Part 4: Collaboration between the CCP and the Minzhu Dangpai

In several ways the party leaders of the CCP are trying to convince the minzhu dangpai that the collaboration, called the ‘new democracy’, will last at least 20 to 30 years and there will be no big changes in the foreign policy. Zhou Enlai clarifies in a speech for potential candidates of the political consultative conference the foreign policy with respect to the US ".. the policy of the CCP is “Don’t cut them off, but don’t be in a rush to establish diplomatic relations. If we are too eager to get recognition, we may fall into the trap of passivity. If imperialism wishes to establish diplomatic relations with us, it must negotiate according to the principle of equality."
Document: 17-04-1949 Zhou Enlai Report on the problem of the peace tal

CCP’s position towards the US

Many of the CCP leaders have a mixed feeling about the relation with the US. They condemn the military aid given to the GMD government but are open-minded about diplomatic and economic relations with the US. But at the other hand: "The increasingly mild stand taken by (GMD government)Nanking on questions relating to the Occupation (of Japan) --a stand which was interpreted in China as further evidence of Kuomintang weakness and dependence on the United States for support -- and the reliance of Chiang Kai-shek on foreign assistance to wage an unpopular civil war, played an important part in turning much nationalist sentiment against the government. In addition, the identification of the United States with the disliked Kuomintang turned much nationalist feeling into anti-American channels. 5/ As a result the Communists, who might still have been handicapped by their ideological connections with the Soviet Union, found themselves with yet another means of rallying nationalist support as the defenders of China's interests against "American imperialism."
Bernard Thomas S. (1953). Government and administration in Communist China. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. Page 14

During the Second World War Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai have on a regular base contact with the American ‘Dixie Mission’ in Yen an. Yu (1999) cites Mao Zedong in a talk to this American military observers: “Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together.”
Yu Yuegen (1999). The bond of an enduring relationship: United States-China scientific relations, 1949-1989. Page 32
There is also a tactical reason not to offend the US too much. The CCP is in constant fear the US are prepared to intervene directly in the civil war in favour of Jiang Jieshi. There are some incidents. The first one at the consulate in Shenyang
The US has several consulates in China in 1949: Guangzhou, Chongqing, Dalian, Wuhan, Kunming, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao. Chen (2001) states: In fact, CCP leaders in the Northeast already believed that American diplomats in Shenyang were “actively engaged in” collecting military intelligence information about “the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and China’s liberated zones.” In a summary report to the CCP leadership on 24 November, the CCP Northeast Bureau concluded that a group of special spies existed at the U.S. consulate in Shenyang, who had conducted espionage activities on the GMD’s behalf (telegram, CCP Northeast Bureau to CCP Central Committee, 24 November 1948, CCA) page 297
on November 14, 1948 and the second at April 25, 1949 at the embassy in Nanjing.
There are also moments of rapprochement. In May 1949 there some meetings between US ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua a CCP diplomat. Stuart wants to set up a meeting with Zhou Enlai like in 1945. Zhou Enlai is not willing and the talks are without results.
Stalin (1949) in a cable to Mao Zedong remarks in relation to the US: "We think that the democratic government of China must not reject establishing official relations with some of the capitalist countries, including the United States, if these states officially abandon [their] military, trade, and political support of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government… We think that you should not reject foreign loans and trade with the capitalist countries on certain conditions. The main thing is that loans and trade must not impose any conditions. The main thing is that the loans and trade must not impose any economic and financial conditions on China that could be used to limit the national sovereignty of the democratic state and to strangle [its] domestic industry."
Document: 00-04-1949 The principles of establishing relations with the United States, April 1949
Sheng
Sheng Michael M. (1998b). Mao’s ideology, personality, and the CCP’s foreign relations. In Li Hongshan & Hong Zhaohui (Eds.), Image, perception, and the making of U.S.-China relations. University press of America. Page 184
remarks: “It is also worth noting that the CCP's foreign policy process was highly centralized, and Mao had made it clear to every rank and file in November 1948 that anything related to foreign affairs, local authorities had to report to the Center first, before any action could be carried out”.

