Part 13 Complaints about recruitment


Lee (1991)
Lee Hong Yung (1991). From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. University of California Press Pages 49-50
distinguishes six different groups to ameliorate the cadre shortage. They were (1) existing cadres generally known as "old cadres," (2) young high school or college graduates, (3) activists from mass movements such as land reform (most of them came from the worker and peasant classes), (4) old nonparty intellectuals who were scattered throughout the society, (5) demobilized PLA men, and (6) selected officials from the former Nationalist government.
The CCP also tries to solve the shortage problem of capable officials by starting a training program for students on special training facilities. In the spring and summer of 1949 almost 50.000 students have followed a training to serve as civil officials in south China.
Galula David (1964). Counter insurgency warfare. Theory and practice. New York. Page 65. "In the early 1950s Chinese leaders tried to improve the cultural and technical standards of the existing cadre corps by setting up an "intensive middle-school program specially designed for the workers and peasant cadres" as well as cadre training institutes. China had about 347 cadre training institutes —34 managed by central organs and 313 by provincial and municipal governments" Lee (1991). From Revolutionary Cadres. Page 68
Gao (2004)
Gao James Zheng (2004). The communist takeover of Hangzhou: The transformation of city and cadre, 1949-1954. University of Hawaii Press. Page 102
remarks: "These new cadres had neither received systematic political training nor experienced the cruel revolutionary war. The city leaders hoped that the southbound cadres and these new recruits would make up the majority of all the government institutions, with the retained GMD employees comprising less than 30 percent. Actually, the CCP cadres made up a majority only in the Bureaus of Public Security (80 percent) and finance (60.2 percent), while in the offices of health, education, labor, public projects, industry and commerce, and internal affairs, they were in the minority (19–36 percent)" There is a big difference between the party cadres of north China and South China. Mainly the northern party cadres are illiterate and have a rural background. The cadres of the south namely from Guangdong are from the city and have had an education.
"But as the CCP expanded into Guangdong after 1949, the educational profile of the party in Guangdong was gradually reversed. The lower echelons began to fill up with illiterate activists. At the same time, the indigenous leadership of intellectuals and students who had joined the party during the Japanese occupation was purged in the early 1950s. Many of its leading members were subsequently replaced by northern cadres more loyal to the partycenter."
Peterson Glen D. (1991). The Chinese struggle for literacy: villagers and the state in Guangdong, 1949-1976. PhD., University of British Columbia. Page 60

On local administration level the CCP has big problems to find capable men. An unknown upward mobility is progressing. Labourers and peasants attain economic and or political positions, which they could never had achieved under the GMD regime, let alone during the empire. Most of them are not qualified for their job, their only qualification is their social background. The method to keep non-communist and ex GMD party cadres on their jobs is in the eyes of many CCP members a big mistake and not justified.
"Worried reports from Guangdong in 1951 spoke of illiterate village cadres becoming increasingly resentful of the fact that intellectuals from the old society were rapidly assuming positions of power purely on the basis of their superior educational qualifications. They blamed not necessarily the intellectuals, but the communist party for forsaking its moral obligation and historical debt to peasants.”
Peterson Glen D. (1991). Page 53
There are also problems with recruitment in other areas. For example there is a shortage of performers who are capable of working for propaganda teams. Zhao (2014) notices "Performers were picked up randomly from the streets, … ‘‘They even recruited two teenage girls and an old woman who had juggled plates on the street. ... Another cadre brought in a former singing girl from a brothel […] They all were counted as formal cadres who benefitted from our supply system (in-kind payment system) However, such a propaganda team was too costly and the performance of rural ballads was not welcomed in the ‘‘foreign’’ port city (Qingdao)"
Zhao Mi (2014). From singing girl to revolutionary artist: female entertainers remembering China’s socialist past (1949–the present) Twentieth-Century China, 39, 2, Page 169
Mao Zedong has to explain this tactics to his old party members. "... Don't think you deserve preferential treatment because of your achievements in war. You must know that one democratic personage is possibly worth an army. By winning one Li Jishen over to our side, we probably saved the lives of twenty or thirty thousand comrades and won the military victory one or two years ahead of time .... Now we will simply do it this way; this is also the only way we can do it, whether you approve of it or not. ”
Kau Michael Y. M., Leung John K. (1986). The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976. New York. Page 53
Document: Winter 1949: Mao Zedong Comment on Democratic Personages
Li Jishen, Fu Zuoyi, Chen Mingren, Wei Lihuang,
Cheng Qian
Cheng Qian (1882-1968) Former GMD General. Chairman of the Government of Hunan Province 1952-1955
, Tang Shengzhi were some of the former GMD generals who got high positions in the new regime.
There are complaints about “…ex-Kuomintang officials, who were trying to be more Communist than the Communist, were very much worse than any of the regular Communist.”
Lindsay Michael (1950) China: Report of a visit. International Affairs, 26, (1). Page 29
Not all GMD cadres are lucky. Many of them are imprisoned and sent to Fushun re-education camp in Liaoning or executed in 1950 or 1951. List of fate of GMD generals
For example the generals
Gan QWingchi
Gan Qingchi (1900-1951) arrested in March, executed in December
,
Gong Xianxiang
Gong Xianxiang (1900-1951) arrersted in March and executed as Counter Revolutionary in 1951
and
Gan Fang
Gan Fang (1895-1951) arrested in March, executed as Counter Revolutionary in December1951
. Others are put under house arrest and several of them committed suicide for example
Chen Guang
Chen Guang (1905-1954) house arrest 150-1954
.
Middle to low ranking GMD officers, special agents and foot soldiers were the one suffered the most. CCP considered them untrustworthy. Most of them were executed in the "Zhen Fan" period from 1950 - 1951. In the period of 1950-1954 about 400 GMD generals decease, several of them a natural way, some of them during battle and a couple of them as communist spy. The rest of them dies in the hands of the PLA. See table below which gives an indication of death rate GMD generals during the period of 1950-1954.


See also List
List of fate of GMD generals

Privileges of CCP members....

Chen Yun writes in a letter to his nephew that "You must remember that communists have only the same rights as common people do under the laws of the state, and, moreover, they should be exemplary in observing these laws the activities of members of a revolutionary party should have the sole purpose of serving the people: there must be no thoughts of reward."
Document: 19-06-1949 Chen Yun Under no circumstances should children of cadres take on affectation as children of revolutionary heroes
On November 8, 1949 Chen Yun talks to party cadres on the subject of contradictions between the old and the new cadres "The crux of the matter is the relations between veteran and new cadres. The "new" cadres are afraid the “old" cadres don’t trust them, and the "old" cadres, for their part, are afraid the newcomers may not be very reliable.” Further on he tells them "Veteran comrades should not judge east China by the standards of northeast China of a few years back, and comrades from east China should not cling to old attitudes about the Northeast.”
Document: 08-11-1949 Chen Yun Veteran and new cadres should unite

Social background cadres...

The social background of a party member in acquiring a job is the most important factor. The urban members are preferred over those with only rural experiences
"The largest pool for political cadres was that of worker and peasant activists. They were politically reliable because they were recruited from the poorest sector, which had benefited most from the Communist revolution. But their lack of education was a drawback. Nonetheless, the regime justified their promotion to cadre positions for the reason that "once on the job, their rich practical experience and firm class standpoint enable them to learn administrative practice quickly.This group filled vacancies at the lower levels, usually serving in their native locality. Their career pattern leading to the cadre position was first as an activist in the mass movement, then joining the party, and finally occupying a leadership position in a new party-state institute.”
Lee Hong Yung (1991). From revolutionary cadres to party technocrats in socialist China. Berkeley University of California Press.Page 53
In 1949 13% of the administrators is member of the CCP.
Lee Hong Yung (1991). Page 59

The decisions made during the CCP March Plenum in which the emphasis of the revolution has shifted from the rural areas to the city causes many problems. “Far from embracing its rural revolutionary past, in 1949 the party criticized rural characteristics and work methods and preferred people with urban expertise over what it called “purely village-born cadres.” Throughout the 1950s party doctrine still mandated that cities would lead villages.”
Brown Jeremy (2012). City versus countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the divide. Cambridge University Press. Page 17
In Tianjin problems arise between cadres from different backgrounds. “Officials from villages who had served the revolution in the countryside clashed with young urban cadres and other underground party members from Tianjin.”
Brown Jeremy (2012). Page 17
This shift results in a gradually change of CCP’s focus on the working class and less on the peasantry. The CCP considers itself as the political party of the Chinese working class; the advanced and organized force of the working class. But even in 1951 the majority of the party members exists of peasants. North China,which has served as a major communist base during the civil war and where the party therefore has long been entrenched in the countryside, about 1,500,000 of its 1,800,000 members in that region (as of mid-1951) are of peasant origin. Peng Zhen states in 1951 "a political party of the working class may overlook the social composition of its membership; that it may neglect to fully utilize all possible conditions to improve its social composition, that is, to increase the proportion of workers among its membership."
Cited in Thomas S.B. (1953). Government and Administration in China today. Institute of Pacific relations. Page 72
and Thomas concludes “It is clear that party leaders will continue to be uncomfortable as long asthis disparity between theory end reality continues.”

Conflicts...

On Hainan conflicts arise between communist guerrilla leaders and the newly arrived communist cadres. "By 1951, a flood of “southbound cadres” arrived on Hainan to replace local cadres, whose local connections allegedly made them too soft on the island’s landlords and big capitalists. Mutual resentment grew between the old revolutionaries of the Hainan Column and the newly arrived southbound cadres. Many of the new cadres were young urban intellectuals or even students, sent into towns and villages to overturn the local order."
Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Culturing revolution: The local communists of China’s Hainan island. PhD., University of California. b7183687. Page 5
These conflicts in Hainan had a historical background as Murray
Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Page 4
explains: "The Hainan Communists were dedicated to the national revolution, and through their struggle, they had also sunk roots deep into the island’s soil. The mainland Communists had been able to supply little or no support through much of that struggle, and the Hainan Column had turned to the island’s indigenous Li population in an alliance that allowed them to survive in Hainan’s mountainous southern interior. When the mainland Communist leadership had ordered the Hainan Column to abandon the island in 1946, and withdraw their forces north to Shandong, or southeast to Vietnam, the Hainan command responded that this was impossible, and that they respectfully refused to obey the orders."
The distribution of the goods seized, houses, cars, etc. also brings a lot of uneasiness
"...the distribution was not egalitarian. City leaders moved to villas at the lakeshore; district leaders got big houses downtown; and cars, special meals, servants, and other privileges were exclusively available to the top leaders. But the living conditions of most southbound cadres were worse than those of the old employees who had been retained. In addition, many formal occasions required that superiors and subordinates keep a polite distance. Despite the liberation, the old urban elite continued their normal lives, which were unjustfiably luxurious in the eyes of the peasant cadres."
Gao James Zheng (2004). Page 103-104
The cadres staying behind in the rural regions “…felt neglected and undervalued, resulting in a morale crisis of considerable proportions and accentuating tendencies towards passivity and withdrawal.”
Bernstein Thomas P. (1968). Problems of village leadership after land reform. The China Quarterly, 36. Page 8
Some cadres are accused of making “independent kingdoms”. They refuse to accept the supervision and control of the party center. “The belief that one was entitled to special privileges because of past contributions extended well beyond Huang (Yifeng)’s exaggerated view of himself. The lenient handling of the case in its earlier stages was apparently due to the misplaced trust of higher authorities in a cadre with a long record of revolutionary service. Moreover, the tenacity of these attitudes was reflected in the sympathy some cadres had for Huang (Yifeng)even after he had been subjected to extensive criticism. The appearance of sentiments such as “it is going too far that an important cadre is purged as a result of a student’s criticism .. indicate how deeply ingrained notions of status and special privilege were.40 The tendency of veteran revolutionaries in particular to believe such status and privilege were theirs as a matter of right was a major cause of tensions among different segments of the elite in the early post-liberation period.”
Teiwes Frederick C. (1993). Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms. M.E. Sharpe. Page 98. See also for the The Huang Yifeng Affair (from Beijing Daily, 21 August, 2006) cited http://www.danwei.org/newspapers/when_corruption_investigations_1.php
In his "On inner party struggle" Liu Shaoqi gives several examples of so called "unprincipled struggle within the party" and he gives 5 reasons why they exist. "First,the theoretical level of our comrades within the Party is in general very low and their experiences in many respects are not yet sufficient...." "Second, there are many petty-bourgeois elements in the Party..." "Third, the democratic life within the Party is abnormal. The style of discussing questions mutually and objectively among the comrades has not yet been established... " "Fourth, opportunists have smuggled themselves into the Party and certain opportunistic psychology exists in the minds of part of our comrades. To show how well they have been "bolshevized," they often try deliberately to be "Left," thinking that "Left" is better than Right. Or they attack others so as to raise their own prestige." and "Fifth, Trotskyite traitors and counter-revolutionary elements have smuggled themselves into the Party, and they seek to undermine the Party by taking advantage of inner-Party struggle."
Liu Shaoqi(1952). On inner party struggle. Page 29-38. Although this is a lecture delivered on July 2, 1941 at the party school for Central China, it still is of importance after 1949 since it is published in 1950.

