

The current situation and the party's task for 1949

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1) In the military sphere, our one-year plan has been exceeded in half a year.

Between July and December 1948, we annihilated 148 divisions of the enemy's regular troops, including 111 full-strength divisions. When the campaigns of Beijing-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan, and Datong had been concluded, over sixty full-

strength enemy divisions had been destroyed. This means that altogether some 210

enemy divisions have been wiped out, some 173 of them being full-strength divisions. After the spring of 1949, the GMD will have only about 160 divisions, most

of which are newly formed or have been replenished after annihilation, or have a weak fighting capability. Only a small number of them possesses a relatively strong

fighting capability, for example, the Gui clique and the Ma family. In 1949 the

GMD could mobilize half a million people who, apart from replenishing the existing divisions, will be formed into several new divisions which will have no fighting

capability whatsoever. After the campaigns of Beijing-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan,

and Datong, may we say that we have basically overthrown the GMD regime? In

terms of destroying its main military strength, we may say yes. But there are several

major battles to be fought in Nanjing, Wuhan, and Xi'an. After these battles have

been fought, then, not only in military terms but also in political and economic

terms, we will have basically overthrown the GMD regime. Basically overthrowing

the GMD is not the same as completely overthrowing the GMD. There are many

enemy troops in China waiting for us to destroy; there are many areas waiting for us

to occupy and work in. The idea of treating the enemy lightly should not be entertained at any time.

We must never let victory go to our heads.

2) The balance of power between the classes in China has undergone a fundamental change. The majority of the people are leaving the GMD's influence and

control in huge numbers and coming over to our side. The liberal bourgeoisie is

seeking a way out from us. Very few of them are following the GMD. The representatives of each democratic party and private organization have come, or are coming,

to the liberated areas in large groups. The GMD's entire strategic front north of the

Yangtze River has collapsed. The GMD is in a state of great confusion and collapse

within the areas it still rules. We are completely confident that we will defeat the

GMD throughout the whole country. Nineteen forty-nine and 1950 are going to be the two years in which the Chinese revolution will achieve victory throughout the whole country. We must carry the revolution through to the end; we must never allow it to abort halfway. We must persuasively carry out educational work within the party, within the PLA, and among the people. We must provide explanations for the representatives of all the democratic parties and private organizations, so that all will understand why the revolution must be continued to the end and must not be allowed to abort halfway. The GMD's plot of so-called peace negotiations must be continuously exposed and foiled.

3) The favorable conditions for fighting in the south are: the GMD's military no longer has any main strength left, while we have a powerful army; the GMD's prestige is totally gone, while our party enjoys extremely high prestige; the south is a region that experienced the revolution of 1924-27 and the years of the land revolution; now there are many guerrilla forces and areas of guerrilla warfare there. These are the favorable conditions. The unfavorable conditions for fighting in the south are: most of the areas there are under GMD rule. Our party's organizations there are not strong; the masses there have not been mobilized. Under these circumstances, supplies to our army will meet many difficulties in the initial period. It is easy to seize big cities, but it is more difficult to control them than the northern cities. These are unfavorable conditions. We must be aware of both the favorable and unfavorable conditions. We must also clearly tell them to all the cadres and soldiers going south, so that they will have full mental preparations and use the favorable conditions well to overcome unfavorable conditions, thus striving for victory throughout the whole country.

4) We have always calculated in our battle plans the possibility that the United States will send troops directly to occupy several coastal cities in China and involve us in combat. This calculation is not to be given up now, lest we be totally unprepared should such a thing happen. But the stronger and more resolute the Chinese people's revolutionary forces, the smaller the possibility that the United States will resort to direct military intervention, and the smaller the possibility that it will use finance and weapons to aid the GMD. In the past year, especially in the past three

months, the attitude of the U.S. government has continued to waver and has undergone some changes; this has proved the above point. Among the Chinese people and within our party there exist erroneous views that overestimate the strength of the American imperialists. We must continuously expose these views and overcome them.

5) The American imperialists' China policy has changed from only supporting the GMD's armed anticommunism to a two-faced policy. This is: on the one hand, they support the GMD's remaining military forces and regional warlords in their continued resistance against the PLA. On the other hand, they send their lackeys to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organize the so-called opposition to sabotage the revolution from within. When the People's Liberation War nears nationwide victory, they will not even regret using the method of recognizing the People's Republic to gain legal status and implement this policy of "internal sabotage." We must raise our vigilance against and resolutely smash this plot of the imperialists.

6) In the past several years, and particularly in 1948, the majority of party cadres have systematically learned all the specific policies and tactics for working in the countryside, in the cities, and for military operations. They have systematically corrected right and "left" deviations. Many comrades learned in a year what previously they still did not know even after a long period of time. Thus, the party's

General Line can be implemented throughout the entire party. This is the greatest and most fundamental victory. This represents an enormous increase in the degree of political maturity of our party. This example clearly illustrates: our party will be able to control power throughout the country in the not-too-distant future. In order to guarantee victory, a widespread and deepening education about policy should be carried out in 1949. When we say "we have learned," this does not mean that we do not have to continue to learn. We have to learn many things. When we say "deviations have been corrected," this does not mean that there are no deviations within

the party or that no deviations will occur in the future. There are some deviations within the party now, and deviations will occur in the future. We must pay attention to correcting deviations within the party all the time.

B. The Party's Tasks for 1949

1) In the three seasons, summer, autumn, and winter of 1949, we should try to

occupy the major parts of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Gansu. Some of these eight provinces will be occupied in their entirety.

2) We must transfer and train in time the 53,000 cadres to be used together with the army in the summer, autumn, and winter of 1949.

3) We must regularize further all the field armies in 1949; this is mainly to strengthen artillery and army engineering, use modern transportation tools like railways, highways, and waterways, strengthen the organization and discipline of the troops, resolutely overcome the problems of lack of discipline that seriously exist within the army, and strengthen the work of the headquarters.

4) We should try to form a serviceable air force and a navy that can defend our coasts and rivers in 1949 and 1950. This possibility exists.

5) We must genuinely raise agricultural and industrial production throughout the liberated areas in 1949 in comparison with 1948. The main railways and highways in our areas should be repaired and used. Economic and financial operations in our areas should be more planned and unified, where possible and necessary, in order to avoid waste in labor power and material resources and obstacles increased production and to work to support the front.

6) In 1949, where possible and necessary, we must strengthen the organization and efficiency of logistical work in the rear areas of the PLA so as to support effectively their great advances into the southern provinces. Such operations involve appropriate planning for production in the munitions industry, the readjustment and establishment of other military-related industries outside of the munitions industry, the establishment of a weapons system, a unified regulation governing the standards of all kinds of supplies, the unified distribution of medical and communications equipment, the division of labor between the front and the rear in transportation and storage, and the establishment of the organization and system of logistics in the rear.

7) In 1949, in terms of the political work of the PLA, we must summarize, under the leadership of the political department of the Military Affairs Commission, the "New Movement to Rectify the Army," the "Party Committee System," the "Revolutionary Soldiers' Committee," and the "Work of the Company Party Branches." Devise regulations and charters to be popularized throughout the army

and establish such institutions.

8) Work in land reform in all major liberated areas and party rectification in 1949 must revolve around the production movement. Use the leisure time of the masses, and complete one step at a time the remaining work in redistributing or readjusting land and the work of party rectification. Establish people's conferences in all the major liberated areas and elect committees of the people's government at all levels. Perfect the system of party committees in all major liberated areas; convene party conferences at all levels. Enforce the reduction of rent and interest in the liberated areas of the Central Plains, and mobilize the masses. In the provinces south of the Yangtze River, within the next three to five years, the problem is not that of redistributing land but reducing rent and interest and mobilizing the masses. Redistribution of land can only be dealt with after reducing rent and interest and mobilizing the masses.

9) Plans for educating cadres in 1949, and plans for studying the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and the specific policies of the Chinese revolution in schools for training cadres and among cadres on the job must meet the needs of the current revolutionary situation and satisfy the tasks of the revolution.

10) Education plans for citizens in 1949 (higher education, all kinds of technical education, middle-school education, primary school education, and remedial education for adults) must meet the needs of the current revolutionary situation and satisfy the tasks of the revolution. The work of the news agencies and newspapers is similar. The work in literature and the arts is also similar.

11) In 1949, the work of the labor unions, the youth leagues, and among women should have better results than in 1948. In the first half of 1949, work for the national youth conference and the national women's conference should be completed.

12) In 1949 we must convene the political consultative conference of all democratic parties and private groups which will have no reactionary participants and have as its goal the fulfillment of the Chinese people's revolutionary goals. Declare the founding of the PRC, form the republic's central government, and pass the joint political program.

13) After the campaigns of Beijing-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan, and Datong, the

major field armies must take at least two months of rest and training to finish all the preparations for crossing the river and entering the south. Then, they are to proceed through the south steadily, step by step.

14) The struggle within the leading party and army organs at all levels against the lack of discipline and anarchy that seriously exist must be completed before the end of March 1949, in line with the CC's directive. Resolutions on this matter by party committees above the level of regiment in the army and above the county level in the localities must be delivered to the CC by April. Those who have special reasons to postpone this must finish this in April and deliver the resolutions to the CC in May.

15) We must cautiously develop party organization in all the newly occupied areas. In particular, adopt the policy of strictly examining the applications of high-level intellectuals to join the party. We must pay attention to this especially in big cities. We would rather have fewer than have more less qualified [members].

16) We must step up security in all the liberated areas. Firmly struggle against all the concealed or open counterrevolutionaries.

17) After the liberation of Beijing [Beiping], we must convene the Second Plenum of the Seventh CC. The tasks for this meeting will be to: (a) analyze the current situation and define the party's tasks; (b) pass the draft of the joint political program that is to be handed over to the political consultative conference; (c) pass the draft for forming the major components of the central people's government; (d) pass the military plans; (e) decide on the policies of economic construction; (f) determine foreign policy; and g) other matters.