

Title: Memorandum of Conversation between Liu Shaoqi and Stalin**Author:****Date: 27 July 1949****Source:** Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao (This selection was co-edited by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Document Research Unit and the Central Archives) Vol. 1, (Beijing, 2005), pp. 40-41. Translated from Chinese by David Wolff. Published in Bulletin #16 by CWIHP**Description:** Stalin, Bulganin, and Vyshinsky on one side and Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang discuss the state of the Chinese civil war

We said: During the first cooperation between the GuoMinDang and the Communist Party, after the GuoMinDang betrayed us by doing an about-face, we were not at all prepared, we suffered a terrible defeat and were terribly taken in [shangle hendade dang]. But on account of this our heads were clear during the second cooperation between the GuoMinDang and the Communist Party. Even as the cooperation began, we were preparing to overthrow Jiang Jieshi. At the time of the anti-Japanese war of resistance, we prepared steadily for eight years, since this time Jiang Jieshi was also planning to destroy the Communist Party. So when the anti-Japanese war of resistance ended, Jiang Jieshi turned to face us, but we were ready. Having listened this far, Stalin said: This is what the enemy has taught you. He also said: Have we harassed or done you harm? We said: No. And we continued: Comrade Mao Zedong did not have to go to Chongqing. It would have been enough to send Comrade Zhou Enlai. But Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing with good result. It gave us an immediate initiative on the political side of things. Stalin said: Mao's trip to Chongqing was dangerous. The CC² or other secret services could have hurt him. At that time the Americans asked us: The GuoMinDang wants peace. Why do the communists not want peace? I [Stalin] answered them: We do not interfere [guanbuzhao] in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Stalin also asked us: Did your participation with the Americans in the peace movement cause you losses or harm? We answered: The Chinese Communist Party was quite clearheaded going into the peace movement, but there was another responsible comrade who entertained illusions about peace and experienced a minor loss. But this kind of peace movement is very necessary with the result this time that we isolated the Americans and Jiang. When we overthrow the GuoMinDang later and depose Jiang Jieshi, there will not be a single person to say we have not done right. Comrade Stalin said: The victors are not brought to judgment. Victors are always correct.

Printed from an original revised and approved by Liu Shaoqi.

1. This conversation took place during a banquet at Stalin's dacha.
2. This has a double meaning as the initials of a group within the GuoMinDang devoted to keeping Jiang Jieshi in power through party and strong-arm activities, many of them violently anti-Communist.

On July 26, the CCP Central Secretariat cabled Liu with instructions to make the following requests: (1) to supply the Chinese with one hundred to two hundred Yak fighters and forty to eighty heavy bombers along with Japanese and German bombs; (2) to help the Chinese by training twelve hundred pilots and five hundred mechanics in Soviet aviation schools; and (3) to send three to five high-ranking air force officers to work with China's air force in September.

Should the Soviet leaders agree to the first two requests, the directive continued, Liu Yalou (the future air force commander) would be dispatched to the Soviet Union to negotiate the details. Liu Shaoqi discussed these requests with Stalin and other Soviet leaders the next day, and their response was positive. According to Liu Shaoqi, Stalin felt that the CCP should have asked for Soviet assistance a year earlier. He agreed to provide China with planes, but suggested establishing aviation schools in China rather than training the Chinese at Soviet schools.

Red Wings over the Yalu, 33-34

According to Kovalev, a serious clash occurred during the July 27 session between Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gang in connection with the debate over the planned attack on Taiwan that should be seen in the context of Gao's pro-Soviet leanings. Gao was in all probably aware of Stalin's true intention not to withdraw the Soviet troops from Manchuria immediately through his confidential contacts with Kovalev. In order to support Stalin's position, he went further than Stalin did himself. At the July 27 session, he proposed reinforcing the Soviet troops in Dairen and stationing Soviet naval units in Qingdao to protect Manchuria from American attacks and transform it into an even more dependable base for the advance to the south and the final defeat of the KMT army,^{56*}

In this contest, Gao may have said that the KMT and the United States would not dare to attack Manchuria if it was a Soviet republic. Stalin immediately recognized that Gao had made his statements without authority from Peiping and distanced himself from Gao. Liu was furious at Gao's performance and **accused** him of treason after the session Stalin then sought to mediate between Liu and Gao, and even put in a good word for Gao to Mao Zedong. Mao complied with Liu's suggestion to recall Gao from Moscow early for his treasonous behavior. Gao travelled back to Manchuria on July 30—but not without having previously offered to inform the Soviet side confidentially of the anti-Soviet behavior of certain Chinese Party leaders* which he subsequently also did. *Pg 213 The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance. Dieter Heinzig*

Stalin proposed to turn the matter of aid in liberating Taiwan over to an expanded Politburo meeting, which would bring together senior military leaders and some ministers. On July 27, he invited the Chinese delegation to the Central Committee's headquarters, and Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxiang attended. In addition to all the Soviet Politburo members, Marshals Nikolai Bulganin and Aleksandr Vasilevskii took part, Stalin reiterated the arguments he had advanced earlier and offered the Chinese no opening. On the conclusion of his speech, Liu announced that the request for support was withdrawn and the issue was closed.'