

1950

Meetings

Dates of Meeting:

06-08-1950

Type of Meeting:

CMC

Place of Meeting:

Beijing

Attendance:

Mao, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Su Yu, Nie Rongzhen, Deng Xiaoping, Ho Lung and others

Major Agenda Items:

to discuss the Korean War and the Taiwan invasion plan

Speeches/Reports:

Peng and Su advise Mao that the People's Liberation Army is not ready to invade Taiwan. The Army will need modern weapons and transports. Besides, the US Navy is the way because of the Korean War and the invasion must be postponed until the Korean War is concluded and the US Navy withdrawn from the Strait of Formosa..

Nie, acting chief of staff, PLA, reports that the N Korean Army is bogged down and the tide is about to turn against it. Gen. Nie is also concerned about the excessive loss rate (more than 40%) of the N Korean Army.

Su Yu, in charge of the Taiwan invasion army, asks - "What is China supposed to do about it?"

Zhu De, replies - "The Revolutionary Committee has spent a great deal of time discussing the possibility - and I emphasize the tentative nature of our talks. The Committee feels, after giving the matter lengthy consideration, that we should urgently prepare contingency plans to back up the Korean People's Army if the situation on the Korean battlefield deteriorates. There seems little likelihood of this happening, but I need not remind you of the need for planning for any and every contingency."

Ho Lung asks - "Is there any chance of the Americans using the atomic bomb?"

Nie states that it is not likely because Stalin has the bomb, too. But, will Stalin help? Another general asks if the PLA is not up to invade Taiwan now, how can it fight the Americans in Korea? After much debates, the generals agree that China must be prepared to help Kim Il Sung.

Peng states - "There is every indication that this bridgehead will be eliminated within the next two weeks. If it is not, then the possibility of protracted war in Korea cannot be ruled out. Look carefully at the geography. The Korean peninsula . Long and narrow. Remember the enemy. MacArthur the - what's the word?--the 'island-hopper.' The Korean peninsula lends itself to amphibious operations, though this will require a lot of daring. Our Korean comrades discount the possibility, but remember, whoever makes the first move, wins."

"Remember also that a long and narrow landmass imposes its peculiar limitations on our field armies. In past campaigns we have habitually traded space for time when confronting a better-equipped opponent. Korea has no such space. It could turn out to be a straitjacket. A peninsula presents unusual supply difficulties. This occurred to me when I reviewed the American situation in Pusan. The Americans problems are considerably eased because distances within the Pusan perimeter are short. Although it is true that the enemy is forced to transport men and materiel great distances by sea. those supply lines are inviolate. They cannot be cut."

"Our Korean comrades, on the other hand, are operating a long way from their supply bases. This is becoming a dreadful disadvantage. American air attacks on those supply lines are causing serious losses. The basic problem of Korea, for either side, is that the farther you advance the slimmer your supplies are likely to become."

"China will become involved in hostilities in Korea only if the integrity of their Democratic People's Republic is directly threatened. There is no likelihood of any such disaster at present. Still, it is our business to cover every contingency, so let us assume that some incredible turn of fortune enables the American imperialists to launch a full-scale invasion north of the 38th parallel. The Chinese response, in my opinion, should be on a limited scale, sufficient to warn the aggressors. If that fails, we should attack with the full weight of the People's Liberation Army."

Other Decisions and/or Actions:

Remarks: