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Conclusion. Outline on opposing Capitulation

June 13, 1939

I The Question of the Current Situation

1. It is absolutely correct to say that the main factor in capitulation is the wavering of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie.
2. Two possible types of capitulation must be overcome—(1) partial surrender, and (2) surrender of the majority. The first is a possibility at present, in a situation where the majority is fighting the War of Resistance; the other is a possibility in the future, in a situation where the majority may have surrendered. But doing the present work facilitates future work; the two are inextricably linked.
3. According to the definition of the Sixth Plenum, only a balance between enemy forces and our forces under certain circumstances constitutes a stalemate. In that case, not only is it impossible to call the present phase one of stalemate but, if a Li Jingwei appears, that will mean that the enemy has already organized (he is trying hard to organize) his strategic reserves and is deploying them in combat—encircling our positions from the rear (beyond a doubt, national counterrevolution is a strategic ally of imperialism). At such a point, there would be even less of a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, but we would rather have suffered a major defeat. Such a time would be characterized by the fact that we were being attacked by Japanese imperialism plus Li Jingwei (China's Franco). Hence it would be much more serious than the past strategic withdrawal and would by no means constitute any sort of stalemate.
4. Right now, Japanese imperialism is organizing two strategic allied armies. One is that of international capitulationists, and the other is of Chinese capitulationists. The former is used to encircle China from without, and the latter is used to outflank China from within. The direction of our efforts is to mobilize the anticapitulationist forces both internationally and within the country, to defeat these two allied armies of the enemy. So long as they have not been defeated, there is no stalemate phase.
5. The frontal enemy (the main forces of Japanese imperialism) may yet launch more military attacks. It is wrong to say that such a possibility does not exist. Although he faces economic and financial difficulties and problems of manpower and military capability, there still exists the possibility of enemy offensives in terms of real strength and timing. Therefore, not only is it necessary, on the one* hand, to defeat the flank attacks of the new enemy; it is also necessary, on the other hand, to prepare to continue to defeat the frontal attacks of the old enemy. This is the only way to achieve a balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves and to bring about a stalemate.
6. This is not to say, however, that a stalemate will emerge only when the real strength of the frontal and flank enemies has been reduced to such an extent that it is equivalent to that of our anti-Japanese armies in all respects*. It is not a question of

equalizing real strength but, rather, that our real strength plus the enemy's weaknesses plus international constraints equals a stalemate.

7. Therefore, a stalemate may emerge under three conditions:

a. A large geographical area, a large population, and a Consolidated position can create a balance between the enemy and ourselves. For example, the midpoint of the Russian civil war and the midpoint of the war in Europe, China, since the beginning of the War of Resistance, has had large territory and a large population, but not a solid position (political! corruption and troublemaking by the capitulationists), so there is no stalemate yet. If efforts can be made to overcome the danger of surrender, and in the process of overcoming it politics are reformed and positions Consolidated, then a stalemate will occur. This is the First condition.

b. A balance may also occur in areas that are small (meaning that directly controlled base areas are small, though the country is large) and have fewer people but have a Consolidated position. For example, the Red Army's ten years of fighting and, to a certain extent, the Northeast Volunteer Army, during a certain period. If betrayal by the majority became a reality in the future, the remaining minority could still create a balance, as long as the "Encirclement and Suppression" were continuously smashed, and in this way

c. a condition of stalemate would be present. The current situation in North China can be described as a temporary small-scale stalemate. Prolonging the situation in North China will turn it into a protracted small-scale stalemate,

d. The transformation of a small-scale stalemate, as described above, into a large-scale stalemate is achieved through expansion of the united front and victories in the anti-encirclement-and-suppression struggle. If at the time it is still impossible to launch strategic counterattacks (and it is still during a period of counteroffensive campaigns), then it remains a phase of stalemate.