Minzhu dangpai’s position towards the US

Also the members of the minzhu dangpai and many intellectuals have mixed feelings about the US. They also condemn the role of the US in the civil war, but a lot of them consider the US as an example for the development of China and have strong positive feelings for the US. Mao Zedong (1950) warns Liu Shaoqi: "The fact that the United States is pulling out all fits] official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us, but those democratic figures suffering from the fear-of-the-United-States illness may be dissatisfied with the confiscation of the foreign military barracks and other actions. Please pay attention to explaining [the meaning of these actions to them]."
Document: 18-01-1950 Explaining the confiscation of foreign barracks and other anti-western actions to Minzhu Dangpai
Kovalev
Iwan Kovalev
, the SU advisor in Beijing reports at the end 1949 to Stalin about those positive feelings: "Among similar sentiments counts also Zhou Enlai's negative attitude toward the dispatch of groups of Soviet specialists to Shanghai and Tianjin because big economic interests of America and England are concentrated at these points. Such sentiments are the result of pressure on the CC on the part of the bourgeois democrats and other capitalist elements inside the country, who wished and wish the soonest recognition by America and England of new China so as to, relying on these imperialist states, the Chinese bourgeoisie could prevent further democratization of China and disallow strengthening and widening of friendship between China and the Soviet Union"
24-12-1949 Kovalev reports to Stalin on some policies of the CCP central leadership and practical problems."

The US government publication on August 5, 1949 of the “white paper on relations with China” affronted many minzhu dangpai members. In this report the suggestion is made that democratic intellectuals are potential allies of the US. In other words a possible fifth column in China.
Lutze
Lutze Thomas D. (2007). China’s inevitable revolution. Rethinking America’s loss to the communists. New York. Page 181. Jeans (2018) concludes "The China White Paper, (…), included a thinly veiled appeal for such (third force) groups. In 1949 and 1950, the United States was open to third force alternatives to the Nationalists on Taiwan. From 1950 to 1953, American policy drifted toward increasing support for the armed anticommunists in Taiwan, thanks to the Korean War, while still secretly supporting promising third force efforts. … in November 1953, (the US) finally acknowledged Taiwan was the only viable noncommunist force. With conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Nationalists and the Americans at the end of 1954 and recognition of the failure of the CIA’s third force project, Americans resumed their former close relationship with the Nationalists, and US aid flowed to them once again." Jeans Roger B. (2018) The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War. Page 237
cites the orientalist Biggerstaff who during his stay in Nanjing noticed: ”.. Day after day editorials, speeches, resolutions, and reports of roundtable discussion groups and protest meetings were spread across the pages of the Hsin Hua Jihpao, (The New China Daily) challenging American policy and the White Paper from every angle.” See also Article 56 for the reaction of Mao Zedong
Chen Jian
Chen Jian (2005). Mao and Sino-American relations. In Melvyn P. Leffler & David S. Painter, Origins of the cold war An International History Routledge. Page 286
puts forward this argument "…,from a Chinese perspective, the most profound reason underlying the CCP’s anti-American policy was Mao’s grand plans for transforming China’s state, society, and international outlook. Even though it might have been possible for Washington to change the concrete course of its China policy (which was highly unlikely given the policy’s complicated background), it would have been impossible for the United States to alter the course and goals of the Chinese revolution, let alone the historicalcultural environment that gave birth to the event."

China wants to be part of the new world (SU) and not the old one (US).

Demands of the CCP and minzhu dangpai

Besides guarantying a period of 20 to 30 years of new democracy and a positive attitude to western countries, the CCP also wants to satisfy the minzhu dangpai in another way. In his “On a coalition government" (1945) Mao Zedong points out his demands and proposals which approach the suggestions of the minzhu dangpai:
- Mobilisation of all forces to defeat and expel the Japanese.
- Abolition of the GMD's one-party dictatorship.
- Punishment for collaborators.
- Punishment for "reactionaries" creating a danger of civil war.
- "Liquidation" of the GMD's secret police and the abolition of GMD concentration camps.
- Revocation of all "reactionary" laws and decrees aimed at suppressing the people's freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction, and religious belief and freedom of the person and guarantee full civil rights to the people.
- Recognition of the legal status of all democratic parties and groups.
- Release of all patriotic political prisoners.
- Abolition of bureaucratic capital.
- Assistance for private industry.
- Abolition of GMD indoctrination in education and promotion of a national, scientific and mass culture education.
-Guarantees of a livelihood and academic freedom for teachers and other staff members of educational institutions.
Groot G. (1997). Managing transitions: The Chinese communist party united front work, minor parties and groups, hegemony and corporatism. Adelaide. Page 91
Mao Zedong asks Stalin for advice on two occasions (November 30, 1947 and March 15, 1948) about dealing with non-Communist parties and about creating a new political order once the CCP had seized power. He is convinced he can lead a one-party rule like the SU and Yugoslavia. Stalin however disagrees and states: “We think that the various opposition parties in China that are representing the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them in cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers.
Document:20-04-1948 Stalin answers Mao Zedong on coalition government

