 1, 1949, a private organization organized by Japanese businessmen requested permission to visit Beijing to discuss the possibility of establishing trade ties with the PRC government. By the end of 1950, Sino-Japanese trade closely resembled the type of commerce that had occurred between occupied China and Japan before and during World War II. For example, in 1949 and 1950, China's main imports from Japan included industrial products worth millions of US dollars, such as motors, generators, electric furnaces, steel, galvanized iron sheets, copper wire, and machinery for paper and textile manufacturing, as well as steel rails and railroad equipment. In fact, during 1950–1951, Japan exported 61 percent of its total bar steel, 37 percent of its steel plates, and 14 percent of its galvanized iron sheets to China. Most of these Japanese imports entered China through the Northeast port of Yingkou and were then transported to Japanese-built plants and factories in former Manchuria, such as the mills in Jilin and Shenyang.
On June 1, 1952, and October 29, 1953, trade agreements were concluded with the People's Republic of China. These agreement were valid for one year. The goods China exports are coal, iron ore, but the most important is rice. Japan delivers chemicals, equipment, and transportation media. " Under the terms of each of the first three Sino-Japanese trade agreements, the total volume of twoway trade provided for sixty million pounds sterling,⁴⁵ but for the first agreement, the actual transactions only amounted to 5.05 per cent of the total sum; for the second, 38.8 per cent; ... Peking blamed the United States for the Japanese failure to fulfill the trade obligations but had no legal recourse to force the Japanese government to remedy the situation.⁴⁷"