8. If betrayal by the majority is inevitable in the course of the War of Resistance, then there will have to be an entire phase of stalemate according to the following formula: a temporary large-scale stalemate after Wuhan (the current situation can be called a stalemate in a certain sense, but it can only be called temporary because the positions are not solid)—a small-scale stalemate sometime later—another large-scale stalemate sometime later still.

The main characteristic of such a change is that from an insect; re to a Consolidated position. A long-term stalemate demands Consolidated positions. With this condition satisfied, a balance may be maintained even with small numbers, and, without it, even large numbers may not be able to achieve it. "Therefore, it is necessary to strive for large quantities (many people and large areas. But the key element remains strong quality. What is meant by Consolidated positions is consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas and consolidation of the united front.

9. There is a real stalemate situation in North China, but it is still temporary. By proposing to 'persist in the guerrilla war in North China/ we aim to transform the temporary stalemate into a long-term one. If all other places except North China have become dark (as happened to the New Fourth Army and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region). then even though it is a partial situation in terms of geographical area and the number of people, North China will be the only region where anti-Japanese forces exist, and this will still signify strategic stalemate. This is a hard situation. but we should be prepared for it. We will continue to work to the end. and we can continue to work to the end. even if the major half of the sky becomes dark and there is only the Communist Party left to resist the Japanese. Continuing the work in this way for three to five years, arousing the masses, attracting friendly allied forces and gradually forming a grand new anti-Japanese front, we will become the core and leading force in the War of Resistance against Japan and the salvation of the country.

So, no matter how you describe it, our future is bright, but the road is a very difficult one.

10. At present, it is precisely the time for readjustment of the relationship between the enemy and ourselves (the forces of the enemy and our forces). to see which side can win over the majority and which side has the best quality for this will decide which side wins and which side loses. The issue of who will win and who will lose is still undecided. and both sides are renewing their efforts to create favorable conditions.

The front will inevitably be reorganized and it must be reorganized. A portion of our allied forces (that consisting of the landlords and the bourgeoisie) may become a force allied with the enemy. But we should never allow all of them to go. We must seek support from another part of them. and it is entirely possible to do so. We still have broad allied forces which have not yet been mobilized. If the Chinese peasants, the Japanese workers, peasants, and soldiers, the international proletariat, and the power of the Soviet Union are mobilized. the enemies are doomed.

The enemies are counterrevolutionary and we are revolutionary. This difference in nature determines who wins the final victory. But the tactics used in directing the war play an «even greater role in deciding which side wins. Without the latter factor, and relying only on one's superior quality. victory can still not be obtained.

II. The Question of Transformation

1. We have said that we should prepare ourselves to cope with new possible situations and a possible Miaga. This should be done in accordance with the general line of the Sixth Plenum. Under the general line of the Sixth Plenum. prepare to counter a possible Miaga (or a Hacha) and to adopt a policy of temporary retreat in the area occupied by a Miaga. So far. one cannot imagine a 180 degree change as compared to the Sixth Plenum. That is to say that if there are changes. they will not be changes in the line. They will be partial and temporary changes of strategy and tactics for the purpose of preventing unexpected attacks. This point must first be made

very dear. We must adhere resolutely to the general line.

2. At present, what we should strive for with the utmost efforts, with the whole strength of our Party, is to avert the possibility of capitulation; to win over the majority to resist Japan; and to support, help, supervise and criticize the Guomindang and Chiang in order to enable them to overcome the tendency of capitulation in the struggle against Wang and in their future development. This is the central task at present.

3. Therefore, it is imperative to stress unity, unified actions, and long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but not to stress other matters. These emphases are the only means to overcome the crisis, of capitulation and are the only ways to prepare ourselves better to cope with possible turns of events. All of this is to isolate the capitalists and not oneself.

