This chapter describes the position and development of the minorities in China.
In its approach to matters of religion and ethnicity, the PRC did not commence with a blank slate; instead, it drew upon the ideological and tactical influences of the imperial state, its predecessor, the GMD, and their experiences during their time as a rural insurgency. For instance, throughout history, Chinese states had sought to assimilate leaders from ethnic minority groups by conferring official titles and granting them authority over specific territories.
In a similar vein, leaders of the Republic of China, much like the PRC, found themselves at odds with groups whose spiritual beliefs they perceived as hindrances to China's progress and enlightenment. Except for Christianity, these beliefs were commonly labelled as "superstitions," encompassing a broad but vaguely defined spectrum that included non-scientific interpretations of the human body, healing practices, as well as faith in local deities, fortune-tellers, and individuals claiming supernatural insights and wisdom.
Minorities
RMRB editorials on Minorities
Nationalities
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
Nationalities
2
3/1
1
2/1
4/6
Source: Oksenberg (1982). A Red Number indicates the subject was a major theme in the editorial. A Black Number indicates a minor theme in the editorial.
The CCP also appears to have adopted many of the Republic's legal and bureaucratic strategies in handling matters related to ethnicity and religion. The initial provisional constitution of the Republic of China, declared in March 1912, granted freedom of religious belief but did not provide safeguards against the destruction of temples dedicated to deities.
At the CCP’s Second Congress in 1922, the party declared in its manifesto that the ultimate goal of the CCP was the unification of China under a federal system
Therefore, the Second Congress of the Communist Party of China believes that we must vigorously demand:
(1) Eliminate civil strife, overthrow warlords, and build domestic peace;
(2) Overthrow the oppression of international imperialism and achieve the complete independence of the Chinese nation;
(3) Unify China (including the three eastern provinces) as a true democratic republic;
(4) Mongolia, Tibet, and the three regions of Huijiang implement autonomy and become democratic autonomous states;
(5) In principle of free federalism, unite Mongolia, Tibet, and return to Xinjiang to establish the Federal Republic of China;
(6) Various freedoms; (7) Formulate laws to protect workers, peasants, women and children.
The CCP didn't hold on to this opinion.
On the one hand, the 1949 Common Program enshrined ethnic equality, ethnic self-government, and ethnic solidarity as safeguards against Han chauvinism. On the other, the CCP simultaneously built party organizations at every level of society, laying the foundations for a more centralized and cohesive communist state. Formal adoption of Soviet-style federalism would not only have created opportunities for the Soviet Union or other foreign powers to detach minority regions from China, but could also have posed a direct challenge to Mao’s authority within the CCP.
This concern was particularly acute in the case of Xinjiang, and less so in Tibet and other minority regions. From Beijing’s perspective, control over Xinjiang was strategically important for maintaining authority across China’s western frontier and limiting the influence of external powers. By contrast, Tibet’s relative isolation meant that it could be more readily governed without exercising the same degree of control over Xinjiang.