There is yet another reason for miscontent with the ‘genuine’ cadres
"…;activists and lower-level cadres in the CCP had spent 1949-1950 in a state of confusion and dismay about what the revolutionary regime had failed to do. In relaxing its emphasis on transformation and class struggle in favor of orderly takeover and economic stabilization, the new government had deliberately included sorts (including Nationalist government bureaucrats, capitalists, and intellectuals) who were, if not actively counterrevolutionary, then at least by their lights "backward in political consciousness" and patently undeserving of status and reward in the new order. The rank and file of lower- level "regular cadres” (yiban ganbu) passed over for promotion resented having to work in such close quarters with, and sometimes take orders from, holdover officials they considered to be counterrevolutionary.16 The putative mass sentiments that the movement revived and amplified bolstered the morale of activists and frustrated lower-level cadres. Popular enthusiasm for the punishment of counterrevolutionaries, and mass relief that hated local bullies had finally gotten their just desserts resonated with activists and rank and file old cadres, now impressed to “stir up the masses” and raise mass consciousness for the campaign.17 The Party’s message to this constituency was: we are going after enemies after all and we rely on you to help us carry out this important new policy."
Strauss Julia C.(2002). Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950-1953. Comparative Studies in Society and History,. 44, ( 1). Page 85

In order to minimize these conflicts the CCP uses the possibilities of some articles from the Common Program. Particularly Article 7: the suppression of all counter-revolutionary activities and Article 18 which gives options to punish corruption, forbid extravagance and oppose the bureaucratic working-style which alienates the masses of the people.


Literature Notes Documents...

1.Lee Hong Yung (1991). From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. University of California Press Pages 49-50 Back
2. Galula David (1964). Counter insurgency warfare. Theory and practice. New York. Page 65. "In the early 1950s Chinese leaders tried to improve the cultural and technical standards of the existing cadre corps by setting up an "intensive middle-school program specially designed for the workers and peasant cadres" as well as cadre training institutes. China had about 347 cadre training institutes —34 managed by central organs and 313 by provincial and municipal governments" Lee (1991). From Revolutionary Cadres. Page 68 Back
3. Gao James Zheng (2004). The communist takeover of Hangzhou: The transformation of city and cadre, 1949-1954. University of Hawaii Press. Page 102 Back
4. Peterson Glen D. (1991). The Chinese struggle for literacy: villagers and the state in Guangdong, 1949-1976. PhD., University of British Columbia. Page 60 Back
5. Peterson Glen D. (1991). Page 53 Back
6. Zhao Mi (2014). From singing girl to revolutionary artist: female entertainers remembering China’s socialist past (1949–the present) Twentieth-Century China, 39, 2, Page 169 Back
7. Kau Michael Y. M., Leung John K. (1986). The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976. New York. Page 53 Back
9. Lindsay Michael (1950) China: Report of a visit. International Affairs, 26, (1). Page 29 Back
13. Lee Hong Yung (1991). From revolutionary cadres to party technocrats in socialist China. Berkeley University of California Press.Page 53 Back
14. Lee Hong Yung (1991). Page 59 Back
15. Brown Jeremy (2012). City versus countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the divide. Cambridge University Press. Page 17 Back
16. Brown Jeremy (2012). Page 17 Back
17. Cited in Thomas S.B. (1953). Government and Administration in China today. Institute of Pacific relations. Page 72 Back
18. Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Culturing revolution: The local communists of China’s Hainan island. PhD., University of California. b7183687. Page 5 Back
19. Murray Jeremy Andrew (2011). Page 4 Back
20. Gao James Zheng (2004). Page 103-104 Back
21. Bernstein Thomas P. (1968). Problems of village leadership after land reform. The China Quarterly, 36. Page 8 Back
22. Teiwes Frederick C. (1993). Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms. M.E. Sharpe. Page 98. See also for the The Huang Yifeng Affair (from Beijing Daily, 21 August, 2006) cited http://www.danwei.org/newspapers/when_corruption_investigations_1.php Back
23. Liu Shaoqi(1952). On inner party struggle. Page 29-38. Although this is a lecture delivered on July 2, 1941 at the party school for Central China, it still is of importance after 1949 since it is published in 1950. Back
24. Strauss Julia C.(2002). Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950-1953. Comparative Studies in Society and History,. 44, ( 1). Page 85 Back
Next Chapter 1 of the Common Program. Preamble