III. On Several Questions of Tactics

1. The question of consolidating the Party (the policy of organizational streamlining). Since the decision of the meeting held in March last year, the Party has grown greatly in numbers throughout the country. The present task is to consolidate it. So generally speaking, further recruitment should stop for the time being. Of course, this does not mean that not even one person should be admitted. There are some places where the membership should still be expanded. The suspension of recruitment is intended to facilitate consolidation, elimination of spies, and education. There will be further expansion in the future.

2. The Party should protect new Party members and cadres very well. The main responsibility rests on the shoulders of old Party members and old cadres. The relationship between new Party members and old Party members, and between new cadres and old cadres, should be dealt with well. If this is not done well, the old Party members and old cadres must bear the main responsibility. It is entirely reasonable to forgive new Party members and cadres, but there is no reason to treat old Party members and cadres in the same way. There were some erroneous viewpoints regarding this question in the past. The matter is broadly similar to the relationship between the main forces and the local and guerrilla forces.

Large numbers of cadres should be promoted from among the new Party members.

3. Intensify Inner-Party education. Combine class education with national education. But at present, class education should be emphasized, while not neglecting national education in the united front.

Textbooks of an intermediate level should be compiled, and, on philosophical questions, the emphasis should be on historical materialism.

4. Local cadres should be promoted. Without local cadres, including middle-level

and senior ones. it is impossible to establish and consolidate the bases.

Oppose the tendency toward 'imperial envoys," and oppose the attitude that despises "country bumpkins." Do away with the appellation "country bumpkins."

5. We must protect revolutionary intellectuals. and not repeal past mistakes. Without revolutionary' intellectuals. the revolution cannot be victorious. The Guomindang is competing with us for young people. and the army should definitely take in large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals. Worker and peasant cadres should be persuaded to swallow them and not to be afraid of them. Without the help of revolutionary intellectuals. workers and peasants cannot improve themselves. Without intellectuals. the work of managing the country, the Party', and the army cannot be done. The government. the Party bureaus, and the mass movements should also attract revolutionary intellectuals.

6. The question of suspending the expansion of the Party and withdrawing the Party from friendly allied parties and troops. From the perspective of the overall situation, suspension and withdrawal are beneficial. Otherwise. the overall situation may be affected by this matter alone and the united front may be disrupted. The revolution cannot triumph without seeking the support of the Chinese armies, and. at present, this support can best be obtained in political terms. Setting up Party organizations there will hinder gaining political! support.

Rely on mouths rather than on organizations (under the temporary conditions).

and depend on higher levels rather than on lower levels.

On the one hand, withdraw the Party, and. on the other. strengthen liaison, accepting a certain independence of united front work.

In general. the policy of sabotage is to be carried out only in the armies, movements, and political parties of real capitulationists. In principle, only the policy of winning political support is adopted in all other cases. Some special departments may not follow the approach of withdrawal.

7. Not killing Guomindang members is of great significance. This does not mean not killing traitors and spies, and a few defectors, or those who endanger the revolution at critical moments.

8. It is inappropriate to put excessive emphasis on democracy and people's livelihood. Now it is essential to stress the opposition to capitulation (emphasize the War of Resistance). There should not be several priorities at the same time. They are linkages and not priorities.

In the Guomindang-ruled areas, democracy and people's livelihood are propaganda slogans, and not calls for action.

On troop recruitment. taxation. and production issues, an attitude of support as

well as criticism should be adopted. The attitude of fundamental opposition cannot be adopted.

9. local policies. There should be local policies that are clear and suitable to the local conditions and various situations. Later, the Center should give attention to providing guidance.

10. Mass movements should be strengthened. This is the meaning of what is called preparing the masses. It does not imply downgrading class struggle in order to overcome capitulationism. Only by correctly promoting class struggle, and linking it to the united front, can capitulation be overcome. It is dangerous to have only unity and no struggle. The masses are our ultimate support, and the ultimate support of the War of Resistance.

11. The problem of the Muslims.

12. The publication of internal Party periodicals should be started immediately. Localities should also run publications.

13. Other matters.

The overall conclusion is the following: Unite to surmount all difficulties.

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