Academic freedom

The GMD alienates from the intellectuals it needed to operate the state, party, and military apparatus. From the beginning of the 1940’s the CCP were “…a staunch champion of political and academic freedom. This stand won over a number of the intellectuals who, since the Kuomintang policy gave considerable latitude in academic and political freedom, were able to exert their influence in support of the Communist cause.”
Houn Franklin W.(1961) To change a nation: Propaganda and indoctrination in communist China. New York. Page 4-5. Xu notices "The economic hardships were so severe that they (CCP) began to shake peasant support as trade was disrupted and the tax burden increased in Communist-administered areas. The leadership thus launched the “great production movement” to ameliorate the condition. Some base areas even began to join in the illicit opium trade to survive. Coupled with this condition was the need to appeal to public opinion and win over upper classes from the KMT. This led to the strategy to tighten internally and soften externally (waikuan neijing). In other words, the Party needed to establish clear boundaries between the internal and external constituencies and enforce strict discipline in its own rank and file while externally projecting a liberal and open-minded image on its leadership. The goal was to exercise control over the politics of interpretation." Xu Xiaohong (1918). The Origins and Growth of the Chinese CommunistMovement. Page 10
American-educated economist
Ma Yinqu
Ma Yinchu (1882-1982) He served as the president of Zhejiang University, and then as the president of Peking University from 1951 to 1960
is an example of a disillusioned intellectual who joined the GMD regime and criticized the CCP in the 1930’s. He became very disappointed in the GMD and disapproved the mismanagement of the economy, the corruption and the mistreating of the intellectuals. The GMD government no longer permitted him to teach, to publish or to make public appearances. He moves to Hong Kong and in 1949 the CCP invites ho to come back to the mainland and become the dean of the Beijing university. Many intellectuals like Ma, alienated from the Nationalist regime and therefore willing to give the Party a chance, found themselves in demand by the CCP but with stringent terms attached for their involvement with the program. Intellectual participation in society was to be decided by the Party and the state committed to developing a socialist society and at last accomplishing the deferred promises of social revolution, modernization and national wealth and power
Mutter Paul (2010). Separating “Scholar” from “Gentry”: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Ruling Class, 1800 to 1945. Page 62
In scientific circles the CCP policy towards intellectuals is received enthusiastically.
Qian Sanqiang
Qian Sanqiang (1913-1992)
, the founder of the Chinese nuclear program puts in these words: “…I felt an overnight change, a total change in everything around me”.
Li Xiaobing (2007). A history of the modern Chinese army. University Press of Kentucky. Page 165
This change was not only in words but also in cash.
In March 1949, two months after the PLA took over Beijing, Qian received a notice from the CCP government to attend an international conference in Paris. Having studied in Paris, Qian thought attending the conference would provide a good opportunity for him to contact his former professors and buy new books and equipment in France. He requested $200,000 for his purchases. Four days later, he received a call summoning him to the central government office at Zhongnanhai. Li Weihan, minister of the CCP United Front, greeted Qian with the good news that he had received $50,000.
Li Xiaobing (2007). Page 147
Despite all these hopeful outlooks “In that year (1949), thousands of anti-Communist Chinese intellectuals fled the mainland and went to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. (So called) emigre’s, not exiles, because they were not forced to leave China. They left China because they had made the decision to do so."
Yung Kenneth Kai-chung (2015). Cold war currents and Chinese emigre intellectuals, 1949–1960. Twentieth-Century China, 40, (2). Page 165

Peaceful takeover

The peaceful takeover of several cities during the Civil war is another way to reassure the minzhu dangpai. The good examples are Beijing and Tianjin. After negotiations Beijing is fallen in the hands of the PLA. Tianjin is after some fierce fighting in the outskirts of the city under control of the PLA. The infrastructure of this economic important city is more or less intact. Tianjin was north China’s largest port, a finance and transportation hub. The cadres (often small-town students,ex-farmers,and CCP underground operatives), who are sent to the city have recently received crash courses in urban administration. The cadres can not cope with Tianjin’s urban landscape, which represents a new level of complexity and obscurity. They use their old techniques from the land reform and encourage workers and clerks to purge the owners of factories and shops. “Fifty-three such purges had occurred one month after the seizure of Tianjin, forcing many capitalists to flee to Hong Kong. As a result, no more than 30% of private enterprises were still in business several months later.”
Yang Kuisong(2007).The evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's policy on the bourgeoisie (1949–1952), Journal of Modern Chinese History, 1:1,
In order to restore the economy and to facilitate the regime change in this town the prominent political leader Liu Shaoqi handles the problems. Liu Shaoqi was present from April 10 till May 7, 1949 and Liu told leaders that they should centralize city government by having the municipal bureaucracy assume tasks that local districts had been handling. Neighbourhood organizations were in charge of too many things, Liu said, which wasted time and resources and was an example of “village work style.” “The city is concentrated, so work should also be concentrated."
Brown Jeremy (2012). City versus countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the divide. Cambridge University Press. Page 21
See also Kenneth Lieberthal, “Mao versus Liu? Policy towards Industry and Commerce, 1946-49” CQ 47, 494-520
He convinces the cadres to stop the purge of capitalists because for this moment the economy relies on them. The actual economic problems Liu Shaoqi solves in a very pragmatic way.
In answering
Song Feiqing
Song Feiqing (1898–1956)
director of Dongya, a company in Tianjin, Liu Shaoqi reassures him: “You are now exploiting more than 1,000 men; if you exploit more than 2,000 men that’s even better, we want you to exploit more laborers!"
Dittmer Lowell (1998). Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese cultural revolution. New York. Page 203
Song states in an interview that his meeting with Liu Shaoqi has convinced him of the possibilities to develop a national industry under communist reign. His conviction does not last long in 1950 he leaves for Hong Kong and later he goes to Argentina.
Also other leaders try to convince industrialists to stay.
Liu Hongzheng
Liu Hongzheng (1888-1956) Industrialist
an industrialist of Shanghai moved to Hong Kong just days before the PLA took over the city. “…after Premier Zhou Enlai’s emissaries had reassured him of his safety and had promised business opportunities.23 Upon disembarking in Tianjin, Liu was taken to Beijing to dine with Zhou, who pledged protection of Liu’s property and business and urged him to set an example of cooperation. When Liu arrived in Shanghai the following day, Mayor Chen Yi (陈毅) repeated the welcome with supper at his home.”
U Eddy (2012). Dangerous Privilege: The United Front and the Rectification Campaign of the Early Mao Years. The China Journal, 68. Page 40. "Liu Hongsheng was deeply disturbed by the failure of the gold yuan reform and Chiang Ching-kuo’s treatment of Chinese capitalists (October 1948), and he was not alone. According to Lloyd Eastman, “Most people thereafter abandoned all hope for economic recovery; the failure of the reform seemed to demonstrate that the National Government was totally without resources to control the inflation.”13 Liu Hongsheng shared this view, and he ceased to envision any role for himself and his family members in Taiwan. Under the Nationalist government, he soberly told his children at a family meeting, “Taiwan would not be a safe place.”14 Cochran Sherman (2007)Capitalists Choosing Communist China: The Liu Family of Shanghai, 1948–56 in Brown Jeremy & Pickowicz Paul G. Dilemmas of Victory The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China. London Page 363.
Stalin backs Liu Shaoqi and other political leaders in a general comment on how to treat the bourgeoisie: …that we, the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle against the imperialists. Therefore [we] advise to encourage the trading activities of the national bourgeoisie both inside of China and on the outside, let's say trade with Hong Kong and with other foreign capitalists.”
Document: 26-04-1949 Stalin advices Mao on how to treat the Chines bourgeoisie. See also Document: 22-02-1950 Stalin on People's Democracy in China
The CCP want to avoid the complications which occurred in Shijiazhuang on November 12, 1947 "…the Communist advance had prompted armed pickets to turn criticism meetings into indiscriminate slaughter sessions. The party quickly issued an order prohibiting anyone but public security officials from conducting arrests and executions or carrying out property confiscation during the liberation process. When the Sixth All- China Labor Congress was convened in Harbin in August 1948, a resolution outlining procedures for liberating the cities stressed the importance of maintaining order, protecting machines and equipment at all public and private enterprises, and guarding against sabotage and theft. No mention was made of a proletarian uprising."
Perry Elizabeth J.(2006). Patrolling the revolution: Worker militias, citizenship, and the modern Chinese state. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing group. Page 135

On April 8, 1948 Mao Zedong as commander of the PLA has ordered an 8 point instruction to the troops after ransacking of some cities in the Northeast.
1. be very prudent in the liquidation of the organs of Kuomintang rule.
2. Set a clear line of demarcation in defining bureaucrat-capital and do not confiscate all the industrial and commercial enterprises run by Kuomintang members.
3. Forbid peasant organizations to enter the city to seize landlords and settle scores with them.
4. On entering the city, do not lightly advance slogans of raising wages and reducing working hours.
5. Do not be in a hurry to organize the people of the city to struggle for democratic reforms and improvements in livelihood.
6. In the big cities, food and fuel must be handled in a planned way.
7. Members of Kuomintang and Three People’s Principles Youth League must be screened and registered.
8. It is strictly forbidden to destroy any means of production, whether publicly or privately owned, and to waste consumer goods.
Document: 08-04-1948 Telegram to the headquarters of the Loyang front after the recapture of the city. These are based on Mao Zedongs instructions "On the reissue of the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention — instruction of the general headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army" October 10, 1947
Also other members of the CCP make comments on the behaviour of PLA troops.
Huang Jing
Huang Jing (1912-1958) Mayor of Tianjin June 1949-April 1953
, the later mayor of Tianjin, said in a speech on December 1948 “When you enter the city, you absolutely cannot find any old corner and urinate and defecate like you would in the village”
Brown Jeremy (2012). Page 16
Zhu De emphasizes the importance of discipline when the PLA goes south and protect industry and commerce.
Document:11-04-1949 Zhu De "Domestic situation and points for attention after crossing the changjiang river
These peaceful takeovers are also the result of the fear of the residents of the cities. They want to avoid the fate of the inhabitants of Changchun. In October 1948 the PLA conquers the city after a siege of 5 months. During the encirclement between 100.000 and 300.000 citizens die of starvation.
Byrne Paul J. (2006). The Chinese Revolution: The Triumph of Communism. Capstone. Page 61

The CCP had made special preparations to overtake the metropolis Shanghai. They distinguished 3 areas of intervention: the economy, which has to be left more or less intact, the second area education, press and culture has to be gradually reformed and the third area the remains of GMD government, army and police has to be completely destroyed.
In Shanghai the party has a good reputation as Stranahan
Stranahan P. (1992). Strange bedfellows: The communist party and Shanghai’s elite in the National Salvation Movement. The China Quarterly, 129. Page 26. In their book "The Lius of Shanghai" Cochran Sherman & Hsieh Andrew show how a rich family deals with the evolving situation in Shanghai. "On December 17, 1949, Father wrote to him that Shanghai was the place where all of the Lius should be. “Since liberation (in 1949), everything in our country has returned to normal. The corruption and decadence of the old days have been wiped out entirely. The army’s discipline is especially impressive. It is the first we’ve seen in the republican period [since 1911]. Although life is still hard at the moment, people from all walks of life are working diligently to vercome difficulties. It is generally believed that great hope lies ahead. I share this view. At home, everything is fine.” Page 337
puts it: "Making use of multi-class patriotism, Party leaders established a co-operative relationship with members of the elite that became a crucial part of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resistance work against Japan. In many cases, the relationship continued into the post-war years and contributed significantly to the CCP's easy takeover of the city in May 1949."

Strikes

These good relations in Shanghai could not prevent economic and social chaos. In December 1949 there are over 3300 strikes in the city. “…in the months- following the Communist occupation of Shanghai in May,' 1949, thousands of labor disputes broke out in that city. The workers, who were now being told by the Communists that they were the leading class in the country, were evidently determined to put this to the test by pushing for an immediate improvement in their economic status. In very many cases, however, this took the form of excessive and irresponsible demands and actions. The Communist authorities, still not firmly in control of the labor organizations;, were apparently unwilling to antagonize the workers by openly opposing such demands, but at the same time they were also aware that the economy (particularly in this period of economic depression in Shanghai) could not bear up under the continued strain of these demands, and that the situation tended to undermine their policy of cooperation with private capital.”
Bernard Thomas S. (1953). Page 20
Mikoyan has warned the CCP leaders not to prohibit strikes: "…otherwise the CCP may lose the trust of workers. The significance of the working class in the revolution is determined not by its quantity, I said, but by the fact that it is a new class, the carrier of the most progressive ideas. The future belongs to the working class. Its significance in the society will grow unstoppably. The question that one should not prohibit strikes caused a noticeable bewilderment on the part of Mao Zedong and the present members of the CCP CC Politburo. On the whole telegrams with recommendations on the work among workers, youth, women and on the preparation of the Chinese cadres, the content of which was conveyed by me to Mao Zedong and the Politburo members, made a good impression. When they were related, Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo uniformly nodded in agreement, and Mao Zedong said that the suggestions will be carried out."
Document: 05-02-1949 Memorandum of conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong

Problems with governing cities

The CCP politicians are aware that the situation they have to deal with in Shanghai is quite different from former tasks. Mao Zedong is worried and tells Kovalev “…our lack of experience with running such a big city, we do not have specialists, capable of handling the management and usage of the electrical station, water supply, large textile and other enterprises”.
Dcocument:11-04-1949 Zhu De "Domestic situation and points for attention after crossing the changjiang river. Mao Zedong remarks: "We know our weaknesses; we feel it too. It is not just our leaders who have no experience of managing the economy, but the whole party too. We are like a girl who is about to be married. While she knows that she will eventually bear children, she has no idea how it will happen, except that this is bound to happen after marriage. We are exactly like that. We know the general direction, and we know how to develop the national economy. We strive towards this direction, but we cannot say how it will turn out, because we are uncertain ourselves. We must quickly build up our economic capabilities. 60" Cited in Lim Jin Li (2016). New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959. Page 55
Mao Zedong knows he has to rely partly on the old GMD bureaucracy. See Part 12. For that reason he asks Kovalev during this same meeting on April 9, 1949 to send Soviet specialists in running commercial cities and he also asks specialists in contra espionage. The CCP has sent some specialists of their own to Shanghai. On May 5, 1949 Pan Hannian (intelligence worker),
Xu Dixin
Xu Dixin (1906-1988)
(economist) and Xia Yan (writer) leave from Hong Kong to Tianjin, where they receive instructions for underground work in Shanghai.
One of their main tasks is to control the popular press in the newly liberated areas and to promote the upcoming political consultative conference.
Johnson Matthew David (2008) International and wartime origins of the propaganda state : the motion picture in China, 1897-1955 PhD., University of California. Page 340


Literature Notes Documents...

-
2.Bernard Thomas S. (1953). Government and administration in Communist China. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. Page 14 Back
3.Yu Yuegen (1999). The bond of an enduring relationship: United States-China scientific relations, 1949-1989. Page 32 Back
4. The US has several consulates in China in 1949: Guangzhou, Chongqing, Dalian, Wuhan, Kunming, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao. Chen (2001) states: In fact, CCP leaders in the Northeast already believed that American diplomats in Shenyang were “actively engaged in” collecting military intelligence information about “the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and China’s liberated zones.” In a summary report to the CCP leadership on 24 November, the CCP Northeast Bureau concluded that a group of special spies existed at the U.S. consulate in Shenyang, who had conducted espionage activities on the GMD’s behalf (telegram, CCP Northeast Bureau to CCP Central Committee, 24 November 1948, CCA) page 297 Back
6. Sheng Michael M. (1998b). Mao’s ideology, personality, and the CCP’s foreign relations. In Li Hongshan & Hong Zhaohui (Eds.), Image, perception, and the making of U.S.-China relations. University press of America. Page 184 Back
9.Lutze Thomas D. (2007). China’s inevitable revolution. Rethinking America’s loss to the communists. New York. Page 181. Jeans (2018) concludes "The China White Paper, (…), included a thinly veiled appeal for such (third force) groups. In 1949 and 1950, the United States was open to third force alternatives to the Nationalists on Taiwan. From 1950 to 1953, American policy drifted toward increasing support for the armed anticommunists in Taiwan, thanks to the Korean War, while still secretly supporting promising third force efforts. … in November 1953, (the US) finally acknowledged Taiwan was the only viable noncommunist force. With conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Nationalists and the Americans at the end of 1954 and recognition of the failure of the CIA’s third force project, Americans resumed their former close relationship with the Nationalists, and US aid flowed to them once again." Jeans Roger B. (2018) The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War. Page 237 Back
10.Chen Jian (2005). Mao and Sino-American relations. In Melvyn P. Leffler & David S. Painter, Origins of the cold war An International History Routledge. Page 286 Back
11.Groot G. (1997). Managing transitions: The Chinese communist party united front work, minor parties and groups, hegemony and corporatism. Adelaide. Page 91 Back
13.Houn Franklin W.(1961) To change a nation: Propaganda and indoctrination in communist China. New York. Page 4-5. Xu notices "The economic hardships were so severe that they (CCP) began to shake peasant support as trade was disrupted and the tax burden increased in Communist-administered areas. The leadership thus launched the “great production movement” to ameliorate the condition. Some base areas even began to join in the illicit opium trade to survive. Coupled with this condition was the need to appeal to public opinion and win over upper classes from the KMT. This led to the strategy to tighten internally and soften externally (waikuan neijing). In other words, the Party needed to establish clear boundaries between the internal and external constituencies and enforce strict discipline in its own rank and file while externally projecting a liberal and open-minded image on its leadership. The goal was to exercise control over the politics of interpretation." Xu Xiaohong (1918). The Origins and Growth of the Chinese Communist Movement. Page 10 Back
14.Mutter Paul (2010). Separating “Scholar” from “Gentry”: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Ruling Class, 1800 to 1945. Page 62 Back
15.Li Xiaobing (2007). A history of the modern Chinese army. University Press of Kentucky. Page 165 Back
16.Li Xiaobing (2007). Page 147 Back
17.Yung Kenneth Kai-chung (2015). Cold war currents and Chinese emigre intellectuals, 1949–1960. Twentieth-Century China, 40, (2). Page 165 Back
18.Yang Kuisong(2007).The evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's policy on the bourgeoisie (1949–1952), Journal of Modern Chinese History, 1:1, Back
19.Brown Jeremy (2012). City versus countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the divide. Cambridge University Press. Page 21 Back
20. See also Kenneth Lieberthal, “Mao versus Liu? Policy towards Industry and Commerce, 1946-49” CQ 47, 494-520 Back
21. Dittmer Lowell (1998). Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese cultural revolution. New York. Page 203 Back
22.U Eddy (2012). Dangerous Privilege: The United Front and the Rectification Campaign of the Early Mao Years. The China Journal, 68. Page 40. "Liu Hongsheng was deeply disturbed by the failure of the gold yuan reform and Chiang Ching-kuo’s treatment of Chinese capitalists (October 1948), and he was not alone. According to Lloyd Eastman, “Most people thereafter abandoned all hope for economic recovery; the failure of the reform seemed to demonstrate that the National Government was totally without resources to control the inflation.”13 Liu Hongsheng shared this view, and he ceased to envision any role for himself and his family members in Taiwan. Under the Nationalist government, he soberly told his children at a family meeting, “Taiwan would not be a safe place.”14 Cochran Sherman (2007)Capitalists Choosing Communist China: The Liu Family of Shanghai, 1948–56 in Brown Jeremy & Pickowicz Paul G. Dilemmas of Victory The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China. London Page 363. Back
24.Perry Elizabeth J.(2006). Patrolling the revolution: Worker militias, citizenship, and the modern Chinese state. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing group. Page 135 Back
26.Brown Jeremy (2012). Page 16 Back
28.Byrne Paul J. (2006). The Chinese Revolution: The Triumph of Communism. Capstone. Page 61 Back
29.Stranahan P. (1992). Strange bedfellows: The communist party and Shanghai’s elite in the National Salvation Movement. The China Quarterly, 129. Page 26. In their book "The Lius of Shanghai" Cochran Sherman & Hsieh Andrew show how a rich family deals with the evolving situation in Shanghai. "On December 17, 1949, Father wrote to him that Shanghai was the place where all of the Lius should be. “Since liberation (in 1949), everything in our country has returned to normal. The corruption and decadence of the old days have been wiped out entirely. The army’s discipline is especially impressive. It is the first we’ve seen in the republican period [since 1911]. Although life is still hard at the moment, people from all walks of life are working diligently to vercome difficulties. It is generally believed that great hope lies ahead. I share this view. At home, everything is fine.” Page 337 Back
30.Bernard Thomas S. (1953). Page 20 Back
33.Johnson Matthew David (2008) International and wartime origins of the propaganda state : the motion picture in China, 1897-1955 PhD., University of California. Page 340 Back

Documents...

10-10-1947 Mao Zedong "On the reissue of the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention — instruction of the general headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army"
Next Part 5: The role of the Soviet Union in creating a political consultative conference